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Desire for social status affects marital and reproductive attitudes

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Modern low fertility is an unresolved paradox. With reference to life history theory and an evolutionary mismatch perspective, Amy Lim suggest that desire for social status (which is increasingly experienced by individuals in industrialized, modern societies) is a key factor affecting critical reproductive preferences.

Research was funded by Academic Research Fund Tier 1 grant from Singapore’s Ministry of Education and led by Professor of Psychology Dr Norman Li.

Image courtesy of interviewee. April 4, 2024

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The research presented examines the paradox of declining birth rates in affluent countries, where economic resources should theoretically enable higher fertility rates. Despite cultural explanations for low fertility—like the association of higher status with smaller families and economic reasons for having fewer children—the authors argue that these do not adequately explain the significant drop in birth rates below replacement levels.

The study proposes using "life history mismatch theory," which is rooted in evolutionary biology, to analyze how individuals allocate resources between reproductive effort (having children) and investing in the future (e.g., education, career). The theory suggests that individuals adopting a slow life history strategy prioritize future investments over having children, influenced by perceived social status and competition within modern environments laden with cues underscoring insufficient status.

The researchers conducted two similar experimental studies where participants were exposed to passages emphasizing social achievement and its challenges. Results indicated that participants primed to consider social status showed a preference for delaying marriage and childbearing, revealing the impact of perceived social standing on reproductive timing.

In addressing low fertility issues, the authors suggest that while financial incentives can assist, a broader approach considering psychological factors and contemporary societal perceptions may be vital for effectively increasing birth rates in modern contexts. This video video holistic understanding of human psychology and its influence on reproductive choices could lead to more effective interventions for low fertility rates currently observed in various wealthy nations.

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X-TIMESTAMP-MAP:LOCAL=00:00:00.000,MPEGTS=900000

00:00.145 --> 00:03.245
The context of our research really stems from the fact

00:03.245 --> 00:07.085
that we are noticing a really, paradoxical trend in

00:07.085 --> 00:10.045
that, well, both rates are steadily dropping,

00:10.145 --> 00:11.525
but they're not just daily dropping.

00:11.525 --> 00:13.885
They're steadily dropping in countries which

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who are extremely affluent, right?

00:16.385 --> 00:19.645
So there they, in lies the paradox, because these countries,

00:19.645 --> 00:22.965
because of their affluence, their economic affluence,

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they should be able to, you know, have the resources

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to raise offsprings and children.

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Um, however, that's not the case.

00:30.585 --> 00:31.765
In fact, these are the countries

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with the lowest birth rates.

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So the con, so that sets the stage for, our research.

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We wanted to kind of look at this paradox,

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like if there's an abundance of resources

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that can be spent on raising offsprings,

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why are fertility rates in these modern resource reach,

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societies, why are they stately?

00:51.285 --> 00:53.885
Dropping the existing explanations to low fertility

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involves, cultural explanations, right?

00:57.545 --> 01:00.725
To say that at scrap status, they're now more associated

01:00.755 --> 01:01.885
with smaller families,

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or that there's just more economic savings,

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to having less children in the modern world, right?

01:09.425 --> 01:13.325
So while these are, what do you call,

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very valid reasons for why there is low fertility,

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it doesn't really necessarily explain,

01:20.625 --> 01:24.565
why fertility rates has dropped so much, you know,

01:24.695 --> 01:26.205
below replacement levels such

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that it is almost mild adaptive to some extent.

01:29.065 --> 01:31.365
Um, now this is where I also highlight

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that it is not low fertility per se, that's an issue,

01:35.145 --> 01:37.765
but it's low fertility below replacement levels.

01:38.315 --> 01:40.245
That is concerning, right?

01:40.385 --> 01:44.125
So, our research seeks to add in and,

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and complimentary explanation to these existing explanations

01:47.765 --> 01:50.805
because the current explanations as to why, people are

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reproducing less, they don't necessarily explain why

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that stems a shift.

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Sure, we recognize that there's a shift towards having the

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preference for, fewer children,

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but in so far there has been no explanation as

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to why there is such a trend.

02:06.985 --> 02:11.445
So we aim to kind of feel that gap, using this,

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life history mismatch theory.

02:13.545 --> 02:16.625
So in this theory of life history mismatch,

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life history theory essentially is about,

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is based in evolutionary biology, which looks at

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how organisms, phase trade offs in energy allocation.

02:27.925 --> 02:30.105
So, the long story short is

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that we have very limited resources.

02:32.445 --> 02:34.905
We need to be able to know where we can

02:35.205 --> 02:36.945
and should allocate these resources.

02:37.285 --> 02:39.625
So broadly speaking, we can allocate it to

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what we call a reproductive effort.

02:41.885 --> 02:44.585
So, which means, you know, engaging in efforts such as,

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mating and having children

02:46.685 --> 02:50.225
or, efforts in investing for the future.

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Um, things like investing in knowledge,

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accumulating some of, some form of social capital.

02:57.085 --> 02:58.865
So that is the

02:58.865 --> 03:01.045
Life history, theory, right?

03:01.145 --> 03:03.325
So a faster life history theory.

03:03.505 --> 03:05.605
So people who will choose to have

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or choose to adopt a fast life history strategy,

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they are characterized by people who prefer,

03:12.305 --> 03:14.325
having children now,

03:14.325 --> 03:18.325
over investing in the future versus, low people

03:18.345 --> 03:20.205
who adopt this slower life history strategy.

03:20.825 --> 03:25.365
Um, where they, where it's characterized by,

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having fewer children,

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but also the preference prior, the preference

03:30.445 --> 03:31.845
for investing in the future.

03:32.385 --> 03:37.245
Now, life history strategy is, very sensitive

03:37.265 --> 03:38.885
to the ecology, right?

03:40.045 --> 03:43.185
In a, in a optimal,

03:43.405 --> 03:45.305
environment.

03:45.885 --> 03:50.545
Um, these life history theory, would be able

03:50.545 --> 03:55.325
to adjust people's, reproductive decisions

03:55.425 --> 03:57.085
to an optimal level, right?

03:57.185 --> 03:59.085
So, which means that if, if, if,

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if the conditions are right, people have childrens,

04:02.085 --> 04:05.205
but if the condition is not so ideal, they would have,

04:05.355 --> 04:08.125
they would probably prefer to invest for the future.

04:08.705 --> 04:13.365
Now, inherent in that equation is people are,

04:13.585 --> 04:17.365
are people's, what do you call that, evaluation

04:17.365 --> 04:19.925
of the amount of status they have, right?

04:19.985 --> 04:22.765
So status have been, usually tied

04:22.875 --> 04:24.965
with the resources that one can have.

04:25.825 --> 04:29.095
So, sufficient status would mean

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that if one has sufficient status,

04:30.955 --> 04:32.255
one would have sufficient resources,

04:32.255 --> 04:34.295
and hence they would prefer to go

04:34.355 --> 04:35.775
to invest into mating effort.

04:35.965 --> 04:37.975
Whereas if they're insufficient,

04:37.975 --> 04:39.895
then it would only make sense for one,

04:39.895 --> 04:42.175
to actually gain more status, gain more resources

04:42.395 --> 04:43.695
by investing in themselves

04:44.195 --> 04:47.655
before they are deemed capable to, you know, start a family.

04:48.435 --> 04:49.935
Now, the problem is this

04:50.515 --> 04:53.775
problematically in modern environments, so this is

04:53.775 --> 04:57.135
where the mismatch is in modern environments, we have,

04:57.635 --> 05:01.935
we are bombarded with several cues that leads us to believe

05:01.935 --> 05:04.615
that we have insufficient status to pursue meeting

05:04.715 --> 05:06.375
and to start a family, right?

05:06.375 --> 05:08.935
So think about the large population density

05:08.965 --> 05:11.295
that we live in densely populated areas.

05:11.915 --> 05:14.735
We are exposed to technological advancements such

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as social media and media, which portrays a lot

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of successful individuals that are way

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beyond our reach, right?

05:22.475 --> 05:25.175
So all these, these accumulated cue signal

05:25.275 --> 05:29.695
to our evolved psychological mechanisms that, you know, we

05:30.215 --> 05:32.415
probably don't have enough status,

05:32.435 --> 05:36.895
to actually pursue mating and a, a range, right?

05:37.175 --> 05:41.975
A a a entire field of, behavioral economics do show

05:41.975 --> 05:45.535
that we evaluate sufficiency in terms of relative sense,

05:45.535 --> 05:46.855
then absolute sense.

05:47.235 --> 05:49.895
So all of that kind of combines

05:49.895 --> 05:53.055
and accumulates together to well push our,

05:53.485 --> 05:56.455
what we call life history strategy to prefer slow one,

05:56.725 --> 05:59.965
Such that we will prioritize investing for the future

06:01.115 --> 06:03.445
over having children to test.

06:03.705 --> 06:05.085
Um, our hypothesis.

06:05.105 --> 06:07.885
We actually have two experimental studies, so both

06:07.885 --> 06:09.805
of them are extremely similar, right?

06:09.825 --> 06:12.685
So for the first study, we had two groups participants

06:13.085 --> 06:16.365
randomly assigned to the, what we call the experiment group,

06:16.665 --> 06:17.845
and the other half is

06:18.405 --> 06:19.805
randomly assigned to the control group.

06:20.225 --> 06:23.085
Now, the only difference between these two groups,

06:23.225 --> 06:24.725
is the passage that they read.

06:25.225 --> 06:28.205
So in the experimental group, in the passage,

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participants read about, you know,

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reaching high ranking position

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and achieving success is important for oneself

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and everyone in the network.

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And how these successes,

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results in really good outcomes,

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like a good life respect from others,

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invaluable social rewards.

06:43.905 --> 06:47.845
Um, this passage then ends with, you know, emphasizing

06:47.845 --> 06:49.085
that achieving high social standing is

06:49.085 --> 06:50.325
difficult and uncertain.

06:50.625 --> 06:54.245
So it basically to some extent reflect the mental state

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that people would have, in modern societies

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as they know go about pursuing, their careers.

07:01.065 --> 07:03.325
Um, of course, the one in the control group

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read about finding keys.

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So that's totally relevant to, social status.

07:08.505 --> 07:11.005
So once participants are done reading the passage,

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they then fill up questionnaires assessing, their prior,

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their life history strategy.

07:17.105 --> 07:19.965
So whether they would prefer having fewer children

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or more children, and if they prefer investing into their

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future right now or getting a job, right now.

07:26.345 --> 07:31.045
Um, they also completed, questions that asked,

07:31.505 --> 07:33.845
at what age they would like to get married, at

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what age they would like to have children.

07:36.715 --> 07:40.535
So essentially in these two experiments, that,

07:40.675 --> 07:42.295
that's our basic methodology.

07:42.435 --> 07:45.015
So in experimental tool, experimental two, sorry,

07:45.555 --> 07:47.175
it is the same, sorry.

07:47.175 --> 07:49.095
It's very similar to experiment one, in

07:49.095 --> 07:50.815
that we actually included a third condition

07:50.815 --> 07:53.535
where participants do not read any passage at all.

07:54.035 --> 07:55.735
Um, this is only to prevent,

07:55.995 --> 07:57.975
or rather just rule out the fact that, you know,

07:58.075 --> 08:01.015
the differences that we see is not due to some form of,

08:01.315 --> 08:04.015
you know, artifact based on reading a passage.

08:05.105 --> 08:06.485
So that's the, that's the,

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that's the main methodology in the study.

08:08.515 --> 08:10.925
This is where it is, it gets interesting.

08:11.025 --> 08:15.645
So, across both studies, those were prime the desire

08:15.665 --> 08:18.205
for status, those who were, who read the passage about

08:18.225 --> 08:21.205
how important it is to achieve high social standing,

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how good it is to have achieve high social standing.

08:23.855 --> 08:27.325
Those participants, indicated a preference

08:27.385 --> 08:29.165
for a slower life history strategy.

08:29.315 --> 08:31.325
Meaning to say that they actually indicated

08:31.355 --> 08:34.405
that they preferred paradise future investments,

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into themselves over having children.

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These individuals also indicated a later timing,

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a later preferred timing

08:41.865 --> 08:43.565
of getting married in getting married

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and actually having children.

08:45.985 --> 08:47.325
So, this is,

08:47.325 --> 08:50.645
this was evident in actually both studies our underlying

08:50.645 --> 08:51.685
mechanism in this study.

08:52.105 --> 08:54.805
For now, we have looked at how people allocate the

08:54.805 --> 08:56.685
Shift, allocate their resources,

08:56.685 --> 08:58.845
because at the end of the day, that's what we are trying

08:58.845 --> 09:00.005
to argue, right?

09:00.005 --> 09:01.085
That our mechanism

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or rather our decisions to have children is regulated

09:04.385 --> 09:07.205
by our life history strategy, AKA,

09:07.385 --> 09:10.405
or rather also known as, how we allocate the resources.

09:10.865 --> 09:13.895
And because how we allocate the resources, we prefer

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to allocate it to ourselves, we put off having children,

09:16.635 --> 09:21.095
and that's evident in the outcome, of, of, of, well,

09:21.275 --> 09:22.615
of getting married

09:22.715 --> 09:25.895
and actually starting a family now,

09:26.155 --> 09:29.015
we are also currently looking at, other forms of,

09:29.465 --> 09:32.455
underlying, mechanisms that may be at play

09:32.455 --> 09:33.895
because this is just allocation.

09:34.355 --> 09:37.895
Um, we are apparently running studies to see that, you know,

09:38.035 --> 09:40.935
if that perception of competition also plays a part.

09:41.085 --> 09:44.775
Because if you think about it, if we are always exposed to

09:44.875 --> 09:47.175
so many people out there in the world, we are exposed to

09:47.175 --> 09:50.175
so many people out there on social media, that sense

09:50.175 --> 09:52.335
of competition may actually contribute

09:52.715 --> 09:56.575
and may worsen that, that scale in terms of

09:56.575 --> 09:57.815
that life history strategy.

09:58.155 --> 10:00.935
So we are, we are actually looking further into it,

10:00.955 --> 10:04.055
but for now, the underlying mechanism is the way we

10:04.375 --> 10:06.135
allocate, our resources.

10:06.315 --> 10:11.135
So I guess, the main takeaway for this, research

10:11.135 --> 10:14.055
that we have, or at least for this paper that we have, is

10:14.055 --> 10:17.455
that, we are seeing, that a heightened desire

10:17.475 --> 10:19.895
for social status actually affects our preferences

10:20.275 --> 10:22.855
for marital and reproductive timing, right?

10:22.995 --> 10:27.495
So in that sense, when it comes to low fertility,

10:27.555 --> 10:30.775
the problem of low fertility, perhaps we must,

10:31.175 --> 10:32.495
consider a more passon

10:32.675 --> 10:36.815
or a more comprehensive approach, in, in, in trying

10:36.835 --> 10:38.575
to manage, low fertility.

10:38.755 --> 10:41.895
So a lot of countries, right now who we,

10:41.915 --> 10:45.015
who are facing the low fertility rates problem,

10:45.245 --> 10:48.055
they do introduce a lot of financial incentives

10:48.115 --> 10:49.935
to help boost fertility rates.

10:50.675 --> 10:52.695
So while that is helpful, I'm not saying that

10:52.695 --> 10:54.535
that's not helpful, that is definitely helpful

10:54.715 --> 10:58.935
for the rising costs that we observe in, in society,

10:59.435 --> 11:01.575
but perhaps a more targeted,

11:01.755 --> 11:04.735
or rather a more comprehensive measure must be taken into

11:04.735 --> 11:07.735
account when we take into account people's psychology

11:08.115 --> 11:10.455
and the perceptions they have about the modern world.

11:11.945 --> 11:16.525
Um, now we, we, in, in, in this sense, we are,

11:16.745 --> 11:17.925
we do say that there's,

11:17.925 --> 11:19.765
there are relevant ecological conditions

11:19.765 --> 11:22.485
that are likely going to influence people's psychology

11:23.145 --> 11:27.125
in these ways, which intense manifest in greater investments

11:27.125 --> 11:28.685
and decrease like reproduction.

11:29.105 --> 11:33.365
So if further, considerations are given to

11:33.505 --> 11:38.085
how our psychology works, that might actually,

11:38.195 --> 11:41.485
more effectively, help boost the low fertility rates

11:41.485 --> 11:44.325
that we see in modern societies nowadays.

00:00 - The context of our research really stems from the fact that we are noticing a really, paradoxical trend in that, well, both rates are steadily dropping, but they're not just daily dropping. They're steadily dropping in countries which who are extremely affluent, right?

00:16 - So there they, in lies the paradox, because these countries, because of their affluence, their economic affluence, they should be able to, you know, have the resources to raise offsprings and children. however, that's not the case. In fact, these are the countries with the lowest birth rates. So the con, so that sets the stage for, our research. We wanted to kind of look at this paradox, like if there's an abundance of resources

00:42 - that can be spent on raising offsprings, why are fertility rates in these modern resource reach, societies, why are they stately? Dropping the existing explanations to low fertility involves, cultural explanations, right? To say that at scrap status, they're now more associated with smaller families, or that there's just more economic savings, to having less children in the modern world, right? So while these are, what do you call,

01:13 - very valid reasons for why there is low fertility, it doesn't really necessarily explain, why fertility rates has dropped so much, you know, below replacement levels such that it is almost mild adaptive to some extent. now this is where I also highlight that it is not low fertility per se, that's an issue, but it's low fertility below replacement levels. That is concerning, right? So, our research seeks to add in and,

01:44 - and complimentary explanation to these existing explanations because the current explanations as to why, people are reproducing less, they don't necessarily explain why that stems a shift. Sure, we recognize that there's a shift towards having the preference for, fewer children, but in so far there has been no explanation as to why there is such a trend. So we aim to kind of feel that gap, using this, life history mismatch theory.

02:13 - So in this theory of life history mismatch, life history theory essentially is about, is based in evolutionary biology, which looks at how organisms, phase trade offs in energy allocation. So, the long story short is that we have very limited resources. We need to be able to know where we can and should allocate these resources. So broadly speaking, we can allocate it to what we call a reproductive effort.

02:41 - So, which means, you know, engaging in efforts such as, mating and having children or, efforts in investing for the future. things like investing in knowledge, accumulating some of, some form of social capital. So that is the Life history, theory, right? So a faster life history theory. So people who will choose to have or choose to adopt a fast life history strategy,

03:08 - they are characterized by people who prefer, having children now, over investing in the future versus, low people who adopt this slower life history strategy. where they, where it's characterized by, having fewer children, but also the preference prior, the preference for investing in the future. Now, life history strategy is, very sensitive to the ecology, right?

03:40 - In a, in a optimal, environment. these life history theory, would be able to adjust people's, reproductive decisions to an optimal level, right? So, which means that if, if, if, if the conditions are right, people have childrens, but if the condition is not so ideal, they would have, they would probably prefer to invest for the future. Now, inherent in that equation is people are,

04:13 - are people's, what do you call that, evaluation of the amount of status they have, right? So status have been, usually tied with the resources that one can have. So, sufficient status would mean that if one has sufficient status, one would have sufficient resources, and hence they would prefer to go to invest into mating effort. Whereas if they're insufficient,

04:37 - then it would only make sense for one, to actually gain more status, gain more resources by investing in themselves before they are deemed capable to, you know, start a family. Now, the problem is this problematically in modern environments, so this is where the mismatch is in modern environments, we have, we are bombarded with several cues that leads us to believe that we have insufficient status to pursue meeting and to start a family, right?

05:06 - So think about the large population density that we live in densely populated areas. We are exposed to technological advancements such as social media and media, which portrays a lot of successful individuals that are way beyond our reach, right? So all these, these accumulated cue signal to our evolved psychological mechanisms that, you know, we probably don't have enough status, to actually pursue mating and a, a range, right?

05:37 - A a a entire field of, behavioral economics do show that we evaluate sufficiency in terms of relative sense, then absolute sense. So all of that kind of combines and accumulates together to well push our, what we call life history strategy to prefer slow one, Such that we will prioritize investing for the future over having children to test. our hypothesis. We actually have two experimental studies, so both

06:07 - of them are extremely similar, right? So for the first study, we had two groups participants randomly assigned to the, what we call the experiment group, and the other half is randomly assigned to the control group. Now, the only difference between these two groups, is the passage that they read. So in the experimental group, in the passage, participants read about, you know, reaching high ranking position

06:31 - and achieving success is important for oneself and everyone in the network. And how these successes, results in really good outcomes, like a good life respect from others, invaluable social rewards. this passage then ends with, you know, emphasizing that achieving high social standing is difficult and uncertain. So it basically to some extent reflect the mental state

06:54 - that people would have, in modern societies as they know go about pursuing, their careers. of course, the one in the control group read about finding keys. So that's totally relevant to, social status. So once participants are done reading the passage, they then fill up questionnaires assessing, their prior, their life history strategy. So whether they would prefer having fewer children or more children, and if they prefer investing into their

07:23 - future right now or getting a job, right now. they also completed, questions that asked, at what age they would like to get married, at what age they would like to have children. So essentially in these two experiments, that, that's our basic methodology. So in experimental tool, experimental two, sorry, it is the same, sorry. It's very similar to experiment one, in that we actually included a third condition

07:50 - where participants do not read any passage at all. this is only to prevent, or rather just rule out the fact that, you know, the differences that we see is not due to some form of, you know, artifact based on reading a passage. So that's the, that's the, that's the main methodology in the study. This is where it is, it gets interesting. So, across both studies, those were prime the desire for status, those who were, who read the passage about

08:18 - how important it is to achieve high social standing, how good it is to have achieve high social standing. Those participants, indicated a preference for a slower life history strategy. Meaning to say that they actually indicated that they preferred paradise future investments, into themselves over having children. These individuals also indicated a later timing, a later preferred timing of getting married in getting married

08:43 - and actually having children. So, this is, this was evident in actually both studies our underlying mechanism in this study. For now, we have looked at how people allocate the Shift, allocate their resources, because at the end of the day, that's what we are trying to argue, right? That our mechanism or rather our decisions to have children is regulated

09:04 - by our life history strategy, AKA, or rather also known as, how we allocate the resources. And because how we allocate the resources, we prefer to allocate it to ourselves, we put off having children, and that's evident in the outcome, of, of, of, well, of getting married and actually starting a family now, we are also currently looking at, other forms of, underlying, mechanisms that may be at play because this is just allocation.

09:34 - we are apparently running studies to see that, you know, if that perception of competition also plays a part. Because if you think about it, if we are always exposed to so many people out there in the world, we are exposed to so many people out there on social media, that sense of competition may actually contribute and may worsen that, that scale in terms of that life history strategy. So we are, we are actually looking further into it, but for now, the underlying mechanism is the way we

10:04 - allocate, our resources. So I guess, the main takeaway for this, research that we have, or at least for this paper that we have, is that, we are seeing, that a heightened desire for social status actually affects our preferences for marital and reproductive timing, right? So in that sense, when it comes to low fertility, the problem of low fertility, perhaps we must, consider a more passon or a more comprehensive approach, in, in, in trying

10:36 - to manage, low fertility. So a lot of countries, right now who we, who are facing the low fertility rates problem, they do introduce a lot of financial incentives to help boost fertility rates. So while that is helpful, I'm not saying that that's not helpful, that is definitely helpful for the rising costs that we observe in, in society, but perhaps a more targeted, or rather a more comprehensive measure must be taken into

11:04 - account when we take into account people's psychology and the perceptions they have about the modern world. now we, we, in, in, in this sense, we are, we do say that there's, there are relevant ecological conditions that are likely going to influence people's psychology in these ways, which intense manifest in greater investments and decrease like reproduction. So if further, considerations are given to how our psychology works, that might actually,

11:38 - more effectively, help boost the low fertility rates that we see in modern societies nowadays.

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