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Diplomacy, the Media, and a Search for Legitimacy: Reassessing Gerald Ford’s Pacific Tours

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In 1974-75, President Gerald Ford’s Asian travels stressed US alliances and strengthened relations with China. Thomas Tunstall Allcock examines Ford’s diplomacy’s effects on American interests and domestic-foreign relations.

Image courtesy of interviewee. December 14, 2023

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This video video discusses a research project focused on presidential diplomacy, particularly on hosting and travel, with an emphasis on understanding the U.S. president's diplomatic function beyond traditional foreign policy. The author aims to explore the significance of presidential diplomatic interactions, especially during the Cold War era when U.S. presidents hosted numerous visits, many of which remain under-explored.

The article emphasizes the diplomatic efforts of President Gerald Ford during a tumultuous period following Watergate and the Vietnam War. Ford's presidency began without having been elected, putting pressure on him to establish a positive image through effective foreign policy. His travels to Asia in 1974 and 1975 aimed to assure U.S. allies, improve relations with China, and create a favorable public perception domestically, but did not achieve significant domestic political gains.

Despite being the first U.S. president to visit Japan, Ford faced skepticism from the media, which affected his reputation. His diplomatic engagements often resulted in intangible improvements in international relations but lacked substantial achievements that could enhance his domestic standing. This video video further discusses the influence of media coverage, noting that both U.S. and foreign media portrayals of Ford's trips varied significantly, with U.S. coverage being more critical.

Ultimately, the piece highlights the intricate relationship between domestic and foreign policy, underscoring how Ford's diplomatic measures were largely driven by his desire for domestic political success. This video video research contributes to a broader understanding of the role and impact of presidential diplomacy in shaping international relations.

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This article emerged from a broader research project,

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which I'm currently working on,

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which looks at presidential diplomacy

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and particularly look at hosting,

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but also a little bit at at presidential travel as well.

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And really what I'm trying to get at in this broader project

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in which we can see in, in this piece is that traditionally,

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diplomacy

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and foreign policy have been kind of used interchangeably.

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And what I'm really interested in is getting at,

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the president's diplomatic function.

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So when they operate as a diplomat through travel, through,

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meeting with foreign leaders,

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through their kinda individual diplomatic function.

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And because I think in some ways that's not

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that well understood beyond the most famous examples.

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So something like Nixon

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and China, obviously is very well covered.

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Uh, but actually to say that, during the Cold War,

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which is the period of which I'm looking at,

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US presidents hosted more than a thousand

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visits, to the United States.

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Most of those are relatively, unknown,

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not covered in any great amount detail.

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So one aspect of the project is, I wanna know more about

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that, about the president's diplomatic role.

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And I'm also interested as well at looking at slightly more

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cultural elements of presidential diplomacy.

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So, food, clothing, entertainment,

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thinking really about how diplomacy functions

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and how presidents interact with their guests

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or when they're guests elsewhere,

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the thinking about significance

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and impact that that has on diplomacy.

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So for this article in particular, came about

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after I was, at the Ford Library doing some research,

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for this book project.

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And I was particularly looking at material on hosting,

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but really kept coming across as great material on travel,

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and particularly what the administration wanted to achieve

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through, Fords foreign travel.

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And I wanted to write something,

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that really explored some

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of those elements that really stood out.

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The thing that really jumped out was Ford's travel to,

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to Asia in this period in 1974.

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Uh, he travels to Japan

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and Korea, while also trying to toland his well stop

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to meet with the Soviet Union.

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Um, and then the following year, 1975, he goes

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to the People's Republic of China,

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also stopping in Indonesia in the Philippines.

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And for a pretty short presidency,

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this is a substantial amount of,

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of foreign travel to this part of the world.

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So the basis of the article is really trying

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to dig into why he conducts these trips,

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and there are impacting significance.

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To give a bit of context to Ford's presidency, he,

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he entered his office with a really difficult

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job on his hands.

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Uh, in a lot of ways, his predecessor Richard Nixon,

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has resigned in disgrace following Watergate, elevates fall

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to the presidency, but he himself was never actually elected

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even as vice president

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because of another scandal,

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which had meant Nixon's previous vice

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president and had to resign.

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So Ford is in this position of now being the president

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of the United States,

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having never won a presidential election in, in any form.

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We're also here in the post, you know,

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almost post-Vietnam, period.

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The US is in the process of extricating itself from Vietnam

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on this long draining, damaging conflict.

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And of course, we're dealing with the fallout of Watergate.

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Still these investigations into presidential wrongdoing at

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this point at which the trust in politicians is that are

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Really low among the American public relations

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with the press, have been very damaged.

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And there's not much more kinda skeptical attitude

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among the press and relations

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with Congress are also far tense,

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and they have been for a long time.

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You have a Congress really trying to kind

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of take back some control of,

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the legislative process in the United States.

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So this is, again, a context in which Ford is, is trying

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to establish himself as president.

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He, he's initially somewhat welcomed as this kind of,

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clean slate figure,

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but he slightly shoots himself in the foot by,

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first pardoning Richard Nixon of any and all crimes.

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Uh, and then also offering amnesty

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to draft refusers who'd refused,

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draft in the Vietnam War.

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So he manages to annoy people across the political spectrum,

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left and right, congress, public media, so kind

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of already on the back foot pretty early on,

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but of course he wants to do an election in 1976.

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He needs to build some kind of record,

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and he starts to look for ways

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to think about of how he can do that.

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How can he gain a reputation with the public?

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And normally that would be a domestic group, what are kind

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of domestic initiatives we can launch?

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But so he doesn't have a mandate, he's not been elected,

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and Congress is unlikely to allow him

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to pass anything particularly substantial.

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That becomes particularly the case

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after disastrous midterm elections,

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which see his party Republicans lose even more seats.

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So essentially the route open to Ford is foreign policy,

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and that's his foreign policy is an arena in which

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Congress has less control.

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The president has a lot more leeway to do what he wants,

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and foreign policy becomes this route by which Ford

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and his advisors envision in establishing himself,

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as a president with a reputation

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and his predecessor, Richard Nixon seemed to kind

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of set a blueprint for this through his travels to China

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and, meetings with the Soviet Union,

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these kinda dramatic openings, these diplomatic meetings

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with these, global rivals and Ford's.

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Advisors believe that his trips,

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his travel could have a similar impact on the American

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public's perception of him as a leader, kind

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of create this new, image of him.

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Now, why the focus becomes on on Asia,

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is for a couple of reasons.

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Um, and in particular it's

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because of the impact of, again,

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Richard Nixon though shadows a lot of this Nixon's policies.

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So by opening relations with China, by beginning the process

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of normalizing relations with China,

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by visiting there in 1972,

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Nixon had really changed the

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dynamic of relations with China.

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But he'd also done a lot to damage relations

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with other countries in the region because

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after World War II relations with Asia

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and in the Pacific had essentially been built on the idea

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of anti-communism in which the US had built alliances

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with Japan, with South Korea, with other countries in,

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in the region, had been a kinda security guarantor,

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and they'd all been allied in opposing Chinese

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and communist expansionism.

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So with that kind of damage board, see needs to, to reassure

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allies,

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and an opportunity to address some

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of the other problems which Nixon had had caused, such

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as economic issues through Nixon's new economic policy had

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Also impacted Japanese exports.

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There's kind of all these sort of shocks

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as they were termed, have impacted relations in the Pacific.

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So Ford kind of is trying

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to really do quite a lot here in quite a short period.

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What he sees the opportunity to do

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through travel throughout the Pacific is to,

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on the one hand, impress domestic audiences

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and boost his electoral chances by appearing presidential

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and significant also

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to reassure the traditional allies in the region

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that the US remains committed to the Pacific

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and to their security, hence visits to Japan, visits to,

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to South Korea, visits to the Philippines.

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But at the same time,

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while reassuring those traditional allies, he also wants

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to at least maintain

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and possibly improve, relations with China

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that Nixon had been begun.

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So there's quite a lot that we're trying to do there.

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And ultimately then of course, the question,

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so pre question is, is how successful right?

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The, those aspects were?

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And we kinda have to take them to, I think,

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I think one at a time to some degree,

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because domestically, I think what becomes clear,

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for reasons we might get into a little more depth in in a

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moment, it's quite clear

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that this is not a success in terms of domestic politics.

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This does not result in any great boost to,

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to false reputation.

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And if anything, that the kind of skeptical nature of a lot

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of the media coverage is quite damaging

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to his electoral chances.

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And, and in some ways it appears like the idea that,

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you could simply kind of mimic Richard Nixon's success in,

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in projecting this image of a great diplomat,

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always really something of an illusion.

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Um, and that this fails to really have much

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of an impact of the domestic audience.

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And of course, Ford does not win.

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Um, reelection 1976, he loses to Jimmy Carter policy-wise is

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where I think there's a bit more, bit more to talk about.

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Um, he does become the first US president to visit Japan.

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And crucially,

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and it's crucially, symbolically very important,

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certainly very important to the Japanese government

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and the Japanese people, it results in a return visit from

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the emperor the following year to the United States.

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Um, and you know, and it might seem quite, quite distant,

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but for these men, you know,

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this World War II is living history at this point

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board had served in World War ii.

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There is huge symbolic power in this visit to Japan.

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And it's kind of a cultural

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and a symbolic, endorsement of the change in relations

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that's come about since World War ii, the kind of the ties

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between these two countries.

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Um, and it does actually go quite a long way to repair a lot

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of the damage I think that Nixon's policies have made.

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And we'll see Japanese relations broadly

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improve over the next several years.

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In terms of China, Ford doesn't make any huge gains

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there, there's no great kind of policy developments,

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but in part that that's slightly deliberate.

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He doesn't really want anything

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that could be particularly controversial.

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Um, but he does wanna make sure that you're gonna maintains,

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a little bit of momentum

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and maintains positive relations.

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And, and that does happen. His trip's gonna broadly

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successful,

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and, does to go a long way

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to laying some of the foundations

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For future, developments

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finally on his final stop on the way home from his last trip

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when he stopped suffer in Hawaii.

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Um, Ford tries to bring all

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of these elements together when he announces

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what he calls a Pacific doctrine,

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which restates us commitment to the region, in an effort

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to really reassure allies

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that the US is not retreating in the wake of Vietnam,

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not abandoning allies in favor of, of China,

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and tries to kind of balance those two elements while also

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trying to be this kind of big speech for domestic audiences.

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Again, fully has a little bit more impact in terms

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of speaking to the, to his allies than it's us

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to a domestic audience.

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And of course, without winning election, he never has time

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to really see how this would play out.

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But again, I think quite significant in terms of,

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really restating that commitment to the region

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and the aftermath of Vietnam in which there would've been

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quite a strong impetus simply withdraw from the region.

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In terms of Ford, I think his pacific diplomacy speaks

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to kinda wider assessments of his presidential diplomacy.

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Um, 'cause often what's looked at

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with Ford is things like the 1975 Helsinki Accords,

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which were heavily criticized at the time,

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really didn't do much for his reputation domestically,

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and was seen as, a kind of tacit endorsement of,

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Soviet gains at the end of World War ii.

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But subsequent assessments have starting

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to be more generous and giving a bit more respect.

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And ion we can see a kind of a real diplomatic benefit here,

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but it doesn't translate to domestic gains at the time

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because it's complex.

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It doesn't get the kind of media coverage that you want,

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it doesn't really play that well at home.

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And that's the kind of similar pattern I think we see with,

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with the Pacific diplomacy here, that actually some

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of the things he is doing are quite important in some ways,

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quite subtle, but that doesn't necessarily play

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well at home.

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Um, seems to suggest that in order for,

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diplomatic achievements to really have a substantial impact,

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they have to, on the one hand be belly major, they have

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to kind of cut through all the, a lot of,

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particularly in the United States,

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the real focus on domestic issues at expense of, of foreign.

10:56.495 --> 10:59.515
So Nixon's trip to China almost kind

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of set this false precedent where this idea

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that it would be this huge event the world would be

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watching, and you would see that this image of this kind

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of global statesman, changing the world

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through one handshake that's incredibly rare

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and incredibly difficult to achieve.

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And I think Ford finds that out fairly quickly.

11:18.145 --> 11:20.205
And it's a lesson which we can apply, I think subsequently

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to that, you know, this kind of diplomatic initiatives

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are difficult to really gain, leverage out domestically

11:27.705 --> 11:29.285
in terms of the, what they can achieve.

11:29.345 --> 11:31.365
And in terms of what presidential diplomacy can achieve,

11:32.345 --> 11:33.985
I think we do see the importance here

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of presidential personal diplomacy that is a president kind

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of conducting diplomacy themselves rather than

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through ambassadors or envoys is through travel or hosting.

11:43.165 --> 11:44.985
And you see here that actually Fords kind

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of genuinely personable and, and likable, reputation

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and, you know, you know, plays out well

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and goes a long way in personal diplomacy, particularly

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When, when we contrast it to someone like his predecessor

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who is nowhere near as personable or friendly as a a sport.

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You know, he, he is very well received in Japan,

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you know, on a personal level.

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He, he gets on well with people.

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They, the kind of trips to sporting demonstrations,

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the dinners, the banquets that are all part of diplomacy

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actually play a really major role in shaping

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how successful a lot of these trips are,

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particularly when we're not looking at major achievements,

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you know, major treaty signed often all you get out

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of these trips is this almost kind

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of intangible improvement in relations,

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but which can lay the groundwork for future achievements,

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such as trade negotiations and things.

12:32.745 --> 12:35.965
But in terms of relations with China, you know, it does

12:36.885 --> 12:38.685
continue the process, which is going to lead

12:38.685 --> 12:41.685
to normalization of relations under Ford's success.

12:42.835 --> 12:46.155
I think the other really important aspect here that this,

12:46.155 --> 12:48.275
this, that these trips flag up more broadly about

12:48.275 --> 12:50.795
presidential diplomacy is the role of the US media

12:51.135 --> 12:54.235
and the role of media coverage more generally in, in, in

12:54.335 --> 12:55.915
how successful or certainly

12:55.915 --> 12:57.595
and how successful they're,

12:58.115 --> 12:59.675
domestically and electorally.

13:00.345 --> 13:03.455
So the point at which board is, is conducting these trips

13:04.405 --> 13:06.745
is the point which the us television media is,

13:06.765 --> 13:09.385
is well established and influential US News media.

13:10.285 --> 13:13.625
And Nixon had very deliberately turned presidential travel

13:13.655 --> 13:15.905
into, into televisual media events.

13:16.485 --> 13:19.425
He had prioritized bringing television crews

13:19.425 --> 13:20.905
and television reporters with him

13:20.905 --> 13:22.865
to China over other forms of coverage.

13:23.405 --> 13:26.625
Um, so there was then this really close scrutiny

13:26.765 --> 13:27.945
of every element of these,

13:27.945 --> 13:30.105
of these trips could be broadcast to an audience.

13:30.945 --> 13:32.805
Now, this is kind of a double-edged sword that

13:33.345 --> 13:35.365
if you achieve a lot, that's fantastic,

13:35.435 --> 13:36.485
it's broadcast at home.

13:36.945 --> 13:39.325
But if it's a trip like Ford in which there's, there's not

13:39.325 --> 13:41.765
that many concrete achievements, you get a lot of coverage

13:41.985 --> 13:44.165
and there's a lot of scope for press criticism

13:44.185 --> 13:46.805
and kind of close analysis of every element of these trips,

13:46.805 --> 13:48.405
which is something which he gets,

13:48.405 --> 13:49.925
there is analysis of his clothing.

13:49.985 --> 13:52.085
If it's not quite right, there's analysis

13:52.085 --> 13:54.365
of him not standing in quite the right position.

13:54.475 --> 13:58.525
It's a welcoming ceremonies and, and, and degree of mocking

13:58.525 --> 14:00.565
and also a degree of kind

14:00.565 --> 14:01.445
of questioning whether this is

14:01.765 --> 14:03.085
slightly damaging to relations.

14:03.385 --> 14:07.325
So that kind of intense media coverage,

14:07.815 --> 14:09.965
gives the scope for these trips to be impactful,

14:10.065 --> 14:12.805
but also for them to be potentially damaging too.

14:13.715 --> 14:16.245
It's also taking place at a point which we're seeing the

14:16.245 --> 14:18.725
emergence of an explicitly, partisan

14:18.945 --> 14:22.005
and conservative media become increasingly influential.

14:22.145 --> 14:24.525
So publications at this time, like National Review

14:25.025 --> 14:26.605
and Human Events,

14:26.605 --> 14:29.525
are these explicitly right wing conservative publications.

14:30.075 --> 14:31.885
Kind of think of 'em as a kind of precursors

14:31.885 --> 14:33.165
to something like Fox News

14:33.505 --> 14:35.165
and something which speaks explicitly

14:35.165 --> 14:36.645
to a right wing conservative base.

14:37.345 --> 14:39.405
And they essentially want Ronald Reagan to run

14:39.405 --> 14:40.565
for president, not Gerald Ford.

14:40.875 --> 14:42.365
They're very critical of Ford.

14:42.365 --> 14:45.005
They're very critical of, Nixon's policy of

14:45.805 --> 14:46.885
sing relations with China

14:46.905 --> 14:51.250
and the union of

14:51.915 --> 14:54.295
an increasingly influential television media

14:55.155 --> 14:57.415
and an increasingly influential conservative media,

14:57.465 --> 14:59.535
which is not a fan of his either.

15:00.555 --> 15:02.895
And I think what's interesting about the, the diplomacy,

15:02.955 --> 15:05.895
the kinda analysis of the diplomacy conducted within false

15:05.895 --> 15:09.135
administration afterwards is that within the administration,

15:09.135 --> 15:10.895
they're quite surprised,

15:10.895 --> 15:13.295
that his trips haven't done more to boost his reputation.

15:13.525 --> 15:14.895
They're kind of looking at his trips

15:14.915 --> 15:16.695
and they're looking at things like Gallup polls

15:16.695 --> 15:18.655
and saying, well, it seems like

15:19.205 --> 15:21.935
diplomacy doesn't really have any great impact domestically.

15:22.935 --> 15:24.755
And I think that's probably a, a, a fairly

15:25.435 --> 15:28.795
straightforward lesson to take from it that, it has

15:28.915 --> 15:30.395
to be very substantial to cut through,

15:30.735 --> 15:32.435
but I don't think they give quite enough weight

15:32.435 --> 15:34.075
to the degree which media coverage is

15:34.155 --> 15:35.195
starting to shape these things too.

15:35.215 --> 15:38.595
The fact that both trips are kind of slightly,

15:38.975 --> 15:40.115
not quite mocked,

15:40.115 --> 15:42.235
but certainly talked about as being, you know,

15:42.455 --> 15:45.835
fairly insubstantial, nothing compared to Nixon's trips,

15:46.095 --> 15:47.915
you know, that they don't do a lot for him.

15:48.015 --> 15:50.835
Reputationally, and thinking about this longer term,

15:50.955 --> 15:54.235
I think you see this lesson be taken on board, maybe more so

15:54.295 --> 15:58.415
by subsequent presidents who tend to do these kind of trips

15:58.415 --> 16:00.055
and this kind of travel more near the end

16:00.055 --> 16:02.135
of their presidency when they're not seeking reelection.

16:02.765 --> 16:05.415
They tend to use them more for legacy building purposes,

16:05.915 --> 16:07.455
for ways of establishing that kind

16:07.455 --> 16:11.975
of more global reputation, taking on peace initiatives,

16:12.275 --> 16:14.295
but not using them as, as a way

16:14.475 --> 16:16.935
of kinda ensuring electoral success.

16:17.275 --> 16:18.615
Uh, because as Ford manager, just

16:18.615 --> 16:20.375
to demonstrate quite clearly here,

16:20.375 --> 16:22.215
it's extremely difficult to do that.

16:23.205 --> 16:25.695
This piece speaks to some of the broader concerns

16:25.695 --> 16:27.775
of my research in thinking about the significance

16:27.835 --> 16:30.175
and the importance of presidential diplomacy,

16:30.195 --> 16:31.575
in a couple of different contexts.

16:32.615 --> 16:36.295
I think this is just one example of where we can see,

16:36.295 --> 16:39.415
presidential travel and, and Fords initiative by going

16:39.435 --> 16:42.015
and visiting different countries, interacting,

16:42.015 --> 16:44.495
with publics there, interacting with, with foreign leaders

16:45.395 --> 16:47.495
of having a substantial impact on

16:47.495 --> 16:48.855
relations between those countries.

16:49.635 --> 16:52.765
This is just one example, of a fairly short period

16:52.765 --> 16:56.605
of time, and I do think there are extensive examples from

16:56.605 --> 16:59.565
essentially every president since World War II of trips.

16:59.565 --> 17:02.165
They have taken on certainly of, of Foreignly

17:02.165 --> 17:03.565
as they have posted,

17:03.615 --> 17:05.125
which have not been covered well enough.

17:05.125 --> 17:07.565
And there are so many stories to tell about how

17:07.565 --> 17:10.805
that individual diplomacy has played a role in shaping

17:10.805 --> 17:13.925
relations between countries, with broader impacts,

17:14.605 --> 17:17.445
economically, politically, diplomatically in a whole range

17:17.445 --> 17:18.645
of different contexts.

17:19.835 --> 17:22.955
I think as well, we see here the importance

17:22.955 --> 17:25.435
of the media in shaping some of those narratives.

17:25.435 --> 17:26.995
In terms of presidential achievement,

17:27.795 --> 17:30.035
I think presidents have got increasingly better at managing,

17:30.615 --> 17:32.475
that, that media coverage

17:32.475 --> 17:34.635
and I think is interesting to see this period is almost a

17:34.875 --> 17:37.955
snapshot where the, the extent of the coverage

17:37.955 --> 17:40.595
that falls strict to receive has outstripped,

17:40.795 --> 17:42.835
I think the administration's skill in managing it,

17:43.015 --> 17:45.915
and they're not able to really harness it to bring it

17:45.915 --> 17:46.915
to bear for their benefit.

17:47.415 --> 17:48.795
Um, and it does a fair

17:48.795 --> 17:50.645
Amount of damage to his reputation.

17:51.945 --> 17:53.645
It also, I think, speaks to the benefits

17:53.645 --> 17:56.045
of also though looking beyond simply the press coverage in

17:56.045 --> 17:58.805
one nation, because it's interesting if you look at the

17:59.045 --> 18:01.085
coverage, say in Japan, a false trip,

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you get a very different sense of how successful

18:03.205 --> 18:04.485
that trip is than if you look at the

18:04.485 --> 18:05.805
press coverage in the United States.

18:05.945 --> 18:09.205
And it also speaks to thinking a little bit more widely

18:09.205 --> 18:10.565
about the impact of diplomacy

18:10.565 --> 18:14.205
beyond just simply from the perspective of, the US press

18:14.225 --> 18:15.405
and the US audience,

18:15.585 --> 18:17.405
but also thinking about the kind of impact that

18:17.405 --> 18:19.965
that personal diplomacy can really have in boosting a

18:19.965 --> 18:21.325
reputation abroad.

18:22.145 --> 18:24.805
And finally, also speaks to,

18:24.925 --> 18:26.365
a broader consideration in my work,

18:26.375 --> 18:27.925
which is thinking about those connections

18:27.925 --> 18:30.045
between domestic and foreign policy.

18:31.285 --> 18:34.785
Yes, Ford wants to do, things in the Pacific region.

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He does think it's important to reassure allies.

18:37.805 --> 18:40.865
He does think it's important to, maintain the relations

18:40.865 --> 18:42.705
with China, but ultimately he's not doing that

18:42.885 --> 18:45.345
unless he thinks it will give him a boost domestically.

18:45.645 --> 18:48.425
And ultimately, his decision making about his foreign policy

18:48.425 --> 18:51.545
management is being driven by domestic political concerns.

18:51.545 --> 18:55.465
And traditionally, there has sometimes been, too much

18:55.465 --> 18:57.585
of a degree of separating out domestic

18:57.585 --> 19:00.025
and foreign policy simply looking at, at foreign policy,

19:00.045 --> 19:03.025
almost in abstract from domestic political considerations.

19:03.885 --> 19:05.785
That's changing o over recent years.

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And I think this, by looking at this kind

19:07.505 --> 19:09.985
of individual personal diplomacy, it's a really good way

19:09.985 --> 19:12.465
as well of really seeing quite starkly

19:12.605 --> 19:15.665
how tightly connected domestic political concerns are

19:15.695 --> 19:18.345
with these kind of foreign policy initiatives.

00:00 - This article emerged from a broader research project, which I'm currently working on, which looks at presidential diplomacy and particularly look at hosting, but also a little bit at at presidential travel as well. And really what I'm trying to get at in this broader project

00:14 - in which we can see in, in this piece is that traditionally, diplomacy and foreign policy have been kind of used interchangeably. And what I'm really interested in is getting at, the president's diplomatic function. So when they operate as a diplomat through travel, through, meeting with foreign leaders, through their kinda individual diplomatic function. And because I think in some ways that's not that well understood beyond the most famous examples.

00:39 - So something like Nixon and China, obviously is very well covered. but actually to say that, during the Cold War, which is the period of which I'm looking at, US presidents hosted more than a thousand visits, to the United States. Most of those are relatively, unknown, not covered in any great amount detail. So one aspect of the project is, I wanna know more about that, about the president's diplomatic role.

01:02 - And I'm also interested as well at looking at slightly more cultural elements of presidential diplomacy. So, food, clothing, entertainment, thinking really about how diplomacy functions and how presidents interact with their guests or when they're guests elsewhere, the thinking about significance and impact that that has on diplomacy. So for this article in particular, came about after I was, at the Ford Library doing some research,

01:27 - for this book project. And I was particularly looking at material on hosting, but really kept coming across as great material on travel, and particularly what the administration wanted to achieve through, Fords foreign travel. And I wanted to write something, that really explored some of those elements that really stood out. The thing that really jumped out was Ford's travel to, to Asia in this period in 1974.

01:48 - he travels to Japan and Korea, while also trying to toland his well stop to meet with the Soviet Union. and then the following year, 1975, he goes to the People's Republic of China, also stopping in Indonesia in the Philippines. And for a pretty short presidency, this is a substantial amount of, of foreign travel to this part of the world. So the basis of the article is really trying

02:08 - to dig into why he conducts these trips, and there are impacting significance. To give a bit of context to Ford's presidency, he, he entered his office with a really difficult job on his hands. in a lot of ways, his predecessor Richard Nixon, has resigned in disgrace following Watergate, elevates fall to the presidency, but he himself was never actually elected even as vice president because of another scandal,

02:30 - which had meant Nixon's previous vice president and had to resign. So Ford is in this position of now being the president of the United States, having never won a presidential election in, in any form. We're also here in the post, you know, almost post-Vietnam, period. The US is in the process of extricating itself from Vietnam on this long draining, damaging conflict. And of course, we're dealing with the fallout of Watergate.

02:52 - Still these investigations into presidential wrongdoing at this point at which the trust in politicians is that are Really low among the American public relations with the press, have been very damaged. And there's not much more kinda skeptical attitude among the press and relations with Congress are also far tense, and they have been for a long time. You have a Congress really trying to kind of take back some control of,

03:15 - the legislative process in the United States. So this is, again, a context in which Ford is, is trying to establish himself as president. He, he's initially somewhat welcomed as this kind of, clean slate figure, but he slightly shoots himself in the foot by, first pardoning Richard Nixon of any and all crimes. and then also offering amnesty to draft refusers who'd refused, draft in the Vietnam War.

03:39 - So he manages to annoy people across the political spectrum, left and right, congress, public media, so kind of already on the back foot pretty early on, but of course he wants to do an election in 1976. He needs to build some kind of record, and he starts to look for ways to think about of how he can do that. How can he gain a reputation with the public? And normally that would be a domestic group, what are kind of domestic initiatives we can launch?

04:02 - But so he doesn't have a mandate, he's not been elected, and Congress is unlikely to allow him to pass anything particularly substantial. That becomes particularly the case after disastrous midterm elections, which see his party Republicans lose even more seats. So essentially the route open to Ford is foreign policy, and that's his foreign policy is an arena in which Congress has less control. The president has a lot more leeway to do what he wants,

04:25 - and foreign policy becomes this route by which Ford and his advisors envision in establishing himself, as a president with a reputation and his predecessor, Richard Nixon seemed to kind of set a blueprint for this through his travels to China and, meetings with the Soviet Union, these kinda dramatic openings, these diplomatic meetings with these, global rivals and Ford's. Advisors believe that his trips, his travel could have a similar impact on the American

04:52 - public's perception of him as a leader, kind of create this new, image of him. Now, why the focus becomes on on Asia, is for a couple of reasons. and in particular it's because of the impact of, again, Richard Nixon though shadows a lot of this Nixon's policies. So by opening relations with China, by beginning the process of normalizing relations with China, by visiting there in 1972,

05:16 - Nixon had really changed the dynamic of relations with China. But he'd also done a lot to damage relations with other countries in the region because after World War II relations with Asia and in the Pacific had essentially been built on the idea of anti-communism in which the US had built alliances with Japan, with South Korea, with other countries in, in the region, had been a kinda security guarantor, and they'd all been allied in opposing Chinese

05:41 - and communist expansionism. So with that kind of damage board, see needs to, to reassure allies, and an opportunity to address some of the other problems which Nixon had had caused, such as economic issues through Nixon's new economic policy had Also impacted Japanese exports. There's kind of all these sort of shocks as they were termed, have impacted relations in the Pacific. So Ford kind of is trying

06:05 - to really do quite a lot here in quite a short period. What he sees the opportunity to do through travel throughout the Pacific is to, on the one hand, impress domestic audiences and boost his electoral chances by appearing presidential and significant also to reassure the traditional allies in the region that the US remains committed to the Pacific and to their security, hence visits to Japan, visits to, to South Korea, visits to the Philippines.

06:31 - But at the same time, while reassuring those traditional allies, he also wants to at least maintain and possibly improve, relations with China that Nixon had been begun. So there's quite a lot that we're trying to do there. And ultimately then of course, the question, so pre question is, is how successful right? The, those aspects were? And we kinda have to take them to, I think,

06:54 - I think one at a time to some degree, because domestically, I think what becomes clear, for reasons we might get into a little more depth in in a moment, it's quite clear that this is not a success in terms of domestic politics. This does not result in any great boost to, to false reputation. And if anything, that the kind of skeptical nature of a lot of the media coverage is quite damaging to his electoral chances.

07:15 - And, and in some ways it appears like the idea that, you could simply kind of mimic Richard Nixon's success in, in projecting this image of a great diplomat, always really something of an illusion. and that this fails to really have much of an impact of the domestic audience. And of course, Ford does not win. reelection 1976, he loses to Jimmy Carter policy-wise is where I think there's a bit more, bit more to talk about. he does become the first US president to visit Japan.

07:45 - And crucially, and it's crucially, symbolically very important, certainly very important to the Japanese government and the Japanese people, it results in a return visit from the emperor the following year to the United States. and you know, and it might seem quite, quite distant, but for these men, you know, this World War II is living history at this point board had served in World War ii. There is huge symbolic power in this visit to Japan.

08:08 - And it's kind of a cultural and a symbolic, endorsement of the change in relations that's come about since World War ii, the kind of the ties between these two countries. and it does actually go quite a long way to repair a lot of the damage I think that Nixon's policies have made. And we'll see Japanese relations broadly improve over the next several years. In terms of China, Ford doesn't make any huge gains there, there's no great kind of policy developments,

08:36 - but in part that that's slightly deliberate. He doesn't really want anything that could be particularly controversial. but he does wanna make sure that you're gonna maintains, a little bit of momentum and maintains positive relations. And, and that does happen. His trip's gonna broadly successful, and, does to go a long way to laying some of the foundations

08:55 - For future, developments finally on his final stop on the way home from his last trip when he stopped suffer in Hawaii. Ford tries to bring all of these elements together when he announces what he calls a Pacific doctrine, which restates us commitment to the region, in an effort to really reassure allies that the US is not retreating in the wake of Vietnam, not abandoning allies in favor of, of China,

09:18 - and tries to kind of balance those two elements while also trying to be this kind of big speech for domestic audiences. Again, fully has a little bit more impact in terms of speaking to the, to his allies than it's us to a domestic audience. And of course, without winning election, he never has time to really see how this would play out. But again, I think quite significant in terms of, really restating that commitment to the region and the aftermath of Vietnam in which there would've been

09:42 - quite a strong impetus simply withdraw from the region. In terms of Ford, I think his pacific diplomacy speaks to kinda wider assessments of his presidential diplomacy. 'cause often what's looked at with Ford is things like the 1975 Helsinki Accords, which were heavily criticized at the time, really didn't do much for his reputation domestically, and was seen as, a kind of tacit endorsement of, Soviet gains at the end of World War ii. But subsequent assessments have starting

10:12 - to be more generous and giving a bit more respect. And ion we can see a kind of a real diplomatic benefit here, but it doesn't translate to domestic gains at the time because it's complex. It doesn't get the kind of media coverage that you want, it doesn't really play that well at home. And that's the kind of similar pattern I think we see with, with the Pacific diplomacy here, that actually some of the things he is doing are quite important in some ways, quite subtle, but that doesn't necessarily play

10:36 - well at home. seems to suggest that in order for, diplomatic achievements to really have a substantial impact, they have to, on the one hand be belly major, they have to kind of cut through all the, a lot of, particularly in the United States, the real focus on domestic issues at expense of, of foreign. So Nixon's trip to China almost kind of set this false precedent where this idea that it would be this huge event the world would be

11:04 - watching, and you would see that this image of this kind of global statesman, changing the world through one handshake that's incredibly rare and incredibly difficult to achieve. And I think Ford finds that out fairly quickly. And it's a lesson which we can apply, I think subsequently to that, you know, this kind of diplomatic initiatives are difficult to really gain, leverage out domestically in terms of the, what they can achieve. And in terms of what presidential diplomacy can achieve,

11:32 - I think we do see the importance here of presidential personal diplomacy that is a president kind of conducting diplomacy themselves rather than through ambassadors or envoys is through travel or hosting. And you see here that actually Fords kind of genuinely personable and, and likable, reputation and, you know, you know, plays out well and goes a long way in personal diplomacy, particularly When, when we contrast it to someone like his predecessor who is nowhere near as personable or friendly as a a sport.

11:58 - You know, he, he is very well received in Japan, you know, on a personal level. He, he gets on well with people. They, the kind of trips to sporting demonstrations, the dinners, the banquets that are all part of diplomacy actually play a really major role in shaping how successful a lot of these trips are, particularly when we're not looking at major achievements, you know, major treaty signed often all you get out of these trips is this almost kind

12:24 - of intangible improvement in relations, but which can lay the groundwork for future achievements, such as trade negotiations and things. But in terms of relations with China, you know, it does continue the process, which is going to lead to normalization of relations under Ford's success. I think the other really important aspect here that this, this, that these trips flag up more broadly about presidential diplomacy is the role of the US media and the role of media coverage more generally in, in, in

12:54 - how successful or certainly and how successful they're, domestically and electorally. So the point at which board is, is conducting these trips is the point which the us television media is, is well established and influential US News media. And Nixon had very deliberately turned presidential travel into, into televisual media events. He had prioritized bringing television crews and television reporters with him

13:20 - to China over other forms of coverage. so there was then this really close scrutiny of every element of these, of these trips could be broadcast to an audience. Now, this is kind of a double-edged sword that if you achieve a lot, that's fantastic, it's broadcast at home. But if it's a trip like Ford in which there's, there's not that many concrete achievements, you get a lot of coverage and there's a lot of scope for press criticism

13:44 - and kind of close analysis of every element of these trips, which is something which he gets, there is analysis of his clothing. If it's not quite right, there's analysis of him not standing in quite the right position. It's a welcoming ceremonies and, and, and degree of mocking and also a degree of kind of questioning whether this is slightly damaging to relations. So that kind of intense media coverage,

14:07 - gives the scope for these trips to be impactful, but also for them to be potentially damaging too. It's also taking place at a point which we're seeing the emergence of an explicitly, partisan and conservative media become increasingly influential. So publications at this time, like National Review and Human Events, are these explicitly right wing conservative publications. Kind of think of 'em as a kind of precursors to something like Fox News

14:33 - and something which speaks explicitly to a right wing conservative base. And they essentially want Ronald Reagan to run for president, not Gerald Ford. They're very critical of Ford. They're very critical of, Nixon's policy of sing relations with China and the union of an increasingly influential television media and an increasingly influential conservative media,

14:57 - which is not a fan of his either. And I think what's interesting about the, the diplomacy, the kinda analysis of the diplomacy conducted within false administration afterwards is that within the administration, they're quite surprised, that his trips haven't done more to boost his reputation. They're kind of looking at his trips and they're looking at things like Gallup polls and saying, well, it seems like diplomacy doesn't really have any great impact domestically.

15:22 - And I think that's probably a, a, a fairly straightforward lesson to take from it that, it has to be very substantial to cut through, but I don't think they give quite enough weight to the degree which media coverage is starting to shape these things too. The fact that both trips are kind of slightly, not quite mocked, but certainly talked about as being, you know, fairly insubstantial, nothing compared to Nixon's trips,

15:46 - you know, that they don't do a lot for him. Reputationally, and thinking about this longer term, I think you see this lesson be taken on board, maybe more so by subsequent presidents who tend to do these kind of trips and this kind of travel more near the end of their presidency when they're not seeking reelection. They tend to use them more for legacy building purposes, for ways of establishing that kind of more global reputation, taking on peace initiatives, but not using them as, as a way

16:14 - of kinda ensuring electoral success. because as Ford manager, just to demonstrate quite clearly here, it's extremely difficult to do that. This piece speaks to some of the broader concerns of my research in thinking about the significance and the importance of presidential diplomacy, in a couple of different contexts. I think this is just one example of where we can see, presidential travel and, and Fords initiative by going

16:39 - and visiting different countries, interacting, with publics there, interacting with, with foreign leaders of having a substantial impact on relations between those countries. This is just one example, of a fairly short period of time, and I do think there are extensive examples from essentially every president since World War II of trips. They have taken on certainly of, of Foreignly as they have posted, which have not been covered well enough.

17:05 - And there are so many stories to tell about how that individual diplomacy has played a role in shaping relations between countries, with broader impacts, economically, politically, diplomatically in a whole range of different contexts. I think as well, we see here the importance of the media in shaping some of those narratives. In terms of presidential achievement, I think presidents have got increasingly better at managing, that, that media coverage

17:32 - and I think is interesting to see this period is almost a snapshot where the, the extent of the coverage that falls strict to receive has outstripped, I think the administration's skill in managing it, and they're not able to really harness it to bring it to bear for their benefit. and it does a fair Amount of damage to his reputation. It also, I think, speaks to the benefits of also though looking beyond simply the press coverage in

17:56 - one nation, because it's interesting if you look at the coverage, say in Japan, a false trip, you get a very different sense of how successful that trip is than if you look at the press coverage in the United States. And it also speaks to thinking a little bit more widely about the impact of diplomacy beyond just simply from the perspective of, the US press and the US audience, but also thinking about the kind of impact that

18:17 - that personal diplomacy can really have in boosting a reputation abroad. And finally, also speaks to, a broader consideration in my work, which is thinking about those connections between domestic and foreign policy. Yes, Ford wants to do, things in the Pacific region. He does think it's important to reassure allies. He does think it's important to, maintain the relations with China, but ultimately he's not doing that

18:42 - unless he thinks it will give him a boost domestically. And ultimately, his decision making about his foreign policy management is being driven by domestic political concerns. And traditionally, there has sometimes been, too much of a degree of separating out domestic and foreign policy simply looking at, at foreign policy, almost in abstract from domestic political considerations. That's changing o over recent years. And I think this, by looking at this kind of individual personal diplomacy, it's a really good way

19:09 - as well of really seeing quite starkly how tightly connected domestic political concerns are with these kind of foreign policy initiatives.

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