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Hate speech

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Christiane Ahlborn analyses whether the incidents amounted to violations of international law, including international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law.

Image courtesy of interviewee. March 4, 2024

Generating Workspace

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This video video discusses the significant issue of hate speech in cyberspace, emphasizing its impact on individuals and democracies, and citing specific examples including the role of Facebook in human rights violations against the Rohingya ethnic minority in Myanmar. The study referenced in the text examines the regulation of hate speech within the framework of international law, highlighting the challenges posed by the digital landscape and the involvement of transnational platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and TikTok.

The analysis includes hypothetical scenarios involving two states (A and B) where State A's security agents use social media to incite hate against a minority group, resulting in mass violence, while State B struggles with balancing freedom of speech and the need to combat hate speech. It explores potential international responsibilities stemming from the spread of hate speech, including violations of human rights law, international humanitarian law, and the prohibition of genocide.

Key points include that hate speech definitions are not uniform in international law, but various treaties touch upon the issue. The scenario illustrates different actors' responsibilities, including states and social media platforms, in preventing and addressing hate speech. It concludes with a call for greater accountability and legislative clarity on regulating hate speech in cyberspace, especially in light of emerging challenges such as artificial intelligence, highlighting the need for global consensus and more robust frameworks to protect individuals and societies from the dangers of hate speech online.

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X-TIMESTAMP-MAP:LOCAL=00:00:00.000,MPEGTS=900000

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Hate speech in cyberspace is a crucial issue

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that concerns all of us.

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It affects individuals and it threatens democracies.

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I was motivated to study hate speech in cyberspace due

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to Facebook's role in the massive human rights violations

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committed by the Myanmar authorities,

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including the government in the military against the Muslim

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Rohingya ethnic minority.

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Facebook's involvement in those human rights violations has

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actually been well documented in the media

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and also confirmed by an independent fact finding mission,

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which was established by the UN in 2017.

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The mission reported that Facebook has been a,

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a useful instrument for those seeking to spread hate

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in a context where for most users,

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Facebook is really the internet

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and that Facebook is the leading platform

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for hate speech in Myanmar.

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Hate speech in cyberspace has evidently not only been an

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issue in Myanmar, but also many other conflicts such

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as those in Ukraine or the GAA conflict.

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The conflict in Syria was even termed the first

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social media war.

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The regulation of hate speech, per se,

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is not a new challenge in international law.

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Hate speech has played a significant role in instigating the

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genocide in Rwanda, namely by means of, the radio.

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The novelty brought about by cyberspace is the extent

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to which hate speech can be spread.

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And the role of transnationally operating companies is

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especially digital platforms such as Facebook,

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Twitter, or TikTok.

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I conducted my study as part

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of the International Cyber Law Toolkit,

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which is an interactive web-based resource

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for legal professionals who work at the intersection

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of international law and cyber operations.

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There's a general agreement amongst states

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that international law applies in cyberspace.

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The question is just how it applies to answer this question

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with a focus on hate speech.

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I could build on what other authors had done

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in the cyber law toolkit.

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So my study contains a specific analysis of how hate speech

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and cyberspace is regulated in international law,

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but also some general guidance that was prepared

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through a collaborative drafting exercise

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with other resources.

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Now, following the style of the cyber law toolkit,

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my study is based on a fictional scenario.

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In that scenario, we have two states, A and B state.

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A security agents use a social media platform

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to spread hate speech against an ethnic

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and religious minority.

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In state, A, they use fake accounts, trolls

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and news pages to label the minority as ethnically inferior

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terrorists, terrorist, criminal, and an existential threat.

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To state A, that must be eliminated.

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The social media platform that's important to know

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and consider does not have a physical office in the

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territory of A, but it directs its operations

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from its global headquarters.

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In state B, in this scenario,

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an independent international fact finding commission

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establishes that the threat

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of inflammatory disinformation on social media was a

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decisive factor in contributing to mass violence,

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targeting the ethnic

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and religious minority in a,

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including killings in humane treatment, torture, and rape.

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All of these acts were perpetrated by non-state groups,

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but they were often aided

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or ab batted by the military forces of state A.

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Still the government of A does not take any measures

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to stop the spread of disinformation by its security agents.

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In the meantime, civil society calls on the social media

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platform and state B to prevent the spread

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of hate speech against the ethnic minority.

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In a, the digital

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platform reacts only slowly in taking down the relevant

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pages and fake accounts,

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and state B actually emphasizes that the imposition

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of laws against hate speech will violate the freedom

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of speech as guaranteed under its constitution.

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In response to the mass violence, the members of the ethnic

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and religious minority form an armed opposition group,

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which is led by several commanders.

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Group C, as I call it in the scenario

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launches armed counter attacks against both state aid,

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military and associated non-state organizations

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with a proclaim aim, proclaimed aim to liberate the ethnic

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and religious minority from the systematic

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and violent oppression by a,

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these attacks include cyber attacks against states aids,

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state aids government servers that are used

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to spread the hate speech.

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Based on the scenario the study asks,

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who could be internationally responsible for the spread

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of hate speech and its consequences for the ethnic

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and religious minority.

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A particular challenge with answering this question is

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that there is no general definition of hate speech.

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In international law, the UN explains

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that hate speech calls out for, for real

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or perceived identity factors

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of an individual group including religion, ethnicity,

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nationality, race, color, descent,

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but also characteristics such as language, socioeconomic

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origins, health status, or sexual orientation.

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Now, although we don't have a general definition

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of hate speech, there are several treaties

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that cover hate speech in different contexts.

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The International Covenant on Civil

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and Political Rights, the I-C-C-P-R,

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the International Convention on the elimination of all forms

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of Racial Discrimination cert,

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the Convention on the Prevention

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and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,

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the 1949 Geneva

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Conventions and additional protocols one

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and two, they cover international humanitarian law, the Laws

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of war, and the Rome statute

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of the International Criminal Court, which is relevant

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to individual criminal responsibility.

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And many of these rules contained in the treaties have also

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become cast international law.

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In our fictionist scenario, different actors

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could be responsible for violating these rules,

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namely states, a, b, the social media platform,

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and maybe even group C.

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Now, let's first consider possible violations

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of human rights law based on the spread of hate speech.

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International human rights law applies in cyberspace.

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Individuals enjoy the same human rights online

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as they enjoy offline states are

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therefore bound by their obligations to respect, protect,

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and fulfill human rights in cyberspace.

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On the basis we could argue

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that state A has breached different human rights obligation,

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such as articles two and four of ICE Cert

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and Article 20 of the I-C-C-P-R, for example,

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article two of ICE Cert.

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The International Convention on the elimination of all forms

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of racial discrimination provides

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that no state party shall engage in racial discrimination

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and they shall take measures against it.

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In Article 20, paragraph two of the I-C-C-P-R,

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the International Covenant on Civil

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and Political Rights stipulates that any advocacy

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of national racial

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or religious hatred that constitutes incitement

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to discrimination, hostility,

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or violence shall be prohibited by law.

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Now, regarding state B, it will be much more difficult

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to establish its international responsibility

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because the human rights violations take place

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extra territorially.

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Each human rights has its own jurisdictional requirements.

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It is generally acknowledged

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that ex extraterritorial jurisdiction can be established if

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a state has territorial

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or personal control over the victims

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of the human rights violations.

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Only some states disagree with that view,

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but in our scenario state, we did not have such territorial

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or personal control over the ethnic minority.

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In a still, we could maybe argue that B violated,

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its human rights, obligations under I search

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and the I-C-C-P-R by not taking all appropriate measures

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to prevent and stop the spread of hate speech,

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generally human rights law only by states.

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But what about companies like social media platforms?

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In 2011,

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the UN Human Rights Council adopted the guiding principles

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on Business and human rights.

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Although these principles only constitute a soft law

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instrument, we could say

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that the platform acted inconsistently

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with its responsibility

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to respect human rights under the UN guiding principles

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to the extent that it did not take sufficient actions

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against the dissemination of hate speech.

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Now, let's turn to potential violations

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of the prohibition of genocide.

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The prohibition of genocide is enshrined in the

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Genocide Convention.

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It is a rule of customer international law,

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and it has the status of a peremptory norm

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of general international law,

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which is also called use cogans.

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This prohibition of genocide applies to states

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and as we shall discuss in more detail, later

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also individuals, and it applies in cyberspace.

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The definition of genocide consists of two elements,

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the intent to destroy

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and hold on part a national,

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in part a national ethnical racial or religious group,

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and the individual act of committing genocide by a number

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of measures

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or acts explicitly listed in Article two

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of the genocide Convention, such as killing members

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of the group or causing serious bodily

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or mental harm regarding hate speech.

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In our scenario, there are two aspects of the prohibition

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of genocide that are particularly relevant.

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First, the acts

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and questions such as killings in human treatment, ra, rave

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and torture committed against the ethnic

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and religious minority were perpetrated by non-state actors.

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But state A could be responsible for direct

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and public incitement to commit genocide.

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Under Article three C of the Genocide Convention, evidence

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of an intent to destroy the minority in hold on part may

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exist in labeling it on the social media platform as

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ethnically inferior terrorist criminal,

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and an existential threat to a that must be eliminated.

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And second state A could also have breached its obligation

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to prevent genocide under Article one

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of the Genocide Convention,

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or be complicit in the commission

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of genocide under Article three E, depending on the level

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of knowledge it had

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of the acts committed against the ethnic minority,

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given the status of genocide as used against norm,

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all states and other actors in the international community

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also have the following three obligations, first

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to cooperate, to bring to an end through lawful means,

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any serious breach of that norm, the prohibition

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of genocide, not to recognize

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as lawful a situation created by the serious breach.

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And third, not to render aid

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or assistance in maintaining that situation.

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These obligations are particularly relevant to state B,

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which has legislative authority over

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the social media platform.

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So we can conclude that state A may be responsible

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for incitement of genocide, the failure to prevent genocide

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or complicity in genocide state B

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and possibly also other states

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and subjects of international law have an obligation

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to cooperate and to abstain from aiding

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and assisting in the violation

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of the prohibition of genocide.

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The next area of international law that is relevant

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for this fictional scenario is

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international humanitarian law.

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IHL also that's the abbreviation

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IHL applies in international

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and non international,

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conflicts based on the Geneva conventions

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and the additional protocols as well

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as customer international law.

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The hostilities between state A

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and C will likely meet the definition

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of a non-international armed conflict involving cyber

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operations, which triggers the applicability

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of international humanitarian law.

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It is still unlikely

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that state A would've violated the prohibition

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to attack the civilian population under IHL

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through its involvement in the spread

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of hate speech against the ethnic minority incitement to,

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to religious hatred by cyber means per se does not qualify

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as an attack against the civilian population.

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But even if the dissemination

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of inflammatory posts on social media

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during the non international armed conflict was not an

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attack, the threat of a kinetic

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or physical attack by cyber means such as the threat

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to eliminate the ethnic minority could violate,

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the prohibition to spread terror

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among the civilian population.

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In addition, state a could have breached common article one

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of the Geneva conventions, which provides

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that the contracting parties undertake to respect

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and to ensure respect

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for the Geneva conventions in all circumstances

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in this context, state a's spread of disinformation,

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inciting violence against the minority

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who could be understood as an encouragement

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to violate the Geneva conventions.

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As a last field of international law,

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my study considers whether the spread

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of hate speech violates international criminal law

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as applicable to cyber operations.

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Three of the core crimes in the Rome statute

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of the international criminal law could be a criminal court,

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could be relevant here, genocide,

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crimes against humanity and war crimes.

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Different modes of criminal liability exist,

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which are listed in articles 25 and 28 of the Rome statute.

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So this means that a perpetrator can be responsible

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for direct commission of the crime, but also for aiding

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and abetting in the crime

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or instigating others to commit that crime.

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The most promising avenue to establish individual criminal,

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responsibility for the spread of hate speech

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is likely incitement to genocide.

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Similarly to what we've seen with regard to states

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by spreading inflammatory disinformation on social media

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state, a security agents could be criminally responsible

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for directly and publicly inciting genocide pursuant

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to Article six and 25 3 e of the Rome statute.

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Among the different channels of communication

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to incite genocide, social media could be seen

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as particularly effective.

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Now, considering the mass violence against the minority,

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we could also examine whether state a security agents

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and members of the military forces are responsible

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for crimes against humanity.

15:32.395 --> 15:34.715
Pursuant to Article seven of the Rome statute,

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the incitement to racial

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and religious hatred could arguably be part of

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or evidence for a widespread

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and systematic attack directed against the civilian

15:48.005 --> 15:50.515
population, which includes

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or included different acts that qualify

15:54.135 --> 15:57.075
as crimes against humanity, such as murder or persecution.

15:58.235 --> 16:02.015
We could also explore whether state a's security agents

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would be responsible for instigating crimes against humanity

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as a mode of liability under Article

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25 3 B of the Rome statute.

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Similarly, regarding war crimes, the use

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of hate speech could, support the argument that states a

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security agents and military forces are criminally

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responsible for instigating non-state groups

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or vetting them to commit acts of violence to life

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and person and rape.

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Um, under Article eight of the Rome statute, last

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but not least, commanders

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and other superiors in state a might be criminally

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responsible for not preventing the acts that constitute

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or contribute to genocide, crimes against humanity

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and war crimes and the command responsibility

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provided for an Article 28 of the Rome statute.

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So, final point, we should probably note that the members

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of Group C will likely not incur criminal responsibility

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for attacking the government service

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because the service were legitimate military objectives.

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My study shows that there's a dense web

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of international legal rules that regulate the spread

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of hate speech in cyberspace.

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The question is whether these rules are sufficient

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or whether more should be done in view

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of the unique challenges that the spread

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of hate speech in cyberspace poses

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to societies and individuals.

17:27.555 --> 17:30.405
There's general agreement that the regulation

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of hate speech in cyberspace is of major significance,

17:33.955 --> 17:36.925
even more so due to the rise of artificial intelligence.

17:37.625 --> 17:41.885
But regulating hate speech is incredibly complex States

17:41.945 --> 17:44.725
and the European Union have made attempts

17:45.065 --> 17:47.445
to adopt legislation on online hate speech,

17:47.865 --> 17:50.980
but different jurisdictions have diverging understandings

17:50.985 --> 17:54.725
of freedom of speech and possible limitations there too.

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And I try to illustrate that regarding the constitution

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of state b in in my scenario, in the absence of

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of global consensus on

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how hate speech in cyberspace should be regulated,

18:07.265 --> 18:11.485
my study gives general guidance for real life scenarios

18:12.595 --> 18:15.405
such as Myanmar, Ukraine, Syria, or Palestine.

18:16.235 --> 18:19.895
In each of these situations, the possible violation of rules

18:19.895 --> 18:21.695
of international law relevant to the spread

18:21.695 --> 18:23.295
of hate speech can be tested

18:23.595 --> 18:26.055
and possibly lead to greater accountability.

18:27.315 --> 18:30.535
In short, my, my study provides a, a way forward

18:30.755 --> 18:33.815
and a basis for discussion on how the relevant rules

18:33.875 --> 18:34.895
of international law

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that address hate speech apply in cyberspace.

00:00 - Hate speech in cyberspace is a crucial issue that concerns all of us. It affects individuals and it threatens democracies. I was motivated to study hate speech in cyberspace due to Facebook's role in the massive human rights violations committed by the Myanmar authorities,

00:17 - including the government in the military against the Muslim Rohingya ethnic minority. Facebook's involvement in those human rights violations has actually been well documented in the media and also confirmed by an independent fact finding mission, which was established by the UN in 2017. The mission reported that Facebook has been a, a useful instrument for those seeking to spread hate in a context where for most users, Facebook is really the internet

00:47 - and that Facebook is the leading platform for hate speech in Myanmar. Hate speech in cyberspace has evidently not only been an issue in Myanmar, but also many other conflicts such as those in Ukraine or the GAA conflict. The conflict in Syria was even termed the first social media war. The regulation of hate speech, per se, is not a new challenge in international law. Hate speech has played a significant role in instigating the

01:16 - genocide in Rwanda, namely by means of, the radio. The novelty brought about by cyberspace is the extent to which hate speech can be spread. And the role of transnationally operating companies is especially digital platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, or TikTok. I conducted my study as part of the International Cyber Law Toolkit, which is an interactive web-based resource for legal professionals who work at the intersection

01:46 - of international law and cyber operations. There's a general agreement amongst states that international law applies in cyberspace. The question is just how it applies to answer this question with a focus on hate speech. I could build on what other authors had done in the cyber law toolkit. So my study contains a specific analysis of how hate speech and cyberspace is regulated in international law, but also some general guidance that was prepared

02:15 - through a collaborative drafting exercise with other resources. Now, following the style of the cyber law toolkit, my study is based on a fictional scenario. In that scenario, we have two states, A and B state. A security agents use a social media platform to spread hate speech against an ethnic and religious minority. In state, A, they use fake accounts, trolls and news pages to label the minority as ethnically inferior

02:48 - terrorists, terrorist, criminal, and an existential threat. To state A, that must be eliminated. The social media platform that's important to know and consider does not have a physical office in the territory of A, but it directs its operations from its global headquarters. In state B, in this scenario, an independent international fact finding commission establishes that the threat of inflammatory disinformation on social media was a

03:18 - decisive factor in contributing to mass violence, targeting the ethnic and religious minority in a, including killings in humane treatment, torture, and rape. All of these acts were perpetrated by non-state groups, but they were often aided or ab batted by the military forces of state A. Still the government of A does not take any measures to stop the spread of disinformation by its security agents. In the meantime, civil society calls on the social media

03:50 - platform and state B to prevent the spread of hate speech against the ethnic minority. In a, the digital platform reacts only slowly in taking down the relevant pages and fake accounts, and state B actually emphasizes that the imposition of laws against hate speech will violate the freedom of speech as guaranteed under its constitution. In response to the mass violence, the members of the ethnic and religious minority form an armed opposition group,

04:19 - which is led by several commanders. Group C, as I call it in the scenario launches armed counter attacks against both state aid, military and associated non-state organizations with a proclaim aim, proclaimed aim to liberate the ethnic and religious minority from the systematic and violent oppression by a, these attacks include cyber attacks against states aids, state aids government servers that are used to spread the hate speech.

04:49 - Based on the scenario the study asks, who could be internationally responsible for the spread of hate speech and its consequences for the ethnic and religious minority. A particular challenge with answering this question is that there is no general definition of hate speech. In international law, the UN explains that hate speech calls out for, for real or perceived identity factors of an individual group including religion, ethnicity,

05:19 - nationality, race, color, descent, but also characteristics such as language, socioeconomic origins, health status, or sexual orientation. Now, although we don't have a general definition of hate speech, there are several treaties that cover hate speech in different contexts. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the I-C-C-P-R, the International Convention on the elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination cert,

05:49 - the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and additional protocols one and two, they cover international humanitarian law, the Laws of war, and the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court, which is relevant to individual criminal responsibility. And many of these rules contained in the treaties have also become cast international law.

06:15 - In our fictionist scenario, different actors could be responsible for violating these rules, namely states, a, b, the social media platform, and maybe even group C. Now, let's first consider possible violations of human rights law based on the spread of hate speech. International human rights law applies in cyberspace. Individuals enjoy the same human rights online as they enjoy offline states are therefore bound by their obligations to respect, protect,

06:46 - and fulfill human rights in cyberspace. On the basis we could argue that state A has breached different human rights obligation, such as articles two and four of ICE Cert and Article 20 of the I-C-C-P-R, for example, article two of ICE Cert. The International Convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination provides that no state party shall engage in racial discrimination and they shall take measures against it.

07:15 - In Article 20, paragraph two of the I-C-C-P-R, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates that any advocacy of national racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence shall be prohibited by law. Now, regarding state B, it will be much more difficult to establish its international responsibility because the human rights violations take place

07:41 - extra territorially. Each human rights has its own jurisdictional requirements. It is generally acknowledged that ex extraterritorial jurisdiction can be established if a state has territorial or personal control over the victims of the human rights violations. Only some states disagree with that view, but in our scenario state, we did not have such territorial or personal control over the ethnic minority.

08:09 - In a still, we could maybe argue that B violated, its human rights, obligations under I search and the I-C-C-P-R by not taking all appropriate measures to prevent and stop the spread of hate speech, generally human rights law only by states. But what about companies like social media platforms? In 2011, the UN Human Rights Council adopted the guiding principles on Business and human rights. Although these principles only constitute a soft law

08:43 - instrument, we could say that the platform acted inconsistently with its responsibility to respect human rights under the UN guiding principles to the extent that it did not take sufficient actions against the dissemination of hate speech. Now, let's turn to potential violations of the prohibition of genocide. The prohibition of genocide is enshrined in the Genocide Convention.

09:10 - It is a rule of customer international law, and it has the status of a peremptory norm of general international law, which is also called use cogans. This prohibition of genocide applies to states and as we shall discuss in more detail, later also individuals, and it applies in cyberspace. The definition of genocide consists of two elements, the intent to destroy and hold on part a national,

09:38 - in part a national ethnical racial or religious group, and the individual act of committing genocide by a number of measures or acts explicitly listed in Article two of the genocide Convention, such as killing members of the group or causing serious bodily or mental harm regarding hate speech. In our scenario, there are two aspects of the prohibition of genocide that are particularly relevant. First, the acts

10:07 - and questions such as killings in human treatment, ra, rave and torture committed against the ethnic and religious minority were perpetrated by non-state actors. But state A could be responsible for direct and public incitement to commit genocide. Under Article three C of the Genocide Convention, evidence of an intent to destroy the minority in hold on part may exist in labeling it on the social media platform as ethnically inferior terrorist criminal, and an existential threat to a that must be eliminated.

10:44 - And second state A could also have breached its obligation to prevent genocide under Article one of the Genocide Convention, or be complicit in the commission of genocide under Article three E, depending on the level of knowledge it had of the acts committed against the ethnic minority, given the status of genocide as used against norm, all states and other actors in the international community also have the following three obligations, first

11:16 - to cooperate, to bring to an end through lawful means, any serious breach of that norm, the prohibition of genocide, not to recognize as lawful a situation created by the serious breach. And third, not to render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. These obligations are particularly relevant to state B, which has legislative authority over the social media platform. So we can conclude that state A may be responsible

11:47 - for incitement of genocide, the failure to prevent genocide or complicity in genocide state B and possibly also other states and subjects of international law have an obligation to cooperate and to abstain from aiding and assisting in the violation of the prohibition of genocide. The next area of international law that is relevant for this fictional scenario is international humanitarian law.

12:17 - IHL also that's the abbreviation IHL applies in international and non international, conflicts based on the Geneva conventions and the additional protocols as well as customer international law. The hostilities between state A and C will likely meet the definition of a non-international armed conflict involving cyber operations, which triggers the applicability

12:42 - of international humanitarian law. It is still unlikely that state A would've violated the prohibition to attack the civilian population under IHL through its involvement in the spread of hate speech against the ethnic minority incitement to, to religious hatred by cyber means per se does not qualify as an attack against the civilian population. But even if the dissemination of inflammatory posts on social media

13:10 - during the non international armed conflict was not an attack, the threat of a kinetic or physical attack by cyber means such as the threat to eliminate the ethnic minority could violate, the prohibition to spread terror among the civilian population. In addition, state a could have breached common article one of the Geneva conventions, which provides that the contracting parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect

13:40 - for the Geneva conventions in all circumstances in this context, state a's spread of disinformation, inciting violence against the minority who could be understood as an encouragement to violate the Geneva conventions. As a last field of international law, my study considers whether the spread of hate speech violates international criminal law as applicable to cyber operations. Three of the core crimes in the Rome statute

14:12 - of the international criminal law could be a criminal court, could be relevant here, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Different modes of criminal liability exist, which are listed in articles 25 and 28 of the Rome statute. So this means that a perpetrator can be responsible for direct commission of the crime, but also for aiding and abetting in the crime or instigating others to commit that crime. The most promising avenue to establish individual criminal,

14:45 - responsibility for the spread of hate speech is likely incitement to genocide. Similarly to what we've seen with regard to states by spreading inflammatory disinformation on social media state, a security agents could be criminally responsible for directly and publicly inciting genocide pursuant to Article six and 25 3 e of the Rome statute. Among the different channels of communication to incite genocide, social media could be seen as particularly effective.

15:20 - Now, considering the mass violence against the minority, we could also examine whether state a security agents and members of the military forces are responsible for crimes against humanity. Pursuant to Article seven of the Rome statute, the incitement to racial and religious hatred could arguably be part of or evidence for a widespread and systematic attack directed against the civilian population, which includes

15:50 - or included different acts that qualify as crimes against humanity, such as murder or persecution. We could also explore whether state a's security agents would be responsible for instigating crimes against humanity as a mode of liability under Article 25 3 B of the Rome statute. Similarly, regarding war crimes, the use of hate speech could, support the argument that states a security agents and military forces are criminally responsible for instigating non-state groups

16:24 - or vetting them to commit acts of violence to life and person and rape. under Article eight of the Rome statute, last but not least, commanders and other superiors in state a might be criminally responsible for not preventing the acts that constitute or contribute to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes and the command responsibility provided for an Article 28 of the Rome statute. So, final point, we should probably note that the members

16:57 - of Group C will likely not incur criminal responsibility for attacking the government service because the service were legitimate military objectives. My study shows that there's a dense web of international legal rules that regulate the spread of hate speech in cyberspace. The question is whether these rules are sufficient or whether more should be done in view of the unique challenges that the spread of hate speech in cyberspace poses

17:25 - to societies and individuals. There's general agreement that the regulation of hate speech in cyberspace is of major significance, even more so due to the rise of artificial intelligence. But regulating hate speech is incredibly complex States and the European Union have made attempts to adopt legislation on online hate speech, but different jurisdictions have diverging understandings of freedom of speech and possible limitations there too. And I try to illustrate that regarding the constitution

17:58 - of state b in in my scenario, in the absence of of global consensus on how hate speech in cyberspace should be regulated, my study gives general guidance for real life scenarios such as Myanmar, Ukraine, Syria, or Palestine. In each of these situations, the possible violation of rules of international law relevant to the spread of hate speech can be tested and possibly lead to greater accountability. In short, my, my study provides a, a way forward

18:30 - and a basis for discussion on how the relevant rules of international law that address hate speech apply in cyberspace.

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