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Homegrown Radicals

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View the page of Youcef Soufi

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Youcef Soufi discusses the story of how the War on Terror created the conditions for the emergence of a novel theory of jihad

Image courtesy of interviewee. September 17, 2024

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In this video, the speaker recounts a significant event from 2016 when he was informed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) about the arrest of Mohamed del Ferric, an individual he knew from his university days who had joined Al-Qaeda along with two others, initiating a decade-long mystery regarding their disappearance in 2007. The speaker reflects on the broader questions of radicalization—specifically, why individuals join extremist groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS—drawing on his background in Islamic studies to offer a different perspective than typical radicalization studies, which often focus on state interests.

He critiques the lens through which radicalization studies view the problem, suggesting that they fail to address the complexities of individual motivations and the underlying ideologies compelling people to radicalize. Notably, he emphasizes the importance of understanding the discourse of jihad and how figures like Anwar al-Awlaki shaped modern interpretations of it, encouraging violence as a response to perceived injustices against Muslims.

The speaker explores how these radicals' motivations can be traced back to a sense of collective injury within the Muslim community in the aftermath of global conflicts and the war on terror. He delves into the concept of the "umma," or the global Muslim community, underscoring how communal practices and moral exhortations illustrate the solidarity among Muslims and can shape responses to events like radicalization.

Additionally, the speaker addresses the implications of radicalization within Muslim communities, particularly relating to Islamophobia and community dynamics. He provides insights into how these communities interpret and cope with the loss of members to extremist ideologies, while also emphasizing collective vulnerability and the capacity for empathy toward individuals who err.

Ultimately, the text paints a complex picture of radicalization, urging a more nuanced understanding that transcends simplistic definitions of "radical" versus "moderate" Muslims, while recognizing shared human fallibility and societal responsibility.

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Here are five key points derived from the video:

1. **Background of Radicalization**: The speaker discusses their personal connection to the topic of radicalization as they had known three individuals who disappeared in 2007 and later joined Al-Qaeda. This personal experience sets the stage for exploring broader questions of motive behind individuals’ paths to radicalism.

2. **Critique of Radicalization Studies**: The speaker critiques radicalization studies for their limited approach that primarily serves state interests post-9/11 and often oversimplifies the motivations for joining extremist groups, arguing that these studies fail to adequately explore the ideological complexities and compelling narratives that attract individuals to radical ideologies.

3. **Impact of Anwar al-Awlaki**: Anwar al-Awlaki's role as a influential figure within radical circles is emphasized, particularly his shift towards advocating for militarism in response to perceived injustices against Muslims post-9/11. His teachings resonated with disenfranchised individuals, showcasing the importance of understanding the narratives and ideologies that lead to radicalization.

4. **Community Response and Islamophobia**: The speaker examines the effects of radicalization on Muslim communities, focusing on how such incidents shape state perceptions and treatment of Muslims, and suggests that this leads to Islamophobia and a sense of collective injury. The community must process the loss of members and navigate the repercussions of their actions in relation to broader societal views.

5. **Solidarity and Misguidedness in Islamic Thought**: The video discusses notions of solidarity within the Muslim community and the theological perspective of misguidance, emphasizing human fallibility and the need for compassion and understanding in addressing issues related to radicalization, rather than perpetuating fear and division. The speaker advocates for a more empathetic view towards those who have erred, highlighting the potential for shared bonds and collective healing.

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Here are some key quotes extracted from the video:

1. **Introduction to the Phone Call from RCMP**:
- "In 2016, uh, right when I was finishing my PhD at the University of Toronto, um, I got a phone call from the RCMP... the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. It's, it's, I guess, the equivalent of the FBI for Canada."

2. **The Disappearance of Individuals**:
- "Um, and all three individuals in March of 2007 disappeared. [...] it became a kind of a mystery for the next decade, close to a decade, until that phone call from the RCMP."

3. **Question of Radicalization**:
- "And in many ways, this was a very similar question that's asked in, in radicalization studies, right? This question of like, why do individuals go to join groups like Al-Qaeda or groups like ISIS?"

4. **Critique of Radicalization Studies**:
- "Radicalization studies can't really transcend the interests of the state, the terms of the state."
- "It isn't really asking questions about is our approach in the war on terror, the right one? How have we contributed to the violence that we see in the world today?"

5. **Mentality of Muslims Post-9/11**:
- "What variables can we identify that makes somebody at risk? [...] none of these predict these variables have any real predictive value."

6. **Understanding Islam and Jihad**:
- "It's important to look at the radicalization experts don't look at what's compelling because, number one, when you start to look at what's compelling, you risk giving the semblance of legitimacy to that ideology."

7. **The Role of Anwar Al-Awlaki**:
- "What I found out very early on is that [...] everything pointed back to a very particular anglophone preacher scholar, named Anwar Al-Awlaki."
- "Anwar Al-Awlaki becomes convinced that the proper way to respond is through what he calls Jihad, basically through armed violence."

8. **Impact of Radicalization on Muslim Communities**:
- "What is the impact of a case of radicalization on a Muslim community? How does it shape the way that the state treats its Muslim communities?"

9. **The Notion of the Ummah**:
- "The Ummah is the worldwide Muslim community... a community made of what's often talked as, as brothers and sisters in faith."
- "There's a way out. [...] The types of practices that make it possible for somebody in Mauritania to give in charity to somebody in Bangladesh, that type of care teaches us something."

10. **Reflecting on the Radical vs. the Muslim Community**:
- "They offer a view of our co-citizens as immensely fallible, and one where we come from different walks of life and we need to help each other out."

These quotes encompass the themes of radicalization, individual motivations, critiques of existing frameworks, and the significance of community understanding in the convideo of Islam. They reflect the author's journey in understanding the complexities surrounding radicalization and the implications for Muslim communities.

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Here are some articles that explore themes similar to those found in your video, focusing on radicalization, the motivations behind joining extremist groups, and the implications for Muslim communities:

1. **"The Psychology of Radicalization: Understanding the Roots of Extremism"** - This article investigates the psychological factors that contribute to individuals joining extremist groups, examining personal grievances, ideological beliefs, and the role of social networks.

2. **"Radicalization and the Role of Identity in the Muslim Community"** - This piece explores how identity plays a crucial role in the radicalization process, including the sense of belonging and communal practices among Muslims. It emphasizes the importance of understanding individual motivations beyond political or ideological frameworks.

3. **"Global Conflicts and the Rise of Extremism: Analyzing Collective Grievances"** - This article discusses the impact of global conflicts and wars on the collective psyche of the Muslim community, investigating how feelings of injustice and victimization can lead to a search for radical solutions.

4. **"Exploring Jihad: Rhetoric, Ideology, and Recruitment"** - Focusing on the discourse of jihad, this piece delves into how interpretations of jihad have evolved and how figures like Anwar al-Awlaki influence recruitment into jihadist organizations.

5. **"Islamophobia and Its Impact on Radicalization"** - This article examines the relationship between rising Islamophobia and the radicalization of Muslim youth, highlighting how discrimination and stigmatization can contribute to feelings of alienation and extremism.

6. **"Community Responses to Radicalization: A Study of Resilience and Recovery"** - This research looks at how Muslim communities are coping with radicalization and its effects, focusing on resilience, solidarity, and efforts to reconnect individuals who have been lost to extremist ideologies.

7. **"Beyond the Binary: Understanding Extremism in Convideo"** - This article argues for a more nuanced understanding of extremism that moves beyond the simplistic labels of radical versus moderate, focusing on the complexities of individual experiences and motivations.

These articles reflect a breadth of research that aligns with the themes in your video, providing deeper insights into the motivations for radicalization, the role of identity and community, and the impact of societal dynamics on extremist behaviors.

X-TIMESTAMP-MAP:LOCAL=00:00:00.000,MPEGTS=900000

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In 2016,

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right when I was finishing my PhD at the University

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of Toronto, I got a phone call from the RCMP,

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that's the, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

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It's, it's, I guess, the equivalent of the,

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the FBI for Canada.

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And, the RCMP told me that,

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an individual by the name

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of Mohamed del Ferric had been arrested,

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and was,

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gonna be put on trial in Brooklyn in the United States.

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He's a, an American citizen.

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The reason they were calling me is

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because, when I was doing my undergraduate degree at the

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University of Manitoba, I had known this individual,

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alongside another two individuals named, far Ma.

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And, me, ya

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and all three individuals in March of 2007 disappeared.

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Um, and when I say disappeared, basically the, the people

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who knew them, weren't sure where they had gone.

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And it became a kind of a mystery for the next decade, close

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to a decade, until that phone call from the RCMP.

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And what emerged in subsequent years

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after they had left is that those three individuals had,

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gone to, Pakistan and had joined, Al-Qaeda.

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When I got that phone call in 2016, immediately the question

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that I had, like the question of a lot of people

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who knew those three individuals

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before they had left was, was why,

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what exactly was their trajectory?

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And in many ways, this was a very similar question

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that's asked in, in radicalization studies, right?

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This question of like, why do individuals go

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to join groups like Al-Qaeda or groups like isis?

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It's, it's worth mentioning

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that these three individuals had left long

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before this type of, like exodus from western fighters to,

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to a place like Syria and Iraq to, to join isis.

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So in many ways, they were kind of pioneers in this,

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this trend that that was going to

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really become very worrisome for, for, Western states.

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So the question of why was not an uncommon one.

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The thing is that I have a particular background in,

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Islamic studies.

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My training is in classical text.

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Uh, I'm a, a pre-modern historian.

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My first book was examining Islamic law between the 10th

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and 13th centuries,

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and looking at, debates between a scholarly class,

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a class of, of what I call a jurist.

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And so, unlike a lot of, of radicalization studies experts,

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what I have is a certain expertise

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in not only the Islamic tradition,

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but the ability to read Arabic at a high level

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of proficiency, to understand classical text,

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to understand classical arguments.

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I've also been trained, even though I'm a,

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a pre-modern historian, as somebody who's,

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who's trained in a, a religious studies department, I

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really gravitated towards, professors

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that had knowledge in, in what we call the anthropology

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of Islam, which is another field that people

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who work within radicalization studies,

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it's a completely different discipline.

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They, they're typically,

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an offshoot of political science.

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So not really that anthropological focus, which really,

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like, there's two things

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that were really important about anthropology,

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that training in anthropology.

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One is trying to understand from inside, like the,

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the ideas, the beliefs,

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and the practices of particular community.

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That's number one.

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And number two is that the, the approach

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of people within anthropology is a lot more critical than

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the approach of people within,

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within radicalization studies or terrorist studies.

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And the reason being,

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and this I found out when I started asking the question,

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you know, why, why did they do it?

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Why did they go? What were their motivations?

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Is that, and,

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and this, this became really the, the basis of the book,

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which is like, it's a critique of radicalization studies

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precisely because I, I go to the question,

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I asked the same question, but I approach it from a

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completely different angle.

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So what I found out very early on is

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that radicalization studies can't really transcend the,

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the interests of the state, the terms of the state.

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By that, what I mean is that

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radicalization studies emerges post nine 11,

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and it's specifically there

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to help the state out in the war on terror to identify

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who are the bad guys, who are the good guys?

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And, in so far as,

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and when I say who are the good guys, basically,

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who are the Muslims that we don't need to worry about?

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Um, and in so far as it's doing this,

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it isn't really asking questions about

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is our approach in the war on terror, the right one?

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How have we contributed to the violence

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that we see in the world today?

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Really, what, what what it takes

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for granted is the state is, has its agenda.

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It wants to conduct itself in a certain way,

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namely in this situation, it wants

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to engage in wars overseas.

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The global war on terror,

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which is this really ill-defined undefined,

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global conflict where any place on the globe, according

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to an act of Congress after us Congress

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after nine 11, could be a war zone, right?

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And so this is, this is what the state wants.

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How do we facilitate the states?

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And by making sure

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that we can identify any potential threats.

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And as time went on,

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the threat moved away from not just understanding the

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radical Muslim, but this, this figure

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of the homegrown radical.

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It took some years actually,

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and that's a, a central argument of my book.

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And it's also something that's completely obscured within

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radicalization studies, is that this, this idea of the, the,

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the homegrown radical took time to emerge.

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And we have to ask ourselves,

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why did it emerge like several years after nine 11, right?

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So, so, so right away I saw

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that I'd be approaching this from a very different lens.

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And one of the things that becomes very clear in my

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approach, to, to examining the question of why,

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why they did it, is when you take a look at radicalization

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studies, there's this attention to variables.

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What are the variables that could indicate

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that somebody is going to radicalize that a Muslim?

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And, and, and I should backtrack

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and say like, we know

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that radicalization studies is not

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concerned only with Muslims.

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Um, you know, in recent years,

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there's been an interest in thinking about white supremacism

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as a type of radicalization,

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but really it emerged post nine 11 focusing on Muslims.

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And, and Muslims have always,

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and will always, in my view,

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be the paradigm for the radical.

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There's this attention to variables.

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What variables can we identify that makes somebody at risk?

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And they're very clear, radicalization studies experts,

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and this is, I think to their credit, they're very clear

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that none of these predict these variables have any real

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predictive value in the sense of saying, like, okay,

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let's say, somebody is, newly religious,

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they've newly found religion.

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That may be a variable that seems to be common between a lot

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of people who, who radicalize

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and join groups like Alpe or isis.

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But there's no, way that we can say

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that definitively somebody who gets,

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who becomes newly religious will end up in

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that, in that, on that path.

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In fact, you know, it's a very small number of people

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that would end up on that path.

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So, so, so it's a strange, it's,

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it's a strange approach in some ways

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because number one, you're trying to find these variables

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that are not always, shedding much light on, on the,

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the motivations, like the personal beliefs

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of, of those fighters.

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For instance, you could say like,

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like to say they're new.

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They're, they're, they've, they've newly found,

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religion doesn't tell you much about like,

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what's compelling about jihadist ideolog, right?

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It doesn't tell you much about that.

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Or to say, you know, they came to Canada

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and they, they, they felt, they, they were,

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new students in Canada and they didn't fit in.

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And so they, they went to,

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they reappropriated their Arab identity, right?

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It doesn't tell you much about the actual ideology.

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It just tells you these variables about some people in these

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situations tend to gravitate towards

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these ideologies that we don't like.

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So it doesn't give you much predictive value,

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and it doesn't shed light on on what's compelling,

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for about, about certain ideas.

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And I think one of the reasons

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that we don't look at the radicalization experts don't look

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at what's compelling is, number one,

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and when you start to look at what's compelling, you risk,

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and this was really a, a, a fraught issue.

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Post nine 11, you risk giving the semblance

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of legitimacy to that ideology.

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'cause you're starting to look at what, why,

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why could resonate with an individual.

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And then number two, I don't, I think a lot

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of these radicalization experts don't have the means

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to do it because they don't have like a great depth

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of the Islamic tradition,

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and they don't have, oftentimes they don't have Arabic,

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or if they do it, it's not necessarily the type of Arabic

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that would let them, that would permit them to,

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to examine kind of the, the evolution

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of jihadist thought within, within the, within,

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Muslim communities within Islam, took the approach of

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what makes this these ideas compelling.

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And then number two, what is the,

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what are the continuities

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and what are the ruptures in the ideas of jihad?

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Because I had actually studied the

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pre-modern doctrines of jihad.

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I I published with, the Oxford Journal

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of Islamic Studies, a lengthy, article on a,

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11th century jurist, a legal scholar, that had,

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you know, in many ways brought the, the doctrine

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of jihad in a new direction that had been very influential

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for the Ottoman Empire in the century,

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in the subsequent entry, centuries.

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Um, so I knew quite a bit about the classical doctrine.

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And when I started to look at, you know, the,

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the motivations of these guys, everything pointed back

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to a very particular anglophone, a preacher scholar,

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named Anir Lalaki.

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And Anwar Lalaki is, he's very well known, within,

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policy circles.

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Uh, he's had a lot of media coverage.

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And the reason is

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because he was a real thorn on the side

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of the Obama administration.

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And Barack Obama, sanctioned the assassination of,

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of Annu Lalaki when he was in Yemen, despite the fact

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that Annu Lalaki was an American citizen.

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So it was a big controversy at the time.

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Um, but the, the reason the Obama administration did it was

10:43.325 --> 10:47.765
that they were noticing that so many homegrown radicals,

10:48.155 --> 10:51.485
that, so many, of those

10:51.485 --> 10:54.005
that had gravitated towards violence within the anglophone

10:54.005 --> 10:55.605
world were listening to this guy.

10:56.185 --> 10:59.565
Um, he had immense influence in,

10:59.945 --> 11:03.285
in this wave that I, that I mentioned did not exist

11:03.425 --> 11:04.685
before nine 11.

11:05.145 --> 11:08.085
It, it exists. It, it came about in the years after nine 11,

11:08.145 --> 11:10.085
and specifically when this preacher

11:10.755 --> 11:14.045
Anki had a certain turn when he became convinced,

11:14.185 --> 11:15.645
we could call it a radical term.

11:15.665 --> 11:17.965
But, you know, part of the point of this book is, is

11:17.965 --> 11:20.325
to get us to transcend this language of radicalization

11:20.505 --> 11:22.925
and of, of the radical and the moderate Muslims.

11:23.185 --> 11:25.125
But for, for, for the time being, you know,

11:25.125 --> 11:26.205
it's what we call a radical.

11:26.345 --> 11:28.405
We could talk about this radical turn of

11:29.155 --> 11:32.045
Anki when he becomes convinced that violence

11:32.585 --> 11:36.365
mil military violence is a way to, respond

11:36.625 --> 11:38.645
to the American war on terror,

11:38.645 --> 11:43.445
to the American presence in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen.

11:43.745 --> 11:45.805
And, at the time,

11:45.945 --> 11:47.765
Somali is soon gonna add to the list.

11:47.825 --> 11:49.805
So, so by that time, there's already three,

11:50.145 --> 11:51.725
and I guess we could add Pakistan too,

11:51.845 --> 11:54.045
'cause it's gonna become a, a site of drone attacks.

11:54.235 --> 11:58.405
There's three to four zone, war, countries that are,

11:58.585 --> 12:03.405
facing, that are arenas

12:03.405 --> 12:04.525
of the, of the war on terror.

12:04.745 --> 12:09.005
And Anwar Laki becomes convinced that, the proper way

12:09.005 --> 12:12.525
to response is through what he calls Jihad, basically

12:12.525 --> 12:14.365
through, through armed, violence.

12:15.835 --> 12:19.375
And it becomes very convincing for a lot of these,

12:19.635 --> 12:21.615
of these anglophone, Muslims,

12:21.615 --> 12:23.895
including these three individuals that I knew

12:23.995 --> 12:27.255
and that, that had left in 2007.

12:28.035 --> 12:30.935
And so it became very clear to me that, that that was,

12:30.935 --> 12:33.375
those ideas were, were what they found compelling.

12:33.795 --> 12:35.655
And the question that I asked myself was,

12:36.285 --> 12:37.775
what were the continuities

12:37.775 --> 12:40.175
and ruptures in Anwar Laki thought on Jihad?

12:40.395 --> 12:43.135
How did he change the doctrine of Jihad

12:43.675 --> 12:46.295
to make it compelling to anglophone Muslims?

12:46.785 --> 12:49.775
Right? Why in 2000

12:49.835 --> 12:53.535
and in 2005, six, when he,

12:53.565 --> 12:56.215
started making the first lectures,

12:56.215 --> 12:59.975
that would become very influential,

13:00.665 --> 13:02.575
advocating for militarism.

13:03.075 --> 13:04.255
Um, one set

13:04.255 --> 13:06.855
of lectures particularly influenced these three men.

13:07.035 --> 13:11.895
It was called Constance, on the Path of Jihad, a six

13:12.445 --> 13:13.615
part lecture series.

13:14.475 --> 13:18.335
And what, what, how did he, in this

13:19.065 --> 13:23.375
historical juncture make, a case for

13:23.945 --> 13:26.895
armed, resistance, we could say for,

13:26.915 --> 13:29.975
for an armed response to the War on terror?

13:31.075 --> 13:34.055
Um, so that's a major part of the book.

13:34.115 --> 13:37.295
And then the other motivation is in

13:37.355 --> 13:40.295
2017, so the year

13:40.295 --> 13:43.335
after I get that phone call from the RCMP, I'm invited

13:43.335 --> 13:47.965
to testify, in Brooklyn at the trial of,

13:48.145 --> 13:49.885
of Moham Mohanad Delek.

13:51.225 --> 13:53.365
And after going to the trial

13:54.025 --> 13:58.765
and, seeing the way that it was conducted,

13:59.785 --> 14:00.885
I'm coming back to Canada,

14:01.665 --> 14:04.005
and I'm feeling very uneasy with the whole process.

14:04.665 --> 14:08.645
I'm feeling very uneasy with some of the things

14:08.645 --> 14:11.005
that I feel are irregularities within the trial.

14:11.665 --> 14:15.045
And I tell myself, okay, so I have this question

14:15.045 --> 14:16.245
of why, why did they go?

14:16.885 --> 14:20.965
But I also have a question of what is the impact

14:22.575 --> 14:26.745
of, a a a, a case

14:26.745 --> 14:29.785
of radicalization on a Muslim community?

14:30.865 --> 14:33.765
How does it shape the way that the state

14:34.425 --> 14:36.365
treats its Muslim communities?

14:37.265 --> 14:41.085
And so I started to do, to examine that question as well,

14:41.085 --> 14:42.565
that that was the other motivation.

14:42.565 --> 14:43.885
And so much of the book,

14:45.835 --> 14:47.875
although a lot of the book is looking at motivations

14:48.015 --> 14:50.155
and looking at continued continuities

14:50.155 --> 14:52.885
and ruptures in the doctrine of Jihad, a huge part

14:52.885 --> 14:54.725
of the book, a large part of the book is,

14:54.725 --> 14:56.045
is looking at Islamophobia

14:56.305 --> 15:00.565
and is thinking about what happens to a community when

15:01.185 --> 15:03.605
it loses three of its members to radicalization.

15:04.265 --> 15:07.165
Um, and one of the things that it, that the book, that

15:07.705 --> 15:10.885
the book does that's kind of unique is, yes,

15:10.885 --> 15:12.405
there's a question of Islamophobia,

15:12.545 --> 15:16.725
but there's also the question of of of how did that, does

15:16.725 --> 15:18.965
that community understand the radical, right?

15:19.795 --> 15:21.245
They've lost three of their members.

15:21.415 --> 15:23.405
These were people that were part of that community.

15:24.185 --> 15:26.125
How do they l how do they live with that?

15:26.345 --> 15:27.925
How do they look at that in hindsight?

15:28.345 --> 15:30.005
How do they assess that situation?

15:31.305 --> 15:33.565
And, and here too, my training as an,

15:33.625 --> 15:35.165
as a religious studies scholar matters

15:35.165 --> 15:39.445
because these communities have a particular lens based off

15:39.445 --> 15:41.405
of religion to think about what's happened.

15:41.425 --> 15:43.805
And it's a very different lens than a state centric one.

15:43.825 --> 15:47.575
If we take a look at his doctrine, it it,

15:47.575 --> 15:50.135
there was a radical break between the,

15:50.155 --> 15:52.175
the pre-modern doctrine of jihad

15:52.595 --> 15:54.575
and his understanding of jihad.

15:54.835 --> 15:56.975
Now, he's not completely novel

15:56.975 --> 16:00.535
because he is within this, tradition, a mod,

16:00.615 --> 16:03.895
a very modern tradition that I'd say starts,

16:04.515 --> 16:05.535
we could date it differently,

16:05.635 --> 16:08.655
but let's say it starts in the 1980s with a, with a,

16:08.775 --> 16:13.215
a dress called Abdullah Za, who was the, main,

16:13.645 --> 16:17.575
organizer and ideolog for, bringing

16:18.235 --> 16:20.575
mostly Arabs, but Muslims to Afghanistan

16:20.575 --> 16:21.615
to fight the Soviet Union.

16:22.555 --> 16:26.095
So, so an, Anir Laki is very indebted to his ideas

16:26.235 --> 16:30.575
and to those that were subsequently also indebted to, to,

16:30.675 --> 16:33.855
to zas ideas and, and came before aki.

16:33.855 --> 16:36.335
In fact, the series of lectures called,

16:36.335 --> 16:39.375
Constance on the Path of Jihad was, a

16:40.675 --> 16:42.965
translation and, and slash commentary.

16:43.065 --> 16:47.205
It was a commentary of, another, set of writings

16:47.985 --> 16:52.715
from an Arab, Saudi Arabian, ideologue,

16:53.135 --> 16:55.755
named Yusef Ari.

16:56.215 --> 17:00.495
So, so, so, so he's not, you know, completely

17:01.515 --> 17:03.575
coming up with ideas outta thin air,

17:04.115 --> 17:06.575
but he's the first eloquent anglophone

17:07.035 --> 17:10.615
who can present these ideas in a compelling way.

17:10.615 --> 17:12.295
And how does he do it in a compelling way?

17:12.605 --> 17:14.415
He's specifically addressing the war on terror.

17:14.555 --> 17:16.615
And that's, that's really the missing key when we say like,

17:17.305 --> 17:19.335
after nine 11, you don't have this problem

17:19.395 --> 17:20.895
of homegrown radicals.

17:21.155 --> 17:23.535
And suddenly, you know, around 2005, you do.

17:24.075 --> 17:27.015
And, and that's exactly when Anwar lalaki is,

17:27.115 --> 17:28.175
is becoming very popular.

17:28.275 --> 17:29.855
He had become popular even

17:29.855 --> 17:33.135
before these quote unquote radical lectures through

17:33.405 --> 17:36.615
what we would call very mainstream popular preaching.

17:36.715 --> 17:40.455
He had, kind of, he was a pioneer in the, in the art of,

17:40.555 --> 17:44.415
of, audio lectures, first in CD form,

17:44.435 --> 17:46.975
and then they started becoming very popular,

17:47.035 --> 17:48.455
online in MP three form.

17:48.515 --> 17:51.885
So his original, lectures,

17:51.885 --> 17:53.645
and he was, he was a master at a Ian,

17:54.065 --> 17:57.445
his original lectures were on things like the lives

17:57.465 --> 18:00.885
of prophets, you know, like, the live life of Abraham

18:01.105 --> 18:04.245
and, Adam and all these biblical figures.

18:04.305 --> 18:05.845
That's, that's where Muslims,

18:06.055 --> 18:08.965
throughout the anglophone world first started listening

18:08.965 --> 18:10.605
to him and started to respect him.

18:10.605 --> 18:12.365
They started to say, this is somebody who's very

18:12.365 --> 18:14.605
eloquent, knowledgeable, I can gain from him.

18:15.105 --> 18:16.925
He takes this turn, right?

18:17.665 --> 18:21.565
And when he takes this turn, he's really addressing

18:21.995 --> 18:24.725
what he sees to be the problem of the war on terror.

18:24.825 --> 18:26.485
And he identifies two things.

18:26.585 --> 18:29.405
He says, he says he, he knows, he knows,

18:29.405 --> 18:31.285
and this is, this is a big part of the book too,

18:31.285 --> 18:34.765
like chapter, two of the book looks at this in depth

18:34.765 --> 18:36.885
because we can't understand the, the trajectory

18:36.945 --> 18:40.005
of these three men without understanding this kind of injury

18:40.005 --> 18:42.285
that they felt what I call an affective injury.

18:42.285 --> 18:45.125
It's very visceral at the fact that there is,

18:45.415 --> 18:47.885
there are wars happening across the Muslim world,

18:48.425 --> 18:51.005
and it seems like there's a great devaluation

18:51.145 --> 18:52.165
of Muslim life.

18:52.235 --> 18:54.485
There's the dehumanization of Muslim life,

18:54.905 --> 18:56.525
and they feel that they see it daily.

18:57.185 --> 19:01.085
Um, and, and Anwar Laki feels it to presumably,

19:01.985 --> 19:04.645
and he is addressing that.

19:05.185 --> 19:07.965
And he's saying, you know, the reason why

19:08.475 --> 19:11.205
there's this great apathy in the face of

19:11.715 --> 19:14.845
what everybody can see is a, an unjust war

19:15.105 --> 19:18.085
or an unjust series of wars, led by the US

19:18.345 --> 19:22.695
and NATO, is that, Muslims are afraid.

19:22.765 --> 19:24.455
They're all, they're all cowards,

19:24.755 --> 19:27.055
and especially they're leaders, right?

19:27.875 --> 19:30.615
And that's why they've hidden from you all the fact

19:30.615 --> 19:33.815
that there's this responsibility when,

19:33.815 --> 19:35.015
Muslim lands are attacked,

19:35.015 --> 19:37.055
there's this responsibility to fight back.

19:38.675 --> 19:41.735
So he provides for, for an audience

19:41.735 --> 19:43.975
that's feeling like there's this unjust state of affairs,

19:44.875 --> 19:47.215
he provides an, a diagnosis.

19:47.485 --> 19:49.935
He's saying, yeah, you guys haven't done anything about it.

19:49.995 --> 19:52.855
You, you, even, you, you, you say, you know,

19:53.015 --> 19:55.135
vituperative things, you say insults towards the,

19:55.135 --> 19:56.775
the Taliban towards Al Qaeda.

19:56.955 --> 19:59.095
Why? Because you're all afraid, right?

19:59.155 --> 20:00.815
You know that this state of affairs is wrong.

20:01.475 --> 20:03.135
Now, that can resonate with a lot of people

20:03.135 --> 20:05.215
because they see that there's an unjust state of affairs.

20:05.795 --> 20:09.415
But what's the second part of, of, of that, of that,

20:09.935 --> 20:11.855
argument that, that presents?

20:12.075 --> 20:15.585
He says, if we look at Islamic history,

20:16.795 --> 20:20.535
we see many cases where people were also afraid,

20:21.075 --> 20:23.295
but if they just did what God asked of them,

20:23.795 --> 20:25.255
God can create the miraculous.

20:25.675 --> 20:29.215
And so this is what I, what I call a utopian, vision

20:29.275 --> 20:30.655
of jihad, right?

20:30.955 --> 20:32.655
If you look at the pre-modern juris,

20:33.045 --> 20:35.805
they had a very pragmatic understanding

20:35.825 --> 20:38.005
of jihad, their understand.

20:38.005 --> 20:40.765
When I say jihad, I, I should say, like in this case, I am,

20:40.925 --> 20:44.045
I, I, it's a, it's a very contested term among Muslims.

20:44.185 --> 20:47.205
For some Muslims, like jihad means that the, the,

20:47.205 --> 20:48.725
literally the word means the struggle.

20:48.825 --> 20:50.925
So it can mean like a, a personal struggle,

20:51.165 --> 20:54.165
a spiritual struggle against one's base, desires,

20:54.705 --> 20:56.005
a struggle to do good.

20:56.385 --> 20:59.005
But when I'm using the term here, I'm using it,

20:59.245 --> 21:02.285
synonymously with the term al in Arabic, which means combat.

21:02.585 --> 21:06.165
And, and when you take a look at classical text of, of law,

21:06.635 --> 21:09.805
they are engaging with the term, using it synonymously,

21:09.805 --> 21:11.605
with, with Patel, with combat.

21:12.425 --> 21:15.685
So in a military context, and, and before,

21:15.705 --> 21:17.965
and also I should say for your listeners, like,

21:18.235 --> 21:21.045
it's important to know that for, for the Islamic tradition,

21:21.045 --> 21:24.005
the classical tradition to engage with this idea

21:24.005 --> 21:27.885
of jihad is, is, is, equivalent to engaging

21:27.885 --> 21:30.205
with a theory of just war in contemporary times.

21:30.305 --> 21:33.045
So, you know, we have within the Christian traditions,

21:33.045 --> 21:35.485
writers like Aquinas or Augustine,

21:35.585 --> 21:37.445
and in within the liberal tradition,

21:37.445 --> 21:38.965
philosophers like Michael Waltz,

21:39.305 --> 21:42.805
who write texts about when there's three questions relating

21:42.805 --> 21:45.805
to just war, when is it, when should war happen?

21:45.805 --> 21:49.325
When is it just what is just conduct in war?

21:50.075 --> 21:52.365
What, what should be done? What shouldn't be done in war?

21:52.865 --> 21:54.325
And what's a just piece?

21:54.535 --> 21:55.525
Those are the, the three

21:55.525 --> 21:56.645
main questions of a just war theory.

21:56.645 --> 21:59.245
They're all there. If you take a, a look at a books of,

21:59.265 --> 22:01.405
of classical Islamic law,

22:02.305 --> 22:05.205
and what was very different about the pre-modern period

22:05.525 --> 22:09.275
compared to the modern period with somebody like El Alki, is

22:09.275 --> 22:11.195
that in the pre-modern period, the Juris,

22:11.265 --> 22:14.915
were living in this environment of, of empires.

22:14.975 --> 22:19.195
And for them, they approach things in a very pragmatic way.

22:19.695 --> 22:20.875
Uh, what do I mean by that?

22:21.625 --> 22:26.595
They did not think that war was, this unmitigated good.

22:26.655 --> 22:29.835
In fact, they, there's a lot of evidence that suggests

22:29.835 --> 22:32.595
that they thought that war was, was, an evil

22:32.695 --> 22:34.035
and sometimes a necessary evil.

22:34.975 --> 22:39.435
Um, and they thought, okay, we have

22:39.435 --> 22:42.755
to weigh whether going to, whether the leader, the, the,

22:42.975 --> 22:45.475
you know, the Khalifa, the emperor should go to war or not.

22:45.615 --> 22:47.435
We have to weigh several considerations.

22:47.935 --> 22:49.595
Is it good for the population or not?

22:49.975 --> 22:51.515
Is it going to lead to turmoil?

22:52.015 --> 22:56.515
Is it, is, is peace something that can, lead to,

22:56.815 --> 23:00.995
a material enrichment of our realms to a,

23:01.615 --> 23:05.315
the ability to, to become, to, to,

23:05.345 --> 23:08.555
patronize the arts and the sciences, right?

23:09.215 --> 23:11.195
War was not just like something you had to do,

23:11.195 --> 23:13.915
like God said, go out and, and engage in conquest.

23:14.295 --> 23:17.715
Now that being said, conquest was itself still seen

23:17.735 --> 23:20.355
as a good, this was a, a realm of empires.

23:20.775 --> 23:24.315
And so if you could expand your imperial realms, not to con,

23:24.375 --> 23:26.035
not necessarily to convert people,

23:26.375 --> 23:29.795
but this idea of like, they did have an idea of, of,

23:29.795 --> 23:31.435
establishing God's glory on earth.

23:31.895 --> 23:35.605
If you could expand your realms, then that's,

23:35.625 --> 23:36.845
that's, that's great.

23:36.845 --> 23:37.925
That's something that you should do.

23:37.985 --> 23:39.685
And it has religious sanction, yes,

23:40.045 --> 23:42.365
religiously you should do that, but it's by no means.

23:42.435 --> 23:46.045
It's kind of like, yes, go, go out and trust in God,

23:46.045 --> 23:48.125
and he will make you victorious no matter what.

23:48.125 --> 23:50.205
And you must do this. God has said, you must do this.

23:51.265 --> 23:53.045
You move to Anki

23:53.045 --> 23:56.725
and what I call the, the, the utopian strand of jihad.

23:56.745 --> 23:58.925
And there is very much this idea of like,

23:59.225 --> 24:02.525
if you just trust in God, he'll make it happen, right?

24:02.545 --> 24:04.605
Oh, yes, you're fighting a nuclear superpower,

24:04.825 --> 24:06.605
but there's instances throughout history

24:06.605 --> 24:09.845
where God has made it possible for, for armies

24:09.845 --> 24:12.605
that were vastly outnumbered to defeat their enemies.

24:13.225 --> 24:16.725
So, and, and an like I said, he's this master rhetorician,

24:16.785 --> 24:18.965
and so he's very convincing in this way,

24:19.265 --> 24:22.285
and he changes the idea of what constitutes victory.

24:23.345 --> 24:26.325
He gives them the assurance that number one, one, yes,

24:26.325 --> 24:27.525
you may not see, you may die

24:27.525 --> 24:29.125
and you may not see the fruits of your labor,

24:29.465 --> 24:32.685
but if you guys keep going, number one, you know,

24:32.905 --> 24:34.165
God will accept your deeds.

24:34.165 --> 24:37.405
Because all these other Muslims are, you know, for

24:38.155 --> 24:40.405
alki at best, they're cowards at worse.

24:40.485 --> 24:41.685
They're, they're hypocrites.

24:41.685 --> 24:42.965
They're really, they're hypocrites.

24:42.965 --> 24:44.325
They're not true Muslims.

24:44.595 --> 24:47.445
Well, that's, that's, maybe putting words in his mouth,

24:47.545 --> 24:49.365
but they, you know, their,

24:49.365 --> 24:51.565
their faith is questionable, is dubious.

24:52.145 --> 24:55.445
So, so for, for, for Alak, he saying like,

24:55.625 --> 24:57.805
God will accept your deeds and,

24:58.625 --> 25:01.085
and you will be part of something

25:01.085 --> 25:03.405
that brings about justice on this earth,

25:03.515 --> 25:04.765
because you guys all know

25:04.765 --> 25:06.285
that the current state of affairs is wrong.

25:06.345 --> 25:08.045
We all know it. That's how he speaks

25:08.105 --> 25:09.845
to his, to his listener.

25:10.905 --> 25:13.645
And so that's what those, what what those men

25:13.705 --> 25:15.845
and what I would say a lot of, of those

25:15.845 --> 25:20.765
who gravitated towards a, a radical ideology, that's

25:20.765 --> 25:23.205
what they found compelling, is this kind of like

25:24.045 --> 25:26.245
anglophone preacher who can speak eloquently,

25:26.665 --> 25:30.845
who is number one seemingly telling them the truth about why

25:30.845 --> 25:35.525
their own leaders are not, are, are not responding to

25:35.525 --> 25:37.045
what they see to be an injustice,

25:37.545 --> 25:38.885
and then giving them a solution.

25:39.035 --> 25:42.925
There's a way out. Right now, it's worth saying

25:43.505 --> 25:46.485
the vast majority of Muslims were not on board with this,

25:46.905 --> 25:50.485
but you know, when you do have a few thousand

25:50.515 --> 25:53.445
that join a group like isis, it's, it becomes something

25:53.445 --> 25:54.565
that worries the state.

25:54.825 --> 25:57.965
The idea of solidarity is, is really big in the book.

25:58.065 --> 26:00.325
And, and the reason that it's big in the book is that,

26:02.165 --> 26:04.745
you know, I mentioned in chapter two that I try to,

26:04.925 --> 26:08.745
to show this sense of injury, affective injury

26:08.745 --> 26:11.625
that Muslims felt, that a lot of Muslims felt.

26:11.625 --> 26:13.385
I don't mean to generalize, but a lot of Muslims,

26:13.385 --> 26:15.385
especially those that attended the mosque felt

26:15.925 --> 26:17.505
during the war on terror.

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And the, the source of the sense of affect of injury is

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this relationship to the umma.

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The umma is, is it can be translated as nation,

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it can be translated as community.

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But when we talk about the Uma,

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we're talking about the worldwide Muslim community,

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a community made of what's often talked as as, as,

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as brothers and sisters in faith.

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And people have written up about thema in different ways.

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Um, some of them have talked about it as kind of,

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the equivalent of a, of a modern nation.

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In some ways, this, this, this imagined community in the,

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the sense of the, the theorist, Benedict Anderson.

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Some of them have talked about it as a, as a product of,

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of a response to, 19th century,

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European imperialism, like the needing to forge a sense of,

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of Muslim identity in the face of imperialism, especially,

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you know, the saltan nil Hamid, the, the second,

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of the Ottoman Empire really used the sense of Pan Islamism,

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to push back against the, the, the threat of,

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of European imperialism.

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But I make the contention

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that there's something really unique about this,

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this, this umma.

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And what's unique about it is that it's,

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it's forged through practices.

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It's forged through moral exhortations.

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If you go to Friday sermons, if you go

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to different Muslim community events, the the theme

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of taking care of, of each other of Muslims is big.

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And it's not just, it's not just, a lip service.

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It's not just like an ideal.

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It's supposed to be put into practice.

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So you see, like, you know, if there's a,

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a flood happening in Bangladesh, for instance,

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you'll see Muslims give donations and,

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and mosques really organize to do charity, efforts.

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And during those charity efforts, there's always reminders

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of like, your, your sisters and brothers

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and Islam have rights over you.

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You have to take care of them.

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And that, that encourages those types

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of charity drives whenever there's a disaster.

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If we think of what's happening in, in Gaza today,

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with the Israeli operations in Gaza, you'll see prayers,

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collective prayers asking people to, to, to, to ask God

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to relieve the suffering of, of those abroad.

28:34.185 --> 28:37.105
So it's not just like a, an imagined community.

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It's not just a, a kind of like, a resemblance thing.

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Oh, I resemble them. They, they have the same God as me.

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We pray the same. It's, it's put into action.

28:46.085 --> 28:47.945
It becomes, visceral.

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It becomes effective because of these practices.

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And here I draw a lot on anthropology, right?

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There's been this whole bunch

28:54.385 --> 28:56.905
of literature in the last two decades that talk about Islam,

28:57.325 --> 29:01.545
and, and Muslims as, as cultivating a certain type of,

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of subjectivity through their practices.

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So the Oma is very much a product of these practices

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and these, these moral ex on the pulpit to take care and,

29:11.715 --> 29:14.715
and to respect the rights of, of, of other Muslims.

29:16.045 --> 29:17.745
One of the things that I also take from,

29:17.745 --> 29:19.865
from the anthropology of Islam is this idea

29:19.865 --> 29:22.545
that we can take a look at groups that historic,

29:22.605 --> 29:24.305
the anthropology of Islam is, is groups

29:24.305 --> 29:26.185
that historically have been maligned, right?

29:26.185 --> 29:27.225
The Muslims, in many ways

29:27.225 --> 29:29.265
for the last two decades have been seen as, you know,

29:29.265 --> 29:31.025
are they engaged in creeping sharia?

29:31.085 --> 29:33.665
Are they radical? Like, can they really fit into the west?

29:34.005 --> 29:36.745
You know, do they really have enough criticality?

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Look what they did during the Rushdi affair.

29:38.625 --> 29:40.505
Look what they did during the Danish cartoon, right?

29:40.505 --> 29:43.045
There's this sense of like this maligned Muslim community.

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But what they do is they take a look at, at

29:46.075 --> 29:47.285
that community more closely,

29:47.505 --> 29:50.525
and they say, they actually have things for, to, for us

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to take us being like the West.

29:52.865 --> 29:54.565
We have things to learn from them.

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And, and what I try to do in the book is to say, like,

29:57.685 --> 30:02.325
this notion of the Ummah, it gives you a sense of

30:02.845 --> 30:04.965
a different type of solidarity than the one

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that's based on the nation state.

30:06.545 --> 30:10.565
And the nation state has been, in many ways the problem of

30:11.105 --> 30:12.765
the cause of Islamophobia, right?

30:12.765 --> 30:14.485
Do Muslims really fit into our nation state?

30:15.155 --> 30:17.245
It's been the, the, the, the driver

30:17.345 --> 30:18.525
behind the war on terror.

30:18.595 --> 30:21.965
Like, okay, America was injured, we were, we were,

30:22.285 --> 30:24.085
attacked, and now we have to respond and,

30:24.265 --> 30:26.605
and we have to protect our Western identity.

30:26.605 --> 30:29.245
There's always like the sense of like resemblance

30:29.385 --> 30:31.965
and like the nation, and this is us and them, and,

30:32.425 --> 30:34.485
and of course the Oma has an us and them too,

30:34.905 --> 30:38.685
but the types of practices that make it possible

30:38.705 --> 30:42.445
for somebody in Mauritania to

30:42.995 --> 30:46.845
give in charity to somebody in Bangladesh, that type of care

30:47.575 --> 30:49.385
teaches us something, I'd say.

30:49.485 --> 30:51.465
And it, it teaches us something about solidarity

30:51.525 --> 30:55.835
and something that may transcend the, the type of violence

30:55.905 --> 30:58.195
that we've seen in the last two decades and beyond.

30:58.195 --> 30:59.675
If we think of the history of the West,

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and it's one where it, it, it demands effort.

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It demands practices, that transform itself,

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that solidarity is a commitment to, caring

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for the other, despite their differences,

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despite their failures too.

31:19.535 --> 31:21.385
When we think about, you know, the radical

31:21.895 --> 31:23.065
despite their failures

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and to, together recognize,

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you know, and this, I, I take from t the, the anthropologist

31:32.625 --> 31:34.225
recognize that we're part of a common world.

31:35.365 --> 31:37.745
Um, so that's, that's the part about solidarity.

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And really, like what I saw in these Muslim communities

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was that, their understanding of the radical

31:49.205 --> 31:53.765
was, not one that, that

31:54.425 --> 31:57.065
excused

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or pardoned the radical in, at, at the level of,

31:59.725 --> 32:01.185
you know, of the law.

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If they broke the law, they needed to pay

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for it across the board.

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My interlocutors thought that way,

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but they also saw the radical in the same way

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that they saw any other human being as,

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immensely fallible, we're all fallible.

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That's the way they saw it.

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And there's this, concept within the Islamic tradition

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of misguidance al that's very prominent.

32:25.715 --> 32:28.845
It's in the central prayer of Muslims, the Fatah,

32:29.215 --> 32:33.685
where they ask God to save them from, going astray.

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And it's also central to the, the thought

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of perhaps the most important,

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Sunni Muslim intellectual,

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who wrote an autobiography that was very influe

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that's been very influential for centuries,

32:48.585 --> 32:52.015
where he talks about misguidance lurking at every corner

32:52.115 --> 32:53.175
in his life, right?

32:53.635 --> 32:57.695
And his, and the need to, for him it was the need

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to intellectually examine different doctrines to be able

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to find what the, the right path is.

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But the point is that whether we look at the central Muslim

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prayer or the life of, within Islamic thought,

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there's this idea that, that misguidance

33:10.635 --> 33:11.695
is lurking at every moment.

33:12.235 --> 33:14.175
But related to that is the idea

33:14.175 --> 33:16.415
that God's mercy is infinite, right?

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And so there's a, there's a sense

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of incredible human fallibility,

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and that's something that my, that the, my interlocutors,

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the Muslim community that I examined,

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the Muslim community from which these three men came,

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they weren't really able to, to share that

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or live that precisely.

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Because, you know, there's this idea of guilt

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by association, in relation to the radical.

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But if we pay attention to, to what they have to offer,

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they offer a, a, a, a view of our,

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co citizens as immensely fallible,

33:48.365 --> 33:50.925
and one where we come from different walks of life

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and we need to help each other out.

00:00 - In 2016, right when I was finishing my PhD at the University of Toronto, I got a phone call from the RCMP, that's the, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. It's, it's, I guess, the equivalent of the, the FBI for Canada.

00:18 - And, the RCMP told me that, an individual by the name of Mohamed del Ferric had been arrested, and was, gonna be put on trial in Brooklyn in the United States. He's a, an American citizen. The reason they were calling me is because, when I was doing my undergraduate degree at the University of Manitoba, I had known this individual, alongside another two individuals named, far Ma.

00:50 - And, me, ya and all three individuals in March of 2007 disappeared. and when I say disappeared, basically the, the people who knew them, weren't sure where they had gone. And it became a kind of a mystery for the next decade, close to a decade, until that phone call from the RCMP. And what emerged in subsequent years after they had left is that those three individuals had, gone to, Pakistan and had joined, Al-Qaeda. When I got that phone call in 2016, immediately the question

01:32 - that I had, like the question of a lot of people who knew those three individuals before they had left was, was why, what exactly was their trajectory? And in many ways, this was a very similar question that's asked in, in radicalization studies, right? This question of like, why do individuals go to join groups like Al-Qaeda or groups like isis? It's, it's worth mentioning that these three individuals had left long

01:58 - before this type of, like exodus from western fighters to, to a place like Syria and Iraq to, to join isis. So in many ways, they were kind of pioneers in this, this trend that that was going to really become very worrisome for, for, Western states. So the question of why was not an uncommon one. The thing is that I have a particular background in, Islamic studies. My training is in classical text. I'm a, a pre-modern historian.

02:29 - My first book was examining Islamic law between the 10th and 13th centuries, and looking at, debates between a scholarly class, a class of, of what I call a jurist. And so, unlike a lot of, of radicalization studies experts, what I have is a certain expertise in not only the Islamic tradition, but the ability to read Arabic at a high level of proficiency, to understand classical text, to understand classical arguments.

02:57 - I've also been trained, even though I'm a, a pre-modern historian, as somebody who's, who's trained in a, a religious studies department, I really gravitated towards, professors that had knowledge in, in what we call the anthropology of Islam, which is another field that people who work within radicalization studies, it's a completely different discipline. They, they're typically, an offshoot of political science.

03:21 - So not really that anthropological focus, which really, like, there's two things that were really important about anthropology, that training in anthropology. One is trying to understand from inside, like the, the ideas, the beliefs, and the practices of particular community. That's number one. And number two is that the, the approach of people within anthropology is a lot more critical than

03:43 - the approach of people within, within radicalization studies or terrorist studies. And the reason being, and this I found out when I started asking the question, you know, why, why did they do it? Why did they go? What were their motivations? Is that, and, and this, this became really the, the basis of the book, which is like, it's a critique of radicalization studies precisely because I, I go to the question,

04:05 - I asked the same question, but I approach it from a completely different angle. So what I found out very early on is that radicalization studies can't really transcend the, the interests of the state, the terms of the state. By that, what I mean is that radicalization studies emerges post nine 11, and it's specifically there to help the state out in the war on terror to identify who are the bad guys, who are the good guys?

04:34 - And, in so far as, and when I say who are the good guys, basically, who are the Muslims that we don't need to worry about? and in so far as it's doing this, it isn't really asking questions about is our approach in the war on terror, the right one? How have we contributed to the violence that we see in the world today? Really, what, what what it takes for granted is the state is, has its agenda.

05:00 - It wants to conduct itself in a certain way, namely in this situation, it wants to engage in wars overseas. The global war on terror, which is this really ill-defined undefined, global conflict where any place on the globe, according to an act of Congress after us Congress after nine 11, could be a war zone, right? And so this is, this is what the state wants. How do we facilitate the states?

05:28 - And by making sure that we can identify any potential threats. And as time went on, the threat moved away from not just understanding the radical Muslim, but this, this figure of the homegrown radical. It took some years actually, and that's a, a central argument of my book. And it's also something that's completely obscured within radicalization studies, is that this, this idea of the, the,

05:49 - the homegrown radical took time to emerge. And we have to ask ourselves, why did it emerge like several years after nine 11, right? So, so, so right away I saw that I'd be approaching this from a very different lens. And one of the things that becomes very clear in my approach, to, to examining the question of why, why they did it, is when you take a look at radicalization studies, there's this attention to variables. What are the variables that could indicate

06:20 - that somebody is going to radicalize that a Muslim? And, and, and I should backtrack and say like, we know that radicalization studies is not concerned only with Muslims. you know, in recent years, there's been an interest in thinking about white supremacism as a type of radicalization, but really it emerged post nine 11 focusing on Muslims. And, and Muslims have always,

06:43 - and will always, in my view, be the paradigm for the radical. There's this attention to variables. What variables can we identify that makes somebody at risk? And they're very clear, radicalization studies experts, and this is, I think to their credit, they're very clear that none of these predict these variables have any real predictive value in the sense of saying, like, okay, let's say, somebody is, newly religious, they've newly found religion.

07:10 - That may be a variable that seems to be common between a lot of people who, who radicalize and join groups like Alpe or isis. But there's no, way that we can say that definitively somebody who gets, who becomes newly religious will end up in that, in that, on that path. In fact, you know, it's a very small number of people that would end up on that path. So, so, so it's a strange, it's,

07:36 - it's a strange approach in some ways because number one, you're trying to find these variables that are not always, shedding much light on, on the, the motivations, like the personal beliefs of, of those fighters. For instance, you could say like, like to say they're new. They're, they're, they've, they've newly found, religion doesn't tell you much about like, what's compelling about jihadist ideolog, right?

07:59 - It doesn't tell you much about that. Or to say, you know, they came to Canada and they, they, they felt, they, they were, new students in Canada and they didn't fit in. And so they, they went to, they reappropriated their Arab identity, right? It doesn't tell you much about the actual ideology. It just tells you these variables about some people in these situations tend to gravitate towards these ideologies that we don't like.

08:28 - So it doesn't give you much predictive value, and it doesn't shed light on on what's compelling, for about, about certain ideas. And I think one of the reasons that we don't look at the radicalization experts don't look at what's compelling is, number one, and when you start to look at what's compelling, you risk, and this was really a, a, a fraught issue. Post nine 11, you risk giving the semblance of legitimacy to that ideology.

08:52 - 'cause you're starting to look at what, why, why could resonate with an individual. And then number two, I don't, I think a lot of these radicalization experts don't have the means to do it because they don't have like a great depth of the Islamic tradition, and they don't have, oftentimes they don't have Arabic, or if they do it, it's not necessarily the type of Arabic that would let them, that would permit them to, to examine kind of the, the evolution

09:18 - of jihadist thought within, within the, within, Muslim communities within Islam, took the approach of what makes this these ideas compelling. And then number two, what is the, what are the continuities and what are the ruptures in the ideas of jihad? Because I had actually studied the pre-modern doctrines of jihad. I I published with, the Oxford Journal of Islamic Studies, a lengthy, article on a,

09:44 - 11th century jurist, a legal scholar, that had, you know, in many ways brought the, the doctrine of jihad in a new direction that had been very influential for the Ottoman Empire in the century, in the subsequent entry, centuries. so I knew quite a bit about the classical doctrine. And when I started to look at, you know, the, the motivations of these guys, everything pointed back to a very particular anglophone, a preacher scholar, named Anir Lalaki.

10:15 - And Anwar Lalaki is, he's very well known, within, policy circles. he's had a lot of media coverage. And the reason is because he was a real thorn on the side of the Obama administration. And Barack Obama, sanctioned the assassination of, of Annu Lalaki when he was in Yemen, despite the fact that Annu Lalaki was an American citizen. So it was a big controversy at the time.

10:40 - but the, the reason the Obama administration did it was that they were noticing that so many homegrown radicals, that, so many, of those that had gravitated towards violence within the anglophone world were listening to this guy. he had immense influence in, in this wave that I, that I mentioned did not exist before nine 11. It, it exists. It, it came about in the years after nine 11, and specifically when this preacher

11:10 - Anki had a certain turn when he became convinced, we could call it a radical term. But, you know, part of the point of this book is, is to get us to transcend this language of radicalization and of, of the radical and the moderate Muslims. But for, for, for the time being, you know, it's what we call a radical. We could talk about this radical turn of Anki when he becomes convinced that violence mil military violence is a way to, respond

11:36 - to the American war on terror, to the American presence in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen. And, at the time, Somali is soon gonna add to the list. So, so by that time, there's already three, and I guess we could add Pakistan too, 'cause it's gonna become a, a site of drone attacks. There's three to four zone, war, countries that are, facing, that are arenas of the, of the war on terror.

12:04 - And Anwar Laki becomes convinced that, the proper way to response is through what he calls Jihad, basically through, through armed, violence. And it becomes very convincing for a lot of these, of these anglophone, Muslims, including these three individuals that I knew and that, that had left in 2007. And so it became very clear to me that, that that was, those ideas were, were what they found compelling. And the question that I asked myself was,

12:36 - what were the continuities and ruptures in Anwar Laki thought on Jihad? How did he change the doctrine of Jihad to make it compelling to anglophone Muslims? Right? Why in 2000 and in 2005, six, when he, started making the first lectures, that would become very influential, advocating for militarism. one set

13:04 - of lectures particularly influenced these three men. It was called Constance, on the Path of Jihad, a six part lecture series. And what, what, how did he, in this historical juncture make, a case for armed, resistance, we could say for, for an armed response to the War on terror? so that's a major part of the book. And then the other motivation is in 2017, so the year

13:40 - after I get that phone call from the RCMP, I'm invited to testify, in Brooklyn at the trial of, of Moham Mohanad Delek. And after going to the trial and, seeing the way that it was conducted, I'm coming back to Canada, and I'm feeling very uneasy with the whole process. I'm feeling very uneasy with some of the things that I feel are irregularities within the trial. And I tell myself, okay, so I have this question

14:15 - of why, why did they go? But I also have a question of what is the impact of, a a a, a case of radicalization on a Muslim community? How does it shape the way that the state treats its Muslim communities? And so I started to do, to examine that question as well, that that was the other motivation. And so much of the book, although a lot of the book is looking at motivations

14:48 - and looking at continued continuities and ruptures in the doctrine of Jihad, a huge part of the book, a large part of the book is, is looking at Islamophobia and is thinking about what happens to a community when it loses three of its members to radicalization. and one of the things that it, that the book, that the book does that's kind of unique is, yes, there's a question of Islamophobia, but there's also the question of of of how did that, does

15:16 - that community understand the radical, right? They've lost three of their members. These were people that were part of that community. How do they l how do they live with that? How do they look at that in hindsight? How do they assess that situation? And, and here too, my training as an, as a religious studies scholar matters because these communities have a particular lens based off of religion to think about what's happened.

15:41 - And it's a very different lens than a state centric one. If we take a look at his doctrine, it it, there was a radical break between the, the pre-modern doctrine of jihad and his understanding of jihad. Now, he's not completely novel because he is within this, tradition, a mod, a very modern tradition that I'd say starts, we could date it differently, but let's say it starts in the 1980s with a, with a,

16:08 - a dress called Abdullah Za, who was the, main, organizer and ideolog for, bringing mostly Arabs, but Muslims to Afghanistan to fight the Soviet Union. So, so an, Anir Laki is very indebted to his ideas and to those that were subsequently also indebted to, to, to zas ideas and, and came before aki. In fact, the series of lectures called, Constance on the Path of Jihad was, a translation and, and slash commentary.

16:43 - It was a commentary of, another, set of writings from an Arab, Saudi Arabian, ideologue, named Yusef Ari. So, so, so, so he's not, you know, completely coming up with ideas outta thin air, but he's the first eloquent anglophone who can present these ideas in a compelling way. And how does he do it in a compelling way? He's specifically addressing the war on terror. And that's, that's really the missing key when we say like,

17:17 - after nine 11, you don't have this problem of homegrown radicals. And suddenly, you know, around 2005, you do. And, and that's exactly when Anwar lalaki is, is becoming very popular. He had become popular even before these quote unquote radical lectures through what we would call very mainstream popular preaching. He had, kind of, he was a pioneer in the, in the art of, of, audio lectures, first in CD form,

17:44 - and then they started becoming very popular, online in MP three form. So his original, lectures, and he was, he was a master at a Ian, his original lectures were on things like the lives of prophets, you know, like, the live life of Abraham and, Adam and all these biblical figures. That's, that's where Muslims, throughout the anglophone world first started listening to him and started to respect him.

18:10 - They started to say, this is somebody who's very eloquent, knowledgeable, I can gain from him. He takes this turn, right? And when he takes this turn, he's really addressing what he sees to be the problem of the war on terror. And he identifies two things. He says, he says he, he knows, he knows, and this is, this is a big part of the book too, like chapter, two of the book looks at this in depth because we can't understand the, the trajectory

18:36 - of these three men without understanding this kind of injury that they felt what I call an affective injury. It's very visceral at the fact that there is, there are wars happening across the Muslim world, and it seems like there's a great devaluation of Muslim life. There's the dehumanization of Muslim life, and they feel that they see it daily. and, and Anwar Laki feels it to presumably, and he is addressing that.

19:05 - And he's saying, you know, the reason why there's this great apathy in the face of what everybody can see is a, an unjust war or an unjust series of wars, led by the US and NATO, is that, Muslims are afraid. They're all, they're all cowards, and especially they're leaders, right? And that's why they've hidden from you all the fact that there's this responsibility when, Muslim lands are attacked,

19:35 - there's this responsibility to fight back. So he provides for, for an audience that's feeling like there's this unjust state of affairs, he provides an, a diagnosis. He's saying, yeah, you guys haven't done anything about it. You, you, even, you, you, you say, you know, vituperative things, you say insults towards the, the Taliban towards Al Qaeda. Why? Because you're all afraid, right? You know that this state of affairs is wrong.

20:01 - Now, that can resonate with a lot of people because they see that there's an unjust state of affairs. But what's the second part of, of, of that, of that, argument that, that presents? He says, if we look at Islamic history, we see many cases where people were also afraid, but if they just did what God asked of them, God can create the miraculous. And so this is what I, what I call a utopian, vision of jihad, right?

20:30 - If you look at the pre-modern juris, they had a very pragmatic understanding of jihad, their understand. When I say jihad, I, I should say, like in this case, I am, I, I, it's a, it's a very contested term among Muslims. For some Muslims, like jihad means that the, the, literally the word means the struggle. So it can mean like a, a personal struggle, a spiritual struggle against one's base, desires, a struggle to do good.

20:56 - But when I'm using the term here, I'm using it, synonymously with the term al in Arabic, which means combat. And, and when you take a look at classical text of, of law, they are engaging with the term, using it synonymously, with, with Patel, with combat. So in a military context, and, and before, and also I should say for your listeners, like, it's important to know that for, for the Islamic tradition, the classical tradition to engage with this idea of jihad is, is, is, equivalent to engaging

21:27 - with a theory of just war in contemporary times. So, you know, we have within the Christian traditions, writers like Aquinas or Augustine, and in within the liberal tradition, philosophers like Michael Waltz, who write texts about when there's three questions relating to just war, when is it, when should war happen? When is it just what is just conduct in war? What, what should be done? What shouldn't be done in war? And what's a just piece?

21:54 - Those are the, the three main questions of a just war theory. They're all there. If you take a, a look at a books of, of classical Islamic law, and what was very different about the pre-modern period compared to the modern period with somebody like El Alki, is that in the pre-modern period, the Juris, were living in this environment of, of empires. And for them, they approach things in a very pragmatic way. what do I mean by that?

22:21 - They did not think that war was, this unmitigated good. In fact, they, there's a lot of evidence that suggests that they thought that war was, was, an evil and sometimes a necessary evil. and they thought, okay, we have to weigh whether going to, whether the leader, the, the, you know, the Khalifa, the emperor should go to war or not. We have to weigh several considerations. Is it good for the population or not? Is it going to lead to turmoil?

22:52 - Is it, is, is peace something that can, lead to, a material enrichment of our realms to a, the ability to, to become, to, to, patronize the arts and the sciences, right? War was not just like something you had to do, like God said, go out and, and engage in conquest. Now that being said, conquest was itself still seen as a good, this was a, a realm of empires. And so if you could expand your imperial realms, not to con, not necessarily to convert people,

23:26 - but this idea of like, they did have an idea of, of, establishing God's glory on earth. If you could expand your realms, then that's, that's, that's great. That's something that you should do. And it has religious sanction, yes, religiously you should do that, but it's by no means. It's kind of like, yes, go, go out and trust in God, and he will make you victorious no matter what. And you must do this. God has said, you must do this.

23:51 - You move to Anki and what I call the, the, the utopian strand of jihad. And there is very much this idea of like, if you just trust in God, he'll make it happen, right? yes, you're fighting a nuclear superpower, but there's instances throughout history where God has made it possible for, for armies that were vastly outnumbered to defeat their enemies. So, and, and an like I said, he's this master rhetorician, and so he's very convincing in this way,

24:19 - and he changes the idea of what constitutes victory. He gives them the assurance that number one, one, yes, you may not see, you may die and you may not see the fruits of your labor, but if you guys keep going, number one, you know, God will accept your deeds. Because all these other Muslims are, you know, for alki at best, they're cowards at worse. They're, they're hypocrites. They're really, they're hypocrites.

24:42 - They're not true Muslims. Well, that's, that's, maybe putting words in his mouth, but they, you know, their, their faith is questionable, is dubious. So, so for, for, for Alak, he saying like, God will accept your deeds and, and you will be part of something that brings about justice on this earth, because you guys all know that the current state of affairs is wrong.

25:06 - We all know it. That's how he speaks to his, to his listener. And so that's what those, what what those men and what I would say a lot of, of those who gravitated towards a, a radical ideology, that's what they found compelling, is this kind of like anglophone preacher who can speak eloquently, who is number one seemingly telling them the truth about why their own leaders are not, are, are not responding to what they see to be an injustice,

25:37 - and then giving them a solution. There's a way out. Right now, it's worth saying the vast majority of Muslims were not on board with this, but you know, when you do have a few thousand that join a group like isis, it's, it becomes something that worries the state. The idea of solidarity is, is really big in the book. And, and the reason that it's big in the book is that, you know, I mentioned in chapter two that I try to, to show this sense of injury, affective injury

26:08 - that Muslims felt, that a lot of Muslims felt. I don't mean to generalize, but a lot of Muslims, especially those that attended the mosque felt during the war on terror. And the, the source of the sense of affect of injury is this relationship to the umma. The umma is, is it can be translated as nation, it can be translated as community. But when we talk about the Uma, we're talking about the worldwide Muslim community,

26:37 - a community made of what's often talked as as, as, as brothers and sisters in faith. And people have written up about thema in different ways. some of them have talked about it as kind of, the equivalent of a, of a modern nation. In some ways, this, this, this imagined community in the, the sense of the, the theorist, Benedict Anderson. Some of them have talked about it as a, as a product of, of a response to, 19th century, European imperialism, like the needing to forge a sense of,

27:10 - of Muslim identity in the face of imperialism, especially, you know, the saltan nil Hamid, the, the second, of the Ottoman Empire really used the sense of Pan Islamism, to push back against the, the, the threat of, of European imperialism. But I make the contention that there's something really unique about this, this, this umma. And what's unique about it is that it's, it's forged through practices.

27:34 - It's forged through moral exhortations. If you go to Friday sermons, if you go to different Muslim community events, the the theme of taking care of, of each other of Muslims is big. And it's not just, it's not just, a lip service. It's not just like an ideal. It's supposed to be put into practice. So you see, like, you know, if there's a, a flood happening in Bangladesh, for instance, you'll see Muslims give donations and,

28:03 - and mosques really organize to do charity, efforts. And during those charity efforts, there's always reminders of like, your, your sisters and brothers and Islam have rights over you. You have to take care of them. And that, that encourages those types of charity drives whenever there's a disaster. If we think of what's happening in, in Gaza today, with the Israeli operations in Gaza, you'll see prayers, collective prayers asking people to, to, to, to ask God

28:31 - to relieve the suffering of, of those abroad. So it's not just like a, an imagined community. It's not just a, a kind of like, a resemblance thing. I resemble them. They, they have the same God as me. We pray the same. It's, it's put into action. It becomes, visceral. It becomes effective because of these practices. And here I draw a lot on anthropology, right? There's been this whole bunch of literature in the last two decades that talk about Islam,

28:57 - and, and Muslims as, as cultivating a certain type of, of subjectivity through their practices. So the Oma is very much a product of these practices and these, these moral ex on the pulpit to take care and, and to respect the rights of, of, of other Muslims. One of the things that I also take from, from the anthropology of Islam is this idea that we can take a look at groups that historic, the anthropology of Islam is, is groups that historically have been maligned, right?

29:26 - The Muslims, in many ways for the last two decades have been seen as, you know, are they engaged in creeping sharia? Are they radical? Like, can they really fit into the west? You know, do they really have enough criticality? Look what they did during the Rushdi affair. Look what they did during the Danish cartoon, right? There's this sense of like this maligned Muslim community. But what they do is they take a look at, at that community more closely,

29:47 - and they say, they actually have things for, to, for us to take us being like the West. We have things to learn from them. And, and what I try to do in the book is to say, like, this notion of the Ummah, it gives you a sense of a different type of solidarity than the one that's based on the nation state. And the nation state has been, in many ways the problem of the cause of Islamophobia, right? Do Muslims really fit into our nation state?

30:15 - It's been the, the, the, the driver behind the war on terror. Like, okay, America was injured, we were, we were, attacked, and now we have to respond and, and we have to protect our Western identity. There's always like the sense of like resemblance and like the nation, and this is us and them, and, and of course the Oma has an us and them too, but the types of practices that make it possible for somebody in Mauritania to

30:42 - give in charity to somebody in Bangladesh, that type of care teaches us something, I'd say. And it, it teaches us something about solidarity and something that may transcend the, the type of violence that we've seen in the last two decades and beyond. If we think of the history of the West, and it's one where it, it, it demands effort. It demands practices, that transform itself, that solidarity is a commitment to, caring for the other, despite their differences,

31:17 - despite their failures too. When we think about, you know, the radical despite their failures and to, together recognize, you know, and this, I, I take from t the, the anthropologist recognize that we're part of a common world. so that's, that's the part about solidarity. And really, like what I saw in these Muslim communities was that, their understanding of the radical was, not one that, that

31:54 - excused or pardoned the radical in, at, at the level of, you know, of the law. If they broke the law, they needed to pay for it across the board. My interlocutors thought that way, but they also saw the radical in the same way that they saw any other human being as, immensely fallible, we're all fallible. That's the way they saw it.

32:16 - And there's this, concept within the Islamic tradition of misguidance al that's very prominent. It's in the central prayer of Muslims, the Fatah, where they ask God to save them from, going astray. And it's also central to the, the thought of perhaps the most important, Sunni Muslim intellectual, who wrote an autobiography that was very influe that's been very influential for centuries, where he talks about misguidance lurking at every corner

32:52 - in his life, right? And his, and the need to, for him it was the need to intellectually examine different doctrines to be able to find what the, the right path is. But the point is that whether we look at the central Muslim prayer or the life of, within Islamic thought, there's this idea that, that misguidance is lurking at every moment. But related to that is the idea that God's mercy is infinite, right?

33:16 - And so there's a, there's a sense of incredible human fallibility, and that's something that my, that the, my interlocutors, the Muslim community that I examined, the Muslim community from which these three men came, they weren't really able to, to share that or live that precisely. Because, you know, there's this idea of guilt by association, in relation to the radical. But if we pay attention to, to what they have to offer,

33:41 - they offer a, a, a, a view of our, co citizens as immensely fallible, and one where we come from different walks of life and we need to help each other out.

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