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Iran: A Modern History

View more insights in Arts and Humanities - History - Asian History

View more figures from Yale University

View the page of Abbas Amanat

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Abbas Amanat explores Iranian politics, society, and culture, uncovering how the religious establishment gained and retained control of the state for 40 years.

Image courtesy of interviewee. March 5, 2024

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This video video is a lecture or discussion about the history and dynamics of modern Iran, covering the complexities of its historical narrative, social tensions, and political structures. The speaker emphasizes the importance of understanding Iran's history from an earlier period rather than jumping into the 19th or 20th centuries directly.

Key points include:

1. **Periodization**: The speaker argues that Iran's history should be viewed starting from the early modern period, with critical developments such as the rise of Shiism as the state-enforced national creed emerging in the 16th century.

2. **Political and Cultural Dynamics**: The speaker criticizes conventional barriers in historical scholarship that separate political, socioeconomic, and cultural narratives, advocating for a more integrated approach to understanding Iran’s history.

3. **Continuity and Change**: There is emphasis on continuity amidst change, highlighting the interaction between traditional institutions, particularly the religious establishment and the state, which have significantly influenced Iranian society throughout history.

4. **The Islamic Revolution (1979)**: The speaker discusses the revolution's roots, the socio-political environment leading up to it, and suggests that the revolution, while resulting in the rise of a clergy-led regime, was not an inevitable outcome but rather the result of various social dynamics and failures within the Pahlavi regime.

5. **Domestic and International Relations**: The Islamic Republic's complex domestic agenda involves attempts to create an Islamic society amidst growing dissatisfaction among a modern, educated youth population. Internationally, the regime has engaged in anti-Western rhetoric and formed alliances with countries like Russia and China, reflecting an attempt to project power regionally.

6. **Contemporary Iran**: The speaker notes the growing discontent among the populace, particularly regarding the lack of basic freedoms, and the state's reactionary measures to suppress dissent. They emphasize the internal challenges the regime faces now compared to its past assertiveness.

Overall, the discussion highlights how historical trajectories, socio-political structures, and external relations intersect to shape modern Iran, illuminating the ongoing tensions within the Iranian society and governance.

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Here are some suggested articles and resources that are similar to the content of your video about modern Iran and its historical dynamics:

1. **“Iran’s Political Dynamics: Continuity and Change”** - This article discusses the historical evolution of Iran's political landscape, examining the interplay between traditional institutions and modern governance.

2. **“The Role of Shi’ism in Shaping Iranian Identity”** - This piece explores how the rise of Shi'ism as the state religion in the 16th century affected Iran's national identity and political structures.

3. **“The Impact of the 1979 Islamic Revolution on Iran’s Society”** - This article analyzes the socio-political environment before and after the Islamic Revolution, exploring the roots of the revolution, the emergence of the clergy-led regime, and the subsequent societal changes.

4. **“Iran's Complex Relationship with the West: Historical Perspectives”** - A discussion on how historical grievances and contemporary political dynamics shape Iran's external relations, particularly with Western nations.

5. **“The Youth and Discontent in Contemporary Iran”** - This article focuses on the growing dissatisfaction among the younger population in Iran, examining their aspirations and the challenges they face within the current regime.

6. **“Periodization in Iranian History: A New Approach”** - An academic article that critiques traditional periodization in Iranian historical narratives, advocating for a more integrated understanding of the country’s past.

7. **“Social Movements in Iran: Historical Convideo and Contemporary Challenges”** - An exploration of the social tensions within Iran, focusing on movements designed to foster change in society and governance, rooted in historical conflicts.

8. **“Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: Balance of Power in the Region”** - This article delves into Iran's international relations post-1979, including its alliances and anti-Western stances in the convideo of regional politics.

These resources should provide a deeper understanding of the historical and sociopolitical dynamics outlined in your summary, emphasizing the importance of viewing Iran through both historical and contemporary lenses.

X-TIMESTAMP-MAP:LOCAL=00:00:00.000,MPEGTS=900000

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I've been teaching this topic for many years, for the past

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four decades, I would say, on

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and off, while I was teaching at Yale,

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I had offered courses on modern Iran,

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and in the process it became apparent that much of the

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textbooks and the material that they have assigned

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to the class, there is, a shortage,

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or there is a, a gap in several respects.

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First of all, in terms of periodization.

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So, and in terms of the substance of the issues

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that have been, covered in, available textbooks,

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I'm not critical of them,

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but my approach was somewhat different.

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For one thing is that, better understanding

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of Iran, it seems to me.

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And for that matter, I would say the rest of the region,

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which nowadays is referred to as the Middle East,

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their history should be really looked at,

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at least from early modern times, rather than from the 19th

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or the 20th centuries.

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In the case of Iran in particular, there are three points

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that, justifies a kind of a,

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a broader approach to the history of the period.

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Uh, the first is that to understand modern Iran,

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one should look back at some

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och making events that shaped the Iranian history.

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In, in the case of Iran, probably the most significant,

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the most critical is the,

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rise of Shiism as the,

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national creed.

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Rather, I should say, the creed that was adopted by a state

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and enforced by the state.

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Because much of the conversion, shes in the 16th century

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and later was by, by the use of this, by the force

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of the state, not is volunteer

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conversion as indeed many a times conversions are.

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And then, the second thing, which corresponds to that is

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that it's the 16th century that we see the emergence of.

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We witness the emergence of something called Iran in a kind

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of a unified empire, that eventually,

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I would call it a nation empire.

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'cause the force of shiza

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and the shaping, geographical shaping of Iran,

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complimented each other in this crucial time period in

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early, 16th century

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and thereof, thereof, throughout the period of 16th

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and 17th centuries,

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because it's not just one moment, it's

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probably took Iran more than two centuries

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to be fully converted to Shiism.

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And it took a very long time to stand vis-a-vis

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its, neighbors nemesis, basically,

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as Iran became more surrounded by a Sony world,

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which was really hostile to it,

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the Ottoman Empire in its western borders, the,

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backs,

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and later on, the Afghans on its eastern borders, both

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of them staunch Sonis

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and further on the southeast of Iran, the

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Mogul Empire of India.

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These, although the ul of Empire of Iran,

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had much more in common with Iran, including the language,

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because Persian was the lingua franca of the

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UL Empire of India.

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Um, despite the fact that there were much commonalities

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between the two empires, still, there was,

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a distinct feature into the Iranian world

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that was really unique.

04:12.665 --> 04:14.045
In the course of modern times.

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The shaping of Iran, also

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can be compared in early modern times to many other,

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example, in Europe, for instance,

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you would see the Habsburg Empire

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is also shaping at the same time period

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with a religious ideolog.

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That's becomes the, basically the champion of,

04:45.255 --> 04:48.835
of, Catholicism.

04:49.495 --> 04:53.475
And the same way that we can see emerges in Iran,

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perhaps some examples in Japan, some examples in China,

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we can see some comparisons.

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This is the age of the shaping of the empires.

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So vid the empire is one of them. Okay?

05:07.635 --> 05:08.815
So that's one thing.

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The second thing is, why I

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embarked on this project.

05:16.845 --> 05:20.945
As you see this book, which is fairly big, it was

05:20.945 --> 05:24.105
by the way, not intend, intended to be a thousand pages.

05:24.205 --> 05:27.185
It just happens to be a thousand, a book of a thousand page.

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The second point about it is that I tried to, in a sense,

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break through the conventional barriers

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that often defines political history

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vis-a-vis socioeconomic history, vis-a-vis cultural history,

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and try to adopt a,

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more comprehensive approach whereby I would be able to bring

05:57.985 --> 06:01.685
all these various elements, various approaches together

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in one volume, with the reason that, if you don't do so,

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the whole, the wholeness of the picture

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is going to be affected.

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The whole, kind of historical process

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is going to be affected.

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Therefore, there is a, there is a,

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desire to look at all these various aspects, cultural,

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socioeconomic, and political together.

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That's what I actually explained in

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the introduction of the book.

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Uh, at as such, my book probably is

06:43.675 --> 06:48.515
a curious example of long re, of the French model

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that is very popular with the School of Als

06:53.615 --> 06:56.235
and, that kind of a scholarship.

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Uh, but it's deferred from,

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the, from the annals in the sense that,

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it pays more attention to textual

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and cultural issues than you would find in the works

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of prade or blush

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or other major figures of the,

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of the analysis school.

07:23.615 --> 07:25.235
But by

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and large, you can see that that kind

07:27.795 --> 07:32.145
of a model was in my mind when I,

07:32.145 --> 07:34.585
worked on this book, which took quite a long time.

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It's about 20 years, took me to, finish this book.

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And then of course, I did other things,

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but this was in the process.

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Uh, and the third point, why I was interested

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to write this book is to try to show

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the theme of continuity

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and the challenge of modernity

07:59.325 --> 08:00.505
in effect, you.

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That is, that the purpose of this book is to try to see that

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certain institutions

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or complimentary institutions that are very crucial,

08:12.805 --> 08:15.255
very present in Iran since the ancient times,

08:16.605 --> 08:21.555
these completely was affected in the course of the early,

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modern and modern times, to become,

08:26.555 --> 08:28.405
what Iran is today.

08:29.305 --> 08:31.325
So try to show this process of

08:32.105 --> 08:34.805
how these complementary institutions have changed

08:35.305 --> 08:36.805
by complementary institutions.

08:37.005 --> 08:41.335
I mean, for instance, a very, profound

08:41.555 --> 08:45.495
and dominant, kind of attention.

08:47.725 --> 08:49.905
Uh, the course of Iranian history is

08:49.905 --> 08:52.465
between the religious establishment and the state.

08:54.325 --> 08:58.385
Uh, the other one, which is again, a very,

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old and recognized feature of Iranian history,

09:04.485 --> 09:09.185
is the fact that there is a tension between the,

09:09.365 --> 09:12.595
between the court

09:12.815 --> 09:16.395
and the, position and the authority of the ruler

09:17.755 --> 09:21.535
and the position and the authority of the administration.

09:22.725 --> 09:26.265
We, although one may think that both of them are part

09:26.265 --> 09:28.505
of the state in a sense, within the state,

09:28.505 --> 09:32.625
there is a big tension between these two institutions,

09:32.645 --> 09:35.945
if you can call them institutions and so on.

09:35.945 --> 09:37.905
There is, for instance, a great tension.

09:39.145 --> 09:43.745
I I detect between the, what I would call the women's space,

09:44.445 --> 09:47.345
the interiors, and the exterior,

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which is dominated by the men.

09:49.565 --> 09:51.385
So in the set, there's a matriarchy

09:51.385 --> 09:52.745
and there's a patriarchy.

09:53.325 --> 09:55.545
And this also is the detention.

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All of this, I, I have about eight

09:58.525 --> 10:01.675
or nine of them that I have recognized.

10:02.215 --> 10:05.515
Uh, and although they are not evident in the book,

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they're present everywhere,

10:06.935 --> 10:09.275
but they are not spelled out per se.

10:10.615 --> 10:14.995
Um, but what you would see that all of these in the course

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of early modern, and particularly in

10:17.235 --> 10:18.475
modern times, have changed.

10:19.615 --> 10:23.235
And the modern forms of modality

10:23.385 --> 10:28.115
that we are familiar with in our time, in challenged all

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of these, institution.

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Some of them survived, some of them didn't.

10:32.635 --> 10:35.235
Some of these tensions is still very much

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present in today's Iran.

10:37.975 --> 10:42.885
So that's really the purpose of how this book,

10:43.355 --> 10:45.525
what came about as far

10:45.525 --> 10:49.525
as the second question is concerned send,

10:50.035 --> 10:52.285
with reference to,

10:53.545 --> 10:55.965
the periodization Mm-Hmm.

10:56.305 --> 10:58.805
Why am I looking?

10:59.235 --> 11:02.405
What period do, am, am I dealing with?

11:03.505 --> 11:08.165
Uh, first of all, it should be, pointed out

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that, the periodization of European history

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or western history that we would have

11:16.895 --> 11:20.905
necessarily does not correspond to the history of the rest

11:20.905 --> 11:24.865
of the world, certainly to, Islamic world

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that Iran was part of.

11:28.725 --> 11:32.275
But nevertheless, I have found,

11:33.055 --> 11:37.055
as we get closer to modern times, there are,

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there are areas where you can see that

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European history interacts with, in modern times

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with the history of the rest of the world.

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Therefore, we can speak up modern,

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although necessarily the rest

11:56.185 --> 11:59.805
of the world did not experience modernity the same way that

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the West or Europe

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or a large chunk of Europe has experienced it.

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For instance, industrialization.

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One of the major argument why there is a modern notion in

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European, and the American context for,

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for modern period is the question of industrialization.

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But you can find in Iran

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or many countries like Iran, a, a degree of,

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industrialization, but not the same way

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that it transformed those societies.

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But nevertheless, you can speak of

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modern versus pre-modern.

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Now, in Iranian case,

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the situation is a little bit more complicated

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because first of all, there is a

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very concrete, ancient history.

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Iran has a, a fairly substantive period of ancient history

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that is from the beginning of the Persian Empire,

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353 50 BC

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or thereabout, Accumen Empire.

13:05.885 --> 13:09.915
And then, of course, despite the

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defeats, the Macedonian, conquest

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of Iran, Alexander's conquest of Iran

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and of the Ommunity Empire is still, Iran had a fairly rich

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and remarkable history all the way into late antiquity.

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This is what is usually referred to as pre-Islamic Iran,

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or ancient Iran.

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And, in the period of the late, antiquity,

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which brings us probably up to

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six 40 ad that is when Iran was conquered by

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Arab Islamic armies at that time

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and end of the Sasanian empire of the,

13:58.105 --> 14:01.625
late antiquity, which was one of the two great powers

14:01.625 --> 14:05.425
of the time, rival to the Roman Empire.

14:06.325 --> 14:09.935
Um, after the, from there on,

14:10.705 --> 14:14.495
there is a period which may correspond to medieval Europe,

14:15.555 --> 14:17.895
but as a matter of fact is referred to

14:17.895 --> 14:19.215
as early Islamic times.

14:19.765 --> 14:23.935
There's a centuries between probably six 40

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or the seventh century, the rise of Islam, all the way

14:28.195 --> 14:30.175
to the beginning of the 16th century.

14:30.325 --> 14:31.615
It's where my book starts.

14:32.155 --> 14:35.135
So that's the second period, the third period,

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which is early modern.

14:37.155 --> 14:41.695
And it's a term that it's historians generally,

14:42.315 --> 14:43.535
accept.

14:43.835 --> 14:48.015
And, is, kind of an accepted term.

14:48.795 --> 14:50.655
It starts from the 16th century

14:50.985 --> 14:54.045
and goes all the way probably to late 18th century,

14:54.175 --> 14:55.325
early 19th century.

14:56.265 --> 14:59.405
And this is a period,

14:59.655 --> 15:02.165
where you can see the shaping of the empires.

15:02.185 --> 15:04.565
For instance, in Europe, I mean, the example

15:04.625 --> 15:07.605
of the European empires, as I mentioned, Habsburgs have

15:08.155 --> 15:12.405
certain commonalities with Iran or with the Ottoman Empire.

15:12.785 --> 15:17.525
The other one, which actually has a curious,

15:17.945 --> 15:22.525
similarity in certain ways to the Iranian case

15:23.345 --> 15:28.205
is Tudor England, where you would find the, with the,

15:28.585 --> 15:33.085
from the period of Henry eight onwards, where you,

15:33.185 --> 15:37.045
we can see that there is the emergence of the Church

15:37.065 --> 15:40.525
of England, Protestantism, church of England,

15:40.755 --> 15:42.365
that corresponds to schism.

15:42.465 --> 15:43.685
Of course, one can say

15:43.685 --> 15:47.725
that Shiism in many respects also shows characteristics

15:47.725 --> 15:52.165
with the entire Protestant movement in Europe at the time.

15:52.875 --> 15:56.605
It's an alternative religion to the accepted religion

15:56.665 --> 15:59.565
of the majority, which is Catholicism, in this case,

15:59.845 --> 16:00.885
Xi's and versus Oneism.

16:01.875 --> 16:02.975
So,

16:03.635 --> 16:06.775
but of course, there is much difference

16:06.805 --> 16:08.815
between the development

16:09.315 --> 16:12.615
of the early modern times in Iran versus Europe.

16:13.235 --> 16:14.975
For instance, one characteristic,

16:14.975 --> 16:16.895
which you can see in the Iranian case,

16:17.595 --> 16:21.735
or for that matter, most of the, a Muslim world,

16:22.795 --> 16:25.935
perhaps the Ottomans, are an exception.

16:26.355 --> 16:31.295
But, you would see that contrary to European empires,

16:31.945 --> 16:36.735
which developed American tile, trade,

16:37.595 --> 16:40.975
and, as a result of which overseas trade

16:40.975 --> 16:45.175
and the creation of colonial empires in South America,

16:46.315 --> 16:49.655
in India elsewhere, in the case

16:49.675 --> 16:53.975
of the early modern times in empires such as the Sid Empire,

16:54.595 --> 16:56.255
it is very much land bound,

16:56.955 --> 17:01.495
and it did not have those kind of expansionist

17:01.595 --> 17:05.895
or could not really expand beyond certain limits, largely

17:05.895 --> 17:10.015
because of the great barriers, religious barriers

17:10.085 --> 17:13.895
that emerged in, in the course of the early modern times

17:13.965 --> 17:15.695
between she and Sony Islam.

17:16.675 --> 17:20.775
So you don't have that kind of, expansionism

17:21.405 --> 17:23.215
that you would have in the European cases,

17:23.635 --> 17:25.935
and for that matter, colonialism afterwards.

17:26.515 --> 17:29.855
Uh, this is as far as, periodization is concerned,

17:29.855 --> 17:33.815
and of course, modern times corresponds to the age

17:33.815 --> 17:36.775
of revolutions to the age of industrialization in Europe,

17:36.995 --> 17:41.615
in the Iranian case, it's a period of,

17:42.395 --> 17:46.135
late 19th, late 18th century, a a period of,

17:46.505 --> 17:49.565
great trouble and chaos, political trouble

17:49.625 --> 17:53.965
and chaos in Iran that leads eventually to the emergence

17:53.965 --> 17:55.085
of a dynasty.

17:55.265 --> 17:58.925
The disappear, a dynasty emerges,

17:59.975 --> 18:03.115
and there on this is a dynasty.

18:03.495 --> 18:04.795
And there on, you see,

18:05.625 --> 18:08.915
Iran finds itself in a completely different situation than

18:08.915 --> 18:11.115
it, than it was in the earlier times.

18:11.885 --> 18:14.715
There is, you see that the Sony powers

18:14.715 --> 18:19.155
and its frontiers basically, are declining.

18:19.935 --> 18:21.915
And instead, two great

18:22.555 --> 18:25.235
European Christian Powers emerge on its frontiers,

18:25.465 --> 18:28.555
Russian empire in the northern frontier

18:29.025 --> 18:31.355
with a very expansionist project,

18:32.615 --> 18:34.915
and the British Empire in the Persian Gulf

18:35.995 --> 18:40.095
and the Southeast of, Iran with,

18:40.655 --> 18:43.095
colonial India under its control.

18:43.835 --> 18:47.695
So Iran becomes a kind of a land in between.

18:48.985 --> 18:50.485
Uh, there's a kind of a buffer

18:50.555 --> 18:52.365
between these two great empires,

18:52.425 --> 18:55.325
and it's entirely a new situation since

18:56.275 --> 19:00.495
Iran finds itself unprepared to deal with the,

19:01.675 --> 19:06.535
great, land

19:06.715 --> 19:08.375
and sea naval

19:08.795 --> 19:13.175
and, land armies on both sides of, of its empire.

19:14.315 --> 19:17.695
So this is the story of the 19th century and modern times,

19:18.155 --> 19:22.935
and its continuity in the 20th century with the emergence,

19:23.405 --> 19:27.015
with the constitutional revolution, with the way

19:27.015 --> 19:29.935
that Iran was encountered the great powers

19:30.195 --> 19:31.775
during the first World War

19:32.715 --> 19:35.375
and the continuity of it during

19:35.995 --> 19:37.895
the pa era in the 20th century.

19:37.995 --> 19:39.575
That's the story. Uh,

19:39.675 --> 19:43.855
and that is the story that, occupies a huge chunk

19:43.855 --> 19:48.385
of my book, of the, 1000 pages

19:48.575 --> 19:53.065
that I have, in this book, about

19:53.845 --> 19:55.665
two thirds of it is 20th century,

19:55.975 --> 19:59.305
basically from the beginning of the 20th century

19:59.615 --> 20:03.225
with the Constitutional Revolution, all

20:03.225 --> 20:07.625
through the period of first parallel rule on the,

20:08.895 --> 20:12.545
then the course of the Second World War, the experience

20:12.545 --> 20:14.465
of democracy for the second time

20:15.325 --> 20:19.785
in the postwar post-second World War period, then the,

20:20.485 --> 20:24.985
rise of, iv, second

20:25.565 --> 20:29.945
IV period, and then eventually the 1979

20:30.345 --> 20:33.625
revolution that the collapse of monarchy

20:33.765 --> 20:37.865
and the emergence of the Islamic Republic,

20:37.915 --> 20:41.185
about which I have also included three chapters.

20:41.965 --> 20:44.945
So we have the emergence of the revolution,

20:45.765 --> 20:46.865
we have the shaping

20:47.025 --> 20:49.845
of the constitutions under the Islamic Republic,

20:50.665 --> 20:53.605
and then debate about the society

20:53.665 --> 20:55.325
and culture in the,

20:55.585 --> 20:58.805
on the Islamic Republic up to the present.

20:59.385 --> 21:03.535
You see, from the perspective of historians these days,

21:04.225 --> 21:08.655
historians, nobody can speak of inevitability

21:08.845 --> 21:12.615
because, that kind of a presumption

21:13.565 --> 21:17.615
that there are certain forces in action

21:17.805 --> 21:21.535
that makes certain things happen in due course

21:22.755 --> 21:23.895
is now questioned.

21:24.485 --> 21:29.055
This is no longer that kind of a Marxist,

21:30.235 --> 21:34.375
interpretation of history in which there is a,

21:34.395 --> 21:38.375
you know, historical determination that societies,

21:38.375 --> 21:39.975
because of the movement of the capital,

21:40.665 --> 21:42.855
would move in a certain direction,

21:42.955 --> 21:45.735
and eventually they bring about a change

21:45.735 --> 21:47.375
through revolution and so on.

21:47.885 --> 21:52.815
This has been by the historians of which I subscribed,

21:52.925 --> 21:57.135
that that historiography,

21:57.615 --> 22:01.645
question the fact that there is an inevitability in

22:02.045 --> 22:03.525
anything you see.

22:04.025 --> 22:08.965
But that does not mean that it's a complete accident.

22:09.675 --> 22:10.805
That doesn't mean the case.

22:12.055 --> 22:16.845
Still, there are very powerful forces that

22:17.595 --> 22:20.935
shapes the history of a region or a country

22:21.115 --> 22:25.965
or a period, that provides a certain

22:27.335 --> 22:29.555
ground for change.

22:30.475 --> 22:35.205
But how that change is going to come about is,

22:35.585 --> 22:38.445
not known to anyone.

22:39.935 --> 22:43.795
Not nobody can predict. Nobody can even be.

22:43.795 --> 22:47.155
The hindsight of a historian says that it was,

22:47.225 --> 22:49.515
this was inevitable, okay?

22:50.215 --> 22:54.035
And I think 40 years after the re 45 years now,

22:54.365 --> 22:57.115
after the revolution of 90 79,

22:58.735 --> 23:02.715
it becomes more apparent that

23:03.535 --> 23:07.595
the option for the collapse of the pavy period

23:08.535 --> 23:12.395
and coming to power of a radical

23:13.785 --> 23:17.515
Islamic regime necessarily was

23:17.515 --> 23:18.835
not the only option.

23:19.855 --> 23:22.615
Could have been, could have,

23:23.085 --> 23:26.695
this movement could have gone to a different direction.

23:27.555 --> 23:32.055
But why it didn't, why it ended up in a revolution,

23:33.155 --> 23:34.415
one might say, is

23:35.245 --> 23:39.495
because of certain circumstances under the

23:40.015 --> 23:44.335
period that that in effect facilitators

23:45.695 --> 23:47.935
movement towards a revolutionary change.

23:48.725 --> 23:51.215
What were they? There's a long list.

23:51.405 --> 23:52.855
I've discussed this in my book,

23:53.435 --> 23:55.015
but two that comes to me

23:55.765 --> 23:58.295
immediately under very interrelated.

23:59.235 --> 24:04.135
One is the fact that Iran Iranian Society of the 1970s

24:04.645 --> 24:05.815
rapidly changed.

24:06.465 --> 24:08.665
There was a,

24:09.125 --> 24:13.635
almost a demographic explosion, namely

24:13.635 --> 24:18.275
that the population, of Iran grew,

24:19.015 --> 24:21.795
rather fast.

24:22.095 --> 24:25.915
And, and, and very remarkable.

24:27.335 --> 24:30.875
By 1950s, the population of Iran was about 18 million.

24:32.325 --> 24:35.065
By the time of the revolution, it was 36 million,

24:35.805 --> 24:40.185
and now it's 90 odd million population of Iran.

24:40.405 --> 24:45.105
So this growth of the population that's,

24:45.285 --> 24:47.225
in, in, in classical theories

24:47.225 --> 24:49.505
of the revolution is always a major factor.

24:50.395 --> 24:53.975
You have to have a population to,

24:54.045 --> 24:55.815
make a revolution possible.

24:56.115 --> 24:58.095
And then, of course, it's not only the growth

24:58.095 --> 25:00.375
of the population, but the movement

25:00.415 --> 25:02.975
of the population from the countryside to the cities.

25:04.175 --> 25:06.155
So you have the shape

25:06.155 --> 25:10.995
of the cities changed in Iran in the 1960s and seventies.

25:11.695 --> 25:14.955
You have a population in the,

25:15.395 --> 25:18.855
marginalized population in the cities

25:20.045 --> 25:23.895
that created a certain tension, social tension,

25:25.195 --> 25:27.655
and in effect at the time when the state

25:28.425 --> 25:31.735
completely was blind to these major changes

25:32.275 --> 25:33.975
and could not handle it properly.

25:34.485 --> 25:37.775
What did we state produced on?

25:37.995 --> 25:42.415
The PA was a much more of a, absolutist,

25:42.695 --> 25:47.615
a regime that basically did not allow for the,

25:47.845 --> 25:50.735
diversity for,

25:51.435 --> 25:55.465
for open expression, for, for the press,

25:56.365 --> 25:58.425
for,

25:58.475 --> 26:01.745
democratic institutions, for parties.

26:02.725 --> 26:06.065
All of this was very much restricted, was a period of,

26:06.065 --> 26:07.545
in a sense of intimidation

26:07.605 --> 26:12.395
and fear under the, the,

26:12.535 --> 26:15.435
tools of

26:16.425 --> 26:21.395
control under the regime, the AK security forces.

26:22.135 --> 26:26.235
So, on the one hand, they see a period

26:26.535 --> 26:30.115
of suppression, a period of,

26:30.255 --> 26:34.835
in effect the state controlling the, media

26:35.215 --> 26:36.875
and the, political process.

26:37.415 --> 26:38.515
And on the other hand,

26:39.315 --> 26:44.125
a growing population in the cities which are not

26:44.835 --> 26:47.965
find themselves participating in the political process.

26:48.785 --> 26:52.645
So this is most of the time, a

26:53.225 --> 26:57.645
if you want to speak of inevitability, this is

26:58.795 --> 27:02.935
the, a classic recipe for a revolution,

27:03.675 --> 27:08.495
whereby you have a population growing with new demands

27:08.875 --> 27:10.655
and the state which is repressive.

27:11.715 --> 27:15.575
So in the Iranian case, this is very, very obvious

27:16.155 --> 27:20.015
in the years leading to 1979, what,

27:20.955 --> 27:24.335
why this is resulted in emergence of a

27:25.215 --> 27:28.455
religious establishment taking, power,

27:29.415 --> 27:30.935
a radical religious establishment,

27:30.935 --> 27:32.215
which is still in paradise.

27:32.215 --> 27:37.115
The Islamic republic that is in effect

27:37.775 --> 27:42.715
speaks to other aspects of the, process

27:42.905 --> 27:44.915
that started from the 16th century.

27:45.545 --> 27:49.555
That is the emergence of a religious establishment.

27:50.895 --> 27:55.875
The clergy that during the course of the 19th century

27:56.295 --> 28:00.675
as a result of secularization of an Iranian state

28:00.735 --> 28:05.195
and society, were sent into a kind of isolation.

28:06.105 --> 28:11.095
They did not disappear, but they were, they were grudging

28:11.695 --> 28:16.345
because they were no longer part of the, part

28:16.505 --> 28:18.225
of the elite of the country.

28:18.695 --> 28:21.825
Therefore, their position changed in the course

28:21.825 --> 28:22.945
of the Pavia era.

28:23.845 --> 28:27.005
And once there is a,

28:27.035 --> 28:31.685
once there is a repression, once there are no,

28:31.685 --> 28:35.885
other avenues for political expression,

28:36.925 --> 28:40.445
religious, extremism

28:42.075 --> 28:46.945
finds a place to feel this vacuum, which is exactly

28:47.055 --> 28:50.465
what happened in the 1970s in Iran.

28:51.365 --> 28:54.945
And, and the kind of a sense of fascination

28:57.075 --> 29:01.915
with, religion as a kind of a reaction

29:02.855 --> 29:05.515
or what it was assumed to be reaction

29:06.055 --> 29:08.715
to the Western modernity, okay?

29:09.095 --> 29:11.355
Or the adoption of the Western modernity

29:11.355 --> 29:12.795
during the PA times.

29:13.735 --> 29:17.515
So that is why we would see this kind of a fascination.

29:17.535 --> 29:20.435
And beside Iran was always a very rich country,

29:20.815 --> 29:25.235
and that's another aspect rich country in terms of,

29:25.465 --> 29:26.635
messianic movements.

29:26.975 --> 29:29.235
In terms of the emergence movements

29:29.235 --> 29:30.515
with the charismatic leader.

29:31.225 --> 29:35.735
Even the term charisma is,

29:36.115 --> 29:40.135
etymologically from the term in ancient person

29:40.795 --> 29:44.925
or in, a middle Persian of the presna times,

29:45.695 --> 29:49.125
which means the light that comes to the ruler.

29:50.185 --> 29:53.565
Uh, and that kind of an idea of charisma,

29:53.565 --> 29:57.965
therefore was, very much rife in the,

29:59.255 --> 30:04.075
political, in the way that,

30:04.315 --> 30:08.235
Khomeini was seen as this kind of a new prophet.

30:08.785 --> 30:13.435
That it's a new savior, that it's now here to, to bring,

30:14.255 --> 30:19.155
a, a, a, a different Iran from the promises

30:19.855 --> 30:23.315
of, western type of modernity.

30:23.695 --> 30:27.035
So that's what why we would find a revolution

30:27.035 --> 30:29.075
that we see around us.

30:29.655 --> 30:31.795
The old regime disappeared

30:32.255 --> 30:33.955
or collapse, A new

30:34.515 --> 30:37.955
institutions emerges under the Islamic Republic.

30:37.955 --> 30:41.755
There is a new ideology, first of all, the ideology

30:41.755 --> 30:42.875
of the Islamic Republic,

30:42.935 --> 30:45.715
and now we are actually approaching the 45th year

30:46.295 --> 30:48.075
of the Islamic Revolution.

30:49.485 --> 30:52.665
Uh, it was very much a kind of a makeshift

30:53.965 --> 30:57.415
because the religious establishment I mentioned

30:57.635 --> 31:00.735
of these dualities between the state versus religious

31:00.735 --> 31:02.015
establishment earlier on.

31:03.025 --> 31:05.925
Uh, one of the characteristics of this duality

31:05.925 --> 31:09.855
between religion and the state is that basically, first

31:09.855 --> 31:14.255
of all, the religious establishment found itself as an

31:14.935 --> 31:19.745
ally and a, partner,

31:20.005 --> 31:24.825
in the, in basically,

31:25.085 --> 31:29.105
if you don't mind, I turn this, telephone off

31:29.105 --> 31:29.865
because it's going to,

31:35.535 --> 31:40.035
the religious establishment traditionally had no

31:41.385 --> 31:44.555
intention of competing with the state

31:45.255 --> 31:49.315
for political power, not at all in its entire history.

31:50.245 --> 31:54.495
If you look at it, even pre-Islamic times

31:55.075 --> 31:59.445
or pre times pre 16th century,

31:59.905 --> 32:01.525
it had never such an intention.

32:01.985 --> 32:05.405
It was a powerful institution like the Catholic church,

32:05.465 --> 32:10.155
for instance, but it did not have the intention

32:10.295 --> 32:12.315
to take over the political power.

32:12.645 --> 32:16.405
There was a certain,

32:16.995 --> 32:19.365
distinction between political power

32:20.025 --> 32:23.085
and influence, religious influence in the society.

32:23.785 --> 32:27.005
Not only that, the religious establishment was never

32:27.445 --> 32:32.145
prepared, even for creating a political

32:32.845 --> 32:37.605
system, a political authority, at all,

32:38.145 --> 32:41.425
and paid very little attention to the issues

32:41.605 --> 32:44.105
of this political issues of the state.

32:44.855 --> 32:48.465
That was the affair for the state that changed

32:49.015 --> 32:51.105
with the revolution of 1979

32:51.365 --> 32:53.625
or prior to the revolution of 1979.

32:53.965 --> 32:58.105
And that was not by the very common among all these men

32:58.105 --> 33:01.145
that you see with their turbans and their gowns,

33:01.965 --> 33:04.905
and that's considered themselves as clergy.

33:05.405 --> 33:09.225
But basically it was K Romania anti supporters

33:10.045 --> 33:14.865
who were now subscribing to this idea of political Islam,

33:15.195 --> 33:18.985
which they actually,

33:19.205 --> 33:20.745
to a great extent.

33:21.695 --> 33:26.585
They adopted from the Salafi

33:27.005 --> 33:31.825
or the other Soni, Muslim brothers in Egypt,

33:33.225 --> 33:37.385
salafi in Pakistan, that came with this ideas

33:37.495 --> 33:41.625
that Islam is not only a way of worshiping God,

33:41.765 --> 33:45.345
but it's a force that is,

33:46.725 --> 33:48.785
is shaping the society and the state.

33:49.535 --> 33:51.505
This is the idea that was adopted

33:52.325 --> 33:54.705
by the cleric in Iran.

33:55.325 --> 33:59.545
Not only that, but they were also,

33:59.975 --> 34:03.785
exposed to the ideas of

34:04.635 --> 34:09.465
radicalism and radical, approach

34:09.605 --> 34:14.265
to politics through the remnant

34:14.325 --> 34:15.945
of the left in Iran.

34:16.765 --> 34:19.745
So much of the slogans of the left, much of the rhetoric

34:19.805 --> 34:24.625
of the left, much of the ideas of the left were incorporated

34:25.365 --> 34:28.425
by Khomeini and his supporters into this new

34:29.145 --> 34:30.545
ideology of this state.

34:30.695 --> 34:32.945
It's new Islamic ideology of this state.

34:33.525 --> 34:37.505
So that is basically a kind of a sacker makeshift

34:38.435 --> 34:40.865
thing that emerged in 1979.

34:41.165 --> 34:44.745
And over a period of time, it emerged gradually

34:44.745 --> 34:46.665
and became what it is today.

34:47.095 --> 34:51.305
Okay? Nevertheless, the religious establishment

34:52.335 --> 34:55.625
managed kind of miraculously, in my opinion,

34:56.365 --> 35:00.465
to preserve its, at least on the surface,

35:01.445 --> 35:03.625
to try to preserve its solidarity.

35:05.895 --> 35:09.055
I mean, they were distinct in their appearance from the

35:09.135 --> 35:10.175
rest of the society.

35:11.205 --> 35:15.045
They were not modernized in the way

35:15.045 --> 35:18.525
that they were not wearing western clothing, western

35:19.045 --> 35:20.565
behavior and so forth,

35:22.245 --> 35:24.985
but there was much division between within them

35:25.365 --> 35:27.145
as a religious group.

35:27.885 --> 35:32.225
But nevertheless, the bringing, coming to power

35:33.175 --> 35:35.945
gave them a certain gre degree of solidarity

35:36.095 --> 35:39.285
that they have preserved remarkably up to the present,

35:40.725 --> 35:44.135
despite all the opposition within the Iranian society.

35:44.715 --> 35:46.655
And that's my next point.

35:47.365 --> 35:52.145
Basically, you can, you can speak of these

35:52.945 --> 35:57.145
revolution in Iran, in three phases.

35:57.375 --> 36:01.065
That is this 40 odd years of being in power.

36:01.605 --> 36:05.225
You can divide it into three periods, the first period,

36:05.365 --> 36:07.865
and it is somewhat mandatory.

36:08.145 --> 36:10.305
I mean, I'm just making this,

36:11.355 --> 36:12.755
I think it's very realistic,

36:13.295 --> 36:17.425
but nevertheless, there are different ways of,

36:17.485 --> 36:21.385
of periodizing the period, the, the revolution

36:21.445 --> 36:22.585
and its aftermath.

36:23.245 --> 36:28.065
The first is the period from 1979 to the end

36:28.085 --> 36:29.545
of the Irani Iraq War

36:30.005 --> 36:34.785
and Khomeini's, demise in 1989,

36:35.195 --> 36:37.025
thereabout is the first 10 years

36:37.495 --> 36:39.585
that is really the revolutionary years.

36:40.565 --> 36:41.705
That's the first phase.

36:42.405 --> 36:46.265
The phase that this religious establishment

36:46.845 --> 36:49.745
and its associates, revolutionary guard that they create,

36:50.245 --> 36:54.065
and other institutions that they create, the,

36:54.485 --> 36:58.505
the Revolutionary Court, et cetera, managed to, to

36:59.055 --> 37:02.825
basically take over the political establishment entirely

37:03.245 --> 37:06.345
within the first 10 years with great brutality,

37:07.045 --> 37:10.825
and one might say with the execution

37:12.185 --> 37:16.105
suppression, what they call cultural revolution,

37:17.245 --> 37:20.505
all, all of these various tools in their hands to try

37:20.505 --> 37:22.745
to control the society completely

37:23.405 --> 37:25.705
as they thought into their own image.

37:26.465 --> 37:28.355
Okay? This is the first phase.

37:28.855 --> 37:31.355
The second phase from probably

37:31.355 --> 37:35.435
89, 19 89, 19 90, up

37:35.435 --> 37:39.235
to 2009, a kind of a 20 years period,

37:40.175 --> 37:44.495
is a period that the Islamic Republic

37:44.895 --> 37:48.625
experimented with,

37:49.725 --> 37:53.195
first of all, what they themselves refer to as a period

37:53.255 --> 37:57.155
of construction when they try to,

37:57.525 --> 38:02.475
bring about a different society, bring about,

38:03.385 --> 38:07.635
changes, material culture, try

38:07.975 --> 38:11.795
to develop Iran in their own image,

38:12.375 --> 38:16.275
and basically try to improve the economy,

38:17.305 --> 38:21.795
even to some extent, try to amend the fences

38:21.865 --> 38:24.395
with the western world, with the outside world.

38:25.945 --> 38:28.045
But the period, in a sense,

38:28.075 --> 38:32.045
more than anything else was important in the emergence

38:32.045 --> 38:35.805
of a new generation of Iranians under the Islamic Republic.

38:36.385 --> 38:39.205
It was not any longer the generation

38:39.475 --> 38:41.005
that probably I would belong to.

38:41.385 --> 38:45.845
So the third episode is from 2009

38:45.955 --> 38:50.565
that we witnessed protest movements that continues right up

38:50.585 --> 38:52.685
to last year

38:52.945 --> 38:57.005
or two years ago, the movement of women freedom.

38:57.475 --> 38:59.765
That is the movement of 2002.

39:00.075 --> 39:03.405
This is the emergence of a new generation of Iranians

39:04.425 --> 39:07.435
that are by completely

39:08.295 --> 39:12.745
in effect defy the project of the Islamic Revolution.

39:13.495 --> 39:18.145
This they are no longer, in a sense

39:19.025 --> 39:22.425
accepted the social engineering, the cultural engineering,

39:22.645 --> 39:25.905
the islamification process of the Islamic Republic.

39:26.535 --> 39:28.185
They are a new generation.

39:28.295 --> 39:31.945
What I'm saying is that this is the critical moment.

39:32.535 --> 39:36.585
That revolution was not only the question

39:37.165 --> 39:40.065
of coming of the clergy to power

39:40.205 --> 39:43.025
and their associates, of course, to power

39:43.085 --> 39:44.385
and creating a regime,

39:44.595 --> 39:47.425
which very well defines a fascist regime.

39:47.445 --> 39:49.985
Really, it's authoritarian.

39:51.005 --> 39:52.865
It is oppressive.

39:53.725 --> 39:57.545
It is in its treatment of its own population. Brutal.

39:58.685 --> 40:02.475
Now, since we have a little bit more time, I would like

40:02.475 --> 40:04.235
to focus on these two aspects.

40:05.055 --> 40:07.625
They have a domestic agenda,

40:08.205 --> 40:12.265
and they have a kind of a, if you like, call international

40:12.605 --> 40:13.905
or external agenda.

40:14.685 --> 40:19.025
The domestic agenda is, as I pointed out, is to try

40:19.045 --> 40:21.265
to create a more

40:21.265 --> 40:24.105
of an Islamic society.

40:24.725 --> 40:28.065
And for the past 45 years, they keep repeating that.

40:28.525 --> 40:33.185
And every new, president that comes

40:33.205 --> 40:35.825
to power says, okay, now it's the time to try

40:36.125 --> 40:38.665
to Islamic size the Iranian society.

40:39.085 --> 40:43.225
Why they are saying so, because in a sense, it's a failure

40:43.315 --> 40:47.225
after failure to change the Iranian,

40:47.225 --> 40:48.985
particularly the Iranian youth.

40:49.525 --> 40:52.385
I'm not saying that part a sector

40:52.485 --> 40:54.745
of the population is not following that.

40:55.285 --> 40:58.545
Yes, it does. Probably 20%

40:58.545 --> 41:01.385
of the Iranian population are supporting of the Islamic.

41:01.725 --> 41:04.585
Of course, this percentages are all,

41:05.685 --> 41:06.785
you know, just figures.

41:07.215 --> 41:11.185
There's no way that I can, that I can, as a matter

41:11.205 --> 41:15.145
of fact, sub substantiated.

41:15.805 --> 41:18.545
But more or less, I think that is what it is.

41:19.835 --> 41:23.535
The rest of the population is a new generation of Iranians

41:24.165 --> 41:25.335
that were educated,

41:26.465 --> 41:29.675
that have different demands from life,

41:30.505 --> 41:33.485
that they basically do not follow

41:35.655 --> 41:39.555
the ideology of islamification,

41:40.915 --> 41:42.615
of the Iranian society.

41:43.115 --> 41:47.815
And they are particularly,

41:47.995 --> 41:52.055
unhappy with,

41:53.235 --> 41:56.455
the isolation that they see around them.

41:57.015 --> 42:01.015
Cultural isolation, political isolation of Iran,

42:01.285 --> 42:03.975
that it's not part of a bigger picture.

42:05.395 --> 42:09.015
So that's the domestic side.

42:09.675 --> 42:10.815
The Islamic Republic,

42:12.295 --> 42:15.155
and as you might know this, the movement

42:15.295 --> 42:19.595
of the women life freedom two years ago now,

42:20.275 --> 42:22.875
September of two years ago,

42:23.705 --> 42:28.535
essentially was on the question of mandatory,

42:29.915 --> 42:33.455
use of hijab that

42:34.575 --> 42:39.205
women were forced to wear hijab, wear,

42:39.515 --> 42:43.365
some kind of headscarf, during,

42:43.785 --> 42:45.605
in public places.

42:47.305 --> 42:51.385
That is the movement were basically

42:52.135 --> 42:53.145
objecting to that.

42:53.415 --> 42:55.385
It's a protest movement against that.

42:55.645 --> 42:57.745
And that became a very important symbol.

42:58.365 --> 43:02.625
So if you would see that there is a question

43:02.645 --> 43:04.305
of hijab becomes so central

43:04.695 --> 43:08.915
because it represents the kind

43:08.995 --> 43:12.635
of social depression and cultural depression within Iran.

43:13.735 --> 43:16.635
Now, I think the failure

43:18.225 --> 43:21.445
of the Islamic Republic in its project

43:21.825 --> 43:24.565
of Islamification over the past 40 years

43:27.035 --> 43:29.855
is now probably fed accomp.

43:30.125 --> 43:35.085
It's ac, there's nothing that, anything more

43:35.085 --> 43:36.405
that can be done about it.

43:37.125 --> 43:40.525
I think there is a, they had almost given up on

43:40.525 --> 43:42.765
that they has almost given up that they cannot

43:43.585 --> 43:46.445
change the Iranian society to their own image.

43:47.825 --> 43:51.435
However, the other pillar of

43:52.075 --> 43:55.915
ideological pillar of the Islamic Republic is the question

43:56.015 --> 43:58.355
of death to America.

43:58.825 --> 44:03.405
America, the great Satan, and a rhetoric

44:04.425 --> 44:08.965
and a certain course of action, which best can be defined

44:09.785 --> 44:11.685
as vester.

44:12.625 --> 44:13.955
Okay? This is

44:14.345 --> 44:17.395
what they have built up over the past 40 years,

44:19.975 --> 44:24.275
and in which we can see the emergence

44:24.335 --> 44:28.805
of a certain, expansionism

44:29.905 --> 44:31.965
by, proxies.

44:33.305 --> 44:34.485
So that's what we witness.

44:34.865 --> 44:38.645
Now, we see that Iran has a presence

44:39.505 --> 44:44.365
in the neighboring lands more significantly in its west in

44:44.955 --> 44:49.645
Iraq, which shares part of its population as being Shiite

44:51.375 --> 44:55.515
in Syria, which also has been traditional ally

44:55.515 --> 44:57.955
of Iran since the start of the revolution.

44:58.575 --> 45:02.995
And more and more that it becomes brutal in its,

45:02.995 --> 45:04.715
treatment of its own population.

45:04.715 --> 45:07.435
It becomes closer ally of Iran.

45:08.695 --> 45:12.755
And as we have not noticed now with the Houthis

45:13.415 --> 45:17.475
in the, in Yemen and in the Red Sea.

45:18.495 --> 45:22.235
So, and of course with the Hezbollah in, in, in Lebanon.

45:22.895 --> 45:27.315
So it had created certain proxies through which

45:28.135 --> 45:32.275
it projects this kind

45:32.275 --> 45:35.515
of an agenda of anti westernism,

45:36.715 --> 45:40.715
which if you look at it in real terms,

45:41.215 --> 45:43.475
it does not serve the Iranian people,

45:44.755 --> 45:48.775
and it does not serve any purpose short

45:48.795 --> 45:51.935
of keeping the Islamic regime in power.

45:52.755 --> 45:57.455
Why? Because first of all, it creates this kind of an other,

45:58.895 --> 46:01.065
this kind of hostile other that they,

46:01.215 --> 46:05.345
that they need in order to,

46:05.855 --> 46:10.715
justify their own position as being the defender

46:11.615 --> 46:13.355
of the right versus the wrong.

46:14.325 --> 46:16.225
That's the one it does not serve.

46:17.245 --> 46:21.025
It has brought nothing but isolation for Iran.

46:21.985 --> 46:24.325
It has not brought anything

46:24.465 --> 46:27.685
but hostility, sanctions,

46:28.505 --> 46:31.765
and economic decline for Iran, that it's,

46:31.955 --> 46:34.725
today's Iran is a major, major issue,

46:35.945 --> 46:38.485
and of course, other huge other problems

46:38.485 --> 46:39.965
that Iran is today facing.

46:40.515 --> 46:43.645
Environmental problems, all other problems that

46:45.265 --> 46:47.485
is completely due to mismanagement

46:48.065 --> 46:50.085
of the current regime in power.

46:50.745 --> 46:54.905
So as such, we see a very strange situation

46:56.145 --> 47:00.785
domestically, they are on defensive,

47:01.555 --> 47:04.735
the Islamic Republic, they are not popular.

47:06.295 --> 47:09.545
They are under their, b barrage

47:09.765 --> 47:13.695
of criticism from within of their own population,

47:13.905 --> 47:16.135
which they don't allow to speak out,

47:16.195 --> 47:17.655
but nevertheless is very visible.

47:19.385 --> 47:23.285
And externally, they try to find a place

47:24.025 --> 47:27.645
within the, the, the region

47:28.265 --> 47:31.285
for themselves as being a major player.

47:31.785 --> 47:34.885
And to some extent they have been successful in doing so.

47:36.335 --> 47:39.265
And by doing so, in a sense,

47:39.485 --> 47:42.385
not only they have this anti-American

47:42.965 --> 47:45.145
in specifically anti-Western,

47:45.285 --> 47:48.785
but specifically anti-American rhetoric, anti-ISIS,

47:48.785 --> 47:50.265
Israeli anti-American rhetoric.

47:50.765 --> 47:54.345
But more so because now they found on the course

47:54.345 --> 47:57.215
of the next, probably last few years

47:57.355 --> 48:02.055
or a decade, they found themselves allies of Russia,

48:03.475 --> 48:06.345
which traditionally where their,

48:06.355 --> 48:10.865
where the great nemesis, and China.

48:11.405 --> 48:15.865
So they see a new kind of a, a strategic

48:17.185 --> 48:22.065
alliance in emerging in this part of the world that

48:22.625 --> 48:26.345
Iranians find themselves as a partner.

48:27.125 --> 48:29.545
The Iranians find themselves as part

48:29.645 --> 48:32.585
of this new strategic alliance.

48:33.325 --> 48:36.505
So the future of the Islamic Republic

48:36.725 --> 48:40.585
and Iran, to some extent is imbalance,

48:40.815 --> 48:44.985
because on the one hand, domestically is weakening.

48:46.795 --> 48:51.555
On the other hand, internationally is finding more

48:52.375 --> 48:53.955
of allies around.

00:00 - I've been teaching this topic for many years, for the past four decades, I would say, on and off, while I was teaching at Yale, I had offered courses on modern Iran, and in the process it became apparent that much of the textbooks and the material that they have assigned

00:22 - to the class, there is, a shortage, or there is a, a gap in several respects. First of all, in terms of periodization. So, and in terms of the substance of the issues that have been, covered in, available textbooks, I'm not critical of them, but my approach was somewhat different. For one thing is that, better understanding of Iran, it seems to me. And for that matter, I would say the rest of the region,

00:59 - which nowadays is referred to as the Middle East, their history should be really looked at, at least from early modern times, rather than from the 19th or the 20th centuries. In the case of Iran in particular, there are three points that, justifies a kind of a, a broader approach to the history of the period. the first is that to understand modern Iran, one should look back at some och making events that shaped the Iranian history.

01:40 - In, in the case of Iran, probably the most significant, the most critical is the, rise of Shiism as the, national creed. Rather, I should say, the creed that was adopted by a state and enforced by the state. Because much of the conversion, shes in the 16th century and later was by, by the use of this, by the force of the state, not is volunteer conversion as indeed many a times conversions are.

02:19 - And then, the second thing, which corresponds to that is that it's the 16th century that we see the emergence of. We witness the emergence of something called Iran in a kind of a unified empire, that eventually, I would call it a nation empire. 'cause the force of shiza and the shaping, geographical shaping of Iran, complimented each other in this crucial time period in early, 16th century and thereof, thereof, throughout the period of 16th

02:54 - and 17th centuries, because it's not just one moment, it's probably took Iran more than two centuries to be fully converted to Shiism. And it took a very long time to stand vis-a-vis its, neighbors nemesis, basically, as Iran became more surrounded by a Sony world, which was really hostile to it, the Ottoman Empire in its western borders, the, backs,

03:29 - and later on, the Afghans on its eastern borders, both of them staunch Sonis and further on the southeast of Iran, the Mogul Empire of India. These, although the ul of Empire of Iran, had much more in common with Iran, including the language, because Persian was the lingua franca of the UL Empire of India. despite the fact that there were much commonalities between the two empires, still, there was,

04:06 - a distinct feature into the Iranian world that was really unique. In the course of modern times. The shaping of Iran, also can be compared in early modern times to many other, example, in Europe, for instance, you would see the Habsburg Empire is also shaping at the same time period with a religious ideolog. That's becomes the, basically the champion of,

04:45 - of, Catholicism. And the same way that we can see emerges in Iran, perhaps some examples in Japan, some examples in China, we can see some comparisons. This is the age of the shaping of the empires. So vid the empire is one of them. Okay? So that's one thing. The second thing is, why I embarked on this project. As you see this book, which is fairly big, it was

05:20 - by the way, not intend, intended to be a thousand pages. It just happens to be a thousand, a book of a thousand page. The second point about it is that I tried to, in a sense, break through the conventional barriers that often defines political history vis-a-vis socioeconomic history, vis-a-vis cultural history, and try to adopt a, more comprehensive approach whereby I would be able to bring all these various elements, various approaches together in one volume, with the reason that, if you don't do so,

06:07 - the whole, the wholeness of the picture is going to be affected. The whole, kind of historical process is going to be affected. Therefore, there is a, there is a, desire to look at all these various aspects, cultural, socioeconomic, and political together. That's what I actually explained in the introduction of the book. at as such, my book probably is

06:43 - a curious example of long re, of the French model that is very popular with the School of Als and, that kind of a scholarship. but it's deferred from, the, from the annals in the sense that, it pays more attention to textual and cultural issues than you would find in the works of prade or blush or other major figures of the, of the analysis school.

07:23 - But by and large, you can see that that kind of a model was in my mind when I, worked on this book, which took quite a long time. It's about 20 years, took me to, finish this book. And then of course, I did other things, but this was in the process. and the third point, why I was interested to write this book is to try to show the theme of continuity

07:55 - and the challenge of modernity in effect, you. That is, that the purpose of this book is to try to see that certain institutions or complimentary institutions that are very crucial, very present in Iran since the ancient times, these completely was affected in the course of the early, modern and modern times, to become, what Iran is today. So try to show this process of

08:32 - how these complementary institutions have changed by complementary institutions. I mean, for instance, a very, profound and dominant, kind of attention. the course of Iranian history is between the religious establishment and the state. the other one, which is again, a very, old and recognized feature of Iranian history, is the fact that there is a tension between the, between the court

09:12 - and the, position and the authority of the ruler and the position and the authority of the administration. We, although one may think that both of them are part of the state in a sense, within the state, there is a big tension between these two institutions, if you can call them institutions and so on. There is, for instance, a great tension. I I detect between the, what I would call the women's space, the interiors, and the exterior, which is dominated by the men.

09:49 - So in the set, there's a matriarchy and there's a patriarchy. And this also is the detention. All of this, I, I have about eight or nine of them that I have recognized. and although they are not evident in the book, they're present everywhere, but they are not spelled out per se. but what you would see that all of these in the course of early modern, and particularly in

10:17 - modern times, have changed. And the modern forms of modality that we are familiar with in our time, in challenged all of these, institution. Some of them survived, some of them didn't. Some of these tensions is still very much present in today's Iran. So that's really the purpose of how this book, what came about as far as the second question is concerned send,

10:50 - with reference to, the periodization Mm-Hmm. Why am I looking? What period do, am, am I dealing with? first of all, it should be, pointed out that, the periodization of European history or western history that we would have necessarily does not correspond to the history of the rest of the world, certainly to, Islamic world that Iran was part of.

11:28 - But nevertheless, I have found, as we get closer to modern times, there are, there are areas where you can see that European history interacts with, in modern times with the history of the rest of the world. Therefore, we can speak up modern, although necessarily the rest of the world did not experience modernity the same way that the West or Europe or a large chunk of Europe has experienced it.

12:05 - For instance, industrialization. One of the major argument why there is a modern notion in European, and the American context for, for modern period is the question of industrialization. But you can find in Iran or many countries like Iran, a, a degree of, industrialization, but not the same way that it transformed those societies. But nevertheless, you can speak of modern versus pre-modern.

12:40 - Now, in Iranian case, the situation is a little bit more complicated because first of all, there is a very concrete, ancient history. Iran has a, a fairly substantive period of ancient history that is from the beginning of the Persian Empire, 353 50 BC or thereabout, Accumen Empire. And then, of course, despite the defeats, the Macedonian, conquest

13:15 - of Iran, Alexander's conquest of Iran and of the Ommunity Empire is still, Iran had a fairly rich and remarkable history all the way into late antiquity. This is what is usually referred to as pre-Islamic Iran, or ancient Iran. And, in the period of the late, antiquity, which brings us probably up to six 40 ad that is when Iran was conquered by Arab Islamic armies at that time and end of the Sasanian empire of the,

13:58 - late antiquity, which was one of the two great powers of the time, rival to the Roman Empire. after the, from there on, there is a period which may correspond to medieval Europe, but as a matter of fact is referred to as early Islamic times. There's a centuries between probably six 40 or the seventh century, the rise of Islam, all the way to the beginning of the 16th century. It's where my book starts.

14:32 - So that's the second period, the third period, which is early modern. And it's a term that it's historians generally, accept. And, is, kind of an accepted term. It starts from the 16th century and goes all the way probably to late 18th century, early 19th century. And this is a period, where you can see the shaping of the empires.

15:02 - For instance, in Europe, I mean, the example of the European empires, as I mentioned, Habsburgs have certain commonalities with Iran or with the Ottoman Empire. The other one, which actually has a curious, similarity in certain ways to the Iranian case is Tudor England, where you would find the, with the, from the period of Henry eight onwards, where you, we can see that there is the emergence of the Church of England, Protestantism, church of England, that corresponds to schism.

15:42 - Of course, one can say that Shiism in many respects also shows characteristics with the entire Protestant movement in Europe at the time. It's an alternative religion to the accepted religion of the majority, which is Catholicism, in this case, Xi's and versus Oneism. So, but of course, there is much difference between the development of the early modern times in Iran versus Europe.

16:13 - For instance, one characteristic, which you can see in the Iranian case, or for that matter, most of the, a Muslim world, perhaps the Ottomans, are an exception. But, you would see that contrary to European empires, which developed American tile, trade, and, as a result of which overseas trade and the creation of colonial empires in South America, in India elsewhere, in the case of the early modern times in empires such as the Sid Empire,

16:54 - it is very much land bound, and it did not have those kind of expansionist or could not really expand beyond certain limits, largely because of the great barriers, religious barriers that emerged in, in the course of the early modern times between she and Sony Islam. So you don't have that kind of, expansionism that you would have in the European cases, and for that matter, colonialism afterwards. this is as far as, periodization is concerned,

17:29 - and of course, modern times corresponds to the age of revolutions to the age of industrialization in Europe, in the Iranian case, it's a period of, late 19th, late 18th century, a a period of, great trouble and chaos, political trouble and chaos in Iran that leads eventually to the emergence of a dynasty. The disappear, a dynasty emerges, and there on this is a dynasty. And there on, you see,

18:05 - Iran finds itself in a completely different situation than it, than it was in the earlier times. There is, you see that the Sony powers and its frontiers basically, are declining. And instead, two great European Christian Powers emerge on its frontiers, Russian empire in the northern frontier with a very expansionist project, and the British Empire in the Persian Gulf and the Southeast of, Iran with,

18:40 - colonial India under its control. So Iran becomes a kind of a land in between. there's a kind of a buffer between these two great empires, and it's entirely a new situation since Iran finds itself unprepared to deal with the, great, land and sea naval and, land armies on both sides of, of its empire. So this is the story of the 19th century and modern times,

19:18 - and its continuity in the 20th century with the emergence, with the constitutional revolution, with the way that Iran was encountered the great powers during the first World War and the continuity of it during the pa era in the 20th century. That's the story. and that is the story that, occupies a huge chunk of my book, of the, 1000 pages that I have, in this book, about

19:53 - two thirds of it is 20th century, basically from the beginning of the 20th century with the Constitutional Revolution, all through the period of first parallel rule on the, then the course of the Second World War, the experience of democracy for the second time in the postwar post-second World War period, then the, rise of, iv, second IV period, and then eventually the 1979 revolution that the collapse of monarchy

20:33 - and the emergence of the Islamic Republic, about which I have also included three chapters. So we have the emergence of the revolution, we have the shaping of the constitutions under the Islamic Republic, and then debate about the society and culture in the, on the Islamic Republic up to the present. You see, from the perspective of historians these days, historians, nobody can speak of inevitability

21:08 - because, that kind of a presumption that there are certain forces in action that makes certain things happen in due course is now questioned. This is no longer that kind of a Marxist, interpretation of history in which there is a, you know, historical determination that societies, because of the movement of the capital, would move in a certain direction, and eventually they bring about a change

21:45 - through revolution and so on. This has been by the historians of which I subscribed, that that historiography, question the fact that there is an inevitability in anything you see. But that does not mean that it's a complete accident. That doesn't mean the case. Still, there are very powerful forces that shapes the history of a region or a country or a period, that provides a certain

22:27 - ground for change. But how that change is going to come about is, not known to anyone. Not nobody can predict. Nobody can even be. The hindsight of a historian says that it was, this was inevitable, okay? And I think 40 years after the re 45 years now, after the revolution of 90 79, it becomes more apparent that the option for the collapse of the pavy period

23:08 - and coming to power of a radical Islamic regime necessarily was not the only option. Could have been, could have, this movement could have gone to a different direction. But why it didn't, why it ended up in a revolution, one might say, is because of certain circumstances under the period that that in effect facilitators movement towards a revolutionary change.

23:48 - What were they? There's a long list. I've discussed this in my book, but two that comes to me immediately under very interrelated. One is the fact that Iran Iranian Society of the 1970s rapidly changed. There was a, almost a demographic explosion, namely that the population, of Iran grew, rather fast.

24:22 - And, and, and very remarkable. By 1950s, the population of Iran was about 18 million. By the time of the revolution, it was 36 million, and now it's 90 odd million population of Iran. So this growth of the population that's, in, in, in classical theories of the revolution is always a major factor. You have to have a population to, make a revolution possible. And then, of course, it's not only the growth

24:58 - of the population, but the movement of the population from the countryside to the cities. So you have the shape of the cities changed in Iran in the 1960s and seventies. You have a population in the, marginalized population in the cities that created a certain tension, social tension, and in effect at the time when the state completely was blind to these major changes and could not handle it properly.

25:34 - What did we state produced on? The PA was a much more of a, absolutist, a regime that basically did not allow for the, diversity for, for open expression, for, for the press, for, democratic institutions, for parties. All of this was very much restricted, was a period of, in a sense of intimidation and fear under the, the,

26:12 - tools of control under the regime, the AK security forces. So, on the one hand, they see a period of suppression, a period of, in effect the state controlling the, media and the, political process. And on the other hand, a growing population in the cities which are not find themselves participating in the political process. So this is most of the time, a

26:53 - if you want to speak of inevitability, this is the, a classic recipe for a revolution, whereby you have a population growing with new demands and the state which is repressive. So in the Iranian case, this is very, very obvious in the years leading to 1979, what, why this is resulted in emergence of a religious establishment taking, power, a radical religious establishment, which is still in paradise.

27:32 - The Islamic republic that is in effect speaks to other aspects of the, process that started from the 16th century. That is the emergence of a religious establishment. The clergy that during the course of the 19th century as a result of secularization of an Iranian state and society, were sent into a kind of isolation. They did not disappear, but they were, they were grudging because they were no longer part of the, part of the elite of the country.

28:18 - Therefore, their position changed in the course of the Pavia era. And once there is a, once there is a repression, once there are no, other avenues for political expression, religious, extremism finds a place to feel this vacuum, which is exactly what happened in the 1970s in Iran. And, and the kind of a sense of fascination with, religion as a kind of a reaction

29:02 - or what it was assumed to be reaction to the Western modernity, okay? Or the adoption of the Western modernity during the PA times. So that is why we would see this kind of a fascination. And beside Iran was always a very rich country, and that's another aspect rich country in terms of, messianic movements. In terms of the emergence movements with the charismatic leader.

29:31 - Even the term charisma is, etymologically from the term in ancient person or in, a middle Persian of the presna times, which means the light that comes to the ruler. and that kind of an idea of charisma, therefore was, very much rife in the, political, in the way that, Khomeini was seen as this kind of a new prophet. That it's a new savior, that it's now here to, to bring, a, a, a, a different Iran from the promises

30:19 - of, western type of modernity. So that's what why we would find a revolution that we see around us. The old regime disappeared or collapse, A new institutions emerges under the Islamic Republic. There is a new ideology, first of all, the ideology of the Islamic Republic, and now we are actually approaching the 45th year of the Islamic Revolution.

30:49 - it was very much a kind of a makeshift because the religious establishment I mentioned of these dualities between the state versus religious establishment earlier on. one of the characteristics of this duality between religion and the state is that basically, first of all, the religious establishment found itself as an ally and a, partner, in the, in basically, if you don't mind, I turn this, telephone off

31:29 - because it's going to, the religious establishment traditionally had no intention of competing with the state for political power, not at all in its entire history. If you look at it, even pre-Islamic times or pre times pre 16th century, it had never such an intention. It was a powerful institution like the Catholic church, for instance, but it did not have the intention to take over the political power.

32:12 - There was a certain, distinction between political power and influence, religious influence in the society. Not only that, the religious establishment was never prepared, even for creating a political system, a political authority, at all, and paid very little attention to the issues of this political issues of the state. That was the affair for the state that changed with the revolution of 1979

32:51 - or prior to the revolution of 1979. And that was not by the very common among all these men that you see with their turbans and their gowns, and that's considered themselves as clergy. But basically it was K Romania anti supporters who were now subscribing to this idea of political Islam, which they actually, to a great extent. They adopted from the Salafi or the other Soni, Muslim brothers in Egypt,

33:33 - salafi in Pakistan, that came with this ideas that Islam is not only a way of worshiping God, but it's a force that is, is shaping the society and the state. This is the idea that was adopted by the cleric in Iran. Not only that, but they were also, exposed to the ideas of radicalism and radical, approach to politics through the remnant

34:14 - of the left in Iran. So much of the slogans of the left, much of the rhetoric of the left, much of the ideas of the left were incorporated by Khomeini and his supporters into this new ideology of this state. It's new Islamic ideology of this state. So that is basically a kind of a sacker makeshift thing that emerged in 1979. And over a period of time, it emerged gradually and became what it is today.

34:47 - Okay? Nevertheless, the religious establishment managed kind of miraculously, in my opinion, to preserve its, at least on the surface, to try to preserve its solidarity. I mean, they were distinct in their appearance from the rest of the society. They were not modernized in the way that they were not wearing western clothing, western behavior and so forth, but there was much division between within them

35:25 - as a religious group. But nevertheless, the bringing, coming to power gave them a certain gre degree of solidarity that they have preserved remarkably up to the present, despite all the opposition within the Iranian society. And that's my next point. Basically, you can, you can speak of these revolution in Iran, in three phases. That is this 40 odd years of being in power. You can divide it into three periods, the first period,

36:05 - and it is somewhat mandatory. I mean, I'm just making this, I think it's very realistic, but nevertheless, there are different ways of, of periodizing the period, the, the revolution and its aftermath. The first is the period from 1979 to the end of the Irani Iraq War and Khomeini's, demise in 1989, thereabout is the first 10 years

36:37 - that is really the revolutionary years. That's the first phase. The phase that this religious establishment and its associates, revolutionary guard that they create, and other institutions that they create, the, the Revolutionary Court, et cetera, managed to, to basically take over the political establishment entirely within the first 10 years with great brutality, and one might say with the execution suppression, what they call cultural revolution,

37:17 - all, all of these various tools in their hands to try to control the society completely as they thought into their own image. Okay? This is the first phase. The second phase from probably 89, 19 89, 19 90, up to 2009, a kind of a 20 years period, is a period that the Islamic Republic experimented with, first of all, what they themselves refer to as a period

37:53 - of construction when they try to, bring about a different society, bring about, changes, material culture, try to develop Iran in their own image, and basically try to improve the economy, even to some extent, try to amend the fences with the western world, with the outside world. But the period, in a sense, more than anything else was important in the emergence of a new generation of Iranians under the Islamic Republic.

38:36 - It was not any longer the generation that probably I would belong to. So the third episode is from 2009 that we witnessed protest movements that continues right up to last year or two years ago, the movement of women freedom. That is the movement of 2002. This is the emergence of a new generation of Iranians that are by completely in effect defy the project of the Islamic Revolution.

39:13 - This they are no longer, in a sense accepted the social engineering, the cultural engineering, the islamification process of the Islamic Republic. They are a new generation. What I'm saying is that this is the critical moment. That revolution was not only the question of coming of the clergy to power and their associates, of course, to power and creating a regime, which very well defines a fascist regime.

39:47 - Really, it's authoritarian. It is oppressive. It is in its treatment of its own population. Brutal. Now, since we have a little bit more time, I would like to focus on these two aspects. They have a domestic agenda, and they have a kind of a, if you like, call international or external agenda. The domestic agenda is, as I pointed out, is to try to create a more

40:21 - of an Islamic society. And for the past 45 years, they keep repeating that. And every new, president that comes to power says, okay, now it's the time to try to Islamic size the Iranian society. Why they are saying so, because in a sense, it's a failure after failure to change the Iranian, particularly the Iranian youth. I'm not saying that part a sector of the population is not following that.

40:55 - Yes, it does. Probably 20% of the Iranian population are supporting of the Islamic. Of course, this percentages are all, you know, just figures. There's no way that I can, that I can, as a matter of fact, sub substantiated. But more or less, I think that is what it is. The rest of the population is a new generation of Iranians that were educated, that have different demands from life,

41:30 - that they basically do not follow the ideology of islamification, of the Iranian society. And they are particularly, unhappy with, the isolation that they see around them. Cultural isolation, political isolation of Iran, that it's not part of a bigger picture. So that's the domestic side. The Islamic Republic,

42:12 - and as you might know this, the movement of the women life freedom two years ago now, September of two years ago, essentially was on the question of mandatory, use of hijab that women were forced to wear hijab, wear, some kind of headscarf, during, in public places. That is the movement were basically objecting to that.

42:53 - It's a protest movement against that. And that became a very important symbol. So if you would see that there is a question of hijab becomes so central because it represents the kind of social depression and cultural depression within Iran. Now, I think the failure of the Islamic Republic in its project of Islamification over the past 40 years is now probably fed accomp.

43:30 - It's ac, there's nothing that, anything more that can be done about it. I think there is a, they had almost given up on that they has almost given up that they cannot change the Iranian society to their own image. However, the other pillar of ideological pillar of the Islamic Republic is the question of death to America. America, the great Satan, and a rhetoric and a certain course of action, which best can be defined

44:09 - as vester. Okay? This is what they have built up over the past 40 years, and in which we can see the emergence of a certain, expansionism by, proxies. So that's what we witness. Now, we see that Iran has a presence in the neighboring lands more significantly in its west in Iraq, which shares part of its population as being Shiite

44:51 - in Syria, which also has been traditional ally of Iran since the start of the revolution. And more and more that it becomes brutal in its, treatment of its own population. It becomes closer ally of Iran. And as we have not noticed now with the Houthis in the, in Yemen and in the Red Sea. So, and of course with the Hezbollah in, in, in Lebanon. So it had created certain proxies through which it projects this kind

45:32 - of an agenda of anti westernism, which if you look at it in real terms, it does not serve the Iranian people, and it does not serve any purpose short of keeping the Islamic regime in power. Why? Because first of all, it creates this kind of an other, this kind of hostile other that they, that they need in order to, justify their own position as being the defender of the right versus the wrong.

46:14 - That's the one it does not serve. It has brought nothing but isolation for Iran. It has not brought anything but hostility, sanctions, and economic decline for Iran, that it's, today's Iran is a major, major issue, and of course, other huge other problems that Iran is today facing. Environmental problems, all other problems that is completely due to mismanagement

46:48 - of the current regime in power. So as such, we see a very strange situation domestically, they are on defensive, the Islamic Republic, they are not popular. They are under their, b barrage of criticism from within of their own population, which they don't allow to speak out, but nevertheless is very visible. And externally, they try to find a place within the, the, the region

47:28 - for themselves as being a major player. And to some extent they have been successful in doing so. And by doing so, in a sense, not only they have this anti-American in specifically anti-Western, but specifically anti-American rhetoric, anti-ISIS, Israeli anti-American rhetoric. But more so because now they found on the course of the next, probably last few years or a decade, they found themselves allies of Russia,

48:03 - which traditionally where their, where the great nemesis, and China. So they see a new kind of a, a strategic alliance in emerging in this part of the world that Iranians find themselves as a partner. The Iranians find themselves as part of this new strategic alliance. So the future of the Islamic Republic and Iran, to some extent is imbalance, because on the one hand, domestically is weakening.

48:46 - On the other hand, internationally is finding more of allies around.

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