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Post-Kantian perfectionism

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The historical context of early post-Kantian debates on politics reveals the emergence of a new type of perfectionist ethics no longer based on the state-sponsored promotion of happiness, as the dominant German tendency in the eighteenth century had been, but on individual freedom. Douglas Moggach suggests Kantian negative freedom enabled a new conception of social interaction based on the idea of right and the progressive extension of rightful relations.

Image courtesy of interviewee. July 18, 2024

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This video discusses the evolution of German idealism, particularly focusing on the contribution of G.W.F. Hegel and the implications of his ideas for political philosophy. The speaker has been researching German idealism, proposing a new perspective that emphasizes the importance of alternative figures like Gottlieb Lessing (Leitz) rather than traditionally starting with Immanuel Kant.

The speaker examines the political dimensions of German idealism and how concepts evolved from 1650 to the late 19th century, tracing connections to Karl Marx. The speaker argues that the notion of spontaneity, which refers to action arising from within individuals as opposed to responding mechanically to external stimuli, is central to understanding later German thought.

Kant's work is highlighted, particularly his revolutionary ideas about negative freedom, which suggest that individuals are capable of independent thought and moral consideration beyond mere desire for happiness. The speaker emphasizes the difference between earlier perfectionist theories—which aimed at promoting happiness—and Kantian self-determination and political theories that prioritize autonomy and freedom.

The discussion expands to compare different thinkers' visions of the state, illustrating a division between minimalist and interventionist approaches, with figures like Wilhelm von Humboldt advocating for a state that protects individual freedoms without imposing paternalistic measures, contrasting with thinkers who support a more interventionist role for the state in ensuring conditions for freedom.

Incorporating Marx, the speaker argues that his notion of labor represents a form of spontaneity but also shows a tension between individual rights and a collective good. This video duality highlights Marx's synthesis of pre-Kantian ideals and post-Kantian thought.

Finally, the text suggests that this philosophical development has implications for how we perceive citizenship and the welfare state, advocating for a vision of the state that empowers individuals rather than merely providing for them, calling for an enabling state over a traditional welfare model. Overall, the speaker intends to publish a book that will trace these developments in German political thought, highlighting debates and distinctions between idealism and romanticism.

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X-TIMESTAMP-MAP:LOCAL=00:00:00.000,MPEGTS=900000

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I've been working on a history of German idealism

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for a long time,

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and, it, it struck me that

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one could tell another kind of, give another kind of account

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of, of its development if we took l Its rather than

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as typically done Kant, as the starting point.

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Uh, now the other people have done that

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before, notably figures in the 19th century,

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writing on the history of German philosophy,

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and perhaps most notably at the beginning

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of the 20th century, el ca ca in his great book,

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Faha Freedom

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and Form of 1917, who made a very compelling case

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that Leitz is the real father of,

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of German idealism.

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So I thought I would, in light of new research, go back

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to CAI's thesis

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and see whether it could be sustained,

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perhaps develop differently.

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And that's what I tried to do, to give a different reading

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based large, much more largely on the political philosophy

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and its development, and

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therefore to trace the connections roughly between WNET

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and Karl Marx.

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So 1650 to 18 50, 18 70, 18 80,

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that is my trajectory.

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And I look at how various La Nian concepts were developed,

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reinterpreted, resituated,

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and how that that gives us a, I think, a more, more

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complete view of the development of this body of thought,

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as well as its political significance, that I think is,

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is noteworthy and needs to be developed more.

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So, again, we have to go back to LeMans here

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and his relation to the emergent materialism of his time.

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So LeMans is very,

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very early thought when he was still a student at,

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the University of Leip had an extensive correspondence

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with one of his professors, Jacque CIOs.

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And in this correspondence he looks at,

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particularly at the work of Thomas Hobbes

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and tries to see what can be made of it

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and how it can be reinterpreted

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or utilize in a different way.

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So, Hobbes, of course, had tried to develop a,

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a mechanistic theory of human action

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in which action is simply a response to external causes

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and pushes and pulls which objects exert on us.

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So, freedom is simply in Hobbs' account, being able

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to get the things that you want

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and avoid the things that you don't want.

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Um, and Leitz thinks that, that there's several problems

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with this account, and he tries

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to give an alternative reading.

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So the first thing he does is to say that

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hos is correct about a certain level of being or,

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or of existence, namely forces in the world.

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Once we act and we put something in the world, then

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that object will indeed respond to pushes

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and pulls in the mechanistic manner that Hobbes

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and other philosophers had had, described.

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Hobbes's problem, however, is to over generalize

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that account and to make it, account

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for the origins of human action in a way that

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Lyness thinks is, is not appropriate.

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So instead, Lys goes back to a version of Aristotle,

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the idea of teleology.

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So ly essentially wants to maintain that there is a level

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of interaction among physical objects, which are governed

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by mechanical laws,

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but that the initiation of the action,

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whereby those objects come to be,

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cannot be explained in that way.

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So Hobbes is over generalized.

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So Ness wants to distinguish intentional

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or theological action from mechanical forces at work in the

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world, and to, to explain the idea of

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initiation of action through teleology.

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He develops the concept that is central

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to later German thinking, namely, spontaneity.

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So spontaneity doesn't mean as it typically means in,

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in contemporary usage,

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unreflective action.

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It means rather action that originates from within

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that subjects actually intentionally

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or purposefully cause and bring about.

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And so this idea then becomes central

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to later German thought.

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And in Ks particular rendition of this idea

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of spontaneity in the, in the critique of

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of practical reason of 1787, he def he,

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he redefines it as negative freedom, namely the ability

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of the will to abs abstract from external causes

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or to admit them selectively according to a rational rule.

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In other words, we're not simply governed by

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the forces that work on us.

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We have an ability to abstract from them, to evaluate them,

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and then to say yes or no to them.

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So we're not simply reacting automatically, we're acting

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spontaneously, namely through this evaluative process

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and determining what we may do, what we ought to do.

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Um, and, and he works out different implications of that,

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through what he calls the, practical reason.

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And he distinguishes two levels.

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There's empirical, practical reason, which is action.

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We undertake in pursuit of happiness, of need, satisfaction,

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and there's pure practical reason, which is action,

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which aims not at happiness, but at freedom.

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And he distinguishes further among those latter actions,

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juridical, interactions, relations of right,

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and relations of virtue or,

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or acts of virtue, which, unlike relations right,

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are not subject to coercion.

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But all of these are governed by spontaneity,

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just spontaneity, working in different ways,

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Different ways through the different

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fields of practical reason.

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The, the claim I wanna make further is the following

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that prior, even prior to the critique of,

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of practical reason, 1787 Kant in 1785 wrote the

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groundwork of the metaphysics of morals.

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And this was a revolutionary text evolution.

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It was revolutionary because it's,

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it's frequently read in anglophone circles as critical of

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what one might almost call proto utilitarianism

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or what K calls empirical romy,

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namely the the will is dominated by external desires for,

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for things, for objects, for happiness.

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But kt wants to say that again, anticipating the idea

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of negative freedom that he works out in the critique of,

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of practical reason two years later, that,

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the will is auto is potentially autonomous or,

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or gives itself its own law and

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therefore indulges in these processes of discrimination

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among different kinds of possible acts in

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light of rational criteria.

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Now, this text was read by K foes

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who already numerous in Germany as announcing a new kind

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of political theory, a theory which

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will aim at essentially the promotion of freedom

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and not as other the theorists had done in Germany prior to,

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to K's work, namely attempting to promote happiness.

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So this is an important distinction.

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I I I'm arguing that with the metaphysics

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and morals, a new kind of political theory is born,

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which distinguishes political actions based upon

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the pursuit of, or the imposition of an idea

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of the good life or of happiness promoted by the state,

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the kind of paternalism versus the idea

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of self-determination.

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And, and they're

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and republican, essentially Republican freedom.

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So there's a, a clash between the old perfectionism,

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the outcome of which was a kind of enlightened absolutism,

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particularly in the works of Christian Wolf,

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who is also a follower of liveness,

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but takes on different aspects

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of W than K does on the one hand.

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And then these new continent thinkers who reject

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that paternalism as K himself will do theory

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and practice of something 9 93.

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Um, but already

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before that people like, the young, very young,

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Humboldt are working out what it would mean

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to have a t political theory based on this idea of,

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of self-determination, of free choice of, of ends.

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So Humboldt basically argues that

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the state ought not to be highly interventionist,

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that it ought to simply defend the borders of the security

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of the subjects, but not promote their happiness,

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their perfection in the, the older sense of, of thriving.

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But simply is the state is an agency of freno

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and not primarily of welfare or happiness.

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Um, and Humboldt went on, he,

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he changed his mind in later life,

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but in this early text, he argued for a,

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essentially a minimalist state as

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what he thought was the necessary outcome

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of Khan's political philosophy.

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Now, the interesting thing, one

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of the many interesting things is that this view

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of Humbolt combines a lag Mitzi idea of the person

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spontaneously following his

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or her own life path with the content restriction on

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paternalism or rejection of paternalism

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and imposition by the state.

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Um, so that's one interesting thing.

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The other interesting thing is that the conclusion

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that Humboldt draws is that the state ought to be minimal,

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that it ought to do very little no, for example,

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public education because that's indoctrinating,

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it's homogenizing,

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no economic interventions beyond what is simply necessary

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to secure, military stability, and,

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and civil, civil peace and so on.

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Now, it, a few years later, fta,

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who is also a a t develops a political theory on the,

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on the same conceptual basis,

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but with completely different institutional results

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because FTA argues for a highly interventionist state,

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which looks very much on the surface, like,

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Christian vol, enlightened tism,

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but it's based on the new continent premises.

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And how does this work? It's

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because FTA understands that

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freedom requires certain objective conditions,

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and it is just the, the, the business of the state

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through economic intervention

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and planning to provide those conditions whereby then

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individuals can freely define themselves

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and pursue their own self given goals.

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So he has the same objective

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and the same conceptual base as Al

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but on on the same premises.

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He draws entirely different conclusions.

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Humboldt a minimal state fta, highly interventionist state.

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So this state could look like FTA is reverting

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to Christian Wolf and the older and my deist theory,

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but in fact, he's not, he's developing a new kind

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of theory which promotes freedom rather than happiness.

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So these are examples of what I call in one essay

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I call left Consci following Bernard Jack's account,

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but which elsewhere I call, post T perfectionism.

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And it's characterized by the shift from,

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focus on happiness or thriving

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or nia in the sense to freedom

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to self-determination to spontaneity first shift.

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The second, it, it's a shift from the idea

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of a largely homogeneous society

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or a society of little differentiation

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as we still find interest on both to the beginnings

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of the understanding of the modern differentiation

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of interest based on the division of labor.

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So you get from homogeneity to diversity

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and then you get a move.

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A third move is from the idea

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that interests are intrinsically compatible with each other

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to the idea that there is a potential conflict of interest.

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And, and so the task of post t perfectionism is to reconcile

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that conflict of interest while respecting the spontaneity

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and, and independence of each member of the social unit.

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So that's the way I, I set up the bol FTA debate,

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and it is a debate this fta

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and the preface says there have been many theories about

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the role of the state, and they're all wrong.

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And here's the right one. He's, he's talking about Humboldt

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and various other contemporaries that

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who he thinks have got the, the, the message wrong,

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and he thinks he's being faithful to K

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and working out his own highly interventionist theory.

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Now, in this question, you also mentioned Karl Marx.

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So Marx is a fascinating figure

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because on the one hand, he has

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in his early theory look looking primarily at

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his works of 1840s.

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So it also, I think the same logic

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of last years later works.

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Um, he has elements of poston perfectionism in his work

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in it through his idea of the emancipation of labor,

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and I'll talk about that in a minute.

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But he also has elements of pre-con perfectionism.

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Uh, and this is largely to be seen in the absence

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of the notion of right, which is fundamental

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to many other post t perfectionists, an idea of a kind

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of collective good, which is not sufficiently individuated

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through ideas of rights.

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So the first part is the, the content heritage

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and the ultimately by nian heritage in Marx.

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So I contend that the idea

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of labor in Marx is essentially his translation

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of spontaneity.

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It's, it's this self-initiation of, of action.

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It's the ability of subjects to,

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to change objectivity in light of their own purposes.

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And that's clear in the 1844 manuscripts in his description

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of the labor process as essentially teleological in the

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sense of transforming nature in light of our ends,

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but also through his ideas of the alienation of labor

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and the potential emancipation of labor.

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The alienation of labor is not primarily in marks an account

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of the aeration or poverty

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or victimization of the workers as one, as

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of many other socialists of this day were arguing

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is rather an account of the emancipatory capacity of labor

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that could potentially

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Be a source of, of, of freedom for,

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for individual workers.

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But in fact, it has turned into its opposite

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because they are dominated by another will.

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They're literally heteronomous in common sense in the labor

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process that is the purposes

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of their action are not their own,

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but they're imposed by the owners of productive apparatus.

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Um, the product, the, the instruments of work do not belong

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to them, but to somebody else.

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So they're just instruments themselves

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and the product does not belong to them either.

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It's, it's taken away from,

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but it's not primarily about the product, it's about

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the conditions of work.

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Um, otherwise,

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a a a merely distributed socialism would be adequate

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in Marx, and it never is.

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He's always very critical of sentimental socialists who

15:40.295 --> 15:41.915
bewail the, the poverty of the workers,

15:42.015 --> 15:45.275
but don't see the workers as this transformative force.

15:45.575 --> 15:47.435
And that's what he wants to pick up,

15:47.695 --> 15:50.115
and that I think is his idealist heritage.

15:51.175 --> 15:55.035
But I said there was also a side of Marx that is not,

15:56.085 --> 15:58.375
attuned to this post content perfectionism.

15:58.955 --> 16:00.655
And that's primarily the, the other idea

16:00.655 --> 16:03.695
that is developed in 1844 gave me the idea

16:03.795 --> 16:06.015
of generics generic being

16:06.015 --> 16:10.535
or species being, which Marx derives from Feuerbach

16:10.535 --> 16:12.935
among other sources as one of his older contemporaries.

16:13.675 --> 16:16.855
Um, and this is largely about shared values

16:17.395 --> 16:20.615
rather than about the individual positing

16:20.615 --> 16:24.015
or taking up the values, which is what Shikta had stressed

16:24.195 --> 16:26.855
and, and other, and alt and other posts.

16:27.355 --> 16:29.815
So with that notion of, of generic being

16:29.995 --> 16:33.375
or general good, which is an important idea,

16:34.035 --> 16:37.135
but in Marxist thought, it, it eclipses the idea of,

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of individuals as right bearing

16:39.395 --> 16:42.015
and as FTA points out, rights don't mean simply.

16:42.965 --> 16:45.015
It's not just a justification of private property,

16:45.445 --> 16:49.335
it's rather the recognition of the individual as the source

16:49.515 --> 16:53.895
of, of validation of, of giving as scent

16:54.395 --> 16:56.735
to whatever values are, are

16:56.915 --> 16:58.495
to be accepted or to be practiced.

16:59.155 --> 17:02.655
And that's the sense that FTA develops and,

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and I think Hagel as well.

17:04.675 --> 17:08.095
Um, but in Marx, this is eclipsed by the idea of

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of a generic good, of a collective good, which sounds

17:11.835 --> 17:15.735
to me much like Christian vols idea of, of happiness

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or thriving, which is the, the post const

17:19.275 --> 17:23.095
or rather the pre-con aspect that I think we find with Marx.

17:23.195 --> 17:25.775
So Marx is kind of synthesis or,

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or a combination of two incompatible

17:28.455 --> 17:29.615
theories in that regard.

17:30.335 --> 17:33.055
I just completed a book for, it's been accepted

17:33.075 --> 17:34.815
for publication by Cambridge University Press.

17:34.835 --> 17:37.735
It will be out next year. It's called, freedom

17:37.995 --> 17:40.095
and Perfection, German Political Thought

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from LeMans to Marx.

17:42.975 --> 17:46.795
And there I trace out the history of this,

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school of thought, and I show its its internal

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differentiations and also some of its the polemics

17:54.325 --> 17:55.525
with other currents that it,

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that are not compatible with it.

17:58.185 --> 18:01.125
One interesting comparison that, that emerges

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is the difference between German idealism on the one hand

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and different types of romanticism on the other.

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So I argue that that romanticism in, for example, herder

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and schlagel and Novartis, schleiermacher

18:18.535 --> 18:20.125
originates from the same ground

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as this German post continent perfectionism.

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But it takes a different stance

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because the post content perfection stance is the following,

18:28.005 --> 18:32.765
that to the extent that objectivity does not conform to

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the freedom or, or the insights

18:35.825 --> 18:39.325
or the ends of subjects of the actors who produce

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that objectivity, then objectivity ought to be

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and can be changed, can be modified.

18:45.065 --> 18:48.845
So idealism is an imperative to perfect the world,

18:48.905 --> 18:51.925
to make it a better place in order to be free.

18:52.385 --> 18:54.765
Not a better place necessarily to be happy

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because happiness is not the primary consideration,

18:57.945 --> 19:00.405
but it's the, the, the quest for happening, the ability to

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set one's own goals

19:02.065 --> 19:05.365
and pursue them, that that's the fundamental thing.

19:05.665 --> 19:08.085
And the task of perfectionism is to try

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to bring about the social

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and political institutions in which

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this quest can be furthered.

19:13.955 --> 19:16.365
Well, idealists, romantics on the other hand,

19:16.365 --> 19:20.205
particularly the, the ironic romantics hold that there's,

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an unbridgeable gap between subjects and objects,

19:23.365 --> 19:26.405
but namely subjects are the, the source

19:26.425 --> 19:27.845
of infinite creativity.

19:28.305 --> 19:30.005
And anything they do, any object

19:30.005 --> 19:33.205
that they could put in the world is merely a fragmented, it,

19:33.235 --> 19:35.405
it's a distortion of their own creativity.

19:35.405 --> 19:38.405
It's not, it's not, it, it, the world cannot affirm me

19:39.215 --> 19:42.305
because I am infinite in my capacity

19:42.365 --> 19:44.425
and all my products are finite.

19:44.565 --> 19:46.545
And that's precisely what romantic irony is.

19:46.575 --> 19:50.025
It's this divorce between unbridgeable gap

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between subjects and their world.

19:52.045 --> 19:54.305
And irony is the recognition of that gap

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and the ability to, revel in

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that diam that separation as the essence of freedom.

20:03.965 --> 20:06.625
So romantics think withdrawal from the world or,

20:07.205 --> 20:10.785
or toying with the world is the way to be free

20:11.245 --> 20:12.465
and idealists think that

20:13.095 --> 20:14.905
reforming the world is the way to be free.

20:15.325 --> 20:20.065
So that's one thing. The other thing is that I think

20:20.065 --> 20:21.785
through this, this body of thought,

20:21.785 --> 20:23.945
we get new ideas about citizenship

20:24.125 --> 20:27.785
and about the state citizenship on the one hand,

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because it's al never a matter of simply

20:31.645 --> 20:35.295
what individuals happen to want, it's always their ability

20:35.295 --> 20:40.055
to rationally evaluate whether what they want is indeed,

20:40.565 --> 20:42.855
conducive to the freedom of others or not.

20:42.955 --> 20:46.775
And therefore the ability to self limit that, not to pursue

20:47.635 --> 20:51.925
litigiously one's own narrow ends when there's a a means

20:51.925 --> 20:54.605
of perhaps bridging bridging differences

20:54.785 --> 20:58.245
or overcoming the separation of interest through,

20:58.945 --> 21:00.565
through discussion.

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So it's not the validation of

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like Hobbes has any individual good, it's rather a, a,

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a ability to stand back to exert negative freedom, to, to,

21:12.405 --> 21:16.065
to ask whether this end that I have is one that I ought

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to have and what its implications are for the freedom

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of others that's citizenship, the state.

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There's also a way of rethinking the,

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what's called the welfare state,

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because the welfare state sounds like

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post sounds like pre-con perfectionism, where the state

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paternalistic doles out benefits to people

21:35.445 --> 21:38.505
who become passive recipients of, of goods

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and quest of happiness.

21:40.845 --> 21:45.275
And, but the, the post T model is akin to the thought

21:45.275 --> 21:48.275
of people like Ammar Asan who talks about the enabling state

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or Martha sba.

21:49.895 --> 21:52.555
Um, so you get the kind of facilitating

21:52.555 --> 21:55.195
or enabling state out of this rather than a welfare state

21:55.195 --> 21:58.555
because the idea is to provide people with the means,

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as Victor said, to secure their own freedom.

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That's the objective. Not to make them happy, not to, not

22:05.595 --> 22:08.845
to look after their their needs paternalistic,

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but to further emancipate them.

22:11.665 --> 22:15.045
The difference is that, San is largely coming out

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of the utilitarian tradition in bu,

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largely out of the Aristotelian.

22:18.505 --> 22:20.325
So you get an interesting convergence

22:20.325 --> 22:23.165
of perspective from very different theoretical basis.

00:00 - I've been working on a history of German idealism for a long time, and, it, it struck me that one could tell another kind of, give another kind of account of, of its development if we took l Its rather than as typically done Kant, as the starting point.

00:21 - now the other people have done that before, notably figures in the 19th century, writing on the history of German philosophy, and perhaps most notably at the beginning of the 20th century, el ca ca in his great book, Faha Freedom and Form of 1917, who made a very compelling case that Leitz is the real father of, of German idealism. So I thought I would, in light of new research, go back

00:51 - to CAI's thesis and see whether it could be sustained, perhaps develop differently. And that's what I tried to do, to give a different reading based large, much more largely on the political philosophy and its development, and therefore to trace the connections roughly between WNET and Karl Marx. So 1650 to 18 50, 18 70, 18 80, that is my trajectory.

01:18 - And I look at how various La Nian concepts were developed, reinterpreted, resituated, and how that that gives us a, I think, a more, more complete view of the development of this body of thought, as well as its political significance, that I think is, is noteworthy and needs to be developed more. So, again, we have to go back to LeMans here and his relation to the emergent materialism of his time. So LeMans is very, very early thought when he was still a student at,

01:53 - the University of Leip had an extensive correspondence with one of his professors, Jacque CIOs. And in this correspondence he looks at, particularly at the work of Thomas Hobbes and tries to see what can be made of it and how it can be reinterpreted or utilize in a different way. So, Hobbes, of course, had tried to develop a, a mechanistic theory of human action in which action is simply a response to external causes

02:24 - and pushes and pulls which objects exert on us. So, freedom is simply in Hobbs' account, being able to get the things that you want and avoid the things that you don't want. and Leitz thinks that, that there's several problems with this account, and he tries to give an alternative reading. So the first thing he does is to say that hos is correct about a certain level of being or, or of existence, namely forces in the world.

02:54 - Once we act and we put something in the world, then that object will indeed respond to pushes and pulls in the mechanistic manner that Hobbes and other philosophers had had, described. Hobbes's problem, however, is to over generalize that account and to make it, account for the origins of human action in a way that Lyness thinks is, is not appropriate. So instead, Lys goes back to a version of Aristotle, the idea of teleology.

03:25 - So ly essentially wants to maintain that there is a level of interaction among physical objects, which are governed by mechanical laws, but that the initiation of the action, whereby those objects come to be, cannot be explained in that way. So Hobbes is over generalized. So Ness wants to distinguish intentional or theological action from mechanical forces at work in the world, and to, to explain the idea of

03:56 - initiation of action through teleology. He develops the concept that is central to later German thinking, namely, spontaneity. So spontaneity doesn't mean as it typically means in, in contemporary usage, unreflective action. It means rather action that originates from within that subjects actually intentionally or purposefully cause and bring about. And so this idea then becomes central

04:27 - to later German thought. And in Ks particular rendition of this idea of spontaneity in the, in the critique of of practical reason of 1787, he def he, he redefines it as negative freedom, namely the ability of the will to abs abstract from external causes or to admit them selectively according to a rational rule. In other words, we're not simply governed by the forces that work on us. We have an ability to abstract from them, to evaluate them,

04:57 - and then to say yes or no to them. So we're not simply reacting automatically, we're acting spontaneously, namely through this evaluative process and determining what we may do, what we ought to do. and, and he works out different implications of that, through what he calls the, practical reason. And he distinguishes two levels. There's empirical, practical reason, which is action. We undertake in pursuit of happiness, of need, satisfaction, and there's pure practical reason, which is action,

05:33 - which aims not at happiness, but at freedom. And he distinguishes further among those latter actions, juridical, interactions, relations of right, and relations of virtue or, or acts of virtue, which, unlike relations right, are not subject to coercion. But all of these are governed by spontaneity, just spontaneity, working in different ways, Different ways through the different fields of practical reason.

05:59 - The, the claim I wanna make further is the following that prior, even prior to the critique of, of practical reason, 1787 Kant in 1785 wrote the groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. And this was a revolutionary text evolution. It was revolutionary because it's, it's frequently read in anglophone circles as critical of what one might almost call proto utilitarianism or what K calls empirical romy, namely the the will is dominated by external desires for,

06:32 - for things, for objects, for happiness. But kt wants to say that again, anticipating the idea of negative freedom that he works out in the critique of, of practical reason two years later, that, the will is auto is potentially autonomous or, or gives itself its own law and therefore indulges in these processes of discrimination among different kinds of possible acts in light of rational criteria. Now, this text was read by K foes

07:05 - who already numerous in Germany as announcing a new kind of political theory, a theory which will aim at essentially the promotion of freedom and not as other the theorists had done in Germany prior to, to K's work, namely attempting to promote happiness. So this is an important distinction. I I I'm arguing that with the metaphysics and morals, a new kind of political theory is born, which distinguishes political actions based upon the pursuit of, or the imposition of an idea

07:41 - of the good life or of happiness promoted by the state, the kind of paternalism versus the idea of self-determination. And, and they're and republican, essentially Republican freedom. So there's a, a clash between the old perfectionism, the outcome of which was a kind of enlightened absolutism, particularly in the works of Christian Wolf, who is also a follower of liveness, but takes on different aspects

08:07 - of W than K does on the one hand. And then these new continent thinkers who reject that paternalism as K himself will do theory and practice of something 9 93. but already before that people like, the young, very young, Humboldt are working out what it would mean to have a t political theory based on this idea of, of self-determination, of free choice of, of ends. So Humboldt basically argues that

08:43 - the state ought not to be highly interventionist, that it ought to simply defend the borders of the security of the subjects, but not promote their happiness, their perfection in the, the older sense of, of thriving. But simply is the state is an agency of freno and not primarily of welfare or happiness. and Humboldt went on, he, he changed his mind in later life, but in this early text, he argued for a, essentially a minimalist state as

09:17 - what he thought was the necessary outcome of Khan's political philosophy. Now, the interesting thing, one of the many interesting things is that this view of Humbolt combines a lag Mitzi idea of the person spontaneously following his or her own life path with the content restriction on paternalism or rejection of paternalism and imposition by the state. so that's one interesting thing.

09:45 - The other interesting thing is that the conclusion that Humboldt draws is that the state ought to be minimal, that it ought to do very little no, for example, public education because that's indoctrinating, it's homogenizing, no economic interventions beyond what is simply necessary to secure, military stability, and, and civil, civil peace and so on. Now, it, a few years later, fta, who is also a a t develops a political theory on the,

10:19 - on the same conceptual basis, but with completely different institutional results because FTA argues for a highly interventionist state, which looks very much on the surface, like, Christian vol, enlightened tism, but it's based on the new continent premises. And how does this work? It's because FTA understands that freedom requires certain objective conditions, and it is just the, the, the business of the state

10:48 - through economic intervention and planning to provide those conditions whereby then individuals can freely define themselves and pursue their own self given goals. So he has the same objective and the same conceptual base as Al but on on the same premises. He draws entirely different conclusions. Humboldt a minimal state fta, highly interventionist state. So this state could look like FTA is reverting

11:15 - to Christian Wolf and the older and my deist theory, but in fact, he's not, he's developing a new kind of theory which promotes freedom rather than happiness. So these are examples of what I call in one essay I call left Consci following Bernard Jack's account, but which elsewhere I call, post T perfectionism. And it's characterized by the shift from, focus on happiness or thriving or nia in the sense to freedom to self-determination to spontaneity first shift.

11:53 - The second, it, it's a shift from the idea of a largely homogeneous society or a society of little differentiation as we still find interest on both to the beginnings of the understanding of the modern differentiation of interest based on the division of labor. So you get from homogeneity to diversity and then you get a move. A third move is from the idea that interests are intrinsically compatible with each other

12:20 - to the idea that there is a potential conflict of interest. And, and so the task of post t perfectionism is to reconcile that conflict of interest while respecting the spontaneity and, and independence of each member of the social unit. So that's the way I, I set up the bol FTA debate, and it is a debate this fta and the preface says there have been many theories about the role of the state, and they're all wrong. And here's the right one. He's, he's talking about Humboldt and various other contemporaries that

12:52 - who he thinks have got the, the, the message wrong, and he thinks he's being faithful to K and working out his own highly interventionist theory. Now, in this question, you also mentioned Karl Marx. So Marx is a fascinating figure because on the one hand, he has in his early theory look looking primarily at his works of 1840s. So it also, I think the same logic of last years later works.

13:18 - he has elements of poston perfectionism in his work in it through his idea of the emancipation of labor, and I'll talk about that in a minute. But he also has elements of pre-con perfectionism. and this is largely to be seen in the absence of the notion of right, which is fundamental to many other post t perfectionists, an idea of a kind of collective good, which is not sufficiently individuated through ideas of rights. So the first part is the, the content heritage

13:51 - and the ultimately by nian heritage in Marx. So I contend that the idea of labor in Marx is essentially his translation of spontaneity. It's, it's this self-initiation of, of action. It's the ability of subjects to, to change objectivity in light of their own purposes. And that's clear in the 1844 manuscripts in his description of the labor process as essentially teleological in the sense of transforming nature in light of our ends,

14:23 - but also through his ideas of the alienation of labor and the potential emancipation of labor. The alienation of labor is not primarily in marks an account of the aeration or poverty or victimization of the workers as one, as of many other socialists of this day were arguing is rather an account of the emancipatory capacity of labor that could potentially Be a source of, of, of freedom for, for individual workers.

14:56 - But in fact, it has turned into its opposite because they are dominated by another will. They're literally heteronomous in common sense in the labor process that is the purposes of their action are not their own, but they're imposed by the owners of productive apparatus. the product, the, the instruments of work do not belong to them, but to somebody else. So they're just instruments themselves and the product does not belong to them either.

15:23 - It's, it's taken away from, but it's not primarily about the product, it's about the conditions of work. otherwise, a a a merely distributed socialism would be adequate in Marx, and it never is. He's always very critical of sentimental socialists who bewail the, the poverty of the workers, but don't see the workers as this transformative force. And that's what he wants to pick up,

15:47 - and that I think is his idealist heritage. But I said there was also a side of Marx that is not, attuned to this post content perfectionism. And that's primarily the, the other idea that is developed in 1844 gave me the idea of generics generic being or species being, which Marx derives from Feuerbach among other sources as one of his older contemporaries. and this is largely about shared values rather than about the individual positing

16:20 - or taking up the values, which is what Shikta had stressed and, and other, and alt and other posts. So with that notion of, of generic being or general good, which is an important idea, but in Marxist thought, it, it eclipses the idea of, of individuals as right bearing and as FTA points out, rights don't mean simply. It's not just a justification of private property, it's rather the recognition of the individual as the source of, of validation of, of giving as scent

16:54 - to whatever values are, are to be accepted or to be practiced. And that's the sense that FTA develops and, and I think Hagel as well. but in Marx, this is eclipsed by the idea of of a generic good, of a collective good, which sounds to me much like Christian vols idea of, of happiness or thriving, which is the, the post const or rather the pre-con aspect that I think we find with Marx. So Marx is kind of synthesis or,

17:25 - or a combination of two incompatible theories in that regard. I just completed a book for, it's been accepted for publication by Cambridge University Press. It will be out next year. It's called, freedom and Perfection, German Political Thought from LeMans to Marx. And there I trace out the history of this, school of thought, and I show its its internal differentiations and also some of its the polemics

17:54 - with other currents that it, that are not compatible with it. One interesting comparison that, that emerges is the difference between German idealism on the one hand and different types of romanticism on the other. So I argue that that romanticism in, for example, herder and schlagel and Novartis, schleiermacher originates from the same ground as this German post continent perfectionism. But it takes a different stance

18:24 - because the post content perfection stance is the following, that to the extent that objectivity does not conform to the freedom or, or the insights or the ends of subjects of the actors who produce that objectivity, then objectivity ought to be and can be changed, can be modified. So idealism is an imperative to perfect the world, to make it a better place in order to be free. Not a better place necessarily to be happy because happiness is not the primary consideration,

18:57 - but it's the, the, the quest for happening, the ability to set one's own goals and pursue them, that that's the fundamental thing. And the task of perfectionism is to try to bring about the social and political institutions in which this quest can be furthered. Well, idealists, romantics on the other hand, particularly the, the ironic romantics hold that there's, an unbridgeable gap between subjects and objects,

19:23 - but namely subjects are the, the source of infinite creativity. And anything they do, any object that they could put in the world is merely a fragmented, it, it's a distortion of their own creativity. It's not, it's not, it, it, the world cannot affirm me because I am infinite in my capacity and all my products are finite. And that's precisely what romantic irony is. It's this divorce between unbridgeable gap

19:50 - between subjects and their world. And irony is the recognition of that gap and the ability to, revel in that diam that separation as the essence of freedom. So romantics think withdrawal from the world or, or toying with the world is the way to be free and idealists think that reforming the world is the way to be free. So that's one thing. The other thing is that I think through this, this body of thought,

20:21 - we get new ideas about citizenship and about the state citizenship on the one hand, because it's al never a matter of simply what individuals happen to want, it's always their ability to rationally evaluate whether what they want is indeed, conducive to the freedom of others or not. And therefore the ability to self limit that, not to pursue litigiously one's own narrow ends when there's a a means of perhaps bridging bridging differences or overcoming the separation of interest through,

20:58 - through discussion. So it's not the validation of like Hobbes has any individual good, it's rather a, a, a ability to stand back to exert negative freedom, to, to, to ask whether this end that I have is one that I ought to have and what its implications are for the freedom of others that's citizenship, the state. There's also a way of rethinking the, what's called the welfare state, because the welfare state sounds like

21:29 - post sounds like pre-con perfectionism, where the state paternalistic doles out benefits to people who become passive recipients of, of goods and quest of happiness. And, but the, the post T model is akin to the thought of people like Ammar Asan who talks about the enabling state or Martha sba. so you get the kind of facilitating or enabling state out of this rather than a welfare state because the idea is to provide people with the means,

21:59 - as Victor said, to secure their own freedom. That's the objective. Not to make them happy, not to, not to look after their their needs paternalistic, but to further emancipate them. The difference is that, San is largely coming out of the utilitarian tradition in bu, largely out of the Aristotelian. So you get an interesting convergence of perspective from very different theoretical basis.

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