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Janne Tukiainen discusses geographic political representation and geographic distribution of local public goods within local jurisdictions using geo-coded data on politicians, the electorate and elementary schools.

Image courtesy of interviewee. December 21, 2023

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This video video discusses research conducted on urban economics, specifically focusing on neighborhood segregation and the impact of local public goods on geographic inequalities. It starts by identifying the correlation between childhood environments—growing up in poor neighborhoods versus rich neighborhoods—and future life outcomes. The authors express interest in understanding how local public services and political processes influence these inequalities.

The study analyzes local municipal politics, particularly looking at the relationship between elected officials' proximity to schools and the likelihood of those schools remaining open. Using a unique electoral system in Finland, which incorporates open list proportional representation, the authors investigate how personal votes affect service allocation. They find that schools in neighborhoods with elected officials living nearby are less likely to close.

Data analyzed includes the addresses of candidates and schools, which provides insights into local representation. The findings indicate that affluent neighborhoods are better represented in local politics due to higher voter turnout and geographical loyalty in voting patterns, resulting in more elected officials from wealthy areas.

The research also highlights the consequences of school closures, revealing that wealthier residents tend to leave neighborhoods when schools shut down, perpetuating a cycle of decline in less affluent areas. The authors suggest that municipalities should consider long-term implications of public service locations on neighborhood dynamics and inequalities when making policy decisions.

In conclusion, they emphasize the importance of political processes and voter turnout on representation, cautioning that increasing turnout could lead to unintended consequences. They also discuss the inherent trade-offs in electoral systems regarding representation, accountability, and quality of political selection, emphasizing the need for careful consideration by lawmakers when choosing such systems.

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X-TIMESTAMP-MAP:LOCAL=00:00:00.000,MPEGTS=900000

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Motivation arise, from our, my co-authors

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interest in, in urban economics, questions about,

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neighborhood segregation.

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And in that literature, there is this understanding

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that, you know, children grow up in,

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you know, poor neighborhoods.

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They, they tend to do worse.

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Uh, and, and likewise, it, those who grow up in,

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rich neighborhoods, tend to do better

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later, in lifetime.

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And, and, and several studies also establish this in sort of

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causal sense, avoiding obvious selection, problems.

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Now it's sort of less clear, like to

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what extent these arise from sort of peer effects

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or what's the role of, local public

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services in it now.

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Now we did not really set out to sort of, not

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to tease out these mechanisms,

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but we were more than interested in, the part with,

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with the sort of local public goods.

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Now, if those local public goods are important in, in sort

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of part of, of these,

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geographic inequalities,

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then naturally also politics comes into play.

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And then we sort of wanted to understand that,

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that the politics of this, local public good provision

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and to what extent those, political processes

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contribute to, to the geographic inequalities,

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the broader literature about location based, you know,

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public fund allocation, location

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of politicians or where they are from.

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Uh, there is a lot of that, but,

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but that evidence is mostly,

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before us related to more like aggregate level,

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sort of location and more sort

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of aggregate level politics in the sense that if,

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if your congressman is from some area

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or state, they tend to put more money there,

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or if your member of the parliament is from some area,

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they tend to put more money there.

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But what our, data facilitated was

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to actually look at things at more like neighborhood level.

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So we studied, local municipal politics and,

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and municipal public courts,

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and we could really kind of narrow down the sort of

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very neighborhood level in, in the sense that

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does it matter if your actual neighbors are the politicians?

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Does it matter for, having these very, relevant

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services, close to your home, such

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as in specifically school is the case that we study.

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There are two important institutions here.

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First is the fitness municipalities

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And what they do.

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And, and it's, in the period that we studied,

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they're very important entities in the sense that they

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have a lot of responsibilities over the education system

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over primary healthcare.

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And of course they do also other things that municipalities

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around the world do such a zoning policies

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and, and things like that.

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But, but

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because they take care of so big chunk of healthcare

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and education, actually they employ, almost 20%

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of the entire labor force in,

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in Finland coastal municipality.

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So it's a big, user of of public budget. It.

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And second important institutional setting here is,

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is the election system in Finland,

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in these local elections.

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And it's called,

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open list proportional representation system.

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And it takes place, in something that,

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the district calls at large elections, meaning

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that there are no like wars

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or separate geographics, areas,

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within the municipality,

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but basically all the candidates are sort

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of running in the entire municipality

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and every voter can sort of vote for, for any candidate.

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And, and, and also the open list nature means

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that in this election system, each voter has one single vote

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and they have to give it to one single candidate.

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Uh, they are not giving it to a party like in isolation

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of the candidate, basically.

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And, and what this means is that parties are running

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quite long lists.

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Typically there are tens and you know, dozens

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and dozens of candidates per per party.

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So voters just speak one of those candidates

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and then the party gets seats according to some

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of the votes over its own candidates.

04:48.165 --> 04:50.745
And these personal votes determine

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who gets elected from within the part and, and, and

04:55.985 --> 04:57.345
therefore it's, it sort of creates this

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very personal system.

04:59.455 --> 05:03.835
And then, sort of our interest was to sort of, well,

05:03.835 --> 05:06.235
this, this, this election system is, is relevant for us

05:06.945 --> 05:09.235
from, from several perspectives.

05:09.415 --> 05:13.395
But first perspective is that it gives us, sort

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of al identification strategy to study the effects of

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where politicians live on where you locate the services.

05:22.425 --> 05:25.995
Here specifically, we studied the question that

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does the probability of school closure increase

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if you have less people elected

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who live close to the school?

05:37.175 --> 05:39.595
And how our election system allows

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to tease out the causal effect here is that quite often,

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surprisingly often in this party races

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with the personal votes, there are actually exact

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that es who gets selected.

05:54.775 --> 05:56.555
For example, if in my

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Municipality the conservative party got six seats,

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then maybe the sixth

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and the seventh ranked conservative,

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party candidate both cut, let's say exactly 40 votes.

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So for the last seat, there was an for an exact tie.

06:15.055 --> 06:16.705
What happens then is that

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these candidate's names are written on a paper

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and this paper is put in a hat

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and someone wears supplying fault

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and rose randomly the name was

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to be elected out of those two candidates.

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And this allows that sort of a,

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a real randomized control trial in a sense of, of this,

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does some school get more representation or not?

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Because we can then, look at the hat.

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There is one guy who lives close to school A

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and another person who lives close to school, school B,

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and we can kind of think that, okay, now school A got lucky

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because it randomly got more,

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politicians living close to it.

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And we show that if the school gets lucky, it's, only,

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it's like half the probability that it closes down compared

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to the school that got got unlucky.

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We have several models

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and several sort of findings in this paper and,

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and we wanted to follow this sort of chain of events,

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to, to little bit.

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So what we, what facilitates our analysis is

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that we have data on, exact locations of

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where all the candidates live.

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So we know the address and we know the living history,

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and we have tens of thousands candidates in the day.

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And we also know the address of this school.

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So we have religious geo-coded, sort of intersection

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of politics and, and the local public coding question.

07:42.755 --> 07:46.895
So first we wanted to understand like, are

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richer and more affluent, affluent, neighborhoods

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more represented or better represented?

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And we showed that that's indeed the case,

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like the high educated that that the sort

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of high income neighborhoods within the municipality

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have more, elected counselors, from within that,

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that area.

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And, and we sort of traced the most likely mechanism

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to be the sort of two things like the higher turnout

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of the more affluent voters.

08:18.355 --> 08:22.255
And second was that there was surprisingly much sort

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of geographic loyalty in the sort of voter choice

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and vote preferences.

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Even if you could vote anyone in the whole of municipality,

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there was a big bonus you get from your local voters.

08:35.435 --> 08:38.815
And we know this because these municipalities are divided in

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the sort of just for sort

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of practical purposes into polling districts, like

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the exact place where you go to vote like your local school

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or church or whatever pub or some public, library.

08:53.555 --> 08:55.465
And, and

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because the votes are documented at this level,

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we can also tell like,

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which candidates get more votes from which parts

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of the municipality, even if it has no,

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like real institutional power

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or like these votes are, are not there.

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Um, so we could say that people tend to vote more for,

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for candidates who live close to them.

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And that combined with the higher turnout of, sort

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of more higher educated than richer voters leads

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to the result that,

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you have more people in power in rich places.

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And, and that we just, you know, normal, sort

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of descriptive regression analysis,

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reveal revealed this.

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And then our second step was the sort of

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causal regression analysis using this, the RCT thing

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to show that this representation matters for,

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for, actual policies.

09:56.545 --> 10:00.325
And then some of the final piece that we did was we studied,

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okay, what happens to the areas that

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where the school closes?

10:05.265 --> 10:07.365
And there we use the model that is called,

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difference in difference design

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and to sort of compare populations in the places

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that, you know, had a school

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and he kept on having school as opposed to had a school.

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And then the school went away.

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And then we showed that, actually the,

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especially the sort of

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richer people move away from the neighborhood

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that loses the school.

10:33.045 --> 10:36.505
And this sort of completes a kind of circle in our mind

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that, that the sort of the political process through which,

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these richer areas to better,

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but also this sort of hinting towards this vicious cycle

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that if things start to get worse, they sort

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of keep on going worse.

10:57.045 --> 11:00.785
Big policy implication we have is that when

11:01.385 --> 11:04.665
a municipality is considering the location of

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whatever public could, it might want

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to consider not only the sort of short run monetary

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cost and benefit calculation,

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but also think of the more longer run implications on,

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on the sort of dynamics of, of neighborhood segregation.

11:24.245 --> 11:26.385
So that's, that's one, one conclusion.

11:27.125 --> 11:31.425
And, and the second conclusion is that politics,

11:31.485 --> 11:35.525
really matter and also turnout really matters.

11:36.465 --> 11:37.605
But then it sort of,

11:38.415 --> 11:41.595
but of course we know from a large literature in political

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science that, you know, inducing turnout is not that simple.

11:46.695 --> 11:51.035
Uh, and there are also some risks involved on, you know, if,

11:51.055 --> 11:52.835
if, if you're gonna do that, you may not

11:52.835 --> 11:56.365
Get the result that, that you wanted in terms of,

11:57.305 --> 12:02.165
you might even increase the imbalances in the democratic

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of voting or, or,

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or get some more noise in the process and so forth.

12:06.825 --> 12:10.325
And it also, the other policy conclusion is that

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there are trades in what kind of election system you have.

12:14.905 --> 12:18.485
And even in this sort of kind of at large election system

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that is meant to be sort of not so much like play-based

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and have this work ing to certain places they do exist,

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sort of endogenously even if not

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enforced by, by the system.

12:32.385 --> 12:34.285
But also unfortunately, like various

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election systems have sort of trade-offs

12:37.285 --> 12:40.005
between let's say representation and accountability

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and the quality of political selection.

12:42.705 --> 12:45.045
So it's not clear like outside, which is the best,

12:45.185 --> 12:47.565
but it's just that you need to consider this carefully.

12:48.185 --> 12:52.735
For example, if you would do like more like Bard based,

12:53.155 --> 12:57.095
system, you might guarantee a more equal representation

12:57.355 --> 12:59.215
of, of the rich samur in the council.

12:59.915 --> 13:02.215
But, but, but maybe the tradeoff is that

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because Uuv can this political competition,

13:05.115 --> 13:08.935
you maybe get not so high quality candidate selected.

13:09.155 --> 13:11.375
So it's always like two sides to this coin

13:11.435 --> 13:15.535
and that the lawmakers have to decide which they favor.

00:00 - Motivation arise, from our, my co-authors interest in, in urban economics, questions about, neighborhood segregation. And in that literature, there is this understanding that, you know, children grow up in, you know, poor neighborhoods.

00:21 - They, they tend to do worse. and, and likewise, it, those who grow up in, rich neighborhoods, tend to do better later, in lifetime. And, and, and several studies also establish this in sort of causal sense, avoiding obvious selection, problems. Now it's sort of less clear, like to what extent these arise from sort of peer effects or what's the role of, local public services in it now.

00:57 - Now we did not really set out to sort of, not to tease out these mechanisms, but we were more than interested in, the part with, with the sort of local public goods. Now, if those local public goods are important in, in sort of part of, of these, geographic inequalities, then naturally also politics comes into play. And then we sort of wanted to understand that, that the politics of this, local public good provision

01:30 - and to what extent those, political processes contribute to, to the geographic inequalities, the broader literature about location based, you know, public fund allocation, location of politicians or where they are from. there is a lot of that, but, but that evidence is mostly, before us related to more like aggregate level, sort of location and more sort of aggregate level politics in the sense that if,

02:05 - if your congressman is from some area or state, they tend to put more money there, or if your member of the parliament is from some area, they tend to put more money there. But what our, data facilitated was to actually look at things at more like neighborhood level. So we studied, local municipal politics and, and municipal public courts, and we could really kind of narrow down the sort of very neighborhood level in, in the sense that

02:39 - does it matter if your actual neighbors are the politicians? Does it matter for, having these very, relevant services, close to your home, such as in specifically school is the case that we study. There are two important institutions here. First is the fitness municipalities And what they do. And, and it's, in the period that we studied, they're very important entities in the sense that they have a lot of responsibilities over the education system

03:09 - over primary healthcare. And of course they do also other things that municipalities around the world do such a zoning policies and, and things like that. But, but because they take care of so big chunk of healthcare and education, actually they employ, almost 20% of the entire labor force in, in Finland coastal municipality. So it's a big, user of of public budget. It.

03:36 - And second important institutional setting here is, is the election system in Finland, in these local elections. And it's called, open list proportional representation system. And it takes place, in something that, the district calls at large elections, meaning that there are no like wars or separate geographics, areas, within the municipality,

04:02 - but basically all the candidates are sort of running in the entire municipality and every voter can sort of vote for, for any candidate. And, and, and also the open list nature means that in this election system, each voter has one single vote and they have to give it to one single candidate. they are not giving it to a party like in isolation of the candidate, basically. And, and what this means is that parties are running quite long lists.

04:32 - Typically there are tens and you know, dozens and dozens of candidates per per party. So voters just speak one of those candidates and then the party gets seats according to some of the votes over its own candidates. And these personal votes determine who gets elected from within the part and, and, and therefore it's, it sort of creates this very personal system. And then, sort of our interest was to sort of, well,

05:03 - this, this, this election system is, is relevant for us from, from several perspectives. But first perspective is that it gives us, sort of al identification strategy to study the effects of where politicians live on where you locate the services. Here specifically, we studied the question that does the probability of school closure increase if you have less people elected who live close to the school? And how our election system allows

05:39 - to tease out the causal effect here is that quite often, surprisingly often in this party races with the personal votes, there are actually exact that es who gets selected. For example, if in my Municipality the conservative party got six seats, then maybe the sixth and the seventh ranked conservative, party candidate both cut, let's say exactly 40 votes. So for the last seat, there was an for an exact tie.

06:15 - What happens then is that these candidate's names are written on a paper and this paper is put in a hat and someone wears supplying fault and rose randomly the name was to be elected out of those two candidates. And this allows that sort of a, a real randomized control trial in a sense of, of this, does some school get more representation or not? Because we can then, look at the hat.

06:43 - There is one guy who lives close to school A and another person who lives close to school, school B, and we can kind of think that, okay, now school A got lucky because it randomly got more, politicians living close to it. And we show that if the school gets lucky, it's, only, it's like half the probability that it closes down compared to the school that got got unlucky. We have several models and several sort of findings in this paper and,

07:14 - and we wanted to follow this sort of chain of events, to, to little bit. So what we, what facilitates our analysis is that we have data on, exact locations of where all the candidates live. So we know the address and we know the living history, and we have tens of thousands candidates in the day. And we also know the address of this school. So we have religious geo-coded, sort of intersection of politics and, and the local public coding question.

07:42 - So first we wanted to understand like, are richer and more affluent, affluent, neighborhoods more represented or better represented? And we showed that that's indeed the case, like the high educated that that the sort of high income neighborhoods within the municipality have more, elected counselors, from within that, that area. And, and we sort of traced the most likely mechanism to be the sort of two things like the higher turnout

08:15 - of the more affluent voters. And second was that there was surprisingly much sort of geographic loyalty in the sort of voter choice and vote preferences. Even if you could vote anyone in the whole of municipality, there was a big bonus you get from your local voters. And we know this because these municipalities are divided in the sort of just for sort of practical purposes into polling districts, like the exact place where you go to vote like your local school

08:48 - or church or whatever pub or some public, library. And, and because the votes are documented at this level, we can also tell like, which candidates get more votes from which parts of the municipality, even if it has no, like real institutional power or like these votes are, are not there. so we could say that people tend to vote more for, for candidates who live close to them.

09:18 - And that combined with the higher turnout of, sort of more higher educated than richer voters leads to the result that, you have more people in power in rich places. And, and that we just, you know, normal, sort of descriptive regression analysis, reveal revealed this. And then our second step was the sort of causal regression analysis using this, the RCT thing to show that this representation matters for,

09:53 - for, actual policies. And then some of the final piece that we did was we studied, okay, what happens to the areas that where the school closes? And there we use the model that is called, difference in difference design and to sort of compare populations in the places that, you know, had a school and he kept on having school as opposed to had a school. And then the school went away.

10:21 - And then we showed that, actually the, especially the sort of richer people move away from the neighborhood that loses the school. And this sort of completes a kind of circle in our mind that, that the sort of the political process through which, these richer areas to better, but also this sort of hinting towards this vicious cycle that if things start to get worse, they sort of keep on going worse.

10:57 - Big policy implication we have is that when a municipality is considering the location of whatever public could, it might want to consider not only the sort of short run monetary cost and benefit calculation, but also think of the more longer run implications on, on the sort of dynamics of, of neighborhood segregation. So that's, that's one, one conclusion. And, and the second conclusion is that politics, really matter and also turnout really matters.

11:36 - But then it sort of, but of course we know from a large literature in political science that, you know, inducing turnout is not that simple. and there are also some risks involved on, you know, if, if, if you're gonna do that, you may not Get the result that, that you wanted in terms of, you might even increase the imbalances in the democratic of voting or, or, or get some more noise in the process and so forth. And it also, the other policy conclusion is that

12:11 - there are trades in what kind of election system you have. And even in this sort of kind of at large election system that is meant to be sort of not so much like play-based and have this work ing to certain places they do exist, sort of endogenously even if not enforced by, by the system. But also unfortunately, like various election systems have sort of trade-offs between let's say representation and accountability and the quality of political selection.

12:42 - So it's not clear like outside, which is the best, but it's just that you need to consider this carefully. For example, if you would do like more like Bard based, system, you might guarantee a more equal representation of, of the rich samur in the council. But, but, but maybe the tradeoff is that because Uuv can this political competition, you maybe get not so high quality candidate selected. So it's always like two sides to this coin and that the lawmakers have to decide which they favor.

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