Popular in Arts and Humanities

Arts and Humanities

Titus Quinctius Flamininus’ “Italian triumph”

McGill University Michael Fronda

Arts and Humanities

Lincoln and the Jews

Brandeis University Jonathan Sarna

Arts and Humanities

Amputations and Convalescence

University of Western Australia Emily Brink

Art

Drawing on the past: Palladio, his precursors and knowledge of ancient architecture

University of Birmingham David Hemsoll

Art

Language, Sound, and Image in Wallace Berman’s Aleph, 1956–1966

University of San Diego Chelsea Behle Fralick

Arts and Humanities

Early Modern Natural Law Theories

University of Copenhagen Knud Haakonssen

Popular Iranian Cinema Before the Revolution

View more insights in Arts and Humanities - History - Middle Eastern and African History

View more figures from American University

View the page of Pedram Partovi

Read the Study

By writing popular films into Iranian history, Pedram Partovi advocates both a fresh approach to the study of Iranian cinema, as well as a rethinking of the modernity/tradition binary that has organized the historiography of the recent past.

Image courtesy of interviewee. March 25, 2024

Generating Workspace

Export as PDF

This video video is a comprehensive exploration of the evolution of Iranian cinema, particularly focusing on the commercial film industry after World War II and the context surrounding its development. The speaker, reflecting on their personal journey of reconnecting with their Iranian heritage, delves into the origins and characteristics of what is termed "Film Farsi," or the popular Iranian cinema that emerged during the pre-revolutionary era.

Key points include:

1. **Personal Background**: The speaker discusses their Iranian roots and their academic pursuit to understand modern Iran, leading to a greater appreciation of its cinematic history.

2. **Cinematic Training**: Their educational experiences primarily revolved around Iran's art cinema, which is celebrated internationally but is little-known among regular Iranian audiences. They identify a gap between the academic study of these films and their actual reception within the country.

3. **Pre-Revolutionary Popular Cinema**: The discussion highlights the emergence of a commercial film industry that produced thousands of films until the 1979 Islamic Revolution, exploring themes and social critiques present in these films.

4. **Cultural Context**: The development of Iranian cinema in the mid-20th century is linked to significant social changes, modernization, and state power dynamics that influenced narrative themes and audience engagement.

5. **Audience Dynamics**: Contrary to common assumptions, the speaker argues that the educated middle class formed a substantial part of the audience for these films, despite critics viewing the cinema as reflective of the lower classes. The relationships between different classes and portrayals of heroism are discussed.

6. **Themes of Heroism and Sacrifice**: Many films feature anti-heroes who, despite morally ambiguous lives, embody values of selflessness and communal loyalty, often sacrificing personal happiness for familial and societal obligations.

7. **Conflict of Love Types**: The tension between familial duty and romantic love is a recurring theme, with the films often illustrating the consequences of prioritizing personal desires over traditional values.

8. **Enduring Cultural Relevance**: The legacy of Film Farsi continues to inform Iranian cultural identity, offering reflections on modernization and social values, maintaining its relevance even decades after the industry faced censorship and decline post-revolution.

Overall, the text serves as an analysis of the complex interplay between Iranian cinema, societal values, and historical context, emphasizing the nuanced representations of class, culture, and identity within the medium.

Language:

Export as PDF

X-TIMESTAMP-MAP:LOCAL=00:00:00.000,MPEGTS=900000

00:00.255 --> 00:03.415
I was born in Iran, but I've, I've lived much of my life

00:03.485 --> 00:04.495
outside of the country.

00:05.555 --> 00:09.295
And, I was drawn to studying modern Iran as a way

00:09.295 --> 00:11.855
to sort of compensate for my lack of connection

00:12.595 --> 00:14.975
to my birth country, my lack of knowledge,

00:14.975 --> 00:16.335
really, of my birth country.

00:17.115 --> 00:20.695
Um, and, you know, my, the the training that I received

00:20.835 --> 00:23.415
as a graduate student was not really all together

00:23.445 --> 00:26.815
that different than, other people in my field.

00:26.975 --> 00:29.975
I took Persian classes, I learned about the cultural

00:30.105 --> 00:31.415
canon, old and new.

00:32.035 --> 00:34.295
Um, watching films was certainly part

00:34.295 --> 00:35.495
of my language training.

00:36.315 --> 00:37.895
Uh, but again, I mean, the films

00:37.895 --> 00:40.975
that we watched were largely those that we associate

00:41.085 --> 00:43.725
with Iran's art cinema,

00:44.015 --> 00:47.285
which since the late 1960s has been

00:47.845 --> 00:50.445
prominently featured in international film festivals.

00:51.105 --> 00:53.725
Um, but then I later found out that most of the films

00:53.725 --> 00:56.245
that we watched were little watched

00:56.425 --> 00:59.205
or even known by many Iranians in Iran.

01:00.605 --> 01:03.625
Um, but thankfully during my l language training,

01:03.785 --> 01:06.505
I was also introduced to some of the, so-called Classics

01:06.505 --> 01:08.465
of the Pre-Revolutionary Popula Cinema.

01:09.325 --> 01:12.865
Um, the sound and picture quality was not great,

01:13.085 --> 01:15.185
but these films were, were interesting to me

01:15.385 --> 01:17.465
because their characters, their plots,

01:17.465 --> 01:21.105
their dialogue was substantially different from the art

01:21.105 --> 01:22.385
cinema that we'd watched,

01:22.525 --> 01:25.465
and that is so well known, in the West.

01:26.005 --> 01:28.665
Um, and so I, I started to ask my family members

01:28.805 --> 01:32.465
who had lived in Iran during the time of the release

01:32.465 --> 01:34.905
of these particular films,

01:35.325 --> 01:39.055
and their responses were pretty uniform.

01:39.295 --> 01:43.175
I mean, they either said that we, we, as in us our group

01:43.355 --> 01:46.175
or class, never saw any of these movies,

01:46.915 --> 01:49.375
or even if we did see these movies,

01:49.485 --> 01:52.295
they had no redeeming qualities or,

01:52.315 --> 01:55.415
and were made with a different class of people in mind,

01:55.645 --> 01:58.175
meaning an audience that was not as educated

01:58.715 --> 02:01.095
and as cultured as those in the Middle East.

02:01.835 --> 02:04.495
And I, I, I wasn't really satisfied with the kind

02:04.495 --> 02:06.735
of blanket dismissals that they were giving me.

02:06.735 --> 02:09.615
So I, I looked for more information about these popular

02:09.675 --> 02:12.735
movies in the existing histories that we have.

02:12.995 --> 02:15.095
And I, interestingly enough, found this sort

02:15.095 --> 02:17.695
of similar culture of denial about them.

02:18.515 --> 02:21.115
I mean, I knew that Iranians had in very large

02:21.115 --> 02:22.555
numbers, watch these movies.

02:22.915 --> 02:25.595
I mean, the commercial cinema, film industry

02:25.985 --> 02:27.115
that developed

02:27.165 --> 02:29.355
after World War II would go on

02:29.355 --> 02:33.315
to produce about a thousand films over the next couple

02:33.335 --> 02:37.795
of decades, until 1979 and the Islamic Revolution.

02:38.415 --> 02:40.555
And so, I, I I, I started to wonder

02:40.665 --> 02:44.355
what it is about these films that both attracted Iranians,

02:44.535 --> 02:46.315
but seemingly also repelled them.

02:47.015 --> 02:49.875
Uh, and that's really how the research

02:49.975 --> 02:51.275
for this book started.

02:51.475 --> 02:54.795
I mean, I began with a handful of questions.

02:55.455 --> 02:58.795
Uh, why does a commercial film industry, for example,

02:59.145 --> 03:02.965
emerge in this post-war era immediately after World War ii?

03:03.905 --> 03:06.685
Who exactly made up the audiences of these films?

03:07.935 --> 03:10.185
What kinds of ideas, themes,

03:10.325 --> 03:13.585
and images were regularly found in these films?

03:14.645 --> 03:18.865
And did these seemingly formulaic elements have any links

03:19.405 --> 03:21.825
to older forms of entertainment in Iran?

03:22.575 --> 03:24.515
Or where these films, as some

03:24.515 --> 03:27.035
of the critics claim just simply second rate

03:27.095 --> 03:29.435
or third rate copies of Hollywood hits?

03:30.545 --> 03:34.925
And if they weren't simply poorly done Homa, homages

03:34.945 --> 03:39.285
to Hollywood hits, then what might these films have

03:39.285 --> 03:42.605
to tell us about Iran in those final decades

03:43.065 --> 03:47.945
of pa rule was social critique, political critique,

03:48.255 --> 03:49.345
part of their entertainment?

03:50.685 --> 03:54.425
And this final question sort of had in mind the

03:55.045 --> 03:59.025
widely accepted claim about the Iranian art cinema as a kind

03:59.025 --> 04:03.025
of critical mirror on modern Iranian politics and society.

04:03.725 --> 04:06.625
And I think in contrast, many critics have claimed

04:06.695 --> 04:10.945
that the commercially oriented cinema was a sort of mindless

04:11.705 --> 04:16.105
escapism with very little to say about Iran's encounter

04:16.105 --> 04:18.905
with Western modernity, whether successful or otherwise.

04:19.405 --> 04:22.345
And so, I, I wanted to investigate the claim that these

04:23.265 --> 04:26.505
domestic studio productions, which re, which really enjoyed

04:27.125 --> 04:30.705
the peak of their popularity in the 1960s through

04:30.705 --> 04:33.465
to the middle of the 1970s,

04:34.175 --> 04:37.385
whether these films had anything to tell us

04:38.475 --> 04:41.665
about their audience's lives, about their life,

04:41.665 --> 04:43.625
wishes about their interactions

04:43.645 --> 04:45.945
or engagements with Western modernity.

04:46.465 --> 04:48.625
I mean, this period between the 1960s

04:48.725 --> 04:52.305
and the middle 19, middle of the 1970s was a period

04:52.325 --> 04:56.385
of immense social change, of economic modernization,

04:57.045 --> 05:00.345
of the dramatic expansion of the state's power and reach.

05:00.725 --> 05:02.065
And so I wanted to see if these films

05:02.065 --> 05:03.345
have anything to say about this.

05:04.825 --> 05:07.925
Uh, and so that, that's really what, what, got me going,

05:08.745 --> 05:13.245
to study these films in greater detail and depth.

05:13.825 --> 05:17.125
It wasn't, it was a very, unsettled,

05:17.195 --> 05:19.205
environment politically and socially

05:19.205 --> 05:22.565
after World War ii, the,

05:23.465 --> 05:25.325
the country had been occupied during the war

05:25.325 --> 05:26.325
by the Allied Forces.

05:27.225 --> 05:30.125
Um, we had had an interna,

05:30.325 --> 05:34.445
a a a succession from father to son from,

05:34.805 --> 05:38.205
Rezo Pavi, who abdicated his throne was forced

05:38.225 --> 05:41.005
to abdicate his throne to Mohammed Rezo Pavi.

05:41.425 --> 05:45.205
Uh, and so we have a kind of weak, monarch in place,

05:46.065 --> 05:49.245
heavy western involvement

05:49.425 --> 05:50.725
and influence in the country.

05:51.505 --> 05:53.965
Uh, and ironically enough, it's in these,

05:54.465 --> 05:56.765
in this circumstances that a domestic film

05:57.405 --> 06:01.845
Industry was able to, flourish, in part

06:01.845 --> 06:03.925
because of the kind of political vacuum

06:03.955 --> 06:05.125
that existed at the time.

06:05.405 --> 06:08.085
I mean, domestic film production in Iran

06:08.605 --> 06:11.525
develops relatively late compared to some

06:11.525 --> 06:13.685
of the other countries in the neighborhood like Turkey

06:13.945 --> 06:15.485
or Egypt or India.

06:16.225 --> 06:19.045
Um, I mean, film technology had been introduced

06:19.065 --> 06:22.845
to Iran in the late 19th century by the Royal Court.

06:23.385 --> 06:27.405
Uh, but filmmaking film watching this remained largely per

06:27.505 --> 06:29.725
the preserve of the well to do

06:29.825 --> 06:32.485
and of foreign expatriates in the country

06:32.665 --> 06:33.885
for the next couple of decades.

06:35.145 --> 06:39.295
Um, and I, I mean, we can talk about war,

06:39.845 --> 06:44.255
foreign occupation, endemic poverty as all

06:45.175 --> 06:47.375
contributing to this slow uptake of cinema

06:47.555 --> 06:52.305
as a popular entertainment, and certainly mass illiteracy.

06:52.665 --> 06:54.865
A lack of familiarity with the host culture

06:55.045 --> 06:58.625
of the film screened, also contributes

06:58.645 --> 06:59.865
to this slow uptake.

07:00.025 --> 07:01.865
I mean, this lack of

07:02.745 --> 07:04.505
familiarity would require extra

07:04.505 --> 07:06.305
accommodations for audiences.

07:06.325 --> 07:10.665
So we have, for example, in the, interwar years,

07:11.485 --> 07:15.475
what we call the, the position of the did march,

07:15.775 --> 07:20.345
or a kind of live narrator who would sit in the,

07:20.485 --> 07:22.905
in the movie theater along with the audience

07:23.005 --> 07:24.785
to translate into titles

07:25.125 --> 07:26.385
and explain the action

07:26.385 --> 07:28.705
that was taking place on the scene, on the screen.

07:30.485 --> 07:34.645
Um, but then, yes, I mean, we get the rise

07:34.705 --> 07:37.125
of a new pan Avid dynasty in 1920s

07:37.235 --> 07:41.125
that would bring about some degree of political stability

07:41.305 --> 07:44.285
for a time, as well as a plan

07:44.305 --> 07:46.285
for the rapid transformation of the economy

07:46.345 --> 07:48.245
and society along Western lines.

07:48.385 --> 07:51.845
But unlike the Soviet Union, at the same time,

07:51.945 --> 07:54.845
the PA government did not really pay much attention

07:55.505 --> 07:59.765
to cinema as a tool for propaganda and education.

07:59.815 --> 08:02.725
There wasn't much official encouragement for

08:03.445 --> 08:04.485
domestic film production,

08:05.065 --> 08:07.325
and the government was more concerned with

08:08.075 --> 08:10.805
censoring the medium rather than cultivating it.

08:10.805 --> 08:14.125
And so we get very few homegrown product,

08:14.125 --> 08:15.405
productions at this time.

08:16.265 --> 08:18.645
And early film production was really limited

08:18.785 --> 08:21.645
to one-off experiments by private individuals.

08:22.505 --> 08:25.725
Uh, the really, we might say that the first sustained

08:25.785 --> 08:29.125
and successful efforts at Persian language film production

08:29.365 --> 08:32.005
actually take place in India in the 1930s

08:32.625 --> 08:36.725
by an Iranian expatriate by the name of Abdul Hussein Sto.

08:37.425 --> 08:40.645
And interestingly, the films that he makes,

08:40.795 --> 08:43.005
were made in a similar style

08:43.025 --> 08:45.845
as the them emerging popular Indian cinema.

08:46.345 --> 08:50.485
So it incorporated aspects of action, comedy,

08:50.995 --> 08:54.645
romance interspersed with song and sometimes dance numbers.

08:55.825 --> 08:57.085
And these films

08:57.155 --> 09:00.765
that Stom makes in India were widely shown in Iran,

09:00.825 --> 09:05.335
and became a sort of early template to follow

09:05.675 --> 09:08.095
for the domestic studios that would emerge

09:08.105 --> 09:09.175
after World War ii.

09:09.475 --> 09:10.495
So,

09:10.495 --> 09:14.855
this early experiment in popular filmmaking becomes a kind

09:14.855 --> 09:19.495
of model, for later, studios to follow

09:19.545 --> 09:20.615
after World War ii.

09:22.125 --> 09:24.665
Um, but again, I mean,

09:26.165 --> 09:29.585
at some point in the mid 1930s decides to come back to Iran

09:30.285 --> 09:32.065
and to make films in Iran,

09:32.165 --> 09:35.225
but all of these efforts were thwarted

09:35.285 --> 09:36.985
by government interference

09:37.125 --> 09:39.385
and by film distribution companies

09:39.415 --> 09:40.865
operating in Iran at that time.

09:40.895 --> 09:43.705
They didn't really want extra competition

09:43.845 --> 09:45.905
for then very limited audience.

09:46.005 --> 09:49.865
And so we don't get another attempt at studio building

09:49.955 --> 09:52.985
until the late 1940s when,

09:53.045 --> 09:56.585
we have this political vacuum, as I talked about earlier,

09:57.055 --> 09:58.625
opening up the cultural field.

09:59.365 --> 10:02.465
And again, it's private individuals that take the initiative

10:02.645 --> 10:04.425
to ramp up film production.

10:05.085 --> 10:07.785
Uh, those pioneers had first experimented

10:07.785 --> 10:10.665
with dubbing foreign features into Persian.

10:11.365 --> 10:14.825
But these dubbing experiments could also involve a rewriting

10:14.885 --> 10:18.865
of aspects of the film story, renaming characters

10:19.815 --> 10:22.185
rearranging scenes, or adding scenes,

10:22.205 --> 10:24.105
and even writing new music for the film.

10:24.245 --> 10:27.825
In other words, the the dubbed films had been Iran unionized

10:28.485 --> 10:31.265
before reaching, audiences.

10:31.965 --> 10:34.305
And the common epithet that we get

10:34.405 --> 10:37.905
for the pre-revolutionary commercial cinema film for sea

10:38.085 --> 10:41.465
or Persian film, it actually originates in this era,

10:41.655 --> 10:42.865
this early dubbing era.

10:42.965 --> 10:44.385
It was initially used

10:44.405 --> 10:48.545
to describe in newspaper advertisements those foreign films

10:48.575 --> 10:51.145
that were to be shown in the Persian language.

10:51.805 --> 10:55.665
And later on, only it becomes a kind of term of abuse

10:56.325 --> 10:58.145
for the domestic commercial cinema.

10:58.295 --> 11:00.825
With critics claiming that the only thing

11:00.825 --> 11:03.625
that was culturally authentic about, these

11:04.455 --> 11:06.945
homegrown studio productions was their use

11:06.945 --> 11:08.545
of Persian language dialogue.

11:09.385 --> 11:12.205
In any case, the success

11:12.545 --> 11:15.805
of dubbed foreign titles would lead to the production

11:15.805 --> 11:16.965
of homegrown features.

11:17.625 --> 11:19.645
And interestingly, the, the use

11:19.665 --> 11:23.925
of post synchronous sound continued to be used for local,

11:24.265 --> 11:25.965
studio productions, too.

11:26.605 --> 11:29.365
I mean, it, it was not unusual

11:29.825 --> 11:33.605
for a professional dubbing artist to record the dialogue

11:33.785 --> 11:34.925
for the screen actor.

11:34.985 --> 11:37.205
In other words, that the dubbing artist was a different

11:37.205 --> 11:38.485
person than the, than the actor

11:38.485 --> 11:39.645
that you would see on the screen.

11:40.385 --> 11:42.525
And dubbing artists,

11:42.665 --> 11:46.645
in this post-war era became celebrities alongside screen

11:46.645 --> 11:50.445
actors, work as a dubbing artist could also provide

11:50.445 --> 11:54.165
opportunities to transition to stardom in front

11:54.165 --> 11:55.205
of the camera, too.

11:55.365 --> 11:59.965
I mean, perhaps one of the biggest male stars of the,

12:00.065 --> 12:03.165
film Farsi era is Beh Uri.

12:03.705 --> 12:07.285
Um, and he began as a voiceover actor

12:07.425 --> 12:09.285
and then became a film star.

12:10.365 --> 12:13.465
So sound films, whether they were locally produced

12:13.525 --> 12:17.585
or dubbed into Persian made cinema, as we might imagine,

12:17.775 --> 12:20.385
much, much more accessible to Iranian audiences.

12:20.405 --> 12:24.345
And we get a significant rise in the number of cinema halls

12:24.405 --> 12:27.785
and year attendance, in these post-war decades.

12:28.525 --> 12:30.705
We also get new government tax incentives

12:30.815 --> 12:34.305
that are put into place that boost cinema, construction

12:35.045 --> 12:39.705
and other factors like rapid urbanization, the expansion

12:39.705 --> 12:43.705
of the national educational system, the rise of a salaried,

12:43.705 --> 12:46.065
middle, middle class with disposable income,

12:46.065 --> 12:47.225
with leisure time.

12:48.045 --> 12:52.105
Uh, all of these things would help to fuel film going,

12:52.205 --> 12:53.825
in these post-war decades.

12:54.705 --> 12:57.225
I mean, I think one of the more controversial arguments

12:57.225 --> 12:59.625
that I make in the book is that the urban

13:00.185 --> 13:02.545
educated middle class, despite their long

13:02.545 --> 13:05.385
and loud denials, they're the ones that have made up the

13:06.065 --> 13:08.545
audience for film far c productions.

13:08.605 --> 13:12.345
In fact, my argument is that the middle class has made up

13:12.925 --> 13:16.185
the bulk of the audience for all films shown in Iran,

13:16.185 --> 13:18.025
because they were the ones with the means

13:18.445 --> 13:20.225
and the opportunity to do so.

13:20.945 --> 13:25.925
Um, and as, as the number of cinemagoers vastly increased,

13:26.545 --> 13:29.125
we also get the development of a kind of fan culture

13:29.715 --> 13:32.765
that could take an obsessive interest in the lives

13:33.065 --> 13:36.485
of the film stars themselves, both as kind

13:36.485 --> 13:40.245
of aspirational models, but also as cautionary tales.

13:40.245 --> 13:42.285
So I, we shouldn't get the impression that they were simply,

13:42.985 --> 13:47.845
the, the film stars were, were, were simply,

13:48.775 --> 13:51.405
idols for the audience to follow.

13:51.745 --> 13:54.325
And again, I mean, one of the key sources that I used

13:54.385 --> 13:57.045
for my book are the fan

13:57.145 --> 13:59.725
and industry magazines that first popped,

13:59.925 --> 14:03.525
cropped up in the 1950s, filled with interviews

14:03.715 --> 14:07.965
with the major players in the film, far c cinema,

14:08.115 --> 14:10.325
both in front of and behind the camera.

14:11.025 --> 14:13.445
And these magazines also included lots of fan letters

14:13.595 --> 14:16.405
that sort of speak to the audience's depth

14:16.425 --> 14:18.125
of engagement with this cinema.

14:18.765 --> 14:22.165
I mean, the common idea that the commercial cinema was a

14:22.165 --> 14:24.205
kind of timeout from everyday life

14:24.745 --> 14:26.885
to be experienced quite passively

14:27.585 --> 14:29.565
is drawn into question in my mind

14:29.625 --> 14:31.445
by this level of engagement.

14:31.725 --> 14:33.885
I mean, for some people who might imagine

14:33.905 --> 14:35.045
the cinema was their life.

14:35.785 --> 14:39.325
And so, I think, this notion that, you know,

14:39.325 --> 14:40.325
people would go

14:40.325 --> 14:42.405
and watch these films for two hours

14:42.825 --> 14:46.605
as a break from their everyday activities is undermined by

14:47.145 --> 14:49.885
the amount of time and effort they put into

14:50.805 --> 14:52.725
Engaging with the cinema outside

14:52.725 --> 14:54.925
of the cinema hall, all, all together.

14:55.415 --> 14:59.175
Again, I, i, I, I think that, you know, the heroism

14:59.245 --> 15:02.855
that we see in the films is one of the reasons why,

15:03.635 --> 15:04.695
you know, people became,

15:04.995 --> 15:07.535
or the kind of heroism that we see in the films is one

15:07.535 --> 15:10.295
of the reasons why people became so fascinated

15:10.495 --> 15:12.135
with these films, and also

15:12.875 --> 15:15.655
how they could inform their everyday lives.

15:16.095 --> 15:17.455
I mean, I think it's quite clear to me

15:17.455 --> 15:21.615
that the popular films from the Pavi era involved the kind

15:21.615 --> 15:25.375
of reconfiguration and democratization of ideas

15:25.795 --> 15:28.575
and institutions that were associated with

15:28.695 --> 15:32.375
what I would call a Persian culture of longstanding.

15:32.485 --> 15:37.055
Meaning that it was a culture that was associated with

15:37.965 --> 15:42.335
Persian speaking elites in particular, that,

15:42.545 --> 15:46.615
ruled over Iran, but also over a much broader geographic

15:47.045 --> 15:51.575
area that at times ex,

15:51.975 --> 15:55.495
extended from, the Balkans all the way to India.

15:56.855 --> 15:59.715
And so I think we can also see a kind of similar process,

16:00.835 --> 16:04.895
of the reconfiguration and democratization of ideas

16:04.995 --> 16:08.375
and institutions associated with Persian Persian culture

16:08.915 --> 16:11.615
in the popular Indian cinema as well, as well

16:11.615 --> 16:14.295
as in the popular Turkish cinema of this particular era,

16:14.755 --> 16:15.985
which again, sort of speaks

16:16.005 --> 16:18.225
to the wide dispersal of this culture.

16:19.205 --> 16:23.305
And, it's this Persian culture that sort of gives birth

16:23.445 --> 16:26.145
to the heroism or the ideas

16:26.285 --> 16:28.865
or representations of heroism that we see.

16:29.445 --> 16:34.325
Uh, in film, Farsi, I mean, the heroes at the center

16:34.385 --> 16:37.005
of many popular Iranian films were often

16:37.765 --> 16:41.325
socially marginal characters who were quick to the rescue

16:41.425 --> 16:46.165
of honorable women who were unfailingly loyal to friends,

16:46.425 --> 16:49.765
family, and their working class neighborhoods.

16:50.345 --> 16:53.365
But also at the same time, hard drinkers, gamblers,

16:53.765 --> 16:56.805
brawlers, even sometimes small time gangsters.

16:57.685 --> 17:00.445
I mean, all these men sort of lived by a code of chivalry,

17:01.015 --> 17:02.965
which they sometimes reference

17:02.965 --> 17:04.565
quite directly in the dialogue.

17:05.225 --> 17:07.165
And which scholars have claimed

17:07.225 --> 17:11.845
to have a long history in this Persian,

17:12.145 --> 17:13.605
cultural region.

17:14.725 --> 17:17.085
I mean, the Persian term that's commonly used

17:17.085 --> 17:20.365
to describe this code is Javan maddi,

17:20.575 --> 17:23.085
which literally means young manliness.

17:23.985 --> 17:27.045
In the past, the groups said to uphold

17:27.385 --> 17:31.445
or exploit these particular ideals were themselves

17:31.735 --> 17:33.965
associated with neighborhood gangs

17:34.505 --> 17:37.285
who could engage in disreputable activities

17:37.285 --> 17:38.725
like gambling and drinking.

17:39.505 --> 17:43.845
And were also engaged in lowly professions, including,

17:44.145 --> 17:45.325
as public entertainers.

17:46.285 --> 17:48.865
And so there's been a long link, we might say,

17:48.965 --> 17:53.725
between these ideals of manliness and entertainment in Iran

17:53.905 --> 17:58.815
and in the wider, Persian world.

18:00.315 --> 18:05.305
Um, so these young men who were,

18:06.205 --> 18:09.865
said to uphold the ideals

18:09.865 --> 18:12.705
of young manliness were generally not a part

18:12.705 --> 18:17.285
of respectable society, and had little hopes of joining it,

18:17.505 --> 18:22.005
but could nevertheless be held up as paragons of manhood by

18:22.005 --> 18:25.925
that very society because of their selflessness,

18:25.995 --> 18:28.125
because of their generosity,

18:28.715 --> 18:32.405
because of their earnest commitment to a code of honor

18:32.835 --> 18:35.845
that most other men, and especially perhaps the rich

18:35.845 --> 18:38.725
and powerful, often failed to live by.

18:39.865 --> 18:44.085
And what's often said is that the modern state,

18:44.115 --> 18:47.165
when the modern state appears its military

18:47.185 --> 18:49.885
and security apparatus, manages

18:49.945 --> 18:54.325
to wipe out the strongholds of these gangsters

18:54.425 --> 18:57.525
who had dominated, urban neighborhoods

18:57.625 --> 18:59.045
for centuries upon centuries.

18:59.785 --> 19:03.765
But it would seem to me that their ethos sort of lives on,

19:04.425 --> 19:06.445
at least in the populist cinema,

19:07.505 --> 19:11.605
and many of the pre-revolutionary studio productions,

19:12.225 --> 19:16.805
we might call them melodramas, that dealt with the moral

19:17.065 --> 19:19.965
and material consequences of modernization.

19:20.325 --> 19:24.365
A process that involved not just the rapid transformation

19:24.385 --> 19:26.085
of people's daily surroundings

19:26.105 --> 19:28.685
and lifestyles along western lines,

19:29.145 --> 19:32.725
but also the adapt adoption, the adoption

19:33.265 --> 19:37.285
of a set of social ideals western in origin

19:37.435 --> 19:40.405
that differed in significant ways from what we might call,

19:41.055 --> 19:44.405
quote unquote traditional family life in Iran.

19:45.485 --> 19:48.105
And the films would seem to critique

19:49.165 --> 19:51.385
the acquisitive individualism

19:51.455 --> 19:55.065
that the modernization process was seemingly promoting

19:55.565 --> 19:59.265
by holding up the traditional values of Javelin Mardi

19:59.485 --> 20:00.625
as a kind of alternative.

20:01.875 --> 20:04.095
And the film heroes that sort

20:04.095 --> 20:07.735
of best embodied these masculine ideals, again,

20:07.765 --> 20:11.935
usually belong to the working classes, to the poor,

20:12.075 --> 20:14.135
who were engaged in lowly professions

20:15.165 --> 20:17.825
and who were perhaps less affected

20:18.005 --> 20:19.985
by the state's modernization programs,

20:19.985 --> 20:22.105
then other segments of society.

20:22.845 --> 20:27.415
However, these heroes in the films almost invariably come

20:27.415 --> 20:29.735
to the rescue of middle class characters

20:30.625 --> 20:34.765
who have fallen victim to the selfishness, the greed,

20:35.105 --> 20:36.805
the lust of less principled

20:36.905 --> 20:39.485
and culturally rootless individuals.

20:40.615 --> 20:43.885
These melodramas did not outright reject

20:44.595 --> 20:46.485
modernization along western lines,

20:46.545 --> 20:48.885
but certainly pointed to the pitfalls of it,

20:49.495 --> 20:50.685
which interestingly,

20:50.685 --> 20:53.685
these socially marginal characters were most aware of,

20:54.385 --> 20:58.725
and like in the Pres cinematic past, came to serve as sort

20:58.725 --> 21:01.365
of models for the rest of society for how

21:01.365 --> 21:02.845
to retain one's dignity

21:03.065 --> 21:05.125
and honor in spite

21:05.265 --> 21:06.765
of the rapidly changing

21:06.765 --> 21:08.365
environment in which they were living.

21:08.585 --> 21:09.965
So again, I mean, it,

21:09.965 --> 21:12.685
it's a very strange situation in which the heroes are kind

21:12.685 --> 21:14.285
of anti-heroes in many ways.

21:14.995 --> 21:19.005
They are, living on the margins of, of, law

21:19.065 --> 21:20.605
and society more often than not.

21:20.665 --> 21:23.605
But they become sort of paragons of

21:24.145 --> 21:27.285
how society should adapt,

21:27.665 --> 21:32.565
and live in this rapidly changing environment

21:32.715 --> 21:35.085
that the p

21:35.115 --> 21:38.605
modernization project is, creating.

21:38.665 --> 21:43.045
And film Farsi titles often again, sort of endorse

21:43.075 --> 21:46.645
what we might call traditionalist bourgeois interests

21:47.755 --> 21:50.805
alongside the more desirable aspects

21:50.945 --> 21:53.125
of the pa modernist project.

21:53.825 --> 21:57.845
And they do so by depicting the hero's willingness to

21:58.645 --> 22:02.805
sacrifice himself or his personal happiness

22:03.265 --> 22:06.125
to protect honorable women more often,

22:06.125 --> 22:07.725
middle class honorable women,

22:08.425 --> 22:11.005
and the unbreakable bonds of family

22:11.105 --> 22:14.085
and friends from morally dissolute

22:14.305 --> 22:18.005
and superficially westernized middle class antagonists.

22:18.625 --> 22:22.045
And so there is a kind of class conflict that's,

22:22.185 --> 22:24.045
at the center of many of these films,

22:24.625 --> 22:26.805
but it's a conflict more often than not

22:26.865 --> 22:28.245
within the middle class.

22:28.845 --> 22:31.845
Interesting. And so martyrdom,

22:32.045 --> 22:34.845
I I should stress does not necessarily mean

22:35.485 --> 22:37.645
physical death in the but could als,

22:37.865 --> 22:39.285
but could often refer

22:39.385 --> 22:44.285
to the hero's self abnegation his rejection in

22:44.285 --> 22:46.525
a sense of his own personal fulfillment.

22:47.465 --> 22:50.965
Uh, and by doing so, the hero more often than not, sort

22:50.965 --> 22:52.765
of upholds the centrality

22:52.825 --> 22:56.285
of family life in modern Iranian society,

22:57.175 --> 22:59.565
often at the expense of his own romantic life.

23:00.635 --> 23:03.855
And of course, I mean, the fact that someone on the margins

23:03.855 --> 23:07.815
of society would be more committed to its ideals

23:08.625 --> 23:12.415
makes this sacrifice all the more poignant,

23:12.425 --> 23:14.135
given his sort of lack

23:14.135 --> 23:18.295
of stakes in a bourgeois dominated social order.

23:19.455 --> 23:22.915
And if the hero didn't sacrifice himself for the sake

23:22.915 --> 23:26.755
of the family institution, then he would sacrifice himself

23:26.895 --> 23:29.475
or his future for the sake of a friend.

23:30.215 --> 23:33.355
And again, I would argue that this idealization

23:33.375 --> 23:35.955
of male friendship that we get in the films

23:36.605 --> 23:40.795
could itself sort of contribute to the,

23:41.265 --> 23:43.915
integrity of the family institution,

23:44.285 --> 23:48.775
after all, who best to marry off your daughters to than

23:48.835 --> 23:50.255
to the sons of your friends.

23:51.205 --> 23:52.505
And so male friendship

23:53.165 --> 23:57.505
and the family institutions seemingly go together here,

23:57.765 --> 23:59.985
in these traditionalist bourgeois values.

24:00.845 --> 24:04.105
And so, yes, I mean, generally what you get at the end

24:04.105 --> 24:05.945
of these films is the hero

24:06.245 --> 24:10.705
or the anti-hero giving up on any kind

24:10.725 --> 24:15.545
of personal self-fulfillment in, in favor

24:15.605 --> 24:18.625
of rescuing his, a friend

24:18.765 --> 24:22.345
or rescuing a middle class family from disaster.

24:23.125 --> 24:26.265
And so these film far c titles are not necessarily feel,

24:26.455 --> 24:28.025
feel good, happy films.

24:28.295 --> 24:32.145
They're tragic, bittersweet at best.

24:32.805 --> 24:35.065
And while the dominant forms

24:35.205 --> 24:37.225
of social organization are threatened in the films,

24:37.735 --> 24:41.265
they are generally upheld through the self-sacrifice

24:41.525 --> 24:45.505
of the hero who cannot, in any case, be a full member of

24:45.505 --> 24:46.945
that society in the first place.

24:48.365 --> 24:52.905
So yes, I mean, martyrdom can mean physical death,

24:53.765 --> 24:55.505
but it doesn't necessarily have to mean

24:55.505 --> 24:58.345
that martyrdom here is a kind of,

24:58.605 --> 25:02.465
self-sacrifice is probably a better word to use,

25:02.525 --> 25:07.065
or the sacrifice of one's life wishes is a better,

25:07.125 --> 25:11.185
way to phrase it, than simply physical death.

25:11.375 --> 25:12.585
Hopefully it's become clear.

25:12.665 --> 25:16.145
I mean, love is a big topic, in this cinema.

25:16.545 --> 25:18.145
I mean, it's melodrama after all.

25:18.445 --> 25:21.425
And so, the conflict, especially

25:21.445 --> 25:23.025
of fam familial love

25:23.405 --> 25:27.305
and romantic love is at the center of these films and love.

25:27.885 --> 25:32.385
Uh, and romantic love was also a big topic in pre-modern

25:32.385 --> 25:34.505
Persian literature, and especially in poetry.

25:35.845 --> 25:40.025
But ideal romantic love remained chaste

25:40.085 --> 25:42.625
and pure in this literature more often than not.

25:43.365 --> 25:47.785
And this idea of a chaste romantic love

25:48.315 --> 25:51.945
found, especially in the poetic past, I would argue, is sort

25:51.945 --> 25:55.905
of massified in the modern era through popular cinema.

25:56.905 --> 25:57.945
I mean, as I mentioned

25:57.945 --> 26:02.025
before, film Farsi titles generally targeted middle class

26:02.425 --> 26:05.385
audiences for these middle class audiences.

26:05.405 --> 26:09.385
Family honor sort of has been viewed as crucial

26:09.485 --> 26:14.065
to their own social status to which the selfish emotions

26:14.145 --> 26:16.625
of romantic love could pose a danger.

26:17.685 --> 26:21.945
And so, that hopefully sort of sets up the,

26:22.125 --> 26:24.425
the conflict that we get at the center of the films

26:24.425 --> 26:28.265
between romantic love and, familiar love

26:28.485 --> 26:32.265
and hopefully telegraphs, which one of these two forms

26:32.325 --> 26:34.665
of love winds up on top at the end.

26:35.725 --> 26:38.585
And I shouldn't give the impression that, you know,

26:38.905 --> 26:42.505
romantic love is sort of rejected out of hand in the films

26:42.685 --> 26:44.605
or in Persian, a culture altogether.

26:44.925 --> 26:48.925
I mean, the films at one level allow for audiences to sort

26:48.925 --> 26:53.405
of take pleasure in the erotic emotions of the characters.

26:53.465 --> 26:57.245
And we often see these emotional highs best expressed in the

26:57.245 --> 26:59.405
films through song, song sequences

27:00.345 --> 27:02.485
in those sequences in which the characters

27:02.505 --> 27:04.485
who are in love are essentially

27:05.035 --> 27:07.005
singing poetry to one another.

27:07.715 --> 27:12.645
However, the films have also upheld, the social ideals

27:12.645 --> 27:15.005
of family obligation and love too.

27:15.585 --> 27:18.525
So these cinematic representations

27:18.545 --> 27:22.845
of erotic love often have had sort of negative consequences

27:23.185 --> 27:24.405
for their characters.

27:25.145 --> 27:29.605
Uh, again, the darker emotions associated with erotic love

27:30.305 --> 27:34.085
are invariably depicted through song sequences too.

27:34.345 --> 27:37.925
So, I mean, if we can talk about two emotions

27:37.995 --> 27:42.165
that dominate the songs in the films, one is mati

27:42.305 --> 27:43.445
or exhilaration,

27:44.225 --> 27:48.085
the moment in which you are enjoying in a sense the romantic

27:48.085 --> 27:51.765
relationship, and the other is gum or despair.

27:52.225 --> 27:54.125
Uh, the moment in which the characters come

27:54.125 --> 27:58.685
to the realization that the costs invo incurred

27:58.685 --> 28:02.645
through this erotic or romantic love are too high to pay

28:03.455 --> 28:05.195
or must be paid in a sense.

28:05.415 --> 28:09.755
And so, yes, I mean the, the songs are perhaps the, the,

28:09.815 --> 28:12.915
sequences in the film in which we get the deeps,

28:13.015 --> 28:14.275
expression of emotion.

28:15.425 --> 28:18.805
And when erotic love has been sanctioned in the films,

28:19.505 --> 28:22.005
as I say, it usually comes at a great price

28:22.115 --> 28:24.725
through some grand sacrifice,

28:25.185 --> 28:28.765
or it is in some ways subsumed into family love.

28:29.625 --> 28:33.755
But generally, the, the message of the films is that

28:34.615 --> 28:37.915
is of the centrality of the family and social life.

28:38.095 --> 28:41.235
And so, romantic love has, has to sort

28:41.235 --> 28:42.515
of take a back seat to it.

28:43.175 --> 28:46.275
Uh, and yes, I mean, the films do a very good job

28:46.375 --> 28:49.535
of showing you that it's certainly a, a claim

28:49.535 --> 28:51.975
that has been adopted by many of the scholars

28:51.975 --> 28:55.255
and critics of, Iranian cinema as well.

28:55.415 --> 28:56.975
I mean, their general assumption has been

28:56.975 --> 28:58.495
that film Farsi was the cinema

28:58.595 --> 29:01.735
of the traditionally minded poor of the working classes.

29:03.065 --> 29:06.965
Uh, I mean, it was either a kind of accessible local version

29:06.985 --> 29:08.885
of Hollywood films with more familiar,

29:09.365 --> 29:11.245
familiar character types and plots,

29:12.015 --> 29:15.435
or it was the romanticization of traditional values

29:15.575 --> 29:17.035
and lifestyles that were

29:17.585 --> 29:19.915
fast disappearing in a modernizing Iran.

29:19.935 --> 29:23.715
In other words, it was a kind of residue of the,

29:24.345 --> 29:28.595
modernization shell shock that the traditionally minded poor

29:28.595 --> 29:30.795
and working classes were experience.

29:31.765 --> 29:34.865
And of course, the regular incorporation of characters

29:34.925 --> 29:36.665
and settings from the poor

29:36.665 --> 29:40.665
and working class neighborhoods was often the main reason

29:40.755 --> 29:43.085
given for the cinema's association

29:43.085 --> 29:45.005
with the traditionally minded and the poor.

29:45.645 --> 29:47.215
However, as I've mentioned

29:47.215 --> 29:50.135
before, I mean, cinema going in the postwar decades was

29:50.135 --> 29:53.655
generally a middle class leisure activity regardless

29:53.755 --> 29:55.535
of the kind of films that were being shown.

29:56.115 --> 30:00.775
And filmmaking in these post-war decades was

30:00.775 --> 30:02.935
generally a middle class activity.

30:03.845 --> 30:07.345
And so, I think these two facts are sort of at odds

30:07.345 --> 30:11.225
with the idea of, film far c as a cinema

30:11.365 --> 30:13.345
for those undergoing modernization.

30:13.395 --> 30:16.105
Shell shock. I would also add that

30:17.045 --> 30:20.375
character identification does not necessarily have

30:20.375 --> 30:23.775
to be the only way that audiences engage with a film.

30:24.655 --> 30:28.995
And so, I mean, people can engage with a film at odds

30:28.995 --> 30:31.035
with the characters in the film themselves,

30:31.135 --> 30:33.635
at least in terms of their class backgrounds.

30:34.255 --> 30:36.665
And thirdly, the poor

30:36.725 --> 30:38.305
and working class characters

30:38.305 --> 30:42.345
that we find in many film four C titles certainly did uphold

30:42.345 --> 30:45.265
traditional values such as spam, the obligation.

30:45.285 --> 30:48.425
But those values had also remained important, as far

30:48.425 --> 30:50.305
as I'm concerned, to the educated middle classes,

30:51.035 --> 30:54.185
which did not necessarily see them as conflicting

30:54.185 --> 30:55.265
with the modern lives

30:55.265 --> 30:57.065
that they were trying to create for themselves.

30:58.565 --> 31:01.905
Fourth, the male heroes of the films,

31:02.475 --> 31:05.425
especially may have come from traditional backgrounds,

31:05.445 --> 31:08.465
but they also engaged in these films in all kinds of

31:08.995 --> 31:13.625
subversive behavior that would likely be offensive to a

31:14.185 --> 31:16.665
religiously inclined audience if they were

31:16.685 --> 31:17.825
the primary audience.

31:18.405 --> 31:20.305
And in fact, I think the all-out attack

31:20.305 --> 31:24.065
that we get on cinemas and on the domestic industry during

31:24.165 --> 31:28.105
and after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, would speak

31:28.325 --> 31:30.465
to the general hostility

31:30.495 --> 31:34.865
that the so-called traditional classes who were,

31:34.925 --> 31:37.265
in many ways a kind of, pillar

31:37.525 --> 31:39.865
of the support for the revolution.

31:41.045 --> 31:44.185
It would seem to show their hostility towards not only the

31:44.185 --> 31:47.265
medium as a whole, but of film for c as a genre.

31:47.885 --> 31:51.705
And so the idea of the, traditional classes

31:52.005 --> 31:55.505
as the main audience of these films is drawn into question

31:55.605 --> 31:57.585
by the, actions

31:57.655 --> 32:00.945
that revolutionaries take in the buildup to the revolution.

32:01.045 --> 32:03.865
And in, subsequently after the revolution.

32:05.095 --> 32:08.665
Finally, the low social status

32:09.045 --> 32:11.985
of the male heroes in the films sort

32:11.985 --> 32:15.985
of ironically makes them ideally suited to protect

32:16.245 --> 32:20.305
and defend the values of the middle class audience precisely

32:20.305 --> 32:23.665
because they did so well, not even belonging to that class.

32:24.355 --> 32:27.265
Their faith in such beliefs, despite,

32:27.375 --> 32:29.065
despite their class background,

32:29.175 --> 32:30.785
despite their moral failings,

32:31.235 --> 32:33.865
makes their heroic actions on behalf

32:34.125 --> 32:36.465
of the middle class all the more powerful

32:36.465 --> 32:37.705
symbolically in my mind.

32:38.245 --> 32:40.805
And so, yes, I mean, I think that the notion

32:40.805 --> 32:45.525
that these films are anti-modern is undermined not only

32:45.525 --> 32:47.285
by their content, but by their audience.

32:47.795 --> 32:50.805
Well, I mean, one thing that I can say is that film far c

32:51.105 --> 32:54.525
and its reliance on aspects of the cultural past

32:54.705 --> 32:59.235
for its inspiration often,

32:59.385 --> 33:03.475
puts it in stark contrast with the official national culture

33:03.585 --> 33:06.955
that was promoted by modernist intellectuals

33:07.015 --> 33:09.755
and politicians, during the ardi.

33:11.445 --> 33:13.465
That's not to suggest that these films were somehow

33:13.975 --> 33:17.305
foreshadowing the Clerically led Islamic revolution,

33:17.475 --> 33:20.545
which some have claimed to be a kind of medieval throwback,

33:21.095 --> 33:23.145
because almost immediately

33:23.145 --> 33:25.785
after the revolution, many of the industry figures

33:25.925 --> 33:29.985
and actors involved in the, film four C

33:30.505 --> 33:33.585
industry were banned from taking part in the planned

33:33.865 --> 33:36.305
remaking of Iranians Cinema After Revolution.

33:37.095 --> 33:40.015
I mean, the revolutionary, leadership saw Film for Sea,

33:40.425 --> 33:44.655
ironically enough, as a product of the corrupt Patela era.

33:45.865 --> 33:48.955
Despite these bans, there are still fears down

33:48.955 --> 33:51.555
to the present day that you see in,

33:51.735 --> 33:56.115
the national press in Iran, fears of the Return

33:56.175 --> 33:58.875
of film Farsi conventions to the Iranian cinema.

33:59.425 --> 34:00.915
This has become a vigorous topic

34:00.975 --> 34:04.395
of debate in media circles in recent years.

34:04.975 --> 34:08.755
And so clearly the ideas of entertainment at the center

34:08.775 --> 34:11.235
of Film Farsi have retained their relevance

34:11.235 --> 34:14.635
among Iranian audiences some 40, 50 years

34:14.725 --> 34:15.915
after they're banning.

34:16.375 --> 34:19.315
And that likely speaks to the continuing relevance

34:19.315 --> 34:23.515
of the values, that those films represent

34:23.935 --> 34:25.235
for their audiences.

34:25.755 --> 34:26.795
I mean, if there's one thing

34:26.795 --> 34:29.635
that we can say about film Far C is that it has been

34:29.855 --> 34:33.035
and continues to be a kind of,

34:33.655 --> 34:37.315
or part of, we might say, an alternative national culture

34:37.535 --> 34:40.555
to the one that was, that was offered up by ruling classes

34:41.455 --> 34:42.555
in the Oliviera,

34:42.815 --> 34:45.995
but also the one that was offered up by, the one

34:45.995 --> 34:48.835
that has been offered up by the ruling classes in the

34:48.835 --> 34:49.955
Islamic Republican era.

34:50.455 --> 34:54.115
It would seem to be a kind of unofficial,

34:54.585 --> 34:56.595
perspective on national life

34:57.385 --> 34:59.165
and on the modernization project,

34:59.255 --> 35:02.525
which in many ways has continued unabated,

35:02.735 --> 35:07.605
after the Islamic Republic for its audiences, which,

35:07.625 --> 35:11.245
as far as I'm concerned, continued to be composed largely

35:11.305 --> 35:12.045
of the middle class.

00:00 - I was born in Iran, but I've, I've lived much of my life outside of the country. And, I was drawn to studying modern Iran as a way to sort of compensate for my lack of connection to my birth country, my lack of knowledge, really, of my birth country.

00:17 - and, you know, my, the the training that I received as a graduate student was not really all together that different than, other people in my field. I took Persian classes, I learned about the cultural canon, old and new. watching films was certainly part of my language training. but again, I mean, the films that we watched were largely those that we associate with Iran's art cinema,

00:44 - which since the late 1960s has been prominently featured in international film festivals. but then I later found out that most of the films that we watched were little watched or even known by many Iranians in Iran. but thankfully during my l language training, I was also introduced to some of the, so-called Classics of the Pre-Revolutionary Popula Cinema. the sound and picture quality was not great, but these films were, were interesting to me

01:15 - because their characters, their plots, their dialogue was substantially different from the art cinema that we'd watched, and that is so well known, in the West. and so I, I started to ask my family members who had lived in Iran during the time of the release of these particular films, and their responses were pretty uniform. I mean, they either said that we, we, as in us our group or class, never saw any of these movies,

01:46 - or even if we did see these movies, they had no redeeming qualities or, and were made with a different class of people in mind, meaning an audience that was not as educated and as cultured as those in the Middle East. And I, I, I wasn't really satisfied with the kind of blanket dismissals that they were giving me. So I, I looked for more information about these popular movies in the existing histories that we have. And I, interestingly enough, found this sort

02:15 - of similar culture of denial about them. I mean, I knew that Iranians had in very large numbers, watch these movies. I mean, the commercial cinema, film industry that developed after World War II would go on to produce about a thousand films over the next couple of decades, until 1979 and the Islamic Revolution. And so, I, I I, I started to wonder what it is about these films that both attracted Iranians,

02:44 - but seemingly also repelled them. and that's really how the research for this book started. I mean, I began with a handful of questions. why does a commercial film industry, for example, emerge in this post-war era immediately after World War ii? Who exactly made up the audiences of these films? What kinds of ideas, themes, and images were regularly found in these films? And did these seemingly formulaic elements have any links

03:19 - to older forms of entertainment in Iran? Or where these films, as some of the critics claim just simply second rate or third rate copies of Hollywood hits? And if they weren't simply poorly done Homa, homages to Hollywood hits, then what might these films have to tell us about Iran in those final decades of pa rule was social critique, political critique, part of their entertainment? And this final question sort of had in mind the

03:55 - widely accepted claim about the Iranian art cinema as a kind of critical mirror on modern Iranian politics and society. And I think in contrast, many critics have claimed that the commercially oriented cinema was a sort of mindless escapism with very little to say about Iran's encounter with Western modernity, whether successful or otherwise. And so, I, I wanted to investigate the claim that these domestic studio productions, which re, which really enjoyed the peak of their popularity in the 1960s through to the middle of the 1970s,

04:34 - whether these films had anything to tell us about their audience's lives, about their life, wishes about their interactions or engagements with Western modernity. I mean, this period between the 1960s and the middle 19, middle of the 1970s was a period of immense social change, of economic modernization, of the dramatic expansion of the state's power and reach. And so I wanted to see if these films have anything to say about this.

05:04 - and so that, that's really what, what, got me going, to study these films in greater detail and depth. It wasn't, it was a very, unsettled, environment politically and socially after World War ii, the, the country had been occupied during the war by the Allied Forces. we had had an interna, a a a succession from father to son from, Rezo Pavi, who abdicated his throne was forced

05:38 - to abdicate his throne to Mohammed Rezo Pavi. and so we have a kind of weak, monarch in place, heavy western involvement and influence in the country. and ironically enough, it's in these, in this circumstances that a domestic film Industry was able to, flourish, in part because of the kind of political vacuum that existed at the time. I mean, domestic film production in Iran

06:08 - develops relatively late compared to some of the other countries in the neighborhood like Turkey or Egypt or India. I mean, film technology had been introduced to Iran in the late 19th century by the Royal Court. but filmmaking film watching this remained largely per the preserve of the well to do and of foreign expatriates in the country for the next couple of decades. and I, I mean, we can talk about war,

06:39 - foreign occupation, endemic poverty as all contributing to this slow uptake of cinema as a popular entertainment, and certainly mass illiteracy. A lack of familiarity with the host culture of the film screened, also contributes to this slow uptake. I mean, this lack of familiarity would require extra accommodations for audiences. So we have, for example, in the, interwar years,

07:11 - what we call the, the position of the did march, or a kind of live narrator who would sit in the, in the movie theater along with the audience to translate into titles and explain the action that was taking place on the scene, on the screen. but then, yes, I mean, we get the rise of a new pan Avid dynasty in 1920s that would bring about some degree of political stability for a time, as well as a plan

07:44 - for the rapid transformation of the economy and society along Western lines. But unlike the Soviet Union, at the same time, the PA government did not really pay much attention to cinema as a tool for propaganda and education. There wasn't much official encouragement for domestic film production, and the government was more concerned with censoring the medium rather than cultivating it. And so we get very few homegrown product,

08:14 - productions at this time. And early film production was really limited to one-off experiments by private individuals. the really, we might say that the first sustained and successful efforts at Persian language film production actually take place in India in the 1930s by an Iranian expatriate by the name of Abdul Hussein Sto. And interestingly, the films that he makes, were made in a similar style as the them emerging popular Indian cinema.

08:46 - So it incorporated aspects of action, comedy, romance interspersed with song and sometimes dance numbers. And these films that Stom makes in India were widely shown in Iran, and became a sort of early template to follow for the domestic studios that would emerge after World War ii. So, this early experiment in popular filmmaking becomes a kind of model, for later, studios to follow

09:19 - after World War ii. but again, I mean, at some point in the mid 1930s decides to come back to Iran and to make films in Iran, but all of these efforts were thwarted by government interference and by film distribution companies operating in Iran at that time. They didn't really want extra competition for then very limited audience.

09:46 - And so we don't get another attempt at studio building until the late 1940s when, we have this political vacuum, as I talked about earlier, opening up the cultural field. And again, it's private individuals that take the initiative to ramp up film production. those pioneers had first experimented with dubbing foreign features into Persian. But these dubbing experiments could also involve a rewriting of aspects of the film story, renaming characters

10:19 - rearranging scenes, or adding scenes, and even writing new music for the film. In other words, the the dubbed films had been Iran unionized before reaching, audiences. And the common epithet that we get for the pre-revolutionary commercial cinema film for sea or Persian film, it actually originates in this era, this early dubbing era. It was initially used to describe in newspaper advertisements those foreign films

10:48 - that were to be shown in the Persian language. And later on, only it becomes a kind of term of abuse for the domestic commercial cinema. With critics claiming that the only thing that was culturally authentic about, these homegrown studio productions was their use of Persian language dialogue. In any case, the success of dubbed foreign titles would lead to the production of homegrown features.

11:17 - And interestingly, the, the use of post synchronous sound continued to be used for local, studio productions, too. I mean, it, it was not unusual for a professional dubbing artist to record the dialogue for the screen actor. In other words, that the dubbing artist was a different person than the, than the actor that you would see on the screen. And dubbing artists,

11:42 - in this post-war era became celebrities alongside screen actors, work as a dubbing artist could also provide opportunities to transition to stardom in front of the camera, too. I mean, perhaps one of the biggest male stars of the, film Farsi era is Beh Uri. and he began as a voiceover actor and then became a film star. So sound films, whether they were locally produced or dubbed into Persian made cinema, as we might imagine,

12:17 - much, much more accessible to Iranian audiences. And we get a significant rise in the number of cinema halls and year attendance, in these post-war decades. We also get new government tax incentives that are put into place that boost cinema, construction and other factors like rapid urbanization, the expansion of the national educational system, the rise of a salaried, middle, middle class with disposable income, with leisure time. all of these things would help to fuel film going,

12:52 - in these post-war decades. I mean, I think one of the more controversial arguments that I make in the book is that the urban educated middle class, despite their long and loud denials, they're the ones that have made up the audience for film far c productions. In fact, my argument is that the middle class has made up the bulk of the audience for all films shown in Iran, because they were the ones with the means and the opportunity to do so.

13:20 - and as, as the number of cinemagoers vastly increased, we also get the development of a kind of fan culture that could take an obsessive interest in the lives of the film stars themselves, both as kind of aspirational models, but also as cautionary tales. So I, we shouldn't get the impression that they were simply, the, the film stars were, were, were simply, idols for the audience to follow. And again, I mean, one of the key sources that I used for my book are the fan

13:57 - and industry magazines that first popped, cropped up in the 1950s, filled with interviews with the major players in the film, far c cinema, both in front of and behind the camera. And these magazines also included lots of fan letters that sort of speak to the audience's depth of engagement with this cinema. I mean, the common idea that the commercial cinema was a kind of timeout from everyday life to be experienced quite passively

14:27 - is drawn into question in my mind by this level of engagement. I mean, for some people who might imagine the cinema was their life. And so, I think, this notion that, you know, people would go and watch these films for two hours as a break from their everyday activities is undermined by the amount of time and effort they put into Engaging with the cinema outside

14:52 - of the cinema hall, all, all together. Again, I, i, I, I think that, you know, the heroism that we see in the films is one of the reasons why, you know, people became, or the kind of heroism that we see in the films is one of the reasons why people became so fascinated with these films, and also how they could inform their everyday lives. I mean, I think it's quite clear to me that the popular films from the Pavi era involved the kind

15:21 - of reconfiguration and democratization of ideas and institutions that were associated with what I would call a Persian culture of longstanding. Meaning that it was a culture that was associated with Persian speaking elites in particular, that, ruled over Iran, but also over a much broader geographic area that at times ex, extended from, the Balkans all the way to India. And so I think we can also see a kind of similar process, of the reconfiguration and democratization of ideas

16:04 - and institutions associated with Persian Persian culture in the popular Indian cinema as well, as well as in the popular Turkish cinema of this particular era, which again, sort of speaks to the wide dispersal of this culture. And, it's this Persian culture that sort of gives birth to the heroism or the ideas or representations of heroism that we see. in film, Farsi, I mean, the heroes at the center of many popular Iranian films were often

16:37 - socially marginal characters who were quick to the rescue of honorable women who were unfailingly loyal to friends, family, and their working class neighborhoods. But also at the same time, hard drinkers, gamblers, brawlers, even sometimes small time gangsters. I mean, all these men sort of lived by a code of chivalry, which they sometimes reference quite directly in the dialogue. And which scholars have claimed to have a long history in this Persian,

17:12 - cultural region. I mean, the Persian term that's commonly used to describe this code is Javan maddi, which literally means young manliness. In the past, the groups said to uphold or exploit these particular ideals were themselves associated with neighborhood gangs who could engage in disreputable activities like gambling and drinking. And were also engaged in lowly professions, including,

17:44 - as public entertainers. And so there's been a long link, we might say, between these ideals of manliness and entertainment in Iran and in the wider, Persian world. so these young men who were, said to uphold the ideals of young manliness were generally not a part of respectable society, and had little hopes of joining it, but could nevertheless be held up as paragons of manhood by that very society because of their selflessness,

18:25 - because of their generosity, because of their earnest commitment to a code of honor that most other men, and especially perhaps the rich and powerful, often failed to live by. And what's often said is that the modern state, when the modern state appears its military and security apparatus, manages to wipe out the strongholds of these gangsters who had dominated, urban neighborhoods for centuries upon centuries.

18:59 - But it would seem to me that their ethos sort of lives on, at least in the populist cinema, and many of the pre-revolutionary studio productions, we might call them melodramas, that dealt with the moral and material consequences of modernization. A process that involved not just the rapid transformation of people's daily surroundings and lifestyles along western lines, but also the adapt adoption, the adoption of a set of social ideals western in origin

19:37 - that differed in significant ways from what we might call, quote unquote traditional family life in Iran. And the films would seem to critique the acquisitive individualism that the modernization process was seemingly promoting by holding up the traditional values of Javelin Mardi as a kind of alternative. And the film heroes that sort of best embodied these masculine ideals, again, usually belong to the working classes, to the poor,

20:12 - who were engaged in lowly professions and who were perhaps less affected by the state's modernization programs, then other segments of society. However, these heroes in the films almost invariably come to the rescue of middle class characters who have fallen victim to the selfishness, the greed, the lust of less principled and culturally rootless individuals. These melodramas did not outright reject

20:44 - modernization along western lines, but certainly pointed to the pitfalls of it, which interestingly, these socially marginal characters were most aware of, and like in the Pres cinematic past, came to serve as sort of models for the rest of society for how to retain one's dignity and honor in spite of the rapidly changing environment in which they were living.

21:08 - So again, I mean, it, it's a very strange situation in which the heroes are kind of anti-heroes in many ways. They are, living on the margins of, of, law and society more often than not. But they become sort of paragons of how society should adapt, and live in this rapidly changing environment that the p modernization project is, creating.

21:38 - And film Farsi titles often again, sort of endorse what we might call traditionalist bourgeois interests alongside the more desirable aspects of the pa modernist project. And they do so by depicting the hero's willingness to sacrifice himself or his personal happiness to protect honorable women more often, middle class honorable women, and the unbreakable bonds of family and friends from morally dissolute

22:14 - and superficially westernized middle class antagonists. And so there is a kind of class conflict that's, at the center of many of these films, but it's a conflict more often than not within the middle class. Interesting. And so martyrdom, I I should stress does not necessarily mean physical death in the but could als, but could often refer to the hero's self abnegation his rejection in

22:44 - a sense of his own personal fulfillment. and by doing so, the hero more often than not, sort of upholds the centrality of family life in modern Iranian society, often at the expense of his own romantic life. And of course, I mean, the fact that someone on the margins of society would be more committed to its ideals makes this sacrifice all the more poignant, given his sort of lack of stakes in a bourgeois dominated social order.

23:19 - And if the hero didn't sacrifice himself for the sake of the family institution, then he would sacrifice himself or his future for the sake of a friend. And again, I would argue that this idealization of male friendship that we get in the films could itself sort of contribute to the, integrity of the family institution, after all, who best to marry off your daughters to than to the sons of your friends. And so male friendship

23:53 - and the family institutions seemingly go together here, in these traditionalist bourgeois values. And so, yes, I mean, generally what you get at the end of these films is the hero or the anti-hero giving up on any kind of personal self-fulfillment in, in favor of rescuing his, a friend or rescuing a middle class family from disaster. And so these film far c titles are not necessarily feel, feel good, happy films.

24:28 - They're tragic, bittersweet at best. And while the dominant forms of social organization are threatened in the films, they are generally upheld through the self-sacrifice of the hero who cannot, in any case, be a full member of that society in the first place. So yes, I mean, martyrdom can mean physical death, but it doesn't necessarily have to mean that martyrdom here is a kind of, self-sacrifice is probably a better word to use,

25:02 - or the sacrifice of one's life wishes is a better, way to phrase it, than simply physical death. Hopefully it's become clear. I mean, love is a big topic, in this cinema. I mean, it's melodrama after all. And so, the conflict, especially of fam familial love and romantic love is at the center of these films and love. and romantic love was also a big topic in pre-modern Persian literature, and especially in poetry.

25:35 - But ideal romantic love remained chaste and pure in this literature more often than not. And this idea of a chaste romantic love found, especially in the poetic past, I would argue, is sort of massified in the modern era through popular cinema. I mean, as I mentioned before, film Farsi titles generally targeted middle class audiences for these middle class audiences. Family honor sort of has been viewed as crucial to their own social status to which the selfish emotions

26:14 - of romantic love could pose a danger. And so, that hopefully sort of sets up the, the conflict that we get at the center of the films between romantic love and, familiar love and hopefully telegraphs, which one of these two forms of love winds up on top at the end. And I shouldn't give the impression that, you know, romantic love is sort of rejected out of hand in the films or in Persian, a culture altogether. I mean, the films at one level allow for audiences to sort

26:48 - of take pleasure in the erotic emotions of the characters. And we often see these emotional highs best expressed in the films through song, song sequences in those sequences in which the characters who are in love are essentially singing poetry to one another. However, the films have also upheld, the social ideals of family obligation and love too. So these cinematic representations of erotic love often have had sort of negative consequences

27:23 - for their characters. again, the darker emotions associated with erotic love are invariably depicted through song sequences too. So, I mean, if we can talk about two emotions that dominate the songs in the films, one is mati or exhilaration, the moment in which you are enjoying in a sense the romantic relationship, and the other is gum or despair. the moment in which the characters come to the realization that the costs invo incurred

27:58 - through this erotic or romantic love are too high to pay or must be paid in a sense. And so, yes, I mean the, the songs are perhaps the, the, sequences in the film in which we get the deeps, expression of emotion. And when erotic love has been sanctioned in the films, as I say, it usually comes at a great price through some grand sacrifice, or it is in some ways subsumed into family love. But generally, the, the message of the films is that

28:34 - is of the centrality of the family and social life. And so, romantic love has, has to sort of take a back seat to it. and yes, I mean, the films do a very good job of showing you that it's certainly a, a claim that has been adopted by many of the scholars and critics of, Iranian cinema as well. I mean, their general assumption has been that film Farsi was the cinema of the traditionally minded poor of the working classes.

29:03 - I mean, it was either a kind of accessible local version of Hollywood films with more familiar, familiar character types and plots, or it was the romanticization of traditional values and lifestyles that were fast disappearing in a modernizing Iran. In other words, it was a kind of residue of the, modernization shell shock that the traditionally minded poor and working classes were experience. And of course, the regular incorporation of characters

29:34 - and settings from the poor and working class neighborhoods was often the main reason given for the cinema's association with the traditionally minded and the poor. However, as I've mentioned before, I mean, cinema going in the postwar decades was generally a middle class leisure activity regardless of the kind of films that were being shown. And filmmaking in these post-war decades was generally a middle class activity.

30:03 - And so, I think these two facts are sort of at odds with the idea of, film far c as a cinema for those undergoing modernization. Shell shock. I would also add that character identification does not necessarily have to be the only way that audiences engage with a film. And so, I mean, people can engage with a film at odds with the characters in the film themselves, at least in terms of their class backgrounds. And thirdly, the poor

30:36 - and working class characters that we find in many film four C titles certainly did uphold traditional values such as spam, the obligation. But those values had also remained important, as far as I'm concerned, to the educated middle classes, which did not necessarily see them as conflicting with the modern lives that they were trying to create for themselves. Fourth, the male heroes of the films, especially may have come from traditional backgrounds,

31:05 - but they also engaged in these films in all kinds of subversive behavior that would likely be offensive to a religiously inclined audience if they were the primary audience. And in fact, I think the all-out attack that we get on cinemas and on the domestic industry during and after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, would speak to the general hostility that the so-called traditional classes who were, in many ways a kind of, pillar

31:37 - of the support for the revolution. It would seem to show their hostility towards not only the medium as a whole, but of film for c as a genre. And so the idea of the, traditional classes as the main audience of these films is drawn into question by the, actions that revolutionaries take in the buildup to the revolution. And in, subsequently after the revolution. Finally, the low social status of the male heroes in the films sort

32:11 - of ironically makes them ideally suited to protect and defend the values of the middle class audience precisely because they did so well, not even belonging to that class. Their faith in such beliefs, despite, despite their class background, despite their moral failings, makes their heroic actions on behalf of the middle class all the more powerful symbolically in my mind. And so, yes, I mean, I think that the notion

32:40 - that these films are anti-modern is undermined not only by their content, but by their audience. Well, I mean, one thing that I can say is that film far c and its reliance on aspects of the cultural past for its inspiration often, puts it in stark contrast with the official national culture that was promoted by modernist intellectuals and politicians, during the ardi. That's not to suggest that these films were somehow foreshadowing the Clerically led Islamic revolution,

33:17 - which some have claimed to be a kind of medieval throwback, because almost immediately after the revolution, many of the industry figures and actors involved in the, film four C industry were banned from taking part in the planned remaking of Iranians Cinema After Revolution. I mean, the revolutionary, leadership saw Film for Sea, ironically enough, as a product of the corrupt Patela era. Despite these bans, there are still fears down to the present day that you see in,

33:51 - the national press in Iran, fears of the Return of film Farsi conventions to the Iranian cinema. This has become a vigorous topic of debate in media circles in recent years. And so clearly the ideas of entertainment at the center of Film Farsi have retained their relevance among Iranian audiences some 40, 50 years after they're banning. And that likely speaks to the continuing relevance of the values, that those films represent

34:23 - for their audiences. I mean, if there's one thing that we can say about film Far C is that it has been and continues to be a kind of, or part of, we might say, an alternative national culture to the one that was, that was offered up by ruling classes in the Oliviera, but also the one that was offered up by, the one that has been offered up by the ruling classes in the Islamic Republican era.

34:50 - It would seem to be a kind of unofficial, perspective on national life and on the modernization project, which in many ways has continued unabated, after the Islamic Republic for its audiences, which, as far as I'm concerned, continued to be composed largely of the middle class.

Faculti AI can make mistakes