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Russian Missile Strikes and Ukraine’s Counteroffensive

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View more figures from University of Toronto

View the page of Aurel Braun

Aurel Braun discusses the humanitarian impact of Russia’s recent missile strikes on Kharkiv, Ukraine, the Ukrainian counteroffensive and how the West should respond to Russia’s decision to revise its nuclear doctrine.

Aurel Braun is currently a Professor of International Relations and Political Science at the University of Toronto. He is also a Center Associate of the Davis Center at Harvard University. Additionally he is a senior member of the Centre for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies at the Munk School of Global Affairs, and a Fellow and Senator of Trinity College, all at the University of Toronto. Between July 2012 and June 2015 he was a Visiting Professor teaching in the Department of Government, Harvard University. Professor Braun has twice been appointed a Visiting Scholar at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. In March 2009, the Federal Cabinet via a Governor-in-Council appointment made Professor Braun the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (Rights & Democracy) for a three- year term. In December 2012, Professor Braun was awarded the Queen Elizabeth II Diamond Jubilee Medal for services to Canada and for academic distinction by the Governor-General of Canada. Professor Braun has published extensively on communist affairs and strategic studies with a special focus on the problems of the transformation of the socialist systems in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. He is also a specialist in international law. He is the author and/or editor of several books. His latest
book is NATO-Russia Relations in the 21st Century. His forthcoming book is on Russia, the West and Arctic Security.

Image courtesy of interviewee. September 7, 2024

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This video discusses the ongoing conflict involving Russia, specifically under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, framing it as a complex situation characterized by systematic attacks on civilian targets in Ukraine. The speaker argues that these actions appear deliberate rather than incidental and suggest a blend of aggression and recklessness on Russia's part, likening the country to a "terrorist" or "rogue state."

The analysis emphasizes the psychological warfare aspect of Russia's tactics, aiming to instill fear in Ukraine and undermine its morale. It critiques Western assessments of Russia, arguing they often mistakenly interpret Putin's motivations as being rooted in historical territorial claims, rather than recognizing that they stem from domestic pressures and the need for diversionary tactics to maintain political power.

The speaker further compares Putin’s governing style to that of organized crime rather than classical strategies of statecraft, suggesting a focus on personal power and wealth over rational governance. Finally, the text touches upon the implications of nuclear weapons in the conflict, asserting that while Russia possesses a formidable arsenal, the rational calculations of leadership would likely deter irrational use of nuclear capabilities. The discussion concludes by highlighting the importance of understanding Putin's personality and motivations in predicting his actions.

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Here are five key points from the video:

1. **Deliberate Tactics and Responsibility**: The speaker suggests that the attacks on civilian targets by Russia are not accidental, but rather part of a deliberate strategy or gross negligence, which indicates that Russia bears responsibility for these actions under international law.

2. **Psychological Warfare**: The attacks are seen not only as a means to destroy infrastructure but also as a method of psychological warfare aimed at instilling fear in the Ukrainian populace and demonstrating their helplessness in the face of aggression.

3. **Domestic Motivations of Putin**: The speaker emphasizes that Vladimir Putin's aggressive policies are largely motivated by domestic issues within Russia. As a leader who has held power for a long time, he often seeks external conflicts to distract from internal challenges, using military campaigns for political gain.

4. **Inadequate Western Response**: There is a critique of how the West has responded to the conflict, particularly in terms of the slow and timid provision of advanced weaponry to Ukraine. The speaker argues that timely and sufficient military support is crucial for Ukraine's defense and morale.

5. **Nuclear Deterrence and Rationality**: The discussion touches on the nature of nuclear weapons and deterrence, asserting that while Putin possesses a significant nuclear arsenal, the rationality of state leadership (including the understanding of the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war) plays a vital role in ensuring a balance of power. The speaker questions whether Putin would act irrationally or make suicidal decisions, suggesting that his character and interests indicate a preference for maintaining power and the status quo.

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Here are some key quotes and ideas extracted from the video:

1. **Deliberate Tactics and Responsibility**:
- "These are either deliberate tactics... or there is the kind of recklessness or gross negligence that again, make Russia bear responsibility for this."

2. **Psychological Warfare**:
- "The purpose of these kind of attacks is... to terrify, to send a message to the Ukrainian people, that they are helpless and that their situation is hopeless."

3. **Multiple Levels of Warfare**:
- "It has to be understood as such that we need to appreciate that there are multiple levels of warfare that Russia is using."

4. **Diversionary Tactics**:
- "Much of the policy that Vladimir Putin is pursuing is diversionary. Instead of addressing the fundamental issue domestically... he looks for diversions."

5. **Mafia vs. Machiavelli**:
- "Vladimir Putin's policies are much more mafia than Machiavelli."

6. **Nuclear Deterrence**:
- "Nuclear deterrence is really a kind of balance of terror. Deterrence is a psychological relationship."

7. **Power and Irrationality**:
- "The question is whether Vladimir Putin would be irrational, would he be suicidal?"

8. **Implications of Personal Wealth**:
- "This is a man who loves personal power... but he is also an individual who loves the good life."

These quotes capture the main ideas discussed in the video regarding Russia's actions in Ukraine, the strategies of Putin's regime, psychological warfare, and the dynamics of nuclear deterrence.

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Here are some articles that may be similar to the video, which discusses Russia's military tactics, psychological warfare, and international relations under Vladimir Putin:

1. **"The Psychology of Warfare: Understanding Russia's Aggression"**
This article delves into how psychological tactics are employed in modern warfare, particularly in the convideo of Russia's actions in Ukraine.

2. **"Putin's Leadership and the Russian Military Doctrine"**
An analysis of how Putin's domestic policies influence his military strategies and the implications for international security.

3. **"Understanding the Russian Military Campaign in Ukraine"**
This piece examines the systematic approach of Russia in targeting civilian infrastructure and the broader implications for warfare and humanitarian law.

4. **"The Role of Psychological Warfare in Modern Conflicts"**
Focuses on the various psychological strategies used in military conflicts and how they affect civilian populations and morale.

5. **"Reassessing the Nuclear Threat: Russia's Strategy in a Changing World"**
This article assesses the implications of Russia's nuclear strategy and its effect on global security dynamics, addressing the concerns about nuclear proliferation and deterrence theory.

6. **"Machiavelli vs. Mafia: Understanding Power in Putin's Russia"**
An exploration of the motivations behind Putin’s policies, comparing traditional political theory with more contemporary understandings of power dynamics in Russia.

7. **"The Dangers of Underestimating Russia’s Military Capabilities"**
A critical examination of the underestimated potential of the Russian military and the consequences of such misconceptions in policy-making.

These articles would provide further insights and analyses on related topics such as military strategy, psychological elements of warfare, and the broader convideo of Russia's actions on the international stage.

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That these are not accidental

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because they are happening too frequently,

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too systematically.

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And consequently, I think it is reasonable to assume

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that these are either deliberate tactics

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where civilian targets are, specifically on the agenda,

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or there is the kind of recklessness

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or gross negligence that again,

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make Russia bear responsibility for this.

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And certainly if international law worked,

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there would be punishment,

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there would be deterrence in the case of Russia.

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But I think the purpose here is

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that Russia is not only an aggressive state,

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but they have taken a leap from their ally Iran.

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They're also behaving

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as a terrorist state, as a rogue state.

00:46.165 --> 00:48.785
And the purpose of these kind

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of attacks is not merely to cause damage.

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Certainly the infrastructure is targeted.

00:54.885 --> 00:59.665
Uh, it is meant to destroy much of the capacity Ukraine has

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to generate electricity to keep people warm.

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But it is also meant to terrify, to send a message to the,

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to the Ukrainian people, that they are helpless

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and that their situation is hopeless.

01:12.005 --> 01:14.625
So this part of a type of psychological warfare,

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and, to that extent, I think, it has had an effect.

01:21.085 --> 01:23.945
And it has to be understood as such that we need

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to appreciate that there are multiple levels of warfare

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that Russia is using.

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And that, if this is to be counted effectively,

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every single level of this warfare has to be addressed,

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including the psychological element of it.

01:37.685 --> 01:39.465
And that is part of what is happening here

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is a very good and very important question

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because I think this is where we in the west,

01:48.485 --> 01:51.425
are not very good at what we are doing in terms of analysis.

01:51.605 --> 01:53.905
And this is across the board, whether it is scholars,

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whether it is policy makers.

01:55.805 --> 02:00.225
And there are two real fundamental, issues here

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that are intertwined of how we look at Russia.

02:02.885 --> 02:05.465
One is that we tend to look on this as some kind

02:05.465 --> 02:07.785
of territorial and regional dispute.

02:08.805 --> 02:10.225
Uh, and that the motivation

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therefore is something that is perhaps historical.

02:13.015 --> 02:16.785
Something that is traditional to culture

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that is driven by claims of, historical wrongs.

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And I think there are obviously elements of this,

02:25.515 --> 02:27.275
but this is not the central part of it.

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'cause if we look at Vladimir Putin's policies,

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first we need to understand that these are

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domestically motivated.

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This is a person who has been in power for a very long time,

02:38.975 --> 02:40.035
now, 25 years,

02:41.325 --> 02:44.105
and that has given him an opportunity

02:44.245 --> 02:45.625
to really transform Russia.

02:46.565 --> 02:50.385
We need to look at Russia as a state that is a remnant

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of the Soviet Union, but a very crucial remnant.

02:53.085 --> 02:55.745
It has a population that is highly educated.

02:56.125 --> 02:58.665
It has unparalleled resources. After

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25 years of rule,

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it should be an advanced industrialized state

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that is highly competitive internationally.

03:05.945 --> 03:08.805
In essence, it is Eva with states,

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state in many ways it is a failed state.

03:11.475 --> 03:14.115
Consequently, much of the policy that,

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Vladimir Putin is pursuing is diversionary.

03:17.345 --> 03:20.355
Instead of addressing the fundamental issue domestically,

03:21.085 --> 03:24.275
which he can't or won't, he looks for diversions.

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He looks for wins outside.

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He expected that Ukraine would be a quick win.

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Uh, every time he had gone to war

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before, whether it was Georgia or in 2014 against Ukraine

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the first time, and he annexed Crimea,

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you receive a huge boost in popularity.

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And this motivation is crucial for our understanding.

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The second element is that we need to recognize

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that our social science tools

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and our historical analysis has been inadequate.

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We can look to, to acidities,

03:52.675 --> 03:55.435
and say, look, this is very similar to that.

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Uh, the strong can do what they want

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and the weak must suffer, what,

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what they must, but that doesn't adequately describe it.

04:06.065 --> 04:07.325
Or we can look to Machiavelli

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and say, look, positive, love versus respect

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or to gra grant strategy.

04:14.895 --> 04:18.195
But the closer we look at it, the more it becomes clear

04:18.265 --> 04:21.355
that these do not tell the whole story as well

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as the methodology, quantitative methodology that we use.

04:25.015 --> 04:27.035
And so I've come to the conclusion that in fact,

04:27.215 --> 04:28.715
if we use an outcomes razor,

04:29.335 --> 04:32.995
and I think, I think is so important that we are not sort

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of confused by complexity

04:34.815 --> 04:36.715
and that we understand that there are many things

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that we don't understand.

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But from what we can understand,

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the reality is both more simple and more sinister.

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That if we examine it honestly, we can, see that

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Vladimir Putin's policies are much more

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mafia than Machiavelli.

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We may be better off looking at the Sopranos who clues as to

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what motivates this policy than to look at kitz

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this offensive that goes onto Russian territory.

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And it captures almost as much in terms of territory

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as Russia has during the past year, about 500 square miles.

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They also, were able the Ukrainians

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to capture some like 600 Russian soldiers that gives them,

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the ability to trade soldiers to get some

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of their people, people back.

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It is a gamble because, partly it was,

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largely motivated by desire to have the Russian shift

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resources, from the dawn bass to defending areas in K.

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That really hasn't happened, at least not yet.

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If Van put me saying I'm not going to do that,

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but doesn't mean he won't.

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But the other element,

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also involved the psychological elements of warfare

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Because this offensive not only speaks to Russia

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and saying to the Russian people,

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Vladimir Putin has been telling you

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that Russia is invincible.

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We are showing you that Russia is vulnerable.

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It is also a means of reassuring allies We're wavering

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and is saying to allies, look,

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this is not a hopeless situation.

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You are not investing your resources in a lost cause.

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Uh, we are able to employ combined arms operations.

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And this is where the other element of your question becomes

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relevant, very much.

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And that is that giving Ukraine advanced weapons,

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giving Ukraine what they have asked for

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does make a huge difference.

06:40.955 --> 06:42.935
And in fact, Ukraine has been starved

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of sophisticated weapons.

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There had been a great reluctance.

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You will recall over the arc of discomfort

06:48.915 --> 06:51.295
to provide Ukraine what they needed.

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There was a huge delay in providing fighter aircraft.

06:55.235 --> 06:57.095
It takes a long time to train pilots.

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Why did we start doing this only one year ago when this is

07:00.755 --> 07:02.175
in the third year of conflict?

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What about longer range missiles?

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There was no willingness to provide that.

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And these weapons training does make a difference.

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And consequently, we in the West have to look honest at

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what we have done that often we have been too

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timid, we have been too late.

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And then we are surprised when the Ukrainians

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have not performed as well

07:24.085 --> 07:27.145
as the most exaggerated expectations at told us

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we need to take it seriously is

07:32.985 --> 07:34.025
the nature of nuclear weapons.

07:35.315 --> 07:37.535
But taking it seriously doesn't mean

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that we cannot assess it calmly and realistically.

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Vladimir Putin has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world,

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but we also have a very large nuclear arsenal.

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It is not that he is the only one who has nuclear weapons

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and that consequently he can use nuclear weapons freely.

07:59.845 --> 08:01.905
Yes, there has been an evolution

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of the Russian nuclear doctrine in 2020 already.

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It was stated, by the Russians

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that not only would Russia be prepared

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to use nuclear weapons in the case of a nuclear war,

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but even when there is a conventional attack, if

08:19.785 --> 08:22.545
that conventional attack threatened the existence

08:22.565 --> 08:25.905
of the state, they could use nuclear weapons even if the

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other side did not do so.

08:27.885 --> 08:30.425
Now they're saying they're going to further refine that.

08:31.195 --> 08:32.575
But how credible is this?

08:33.165 --> 08:37.375
Because nuclear deterrence is really a

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kind of balance of terror.

08:38.465 --> 08:41.255
Deterrence is a psychological relationship.

08:42.275 --> 08:46.615
And so it depends who is managing those nuclear weapons,

08:47.635 --> 08:50.655
how they are deployed, under

08:50.655 --> 08:52.335
what circumstances they would be used.

08:52.635 --> 08:54.415
So for example, we know that Britain

08:54.755 --> 08:55.755
Has nuclear weapons.

08:56.605 --> 08:58.365
I do not think many people lose sleep.

08:58.715 --> 09:02.205
That at some point the British Prime Minister will get very

09:02.295 --> 09:04.045
angry at Emma Macron

09:04.105 --> 09:06.045
and will launch a nuclear attack on France.

09:06.675 --> 09:07.845
It's just not realistic.

09:08.735 --> 09:11.395
At the same time we were agreed about North Korea

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because we know that they have what appears

09:14.315 --> 09:16.275
to be an irrational leadership.

09:16.935 --> 09:19.755
We worry about Iran possibly getting nuclear weapons

09:19.755 --> 09:22.395
because the leadership there is fanatical.

09:22.895 --> 09:25.835
Uh, the theology is extreme

09:26.295 --> 09:30.555
and we don't know if at some point they may have a type

09:30.575 --> 09:33.715
of suicide or nuclear policy should they have a viable

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nuclear arsenal.

09:35.435 --> 09:37.885
When we look at Russia, it's very different

09:38.115 --> 09:41.365
because there is an enforced rationality.

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Russia understands that in a nuclear war everyone would lose

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that a nuclear war Russia would be committing suicide.

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Uh, there would be utter destruction in the west as well

09:53.915 --> 09:56.055
and Ukraine, but it would be suicidal.

09:56.715 --> 10:00.335
So the question is whether Vladimir Putin would be

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irrational, would he be suicidal?

10:02.875 --> 10:04.855
And this is where we have a reading,

10:05.075 --> 10:07.015
but it is never totally complete.

10:07.435 --> 10:11.775
And so I suggest to people that sometimes we have

10:11.775 --> 10:12.855
to place a good deal

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of emphasis on the individual decision maker.

10:16.475 --> 10:19.855
And when we look at Vladimir Putin, what I find striking is

10:20.165 --> 10:23.335
that this is a man who loves personal power,

10:24.035 --> 10:27.855
who destroys his internal opponents with, absolute

10:28.775 --> 10:30.695
immunity from international law

10:31.035 --> 10:33.935
and impunity in terms of domestic repercussions.

10:35.035 --> 10:38.775
But he is also an individual who loves the good life,

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has the most lavish palaces, which are not,

10:42.695 --> 10:45.055
official in his name, but he has exclusive use of them.

10:46.355 --> 10:49.815
He wears $650, a bi shirts,

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$10,000 lower piano suits, custom made,

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$2,000 shoes.

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That is not the kind of person who wishes to commit suicide.

00:03 - That these are not accidental because they are happening too frequently, too systematically. And consequently, I think it is reasonable to assume that these are either deliberate tactics where civilian targets are, specifically on the agenda,

00:19 - or there is the kind of recklessness or gross negligence that again, make Russia bear responsibility for this. And certainly if international law worked, there would be punishment, there would be deterrence in the case of Russia. But I think the purpose here is that Russia is not only an aggressive state, but they have taken a leap from their ally Iran. They're also behaving

00:43 - as a terrorist state, as a rogue state. And the purpose of these kind of attacks is not merely to cause damage. Certainly the infrastructure is targeted. it is meant to destroy much of the capacity Ukraine has to generate electricity to keep people warm. But it is also meant to terrify, to send a message to the, to the Ukrainian people, that they are helpless and that their situation is hopeless. So this part of a type of psychological warfare,

01:16 - and, to that extent, I think, it has had an effect. And it has to be understood as such that we need to appreciate that there are multiple levels of warfare that Russia is using. And that, if this is to be counted effectively, every single level of this warfare has to be addressed, including the psychological element of it. And that is part of what is happening here is a very good and very important question because I think this is where we in the west,

01:48 - are not very good at what we are doing in terms of analysis. And this is across the board, whether it is scholars, whether it is policy makers. And there are two real fundamental, issues here that are intertwined of how we look at Russia. One is that we tend to look on this as some kind of territorial and regional dispute. and that the motivation therefore is something that is perhaps historical. Something that is traditional to culture

02:17 - that is driven by claims of, historical wrongs. And I think there are obviously elements of this, but this is not the central part of it. 'cause if we look at Vladimir Putin's policies, first we need to understand that these are domestically motivated. This is a person who has been in power for a very long time, now, 25 years, and that has given him an opportunity to really transform Russia.

02:46 - We need to look at Russia as a state that is a remnant of the Soviet Union, but a very crucial remnant. It has a population that is highly educated. It has unparalleled resources. After 25 years of rule, it should be an advanced industrialized state that is highly competitive internationally. In essence, it is Eva with states, state in many ways it is a failed state. Consequently, much of the policy that,

03:14 - Vladimir Putin is pursuing is diversionary. Instead of addressing the fundamental issue domestically, which he can't or won't, he looks for diversions. He looks for wins outside. He expected that Ukraine would be a quick win. every time he had gone to war before, whether it was Georgia or in 2014 against Ukraine the first time, and he annexed Crimea, you receive a huge boost in popularity. And this motivation is crucial for our understanding.

03:42 - The second element is that we need to recognize that our social science tools and our historical analysis has been inadequate. We can look to, to acidities, and say, look, this is very similar to that. the strong can do what they want and the weak must suffer, what, what they must, but that doesn't adequately describe it. Or we can look to Machiavelli and say, look, positive, love versus respect

04:11 - or to gra grant strategy. But the closer we look at it, the more it becomes clear that these do not tell the whole story as well as the methodology, quantitative methodology that we use. And so I've come to the conclusion that in fact, if we use an outcomes razor, and I think, I think is so important that we are not sort of confused by complexity and that we understand that there are many things that we don't understand.

04:38 - But from what we can understand, the reality is both more simple and more sinister. That if we examine it honestly, we can, see that Vladimir Putin's policies are much more mafia than Machiavelli. We may be better off looking at the Sopranos who clues as to what motivates this policy than to look at kitz this offensive that goes onto Russian territory. And it captures almost as much in terms of territory as Russia has during the past year, about 500 square miles.

05:19 - They also, were able the Ukrainians to capture some like 600 Russian soldiers that gives them, the ability to trade soldiers to get some of their people, people back. It is a gamble because, partly it was, largely motivated by desire to have the Russian shift resources, from the dawn bass to defending areas in K. That really hasn't happened, at least not yet. If Van put me saying I'm not going to do that, but doesn't mean he won't.

05:52 - But the other element, also involved the psychological elements of warfare Because this offensive not only speaks to Russia and saying to the Russian people, Vladimir Putin has been telling you that Russia is invincible. We are showing you that Russia is vulnerable. It is also a means of reassuring allies We're wavering and is saying to allies, look, this is not a hopeless situation.

06:20 - You are not investing your resources in a lost cause. we are able to employ combined arms operations. And this is where the other element of your question becomes relevant, very much. And that is that giving Ukraine advanced weapons, giving Ukraine what they have asked for does make a huge difference. And in fact, Ukraine has been starved of sophisticated weapons. There had been a great reluctance.

06:46 - You will recall over the arc of discomfort to provide Ukraine what they needed. There was a huge delay in providing fighter aircraft. It takes a long time to train pilots. Why did we start doing this only one year ago when this is in the third year of conflict? What about longer range missiles? There was no willingness to provide that. And these weapons training does make a difference. And consequently, we in the West have to look honest at

07:14 - what we have done that often we have been too timid, we have been too late. And then we are surprised when the Ukrainians have not performed as well as the most exaggerated expectations at told us we need to take it seriously is the nature of nuclear weapons. But taking it seriously doesn't mean that we cannot assess it calmly and realistically. Vladimir Putin has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world,

07:48 - but we also have a very large nuclear arsenal. It is not that he is the only one who has nuclear weapons and that consequently he can use nuclear weapons freely. Yes, there has been an evolution of the Russian nuclear doctrine in 2020 already. It was stated, by the Russians that not only would Russia be prepared to use nuclear weapons in the case of a nuclear war, but even when there is a conventional attack, if that conventional attack threatened the existence

08:22 - of the state, they could use nuclear weapons even if the other side did not do so. Now they're saying they're going to further refine that. But how credible is this? Because nuclear deterrence is really a kind of balance of terror. Deterrence is a psychological relationship. And so it depends who is managing those nuclear weapons, how they are deployed, under what circumstances they would be used.

08:52 - So for example, we know that Britain Has nuclear weapons. I do not think many people lose sleep. That at some point the British Prime Minister will get very angry at Emma Macron and will launch a nuclear attack on France. It's just not realistic. At the same time we were agreed about North Korea because we know that they have what appears to be an irrational leadership.

09:16 - We worry about Iran possibly getting nuclear weapons because the leadership there is fanatical. the theology is extreme and we don't know if at some point they may have a type of suicide or nuclear policy should they have a viable nuclear arsenal. When we look at Russia, it's very different because there is an enforced rationality. Russia understands that in a nuclear war everyone would lose that a nuclear war Russia would be committing suicide.

09:49 - there would be utter destruction in the west as well and Ukraine, but it would be suicidal. So the question is whether Vladimir Putin would be irrational, would he be suicidal? And this is where we have a reading, but it is never totally complete. And so I suggest to people that sometimes we have to place a good deal of emphasis on the individual decision maker. And when we look at Vladimir Putin, what I find striking is

10:20 - that this is a man who loves personal power, who destroys his internal opponents with, absolute immunity from international law and impunity in terms of domestic repercussions. But he is also an individual who loves the good life, has the most lavish palaces, which are not, official in his name, but he has exclusive use of them. He wears $650, a bi shirts, $10,000 lower piano suits, custom made, $2,000 shoes.

10:56 - That is not the kind of person who wishes to commit suicide.

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