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In February 1942, during the Japanese invasion of Ambon Island in the Netherlands Indies, a large number of Australian soldiers were captured by the Japanese navy. Paul Taucher discusses how an Australian military tribunal used the legal doctrine of command responsibility to prosecute two Japanese officers accused of indirect liability for crimes committed against prisoners on Ambon.

Image courtesy of interviewee. May 1, 2024

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This video video discusses a trial conducted by an Australian military tribunal in 1946 concerning Captain Rosu Wami and 55 of his military subordinates for war crimes committed against Australian and Dutch prisoners of war (POWs) during World War II at a POW camp on Amon Island. The trial focused on accusations of physical abuse and inadequate provisions of food, medical care, and accommodation for the prisoners.

Despite Wami not directly participating in the abuses or controlling supplies, he was charged under the doctrine of command responsibility, which holds superiors accountable for the actions of their subordinates. The prosecution argued that Wami had a duty to prevent these abuses. However, the conditions at the POW camp deteriorated over time due to a lack of supplies caused by the war's progression, rather than intentional withholding of resources by Wami.

The analysis highlights the complexity of command responsibility as a legal doctrine. It emphasizes that while it simplifies accountability for war crimes, it may overlook the nuanced circumstances that lead to such crimes, like resource shortages and the treatment of POWs within the military's cultural context. Ultimately, Captain Wami was found guilty and executed by hanging, a punishment viewed as severe, particularly for military officers.

This video video concludes by stating that command responsibility can be an effective tool for justice, but it must consider the broader context in which military decisions and actions occur to be applied appropriately. The author expresses an interest in further research on command responsibility and its nuances in legal contexts, particularly in relation to contemporary humanitarian law cases.

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The trial that I look at,

00:02.225 --> 00:06.925
is an Australian military tribunal trying Captain Ani

00:07.105 --> 00:11.645
and what ended up being 55 of his military subordinates.

00:12.435 --> 00:15.685
This trial took place on the island of Moi,

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relatively near modern day Indonesia.

00:19.145 --> 00:20.805
In 1946.

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Zu Wami was a naval captain who was placed,

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amongst other things in command of a POW camp

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on Amon Island.

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This POW camp, held

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around 1000 Australian

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and Dutch prisoners of war who had been captured

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by the Japanese military.

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Uh, during the Japanese invasion

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of the Netherland East Indies in 1942,

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TRO and his subordinates were all charged

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with the same crimes.

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Uh, these crimes were physically beating, prisoners

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of war and denying them adequate food,

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medical care, and accommodation.

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What's particularly interesting about this is that Zu Wami,

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the commander, didn't take part in any of the beatings,

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the physical punishment, and

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nor did he exert any clear control over the supply of food,

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medicine or accommodation.

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The crimes had in fact been directly committed

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by his subordinates.

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This is a really, vexing problem

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with war crimes trials in that the commanding officer

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who was usually absent from the same of the crime was tried

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with direct participation on his charge sheet.

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And, indeed in the indictment,

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it's only when you deal with the transcript itself

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that you realize that these officers are being charged under

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command responsibility.

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So in the trial, the Australian prosecutors argued that

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as a commanding officer, Rosu Wami had a duty

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to ensure that his subordinates were not physically beating,

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Australian and Dutch prisons of law,

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and also a duty to ensure that,

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food medic medicine

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and accommodation were of, an adequate, level.

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The trial transcript revealed that over the course

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of the war conditions at this POW camp slowly changed.

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Uh, at the beginning of the war,

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the conditions at the camp were actually relatively good.

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There were no physical beatings.

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Uh, food and medicine was

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provided, to the prisoners according to their need.

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Um, indeed, their Russians, though not substantial,

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were were more than enough to get by on top of this.

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Uh, the prisoners were also encouraged

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to grow their own garden to supplement, their diet

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of predominantly rice

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and wheat with fresh vegetables

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over the course of the war.

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Though these conditions deteriorated,

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it is not immediately clear from the trial transcript why

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these conditions changed.

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It seems to be that as the war progressed, the allies

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gained the upper hand across the entire Pacific Ocean

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and began sinking Japanese supply ships,

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wherever they propped up.

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The result of this was that the amount of food

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and medicine that reached outlying islands like Amon,

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steadily decreased over the war.

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And indeed, over the final year

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and a half of the second World War,

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supply ships were pretty much entirely destroyed.

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As a result of this, the prisoners diet,

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and rations decreased heavily

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and large numbers of prisoners started

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to die from starvation as well as,

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nutrient deficiencies, particularly berry berry, which is a,

04:21.285 --> 04:23.785
lack of vitamin B in the diet.

04:25.605 --> 04:27.505
By the end of the war, some 400

04:27.965 --> 04:30.505
of the original 1000 prisoners were dead.

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The prosecution argued in the trial that Captain

04:36.605 --> 04:39.665
Zu had purposefully withheld food

04:40.125 --> 04:43.065
and medicine from the prisoners.

04:44.855 --> 04:48.615
A wider examination of the course of the war reveals

04:48.615 --> 04:50.055
that this is not actually the case.

04:51.075 --> 04:55.895
Uh, Zu seemed to be faced with a serious dilemma.

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He could either feed his own troops

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who were garrisoning the island

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and preparing for an eventual allied attack,

05:04.635 --> 05:06.775
or he could feed both the prisoners

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and his own soldiers wherein no one would be fed properly,

05:11.435 --> 05:13.015
and everyone would slowly start.

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This argument was hinted at by

05:17.745 --> 05:19.455
she's defense at the trial,

05:19.915 --> 05:22.015
but it was never fully substantiated.

05:23.735 --> 05:26.145
What this shows is that these trials

05:26.565 --> 05:31.425
for command responsibility were particularly interested in

05:31.745 --> 05:35.545
securing prosecutions, for, for war crimes.

05:36.135 --> 05:40.745
They were not as interested in understanding the conditions

05:40.745 --> 05:42.585
that led to war crimes occurring.

05:43.785 --> 05:48.385
A similar example can be seen in the charge of beating

05:48.685 --> 05:50.665
or physically mistreating prisoners.

05:52.045 --> 05:53.825
In my chapter, I argued

05:53.825 --> 05:56.665
that the Japanese military in the 20th century

05:57.545 --> 06:00.965
had a long tradition of using informal

06:01.925 --> 06:04.125
physical punishment to discipline soldiers.

06:05.035 --> 06:07.365
This was exceptionally widespread

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and was a common practice

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when such punishment was applied to allied prisoners of war.

06:15.795 --> 06:18.675
However, it was seen as an act

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of cruelty rather than punishment,

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and there certainly would've been overlap

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between these two in, in cruelty and punishment.

06:26.215 --> 06:28.515
But allied soldiers were particularly

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aghast at this situation.

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I argue that while certainly a war crime,

06:36.055 --> 06:39.275
the physical punishment that the Allied prisoners received

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was to some extent a punishment of necessity.

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These prisoners were already held in a very

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small prisoner of war compound.

06:50.075 --> 06:53.895
So things like solitary confinement, were not an issue

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or were not available.

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At the same time, putting the prisoners onto limited rations

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by the end of the war was already appointed existence.

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So the availability of punishment for,

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disobedience and within the prison was,

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was simply not there.

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The result was using physical punishment,

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which was widely used across the Japanese military

07:20.635 --> 07:25.635
as it was In the end.

07:25.785 --> 07:30.675
Captain Zu Wami was found guilty under both charges

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that is of, failing to supply adequate food

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and medicine, and also, commander responsibility

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for beating the prisons.

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He was sentenced to death by hanging,

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which was carried out in September of 1947.

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Many Japanese officers who were charged

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with command responsibility for conditions at prisoner

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of war camps were executed.

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Um, it was very much a rallying cry

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of these post-war trials,

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and both surviving prisoners as well

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as the public back home in the other countries

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expected harsh punishment.

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Zoo's execution by hanging was

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probably the harshest punishment

08:18.055 --> 08:21.055
that a soldier could receive at these post-war trials.

08:22.035 --> 08:26.175
It was used as a sign of almost disrespect.

08:26.995 --> 08:31.055
Uh, if a officer was found guilty of a war crime,

08:31.835 --> 08:34.775
that he had no control over,

08:34.955 --> 08:36.095
but was still executed,

08:36.195 --> 08:38.335
he would usually be executed by firing squad.

08:38.915 --> 08:43.895
It was seen as a more, a more fitting form

08:43.895 --> 08:45.695
of execution for a military officer.

08:46.705 --> 08:50.735
Being hanged, however, was, reserved for criminals.

08:50.995 --> 08:53.575
So there was a distinction drawn even in

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death sentence punishments.

08:57.725 --> 08:59.815
What the trial shows overall,

08:59.845 --> 09:02.935
however, is that Captain Zo

09:02.995 --> 09:06.335
and indeed many Japanese prisoner of war officers

09:07.315 --> 09:09.415
didn't really have much control over the

09:09.735 --> 09:10.775
situation they were placed in.

09:11.685 --> 09:15.895
They were often at the end of very long supply routes.

09:16.755 --> 09:19.415
The soldiers that they were overseeing in the prison

09:19.435 --> 09:22.375
of war camps were often of very low quality.

09:23.275 --> 09:26.615
Uh, the reality is you do not use your most disciplined,

09:26.725 --> 09:29.215
best trained troops to guard prisoners.

09:30.715 --> 09:32.335
Beyond that, there were wider

09:33.235 --> 09:36.005
traditional roles within the Japanese military

09:36.005 --> 09:38.165
that impacted on the prisoner's welfare,

09:38.925 --> 09:42.365
particularly the summary use of physical punishment.

09:44.615 --> 09:47.945
What my chapter shows is that command responsibility,

09:48.675 --> 09:52.825
while a very effective tool in pursuing

09:53.435 --> 09:57.025
guilt for war crimes, it was a very blunt tool.

09:57.685 --> 09:59.625
It did not have the capacity,

10:00.085 --> 10:02.905
or rather, the tribunals did not have the capacity

10:03.405 --> 10:06.785
to understand the broader nuance of war crimes

10:06.925 --> 10:08.705
and the conditions in which they occur.

10:09.365 --> 10:13.105
So my areas of future research are still tied

10:13.125 --> 10:14.905
to command responsibility.

10:15.205 --> 10:18.665
Um, though the command responsibility was most widely

10:18.735 --> 10:21.825
applied at the post-war trials of German

10:22.005 --> 10:23.345
and Japanese war criminals

10:23.345 --> 10:26.425
after the Second World War, it has continued

10:26.425 --> 10:28.905
to see sporadic use,

10:28.935 --> 10:32.065
most notably at the International Criminal Tribunal

10:32.125 --> 10:36.745
for the former Yugoslavia, where a number of trials used

10:37.005 --> 10:39.745
and indeed refined command responsibility

10:40.375 --> 10:43.705
into a much more nuanced and precise doctrine.

10:45.375 --> 10:49.505
Outside of my work on command responsibility, I

10:50.015 --> 10:53.425
publish broadly on international humanitarian law.

10:54.125 --> 10:59.025
Um, I have discussed the allegations of war crimes committed

10:59.045 --> 11:02.585
by Australian SAS personnel during the war in Afghanistan,

11:03.205 --> 11:07.985
and have also examined the, south African case

11:08.245 --> 11:10.385
for genocide against Israel, help

11:10.565 --> 11:12.665
for the International Court of Justice.

11:13.215 --> 11:17.065
What I hope that readers take away from, this piece

11:17.065 --> 11:18.505
of work is that

11:19.415 --> 11:24.185
command responsibility is an attractive, doctrine to use

11:24.485 --> 11:26.665
to pursue justice for war crimes,

11:27.485 --> 11:29.265
but that a proper use

11:29.265 --> 11:33.585
of the doctrine requires taking in a vast amount of

11:33.615 --> 11:35.545
what may appear to be secondary.

11:36.505 --> 11:41.025
Material command is not, does not occur in a vacuum.

11:41.715 --> 11:46.545
There are many, much broader factors that influence not only

11:46.725 --> 11:50.065
how command is wielded, but how it can be delegated

11:50.205 --> 11:54.285
and applied to what appear to be very simple situations.

11:55.345 --> 11:58.725
Um, what is clear from my research is that

11:59.585 --> 12:04.045
though many Japanese military personnel did commit

12:04.585 --> 12:07.885
wanton war crimes, a significant number

12:07.985 --> 12:09.325
of the war crimes occurred

12:09.325 --> 12:13.805
because of a wide array of, preexisting

12:13.825 --> 12:15.885
and developing conditions during the war.

00:00 - The trial that I look at, is an Australian military tribunal trying Captain Ani and what ended up being 55 of his military subordinates. This trial took place on the island of Moi, relatively near modern day Indonesia. In 1946.

00:23 - Zu Wami was a naval captain who was placed, amongst other things in command of a POW camp on Amon Island. This POW camp, held around 1000 Australian and Dutch prisoners of war who had been captured by the Japanese military. during the Japanese invasion of the Netherland East Indies in 1942, TRO and his subordinates were all charged

00:56 - with the same crimes. these crimes were physically beating, prisoners of war and denying them adequate food, medical care, and accommodation. What's particularly interesting about this is that Zu Wami, the commander, didn't take part in any of the beatings, the physical punishment, and nor did he exert any clear control over the supply of food, medicine or accommodation. The crimes had in fact been directly committed

01:34 - by his subordinates. This is a really, vexing problem with war crimes trials in that the commanding officer who was usually absent from the same of the crime was tried with direct participation on his charge sheet. And, indeed in the indictment, it's only when you deal with the transcript itself that you realize that these officers are being charged under command responsibility. So in the trial, the Australian prosecutors argued that

02:10 - as a commanding officer, Rosu Wami had a duty to ensure that his subordinates were not physically beating, Australian and Dutch prisons of law, and also a duty to ensure that, food medic medicine and accommodation were of, an adequate, level. The trial transcript revealed that over the course of the war conditions at this POW camp slowly changed. at the beginning of the war, the conditions at the camp were actually relatively good.

02:49 - There were no physical beatings. food and medicine was provided, to the prisoners according to their need. indeed, their Russians, though not substantial, were were more than enough to get by on top of this. the prisoners were also encouraged to grow their own garden to supplement, their diet of predominantly rice and wheat with fresh vegetables over the course of the war.

03:19 - Though these conditions deteriorated, it is not immediately clear from the trial transcript why these conditions changed. It seems to be that as the war progressed, the allies gained the upper hand across the entire Pacific Ocean and began sinking Japanese supply ships, wherever they propped up. The result of this was that the amount of food and medicine that reached outlying islands like Amon, steadily decreased over the war.

03:55 - And indeed, over the final year and a half of the second World War, supply ships were pretty much entirely destroyed. As a result of this, the prisoners diet, and rations decreased heavily and large numbers of prisoners started to die from starvation as well as, nutrient deficiencies, particularly berry berry, which is a, lack of vitamin B in the diet. By the end of the war, some 400

04:27 - of the original 1000 prisoners were dead. The prosecution argued in the trial that Captain Zu had purposefully withheld food and medicine from the prisoners. A wider examination of the course of the war reveals that this is not actually the case. Zu seemed to be faced with a serious dilemma. He could either feed his own troops who were garrisoning the island and preparing for an eventual allied attack,

05:04 - or he could feed both the prisoners and his own soldiers wherein no one would be fed properly, and everyone would slowly start. This argument was hinted at by she's defense at the trial, but it was never fully substantiated. What this shows is that these trials for command responsibility were particularly interested in securing prosecutions, for, for war crimes. They were not as interested in understanding the conditions

05:40 - that led to war crimes occurring. A similar example can be seen in the charge of beating or physically mistreating prisoners. In my chapter, I argued that the Japanese military in the 20th century had a long tradition of using informal physical punishment to discipline soldiers. This was exceptionally widespread and was a common practice when such punishment was applied to allied prisoners of war.

06:15 - However, it was seen as an act of cruelty rather than punishment, and there certainly would've been overlap between these two in, in cruelty and punishment. But allied soldiers were particularly aghast at this situation. I argue that while certainly a war crime, the physical punishment that the Allied prisoners received was to some extent a punishment of necessity. These prisoners were already held in a very

06:47 - small prisoner of war compound. So things like solitary confinement, were not an issue or were not available. At the same time, putting the prisoners onto limited rations by the end of the war was already appointed existence. So the availability of punishment for, disobedience and within the prison was, was simply not there. The result was using physical punishment, which was widely used across the Japanese military

07:20 - as it was In the end. Captain Zu Wami was found guilty under both charges that is of, failing to supply adequate food and medicine, and also, commander responsibility for beating the prisons. He was sentenced to death by hanging, which was carried out in September of 1947. Many Japanese officers who were charged with command responsibility for conditions at prisoner of war camps were executed.

07:59 - it was very much a rallying cry of these post-war trials, and both surviving prisoners as well as the public back home in the other countries expected harsh punishment. Zoo's execution by hanging was probably the harshest punishment that a soldier could receive at these post-war trials. It was used as a sign of almost disrespect. if a officer was found guilty of a war crime,

08:31 - that he had no control over, but was still executed, he would usually be executed by firing squad. It was seen as a more, a more fitting form of execution for a military officer. Being hanged, however, was, reserved for criminals. So there was a distinction drawn even in death sentence punishments. What the trial shows overall, however, is that Captain Zo

09:02 - and indeed many Japanese prisoner of war officers didn't really have much control over the situation they were placed in. They were often at the end of very long supply routes. The soldiers that they were overseeing in the prison of war camps were often of very low quality. the reality is you do not use your most disciplined, best trained troops to guard prisoners. Beyond that, there were wider traditional roles within the Japanese military

09:36 - that impacted on the prisoner's welfare, particularly the summary use of physical punishment. What my chapter shows is that command responsibility, while a very effective tool in pursuing guilt for war crimes, it was a very blunt tool. It did not have the capacity, or rather, the tribunals did not have the capacity to understand the broader nuance of war crimes and the conditions in which they occur. So my areas of future research are still tied

10:13 - to command responsibility. though the command responsibility was most widely applied at the post-war trials of German and Japanese war criminals after the Second World War, it has continued to see sporadic use, most notably at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, where a number of trials used and indeed refined command responsibility into a much more nuanced and precise doctrine.

10:45 - Outside of my work on command responsibility, I publish broadly on international humanitarian law. I have discussed the allegations of war crimes committed by Australian SAS personnel during the war in Afghanistan, and have also examined the, south African case for genocide against Israel, help for the International Court of Justice. What I hope that readers take away from, this piece of work is that command responsibility is an attractive, doctrine to use

11:24 - to pursue justice for war crimes, but that a proper use of the doctrine requires taking in a vast amount of what may appear to be secondary. Material command is not, does not occur in a vacuum. There are many, much broader factors that influence not only how command is wielded, but how it can be delegated and applied to what appear to be very simple situations. what is clear from my research is that though many Japanese military personnel did commit

12:04 - wanton war crimes, a significant number of the war crimes occurred because of a wide array of, preexisting and developing conditions during the war.

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