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Decomposition and decay have influenced capitalism growth, but how does “waste” and value relate post-2008 financialization? Rob Aitken defines financialization as the systematic conversion of misery into wealth.

Image courtesy of interviewee. January 22, 2024

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This video video discusses the intersections between financialization, waste, value, and the implications for society, particularly in the context of the 2007-2008 financial crisis and ongoing issues such as climate change. It highlights how the financial sector's importance increased from the 1970s, leading to a dynamic in which economic value often derives from the exploitation of waste rather than the integrity of assets. The discussion contrasts "risk-capable" actors—who navigate financial crises and can exploit opportunities in waste—with "at-risk" populations that suffer from economic instability.

The Irish financial crisis serves as a key example, exemplifying how large banks became burdened with toxic assets linked to the housing market collapse, leading to a need for large-scale bailouts. A public agency was formed to purchase these bad debts, allowing banks to survive while global investors were able to buy revitalized assets at fractions of their initial values.

The narrative then connects to climate change, positing that financial institutions are attempting to create financial instruments to manage risks associated with climate disasters, paralleling the lead-up to past crises. This video video reflects the tension between abstract financial markets and the tangible impacts they have on communities, particularly those who remain vulnerable to economic fluctuations.

This video video calls for greater public engagement and understanding of financial mechanisms, arguing that decisions impacting climate management and economic stability shouldn't be left solely to experts. It suggests that activists play a crucial role in translating complex financial concepts into more accessible language for those affected by these issues. Overall, the text underscores the need for a public dialogue on financial practices and their real-world consequences.

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X-TIMESTAMP-MAP:LOCAL=00:00:00.000,MPEGTS=900000

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So I, I've been thinking about a couple different

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timeframes here with respect to our,

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our financial economy.

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One has gotta to do with the period we often refer to

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as the, the, the, the period of financialization,

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beginning in the 1970s, 1980s,

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when the financial sector became a much more important part

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of our, of our economic structure and system.

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And then, I was thinking as well about the,

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the more recent timeframe in the, in the context

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of the 2007, 2008, financial crisis,

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global financial crisis.

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And in both of those contexts,

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I've been just interested in the ways in which,

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there is this relationship between waste and and value

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or decay and decomposition.

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So it's a question in general about, given the, the nature

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of our economy today, how much sort of value

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and wealth is generated through assets that have integrity,

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and how much is generated through, the, the sort of,

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dynamics of, of waste and decomposition.

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And, and I think that sets up a, an important question

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that, have some political significance,

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both in the co in the, in the wake of that financial crisis,

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but also in the period sense,

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and especially in relation to the question of climate

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and how climate can be managed.

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Obviously, what happened in that financial crisis was,

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like the dissipation of an enormous amount

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of financial value.

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Um, and, and so I was thinking about how that value was,

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both wasted, and then the ways in which it was kind

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of attempted to, to be recalibrated or re recaptured.

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Um, but there were also wastes that were real harms

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for individuals and families and communities and so on.

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So just thinking about the broad spectrum

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of our financialized capitalism and,

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and, to what degree that capitalism today is,

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is predicated on or,

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or balanced on, waste versus,

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versus other sources of, dynamic, growth and so on.

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I, I was interested in Irish case.

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It was on, it was, a very particular case,

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but maybe part of a broader dynamic.

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Obviously, Ireland's a very small economy in some ways

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and a very particular place,

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but it, it, its experience of financial crisis,

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I think is really indicative of, of this trend where,

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where like waste and,

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and especially with those actors who are able to

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survive moments of decomposition and even find value in it.

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So this is a distinction between, that, that,

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an important scholar Randy Martin refers to as

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between the risk capable and the at risk.

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So in our financialized economy, there are lots

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of risk capable actors who are able to navigate uncertainty

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and danger in moments of crisis,

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and even in sometimes find in some cases,

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find value in those moments.

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And then there, there's, the at risk, the populations

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that are very vulnerable to uncertainty

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and have no ability really,

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and no, no resources to manage, the uncertainty.

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And so the Irish case gave, an episode

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with which we could think this through a little bit.

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And what happened in the, in the Irish context was,

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a financial economy that was, really impacted

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by the enormous

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and very rapid, devaluation of, of assets so that a lot

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of the large Irish banks were like,

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like many other institutions around the world, but,

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but in a very particular way were saddled with these.

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Um, so-called toxic assets, like assets who no longer,

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which no longer had value.

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Many of these assets were investments,

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that were tethered in one way

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or another to like a global housing developments.

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Um, and, and when that subprime

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or housing development, when that, when that crashed, these,

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investors and these large banks

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that were facilitating these investments in the Irish case

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were left, enormously exposed, so exposed in fact that,

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it was a, a real, a real threat to that stability of

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that system and requiring a European and,

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and even broader multilateral bailout of the Irish economy.

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And part of that involved this, this agency

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that was created, public agency that was created

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to buy these, these bad debt.

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Essentially what happened was this agency was charged with,

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purchasing these bad debts from the banks,

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and they, they exchange, with the banks, sort

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of government bonds in exchange for these bad debts.

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So essentially you're moving these bad or toxic or,

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or valueless assets off the balance sheets of these banks,

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which then allowed those banks to survive.

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Um, and, and in some ways was like kind a public injection

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of, of money into those banks.

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Uh, but at the same time,

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this agency then spent the better part

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of the following decade trying

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to rehabilitate some of these assets.

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A lot of them were built, were, were related to,

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housing developments,

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both in Ireland but also around the world.

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A lot of them were in London.

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So they had, they had tied into, into the British,

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kind of financial system.

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And there were, there were even

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international investments as well.

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And so this agency, sort of tried to extract more value

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or try to try to kind of revitalize the value of these,

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these wasted assets.

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But what's interesting to me was, the politics of that,

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of that process, so that when, when this agency did,

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manage to, find value and, and,

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and once again revitalize some of these assets,

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they were almost always, doing this in, in,

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in kind of two ways.

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They were, they were selling these revitalized assets

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or these kind of like rekindled, assets

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to global investors, especially American investors.

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So large American, funds

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that often specialize in distressed assets.

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So there are, there's now a layer of organized layer

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of investors that, that specialize in, in buying these,

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that distressed or wasted or toxic assets.

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And the second element of this is really important note is

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that these investors were, were buying these,

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these assets at a tiny fraction of their initial face value.

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So these investors were finding enormous value,

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in these wasted assets over the years as they were able to,

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to revitalize them.

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So tho those were a good example

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of like risk capable investors who not only were able

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to survive that financial crisis,

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but in fact in some ways to extract, value

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and profits that that most weren't.

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Um, so that's, you know, thinking about the politics of, of

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who benefits

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and who ultimately is harmed in

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that process, is interesting.

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And, and, this also relates of course, to the ongoing

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difficulties in the Irish housing market today, where the,

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the, those who were at risk, continue to be at risk even

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as, you know, large risk capable investors were able

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to extract value from that deep crisis.

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So it was a small, in some ways, example,

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but really, one that was indicative

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of the dynamic at play in the financial crisis

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and thinking about an economy where, waste is

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obviously disastrous for some,

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but an opportunity for others, like a longer debate, a

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among those who write about

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or observe, financial markets.

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And so for, for some, those financial markets

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and the ways in which they have changed since 1970s has

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to do with the ways in which they're becoming more

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and more abstract or virtual or detached from reality.

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So there's the sense that financial markets are,

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these enormously complex, often digital networks that,

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that trade virtually around the world.

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And there's some real truth to that, like

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that these markets have grown enormously,

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because of this kind

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of like virtual world in which they operate.

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But there's a sense that there's a, a real di a real divide

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between that kind of economic activity

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and then the real world that, that those of us,

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you know, the rest of us live in.

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And, and, and so, you know, those, small Irish,

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investors who were, who were buying a second home

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or were investing in houses

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and so on, they, they, they saw real physical harms and,

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and problems as a result of this.

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And for them, it wasn't just a, a kind of a virtual

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or detached, or abstract kind of, relationship.

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But what it, what it, what seems to me important about the,

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the Irish case, or maybe more broadly about,

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the dynamic around global capitalism today is that there,

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there is, a lot of ways in which we,

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we can see the physical material, real kinds of consequences

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of this more abstract economy.

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So for these investors who were either in the lead up

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or in the aftermath, of the crisis we're,

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we're investing in these, housing stocks.

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For them, it was in some ways an abstract relationship.

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They, they were buying investment vehicles that were,

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you know, made up of many small pieces of,

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of actual mortgages around the world.

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They would have no connection to those mortgages.

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They would've no, no way of knowing

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what they actually referred to.

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So it was a very abstract relationship.

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And yet for, for the risk, that risk, that relationship

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to those houses was very physical

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and visceral and, and real.

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And so I began thinking about the, the Ghost Estates in,

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in Ireland, but these ghost estate exist also in,

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in the United States and in Spain

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and other places where the crisis crested.

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And these were, these were housing estates

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that were only partially finished when the

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crisis, mounted.

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And they were, they, they, they were left.

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They were, they, they were left in

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that kind of frozen state.

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And so these gosa estate are a real physical reminder

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that finance, however abstract it might be, you know,

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remains to, to have this really material

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and physical, kind of like presence or residue.

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And a lot of activists have been working in

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and around those ghost estates, to remind us

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and to reconnect our understanding of the financial markets

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to a more physical kind of,

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or visceral even kind of,

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manifestation of, of that crisis.

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So there's like reconnecting the financial world back

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to its actual impacts in the real world was one of the,

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important strategies that,

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that activists concerned about the financial crisis we're

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trying to, trying to develop.

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So I've been thinking about this, dynamic between waste

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and value between the material and the physical and so on.

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And, and the abstract as, as a platform

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for thinking about things have changed even since the

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2007, 2008 crisis.

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And one element of this has to do with climate change.

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Uh, and if you, we can think about climate change

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as in fact, maybe one of the ultimate forms of,

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of wasting in our world today.

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We, you know, thinking about the increasing,

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physical damages associated with climate change, with,

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increasing amounts of environmental and natural disasters

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and catastrophes and so on.

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And that's obviously one

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of our biggest challenges we're facing globally.

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But what's interested me in the way is the way in which,

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a lot of financial institutions have reacted to that,

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in all sorts of ways.

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Uh, and so I've been thinking about,

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the ways in which financial institutions are beginning

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to develop financial, like innovative financial instruments,

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kind of in the way in which, in the lead up

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to the subprime crisis in 2007, they were developing,

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you know, new ways to, to kind of like,

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organize these mortgages and sell these mortgages and so on.

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What we've seen in the last 10 years are,

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increasing forms of innovation among insurers and banks

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and, other financial,

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and investment vehicles to address climate change.

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Uh, so this involves like catastrophe bonds, for example,

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and new insurance products.

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And what's happening in a very general way in this area,

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and I could give some more specific examples if

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that's useful, but just in general, is

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that these institutions are trying

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to think about the uncertainty associated

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with climate in its physical harms and disasters

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and so on, as a risk that could be managed financially.

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So can they, can they create financial vehicles that would,

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that would take that uncertainty around climate

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and the real harms and wasting that it represents

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and turn it into investment vehicles

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that could be sold to global investors?

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So this is what a catastrophe bond is, for example, it's a,

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a, a financial instrument that the value

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of which is based on the, the possibility

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of enormous catastrophes.

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And, and so there's value in that for, for investors.

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Now, these investors argue that this is a way

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of managing the risk of climate

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and of distributing that risk widely,

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but at the same time, for the risk capable,

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they are extracting value from this uncertainty,

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or they're trying to, these, these are risky kind

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of maneuvers, but there's an attempt there to, to,

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find value, even among this like unprecedented kind

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of uncertainty associated with climate change.

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Where as we, as we speak right now, we're, we're seeing

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that the cop meetings happening, and negotiating.

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And so we're, we're more

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and more aware of, of the enormous

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harms associated with climate.

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And so I've been interested in the ways in which financial

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institutions react to that in, in, in a way, in which kind

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of parallels, some of the 2007, 2008 kind

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of crisis we're talking about, enormous uncertainty.

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And, again, some of these, you know, catastrophes

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that we've seen are do, are attached to enormous values.

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And so that, that adds some instability in

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the global financial system.

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Um, the, the, a lot

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of global insurers now talk about global protection gap,

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which is the gap between the uncertainties

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that they think we're gonna be facing over the coming years

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just in terms of say, natural disasters

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and the amount of that that's actually protected

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by insurance contracts.

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And it's sort of like somewhere around 20

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or 30% only are, are covered by any kind of insurance,

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and that that gap is widening.

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Um, so they feel like on one hand these mechanisms could

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fill the gap and, and help, help help

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that protection gap be narrowed.

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There's a lot of uncertainty about that.

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And, we, these are, these are forms of uncertainty.

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We haven't really have a long-term record of.

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So, so how we would predict that is,

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is is really complicated.

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And so, yes, I think there are some

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who are predicting the instability could maybe,

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like you could imagine a scenario similar to the 2007, 2008,

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where the value something triggers,

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an enormous dissipation of value

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and it overwhelms the system.

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It that could lead to, like, could trigger a kind

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of like crescendo

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or waves of, of instability that, that again,

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governments may have to step into

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to help rebalance in some way.

13:33.275 --> 13:35.845
Just thinking about the politics of financial markets is,

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is, is interesting.

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I, I think,

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one observation I've had working in this field as a, not

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as an economist, but as a political scientist,

13:43.665 --> 13:48.165
is thinking about, the politics of, of the,

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instabilities associated with global financial markets.

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And often, my observation is that most

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of the people I talk to feel

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that financial markets are often the purview of like,

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experts so that, you know, they're so complicated, they're

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so specialized that only, financial economists

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or accountants or investment analysts can understand that

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to some extent that is true.

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But at the same time, the, IM, you know, the, the,

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the significance of of these markets politically is

14:17.645 --> 14:21.765
so wide ranging that I think we need to find ways to,

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to make them legible and not to the broader public.

14:24.785 --> 14:25.805
So this has to do again

14:25.805 --> 14:28.765
with like the follow up from the financial crisis in 2007.

14:28.825 --> 14:31.445
And you can see that the, the at risk,

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the at risk population did, take the,

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a disproportionate kind of, set

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of harms from that crisis.

14:39.265 --> 14:41.365
And so there's a political question that we need to kind

14:41.365 --> 14:43.045
of be aware of, but even if we're thinking about the issue

14:43.045 --> 14:44.765
we were just talking about a minute ago around climate,

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these are decisions about how climate is managed

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and how collectively we're going to confront this enormous

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Global uncertainty.

14:52.185 --> 14:55.445
And I don't think it's, it's, I I think there's lots

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of reasons to be worried about leaving those decisions to

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financial experts, that we need to find a, a way to,

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to make that a more public discussion

15:05.705 --> 15:07.525
that's more legible to the rest of us.

15:07.985 --> 15:10.605
And so I was just impressed in some ways by the activists,

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in the Irish context of how they,

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they were at least trying to, to translate,

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a very abstract, complicated financial crisis into terms

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that would be understandable for those

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who were now facing housing shortage

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or increase in housing costs or difficulty finding housing,

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or maybe they'd lost, an asset themselves

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that they were counting on for their retirement

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or their long-term security.

15:32.705 --> 15:34.605
So, the implications there are, I, I, I,

15:34.645 --> 15:35.765
I realize I haven't said much about

15:35.765 --> 15:37.325
what the solution would be there, but I think the question

15:37.345 --> 15:41.805
is, how do we create a public conversation around these,

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financial mechanisms that are really involved in a lot

15:45.085 --> 15:47.525
of important, issues today?

00:00 - So I, I've been thinking about a couple different timeframes here with respect to our, our financial economy. One has gotta to do with the period we often refer to as the, the, the, the period of financialization, beginning in the 1970s, 1980s,

00:13 - when the financial sector became a much more important part of our, of our economic structure and system. And then, I was thinking as well about the, the more recent timeframe in the, in the context of the 2007, 2008, financial crisis, global financial crisis. And in both of those contexts, I've been just interested in the ways in which, there is this relationship between waste and and value or decay and decomposition.

00:37 - So it's a question in general about, given the, the nature of our economy today, how much sort of value and wealth is generated through assets that have integrity, and how much is generated through, the, the sort of, dynamics of, of waste and decomposition. And, and I think that sets up a, an important question that, have some political significance, both in the co in the, in the wake of that financial crisis, but also in the period sense, and especially in relation to the question of climate

01:07 - and how climate can be managed. Obviously, what happened in that financial crisis was, like the dissipation of an enormous amount of financial value. and, and so I was thinking about how that value was, both wasted, and then the ways in which it was kind of attempted to, to be recalibrated or re recaptured. but there were also wastes that were real harms for individuals and families and communities and so on. So just thinking about the broad spectrum

01:35 - of our financialized capitalism and, and, to what degree that capitalism today is, is predicated on or, or balanced on, waste versus, versus other sources of, dynamic, growth and so on. I, I was interested in Irish case. It was on, it was, a very particular case, but maybe part of a broader dynamic. Obviously, Ireland's a very small economy in some ways and a very particular place,

01:59 - but it, it, its experience of financial crisis, I think is really indicative of, of this trend where, where like waste and, and especially with those actors who are able to survive moments of decomposition and even find value in it. So this is a distinction between, that, that, an important scholar Randy Martin refers to as between the risk capable and the at risk. So in our financialized economy, there are lots of risk capable actors who are able to navigate uncertainty

02:27 - and danger in moments of crisis, and even in sometimes find in some cases, find value in those moments. And then there, there's, the at risk, the populations that are very vulnerable to uncertainty and have no ability really, and no, no resources to manage, the uncertainty. And so the Irish case gave, an episode with which we could think this through a little bit. And what happened in the, in the Irish context was,

02:51 - a financial economy that was, really impacted by the enormous and very rapid, devaluation of, of assets so that a lot of the large Irish banks were like, like many other institutions around the world, but, but in a very particular way were saddled with these. so-called toxic assets, like assets who no longer, which no longer had value. Many of these assets were investments, that were tethered in one way

03:15 - or another to like a global housing developments. and, and when that subprime or housing development, when that, when that crashed, these, investors and these large banks that were facilitating these investments in the Irish case were left, enormously exposed, so exposed in fact that, it was a, a real, a real threat to that stability of that system and requiring a European and, and even broader multilateral bailout of the Irish economy. And part of that involved this, this agency

03:44 - that was created, public agency that was created to buy these, these bad debt. Essentially what happened was this agency was charged with, purchasing these bad debts from the banks, and they, they exchange, with the banks, sort of government bonds in exchange for these bad debts. So essentially you're moving these bad or toxic or, or valueless assets off the balance sheets of these banks, which then allowed those banks to survive. and, and in some ways was like kind a public injection

04:12 - of, of money into those banks. but at the same time, this agency then spent the better part of the following decade trying to rehabilitate some of these assets. A lot of them were built, were, were related to, housing developments, both in Ireland but also around the world. A lot of them were in London. So they had, they had tied into, into the British,

04:32 - kind of financial system. And there were, there were even international investments as well. And so this agency, sort of tried to extract more value or try to try to kind of revitalize the value of these, these wasted assets. But what's interesting to me was, the politics of that, of that process, so that when, when this agency did, manage to, find value and, and, and once again revitalize some of these assets,

04:59 - they were almost always, doing this in, in, in kind of two ways. They were, they were selling these revitalized assets or these kind of like rekindled, assets to global investors, especially American investors. So large American, funds that often specialize in distressed assets. So there are, there's now a layer of organized layer of investors that, that specialize in, in buying these, that distressed or wasted or toxic assets.

05:27 - And the second element of this is really important note is that these investors were, were buying these, these assets at a tiny fraction of their initial face value. So these investors were finding enormous value, in these wasted assets over the years as they were able to, to revitalize them. So tho those were a good example of like risk capable investors who not only were able to survive that financial crisis, but in fact in some ways to extract, value

05:54 - and profits that that most weren't. so that's, you know, thinking about the politics of, of who benefits and who ultimately is harmed in that process, is interesting. And, and, this also relates of course, to the ongoing difficulties in the Irish housing market today, where the, the, those who were at risk, continue to be at risk even as, you know, large risk capable investors were able to extract value from that deep crisis.

06:21 - So it was a small, in some ways, example, but really, one that was indicative of the dynamic at play in the financial crisis and thinking about an economy where, waste is obviously disastrous for some, but an opportunity for others, like a longer debate, a among those who write about or observe, financial markets. And so for, for some, those financial markets and the ways in which they have changed since 1970s has

06:50 - to do with the ways in which they're becoming more and more abstract or virtual or detached from reality. So there's the sense that financial markets are, these enormously complex, often digital networks that, that trade virtually around the world. And there's some real truth to that, like that these markets have grown enormously, because of this kind of like virtual world in which they operate. But there's a sense that there's a, a real di a real divide

07:14 - between that kind of economic activity and then the real world that, that those of us, you know, the rest of us live in. And, and, and so, you know, those, small Irish, investors who were, who were buying a second home or were investing in houses and so on, they, they, they saw real physical harms and, and problems as a result of this. And for them, it wasn't just a, a kind of a virtual or detached, or abstract kind of, relationship.

07:41 - But what it, what it, what seems to me important about the, the Irish case, or maybe more broadly about, the dynamic around global capitalism today is that there, there is, a lot of ways in which we, we can see the physical material, real kinds of consequences of this more abstract economy. So for these investors who were either in the lead up or in the aftermath, of the crisis we're, we're investing in these, housing stocks. For them, it was in some ways an abstract relationship.

08:10 - They, they were buying investment vehicles that were, you know, made up of many small pieces of, of actual mortgages around the world. They would have no connection to those mortgages. They would've no, no way of knowing what they actually referred to. So it was a very abstract relationship. And yet for, for the risk, that risk, that relationship to those houses was very physical and visceral and, and real.

08:33 - And so I began thinking about the, the Ghost Estates in, in Ireland, but these ghost estate exist also in, in the United States and in Spain and other places where the crisis crested. And these were, these were housing estates that were only partially finished when the crisis, mounted. And they were, they, they, they were left. They were, they, they were left in that kind of frozen state.

08:50 - And so these gosa estate are a real physical reminder that finance, however abstract it might be, you know, remains to, to have this really material and physical, kind of like presence or residue. And a lot of activists have been working in and around those ghost estates, to remind us and to reconnect our understanding of the financial markets to a more physical kind of, or visceral even kind of, manifestation of, of that crisis.

09:18 - So there's like reconnecting the financial world back to its actual impacts in the real world was one of the, important strategies that, that activists concerned about the financial crisis we're trying to, trying to develop. So I've been thinking about this, dynamic between waste and value between the material and the physical and so on. And, and the abstract as, as a platform for thinking about things have changed even since the 2007, 2008 crisis.

09:41 - And one element of this has to do with climate change. and if you, we can think about climate change as in fact, maybe one of the ultimate forms of, of wasting in our world today. We, you know, thinking about the increasing, physical damages associated with climate change, with, increasing amounts of environmental and natural disasters and catastrophes and so on. And that's obviously one of our biggest challenges we're facing globally.

10:05 - But what's interested me in the way is the way in which, a lot of financial institutions have reacted to that, in all sorts of ways. and so I've been thinking about, the ways in which financial institutions are beginning to develop financial, like innovative financial instruments, kind of in the way in which, in the lead up to the subprime crisis in 2007, they were developing, you know, new ways to, to kind of like, organize these mortgages and sell these mortgages and so on.

10:32 - What we've seen in the last 10 years are, increasing forms of innovation among insurers and banks and, other financial, and investment vehicles to address climate change. so this involves like catastrophe bonds, for example, and new insurance products. And what's happening in a very general way in this area, and I could give some more specific examples if that's useful, but just in general, is that these institutions are trying

10:56 - to think about the uncertainty associated with climate in its physical harms and disasters and so on, as a risk that could be managed financially. So can they, can they create financial vehicles that would, that would take that uncertainty around climate and the real harms and wasting that it represents and turn it into investment vehicles that could be sold to global investors? So this is what a catastrophe bond is, for example, it's a, a, a financial instrument that the value

11:23 - of which is based on the, the possibility of enormous catastrophes. And, and so there's value in that for, for investors. Now, these investors argue that this is a way of managing the risk of climate and of distributing that risk widely, but at the same time, for the risk capable, they are extracting value from this uncertainty, or they're trying to, these, these are risky kind of maneuvers, but there's an attempt there to, to,

11:47 - find value, even among this like unprecedented kind of uncertainty associated with climate change. Where as we, as we speak right now, we're, we're seeing that the cop meetings happening, and negotiating. And so we're, we're more and more aware of, of the enormous harms associated with climate. And so I've been interested in the ways in which financial institutions react to that in, in, in a way, in which kind of parallels, some of the 2007, 2008 kind

12:10 - of crisis we're talking about, enormous uncertainty. And, again, some of these, you know, catastrophes that we've seen are do, are attached to enormous values. And so that, that adds some instability in the global financial system. the, the, a lot of global insurers now talk about global protection gap, which is the gap between the uncertainties that they think we're gonna be facing over the coming years just in terms of say, natural disasters

12:35 - and the amount of that that's actually protected by insurance contracts. And it's sort of like somewhere around 20 or 30% only are, are covered by any kind of insurance, and that that gap is widening. so they feel like on one hand these mechanisms could fill the gap and, and help, help help that protection gap be narrowed. There's a lot of uncertainty about that. And, we, these are, these are forms of uncertainty.

13:00 - We haven't really have a long-term record of. So, so how we would predict that is, is is really complicated. And so, yes, I think there are some who are predicting the instability could maybe, like you could imagine a scenario similar to the 2007, 2008, where the value something triggers, an enormous dissipation of value and it overwhelms the system. It that could lead to, like, could trigger a kind

13:25 - of like crescendo or waves of, of instability that, that again, governments may have to step into to help rebalance in some way. Just thinking about the politics of financial markets is, is, is interesting. I, I think, one observation I've had working in this field as a, not as an economist, but as a political scientist, is thinking about, the politics of, of the,

13:48 - instabilities associated with global financial markets. And often, my observation is that most of the people I talk to feel that financial markets are often the purview of like, experts so that, you know, they're so complicated, they're so specialized that only, financial economists or accountants or investment analysts can understand that to some extent that is true. But at the same time, the, IM, you know, the, the, the significance of of these markets politically is

14:17 - so wide ranging that I think we need to find ways to, to make them legible and not to the broader public. So this has to do again with like the follow up from the financial crisis in 2007. And you can see that the, the at risk, the at risk population did, take the, a disproportionate kind of, set of harms from that crisis. And so there's a political question that we need to kind of be aware of, but even if we're thinking about the issue

14:43 - we were just talking about a minute ago around climate, these are decisions about how climate is managed and how collectively we're going to confront this enormous Global uncertainty. And I don't think it's, it's, I I think there's lots of reasons to be worried about leaving those decisions to financial experts, that we need to find a, a way to, to make that a more public discussion that's more legible to the rest of us. And so I was just impressed in some ways by the activists,

15:10 - in the Irish context of how they, they were at least trying to, to translate, a very abstract, complicated financial crisis into terms that would be understandable for those who were now facing housing shortage or increase in housing costs or difficulty finding housing, or maybe they'd lost, an asset themselves that they were counting on for their retirement or their long-term security. So, the implications there are, I, I, I,

15:34 - I realize I haven't said much about what the solution would be there, but I think the question is, how do we create a public conversation around these, financial mechanisms that are really involved in a lot of important, issues today?

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