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The market for inflation risk

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Saleem Bahaj discusses transaction-level data on the universe of traded UK inflation swaps to characterise who buys and sells inflation risk, when, and with what price elasticity.

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Any views expressed are solely those of the author(s) and so cannot be taken to represent those of the Bank of England or to state Bank of England policy.

Image courtesy of interviewee. August 2, 2023

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This video discusses inflation swaps, which are financial contracts where one party pays the other based on the rate of inflation over the contract's duration. The paper highlights how market participants, including banks, pension funds, and hedge funds, interact in the inflation swap market, providing insights into expected inflation and trading behavior.

Key points include:
1. **Inflation Swap Mechanics**: One party pays a floating rate tied to inflation, while the other pays a fixed rate. The fixed rate reflects expectations of future inflation, which central banks monitor to gauge credibility in meeting inflation targets.

2. **Market Structure**: The analysis reveals distinct trading behaviors among institutions. Banks primarily sell inflation protection (taking on inflation risk), while pension funds buy long-dated swaps for liability matching. Hedge funds engage in short-dated swaps and can either buy or sell inflation protection based on market conditions.

3. **Market Segmentation**: The paper notes segmentation between long-term swaps (traded largely by pension funds) and short-term swaps (traded by hedge funds). This video segmentation leads to differences in trading dynamics and responses to inflation expectations.

4. **Data Insights**: The research analyzes granular transaction-level data from the UK inflation swap market. It identifies institutional trading behaviors, market power dynamics, and how demand and supply shocks affect swap prices.

5. **Modeling and Shocks**: The authors propose a model accommodating various shocks (e.g., inflation expectations, banking supply constraints) to understand how these factors impact swap prices and trading volume.

6. **Informative Pricing**: Long-dated swap prices provide better signals for expected inflation due to a flatter supply curve, while short-dated prices are more volatile and less reliable. The analysis suggests that central banks should focus on long-term inflation swap prices for more accurate insights.

7. **Implications**: There are concerns about banks potentially overexposing themselves to inflation risks given their role in selling inflation protection. The relationship between trading behavior and inflation forecasts among banks suggests that individual trading actions can provide insights into expectations for future inflation.

Overall, the paper presents a comprehensive analysis of inflation swaps, emphasizing the importance of understanding market dynamics, the role of different participants, and potential implications for policymakers regarding inflation expectations.

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X-TIMESTAMP-MAP:LOCAL=00:00:00.000,MPEGTS=900000

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An inflation swap is a financial contract where one party,

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agrees to essentially pay the other party,

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the rate of inflation over the lifetime of the contract. So, you know, if,

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if prices rise by by 10% and you have, let's say, a hundred pound swap,

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the the party that agreed to pay inflation pays 10 pounds to the party

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in exchange for this. The second party,

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the other counterparty receives what we call a fixed, like a fixed payment.

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Okay? So imagine they say that, look, you know, I'm gonna pay you 10% on,

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on my swap, and then, and, you know, it's a hundred pound swap,

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they would also pay 10 pounds. Um, that's the, the idea behind,

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behind how that swap contract works. And that means that, you know,

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if inflation was at 10% and the fixed part of the,

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of the swap contract was at 10%, they break even. Okay?

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So both parties pay to a 10 pounds and no, the money really changes hands, okay?

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And we see the fixed price of these swap contracts in advance. Obviously,

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inflation happens over the, you know, the life of the contract. So maybe five,

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10 years in some cases. And so we can think about this sort of,

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these fixed prices,

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what we call the breakeven price as being a measure of expected

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inflation. So if I, I'm a market participant,

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I'm change trading these swap contracts, I can think about, okay,

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well what do I need inflation to be over, over the next, say,

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five years for me to break even when say it's 5%,

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I want to have a 5% fixed price on, on my swap. Okay?

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So these fixed prices are carefully watched,

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by policy makers to gauge what expected,

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expected inflation's going to, well,

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what expect inflation looks like for the next few years,

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from the point of view of financial market participants.

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Notice also that if I'm buying what we call the floating leg,

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the part of the swap, which varies from infl with inflation,

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I'm insuring myself against prices in inflation,

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by paying out when inflation falls. There's also an insurance aspect,

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to these contracts, too,

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which is why certain market participants like to buy them.

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But going back to the expected inflation, point,

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the reason why we care about these, these contracts is that, you know,

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if I'm a central bank and the Bank of England, for example,

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I want to make sure that people in the economy,

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believe me when I say that I'm gonna hit my inflation target,

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that inflation's gonna be, you know, 2% at least over the medium term, right?

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And so if I see that, that people in financial markets are changing trading,

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swap contracts with fixed prices a long way above 2%,

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that's a sign they don't believe me. Okay? So, so, but policy makers really,

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really watch what's happening to the price of these contracts, okay?

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And so they actually react that they see swap price is going up. They may think,

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okay, we are losing credibility here. Inflation expectations are rising.

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We should raise interest rates. Okay? That's kind of,

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that's kind of a part of the reaction function. Now,

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in terms of how our paper sort of fits into this topic,

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everyone sort of has been able to see the price of inflation swaps,

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from say, Bloomberg or, or other sources for a long time, okay?

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What we have is the micro data on the transactions.

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So who's actually trading in the market, okay?

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And that means we can ask questions like, okay, well,

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who's actually demanding inflation insurance and who's setting inflation

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protection? So who wants to insure themselves against higher prices? Okay?

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And who's at risk if, if inflation rises from these contracts? But also,

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you know, we know that financial,

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markets are imperfect and sometimes the prices that we see don't reflect

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purely expectations about inflation.

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They could reflect the market power or inefficiencies in trading.

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And we can ask, you know, if we can see the prices and the quantities,

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how much the variation is actually due that we see is due to changes in

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inflation and how much is due to say, you know, friction on trading activity.

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So data we have is, is essentially transaction level data.

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So every single transaction of an inflation swap for the UK market,

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so say a, a bank, a dealer bank as we call them,

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sells a swap contract to a hedge fund,

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on a particular day at a particular time, we, we see exactly that transaction,

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okay? And that, and that's reported as part of a regulatory dataset,

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that the Bank of England has access to, and we have access via, via them.

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And what's interesting is that we can use this data to sort of describe the

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features of the market, okay? And we have basically three different facts from,

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from these, from this transac transactional information. The first is that,

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essentially banks are

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net long in selling inflation protection, if that makes sense.

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So they're the ones who actually end up bearing inflation risk.

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So if you actually do function numbers,

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they end up having about a hundred billion dollars worth which dollars they say

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we pounds anymore. Uh, we dollars.

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They have a hundred billion dollars worth of fixation, exposure,

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at the beginning of 2021 when we saw the recent increase, in inflation.

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Okay? What's that mean? How do, how do we make sense of that? Well,

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we've seen about, a 50% overshooting, in the uk,

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price index since that, that time being 2021, okay? Compared to, say,

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the bee's target of 2% inflation, we've seen a 15% increase in, in,

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prices beyond that, okay?

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And that means that banks have sent about $15 billion just in cash

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terms, extra in meeting their commitments,

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under their inflation swap,

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Uh, contract. So it has to be 15 million, dollar outflow,

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from the banking system. Uh, and that's about 3% of bank capital. So it's not,

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it's not a tiny figure. Um,

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obviously banks have benefited from rising rates at the same time. So yeah,

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they have sort of hedged themselves for the means,

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but still it's a relatively substantial, cost for them.

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Who's on the other side of this transactions are fact Two is that we show that

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facing,

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banks who is buying protection from the banking system are pension funds.

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So pension funds in the UK have, have large, real,

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liabilities are pensions are to an extent index linked.

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And pension funds want to ensure that when inflation rises,

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they are protected from that and don't have to end up, you know,

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paying us all very large pensions when they haven't got necessarily assets in

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the balance sheet to meet those payments.

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So they buy inflation tax from the banking system. And what's interesting is,

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'cause our,

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our pensions are very long-term liabilities to the pension fund sector.

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They buy very long dated swaps, okay?

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So we see a lot of trading in sort of 10, 15, 20 year inflation swaps

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between pension funds and, and, and the banking system, okay?

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And a lot of volume that is some very, very long maturity swaps,

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but there's also a lot of trading at the short maturity of the market, okay,

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too. And here we see a very different participant.

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So our fact three is that in shorter maturities,

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we have hedge funds essentially trading against the banking system. Uh,

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they act as like informed traders. So when inflation is falling, they tend to,

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end up selling inflation protection. So they benefit when inflation falls,

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when inflation starts to rise,

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hedge funds switch their position and they end up buying protection.

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So they benefit from when inflation rises.

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So they sort of acting to get ahead of the cyclones, were benefiting from,

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rising and falling prices depending on, on their, on their,

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their net positions.

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And what's interesting about this is you have this very extreme segmentation,

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between these different markets. So in, in long maturity swaps,

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so very long-term inflation swaps,

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it's really pension funds trading against banks, and that's it.

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In the short maturity market, you have a hedge funds trading against banks.

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And so segmentation is very stark in the data. So you a segmented market, okay?

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We have this segmentation. So, so how, how I think about this thinking about,

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okay, we want to model the trading behavior of,

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of banks vis-a-vis the pension funds in the long inflation swap market

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and banks vis-a-vis hedge funds in the short inflation swap, market.

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And our goal here is to say, look, okay,

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imagine that these institutions are all,

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choosing what portfolio they want to invest in. They have some,

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some assets and liabilities,

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and they wanna optimally choose their portfolio knowing that they're trading

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against each other. So banks know they're trading against pension funds and,

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and, and,

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hedge funds military against banks and banks are trading against both

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counterparties actually at the same time. Okay? That's a segmentation view.

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But what we do is we also add frictions to this model and say, look, you know,

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it's not the case that we can all perfectly buy and sell insurance,

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particularly because we know pension funds, for instance,

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have constraints from their mandates.

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There's margining requirements attached to, buying a tenant. Inflation swap.

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Banks have capital requirements and legacy constraints on, on,

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on the transactions that they, that they engage in. And these,

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these constraints generate sort of deviations from the optimal choice, okay?

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And so you think about how this plays out,

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you can imagine a world where there's no sort of deviations,

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everything's perfect, okay? And we observe, you know,

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imagine about long, long dated inflation swaps. We observe some supply curve,

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for selling inflation protection from the banking system towards pension funds

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and some demand curve that arise from the pension fund sector.

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That's what our model predicts in a frictionless case, okay?

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We reached equilibrium where pension funds by protection potentially because

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they're more risk averse than the banking sector or because,

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they had different expected inflation than the banking sector.

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That's two explanations why I have this positive position on the part of pension

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funds, okay? But that's a frictionless case.

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We can have other trading constraints that emerge. Okay?

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So it could be the case that pension funds just can't buy things of mandates

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that we talked about previously.

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Or it could be the case that because pension funds have real liabilities on

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their balance sheets,

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they're unable to properly ensure those of their other assets.

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And so they have to go to the swap market to get protection.

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That's kind of like a,

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a non fundamental or non expected inflation driven demand for inflation

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protection. Okay?

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And that means that that tho those two things can shift around demand for

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inflation swaps from the pension fund sector separately from

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shocks to expected inflation, as it were. Okay?

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And a similar thing applies to the making sector too.

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They also have constraints if say bank capital regulation gets tightened,

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that can shift around the supply curve of inflation swaps from the banking

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sector. And of course then we have two markets, right?

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We have a segmented market,

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we have a market for long data swaps and a market for short data swaps between

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the banking system and hedge funds. And again, you can tell a similar story.

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You have a demand shifter from the hedge funds. You know, they may,

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they may face some margin requirements they can't meet, for example,

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and banks face supply constraints, okay?

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So what we end up with in the model is basically four different shocks.

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The first is what we care about really,

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which is what we call a fundamental shock when expected inflation moves. Okay?

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That's the one to actually get at if I the bank of even care about when expected

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inflation move. But we have also three other shocks, okay?

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One is it's a shock to the ability of the banking system to supply

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inflation protection, supply supply inflation derivatives, inflation swaps,

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okay? And then a swap,

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a demand shock from the pension fund sector and a demand shock from the hedge

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fund sector. So we have these three different,

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four different shocks that emerge from the model.

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And the question is how do we take the two prices that we see the price of a

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long-term swap and the price of a short-term swap and the quantities that we see

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as well.

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So the quantity that that pension funds buy from banks and the quantities that

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that hedge funds buy from banks.

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And take those four time series and figure out how much of the

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variation in the prices that we're seeing is actually driven by expected

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inflation as opposed to these other shifters that can explain how the market is

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moving. What we do next then is say, look, we,

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we have these four different shocks. How do we actually disentangle,

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the effects in the data we have?

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And what we do is propose three different strategies for doing that.

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The first is that, you know,

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on certain days we know that inflation news comes out. So for example,

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D O N S comes out and publishes, estimates of inflation,

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okay? So sorry, estimates the release of inflation for that month.

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Basically that's, that's the data, that's what we're thinking about.

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And so on that day,

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there's much more news about expected inflation than there are

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on other dates, okay? So we have what we call ity,

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identification strategy that emerges from this.

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We can use the fact that the relative variants of these two shocks changes

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to separate out the fundamental shock,

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which is very volatile on the inflation release dates from the other shocks that

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hit, hit the, hit the system of the, the data we have. Okay?

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So that's one strategy that we look at. The second strategy that we look at is,

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what we call granularity. Okay?

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So we look exploit the fact that you know each individual institutional later.

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So we see bank by bank pension, fund by pension fund, hedge fund by hedge fund,

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their trading behavior. And we say that look,

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because there are some very large funds or banks in the data,

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you know, their idiosyncratic behavior,

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which is not affected by effective inflation, for example,

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can actually generate movements in demand or movements in supply independent of,

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of fundamental needs about inflation. Okay?

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And so we use that idiosyncratic movements of large institutions as instruments

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for shocks of demand and supply. Okay? The third thing we do, okay,

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so we do three different strategies to try and answer this question,

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but they actually will lining up.

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But the third thing we do is something called a sign restrictions approach.

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And just so that look, okay,

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imagine that there's no spillover from a demand shock between,

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the long and the short-term market at a very high frequency. So we say look,

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within a trading day,

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the bank's desk that's trading long-term inflation swaps and the bank's debt

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trading shortterm inflation swaps don't talk to each other too much.

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They're busy trading and not really doing anything in that situation.

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When pension funds try to buy more swaps, it doesn't affect

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The price of the short dated, market. Basically that,

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that segmented market we talked about, okay? And vice versa,

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when hedge funds try to buy more swabs, okay?

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We also make the assumption that basically hedge funds have the most

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information. Uh, so when, when the inflation rises,

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they're the ones that react the most. Okay?

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And those two assumptions combined means we can actually attach signs to each of

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these shocks. So,

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so a demand shock raises prices and quantities in the loan market if it's from

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pension funds, but has no effect in the short market, for example.

15:22.760 --> 15:25.680
That's one thing we do. We can use those different signs, which you say, okay,

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let's identify the model that way. Okay? So we have these,

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these three different strategies and what they do is quite interesting.

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They allow us to identify because we've, we've got supply and demand shocks,

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in both markets.

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We identify the slope of supply and demand curves for long data inflation,

15:44.390 --> 15:48.440
swap and pension in funds and banks and short data inflation swaps in pension

15:48.440 --> 15:52.000
funds and banks, okay? And this is kind of like, you know,

15:52.000 --> 15:54.440
in economics you care a lot about slope supply and demand. It's one of,

15:54.440 --> 15:56.960
one of the most interesting things, and we can measure it in the,

15:56.960 --> 15:57.840
in these two different markets.

15:58.940 --> 16:01.880
And what's fascinating about this is that the demand curves are very similar.

16:02.100 --> 16:05.960
So slopes are the same, for both pension funds and, and hedge funds.

16:05.960 --> 16:08.560
They're very, very similar demand curves in terms of their slope.

16:09.220 --> 16:13.720
But banks have a much flatter supply curve when they're supplying

16:13.930 --> 16:18.920
swaps to pension funds compared to when they're supplying swaps to

16:18.920 --> 16:22.030
hedge funds. And that has a very,

16:22.180 --> 16:25.350
important economic consequence. It means that, you know,

16:25.350 --> 16:28.750
imagine you have a very flat supply curve, a demand shock.

16:28.750 --> 16:32.510
There's very little to the price because supply is able to adjust very easily,

16:33.380 --> 16:34.170
okay?

16:34.170 --> 16:38.730
And that means most of the variation in a long dated

16:39.320 --> 16:43.170
swap contract. So one more than 10 years in, in,

16:44.230 --> 16:45.030
in maturity.

16:45.030 --> 16:48.890
So most of the variation in the price of those sorts of contracts is not

16:48.960 --> 16:53.610
explained by demand shifters because you're able just to move along a very flat

16:53.610 --> 16:56.090
supply curve very easily, okay?

16:57.110 --> 17:00.410
And all the variations and explained either by shocks the bank supply,

17:00.710 --> 17:05.490
so the supply curves of up or down or expect inflation moving, okay?

17:05.990 --> 17:08.290
And that means that long dated swap prices,

17:08.430 --> 17:12.330
say more than 10 years are actually quite informative about face expectations.

17:12.350 --> 17:12.770
So you should,

17:12.770 --> 17:16.130
you should look at those long dated prices to get a sense of like what are

17:16.130 --> 17:20.850
long-term face expectations in contrast in the short market,

17:21.240 --> 17:23.490
because you have an upward sloping supply curve.

17:23.490 --> 17:27.090
Now it's not very flat demand stocks are up mattering a lot and generate a lot

17:27.090 --> 17:31.410
of volatility, and they move the price around a lot, okay? And so short dates,

17:31.410 --> 17:35.410
inflation swap prices say less than three years and much less informative but

17:35.570 --> 17:38.930
expected inflation, which is kind of frustrating if, for the Bank of England.

17:39.130 --> 17:43.490
'cause they care about like what's the immediate expectations of, of,

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exp expect of expectation as long as,

17:45.710 --> 17:48.490
as well as a long-term thing they care about both. But in terms of getting a,

17:48.650 --> 17:49.560
a short-term gauge,

17:50.400 --> 17:54.440
actually these short dated swap prices aren't super informative. Okay?

17:54.440 --> 17:58.680
So that's, that's what we do. Um, and we can also do decomposition too.

17:58.700 --> 18:03.570
We can ask, okay, if I take a long-term inflation swap price, how much of the,

18:03.590 --> 18:06.170
of how much of the, the sort of the time series that we see,

18:07.310 --> 18:08.650
how much of that is the,

18:08.710 --> 18:12.450
the variation is due to fundamental factors expected inflation and how much is

18:12.450 --> 18:15.970
due to these demand and supply shocks? And what we see in the data we have,

18:15.970 --> 18:16.890
we have quite a short time.

18:16.910 --> 18:21.250
So these five years is that the events where there was a negative shift in

18:21.250 --> 18:25.050
inflation expectations? So covid for instance, when I face inflation,

18:25.160 --> 18:27.330
fell quite a lot in that time period,

18:27.950 --> 18:32.040
the 10 year swap price overestimated the fall, okay?

18:32.040 --> 18:35.840
So the swap prices were looked like inflation expect were falling a lot more

18:36.150 --> 18:39.080
than they actually were within decomposition, okay?

18:39.900 --> 18:43.440
And the opposite is true most recently. So, so when we had, for example,

18:43.440 --> 18:47.320
in the autum this year around the mini budget crisis, a rise in,

18:47.500 --> 18:50.560
in long-term face expectations, there was also overshooting.

18:50.900 --> 18:55.160
So actually the market prices were saying that face expectations have risen more

18:55.160 --> 18:57.640
than they actually had done. Once you take out the effects of,

18:57.740 --> 19:00.640
of supply the demand shocks and just focus on fundamentals,

19:01.190 --> 19:05.600
so's overshooting aspect too, that's there in, in the, in the data.

19:06.420 --> 19:10.820
The third thing we do in the paper is look at individual

19:11.410 --> 19:13.820
trading behavior. And just to say, you know,

19:14.460 --> 19:18.820
I said that the short term prices are aren't a useful guide, to,

19:19.640 --> 19:20.820
excess inflation.

19:21.520 --> 19:24.220
The other issue is that when you go into institution level beha,

19:24.220 --> 19:25.660
pricing behavior, trading behavior,

19:26.900 --> 19:30.180
actually it turns out that really the short term market for inflation swaps in

19:30.180 --> 19:31.580
the uk, so less than three years,

19:32.680 --> 19:37.220
all the pricing behavior was explained by about four banks and another four or

19:37.220 --> 19:39.020
five hedge funds. So it's a very,

19:39.090 --> 19:43.180
very small number of institutions that are actually doing most of the trading

19:43.360 --> 19:46.020
and reacting to the news that we're seeing. Okay?

19:46.020 --> 19:49.820
So we're aggregating the information about accepted inflation for a high number

19:49.820 --> 19:53.300
of institutions in the short market in a long-term market. However,

19:53.480 --> 19:56.860
you have hundreds of pension funds trading and many, many more banks. So again,

19:56.860 --> 20:01.420
it's a much, much, you know, richer information set that's emerging from, from,

20:01.480 --> 20:05.980
from long dated swap prices. Okay? So again, you know,

20:05.980 --> 20:09.780
it's another reason to perhaps pay less attention to the short dated swap.

20:10.600 --> 20:13.020
The last point I want to make this is sort of like as a crosscheck of what we're

20:13.020 --> 20:13.840
doing here,

20:13.840 --> 20:18.460
is that the banks in our sample all produce monthly forecasts

20:18.760 --> 20:22.340
of inflation. Like what they expect inflation to be over the next,

20:22.360 --> 20:26.220
12 months or so, let's say. And we can say, look, okay,

20:26.400 --> 20:31.100
we extract our shock to expect inflation, from our model and say,

20:31.100 --> 20:34.540
how do those forecasts change with respect to the shock? Okay?

20:35.120 --> 20:39.580
And then compare how that forecast change maps into bank's trading behavior

20:39.640 --> 20:43.420
change in response to the shop. And actually those two things run really,

20:43.420 --> 20:47.760
really well. So banks are trading on the forecast,

20:47.760 --> 20:49.920
that they're producing, which we found very interesting.

20:49.920 --> 20:52.720
So typically we sort of think that their economics department and their trading

20:52.720 --> 20:55.400
department are relatively separate. Doesn't seem to be the case.

20:55.400 --> 20:59.560
There's actually a mapping between, inflation forecast,

20:59.580 --> 21:02.920
but individual banks and their trading behavior as well. So some,

21:02.920 --> 21:06.520
there's something informative about, about individual institutions trading,

21:06.520 --> 21:09.640
that we're seeing. And if there are qualifications, I think we have,

21:09.920 --> 21:13.880
a couple. The first is, you know, there is, there is information contained in,

21:13.880 --> 21:16.320
in the inflation, stock market.

21:16.440 --> 21:17.880
I think that's kind of like what we learned from this.

21:17.990 --> 21:20.320
It's just not a perfect proxy, okay? So you should,

21:20.700 --> 21:23.800
you should take those measures of a slight pinch of salt,

21:23.800 --> 21:26.040
and not think of them as perfect measures of inflation.

21:26.040 --> 21:30.200
And it could be other things, driving the price that that po that you see.

21:30.580 --> 21:31.960
And policymakers should better that in mind.

21:31.960 --> 21:34.360
That's what the overarching message from this.

21:34.980 --> 21:38.440
Having said that the long dated swap is much more informative,

21:38.500 --> 21:42.960
it appears than short data swaps for the reasons we we sort of described, right?

21:43.030 --> 21:46.560
It's both. The flat supply curve basically eliminates the impact of,

21:46.560 --> 21:48.840
of demand shocks. And because you have many,

21:48.840 --> 21:51.160
many more actors trading in that market,

21:51.340 --> 21:52.960
so you're aggregating information across many,

21:52.960 --> 21:55.760
many more agents when you see the prices that you see. Okay?

21:55.760 --> 21:57.640
Those are the two things to bear in mind there. Short let,

21:57.640 --> 22:01.960
just swaps more problematic. Secondly, I mean, there's a slight, you know,

22:01.960 --> 22:03.800
sort of from a more macro prudential perspective,

22:04.630 --> 22:07.520
there's a slight risk that banks are, you know,

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selling a lot of inflation protection. Um, and you know,

22:11.880 --> 22:15.040
if there is an inflationary shock that persists for a long time,

22:15.330 --> 22:18.600
given these are very long dated swaps, 10, 20 years,

22:19.350 --> 22:21.360
that could actually have an impact on bank profitability,

22:21.360 --> 22:22.560
even knock on effect in the economy.

22:23.420 --> 22:26.000
I'm not sure how regulations should be reacted to that,

22:26.000 --> 22:27.320
whether it's a concern or not,

22:27.650 --> 22:31.640
given that banks have other hedges against inflation or more precisely against

22:31.640 --> 22:34.280
wide interest rates, their, their interest margin have to rise,

22:35.120 --> 22:39.000
interest rate rises. So they have some protection from that. However, you know,

22:39.000 --> 22:42.360
that's, there is a concern about, about all this protection that are selling,

22:42.700 --> 22:46.960
from the banking system. Uh, the third thing is that, you know,

22:47.030 --> 22:50.480
this mapping to to individual trading behavior,

22:50.620 --> 22:52.560
we found that really exciting that the fact there is,

22:52.560 --> 22:56.360
there is actually a mapping between the trading behavior of, of,

22:57.690 --> 22:59.750
of individual institutions,

22:59.750 --> 23:02.790
and their inflation forecast that just come straight from the swap,

23:02.790 --> 23:05.190
the swap market and their inflation forecast's gonna be linked together.

23:05.490 --> 23:08.310
We think that's incredibly novel. We've never seen a paper showing that before.

23:08.730 --> 23:10.350
Um, and we were very excited to see that.

00:06 - An inflation swap is a financial contract where one party, agrees to essentially pay the other party, the rate of inflation over the lifetime of the contract. So, you know, if, if prices rise by by 10% and you have, let's say, a hundred pound swap, the the party that agreed to pay inflation pays 10 pounds to the party in exchange for this. The second party,

00:33 - the other counterparty receives what we call a fixed, like a fixed payment. Okay? So imagine they say that, look, you know, I'm gonna pay you 10% on, on my swap, and then, and, you know, it's a hundred pound swap, they would also pay 10 pounds. that's the, the idea behind, behind how that swap contract works. And that means that, you know, if inflation was at 10% and the fixed part of the, of the swap contract was at 10%, they break even. Okay? So both parties pay to a 10 pounds and no, the money really changes hands, okay? And we see the fixed price of these swap contracts in advance. Obviously, inflation happens over the, you know, the life of the contract. So maybe five,

01:13 - 10 years in some cases. And so we can think about this sort of, these fixed prices, what we call the breakeven price as being a measure of expected inflation. So if I, I'm a market participant, I'm change trading these swap contracts, I can think about, okay, well what do I need inflation to be over, over the next, say, five years for me to break even when say it's 5%, I want to have a 5% fixed price on, on my swap. Okay? So these fixed prices are carefully watched, by policy makers to gauge what expected,

01:46 - expected inflation's going to, well, what expect inflation looks like for the next few years, from the point of view of financial market participants. Notice also that if I'm buying what we call the floating leg, the part of the swap, which varies from infl with inflation, I'm insuring myself against prices in inflation, by paying out when inflation falls. There's also an insurance aspect, to these contracts, too, which is why certain market participants like to buy them. But going back to the expected inflation, point,

02:17 - the reason why we care about these, these contracts is that, you know, if I'm a central bank and the Bank of England, for example, I want to make sure that people in the economy, believe me when I say that I'm gonna hit my inflation target, that inflation's gonna be, you know, 2% at least over the medium term, right? And so if I see that, that people in financial markets are changing trading, swap contracts with fixed prices a long way above 2%, that's a sign they don't believe me. Okay? So, so, but policy makers really, really watch what's happening to the price of these contracts, okay? And so they actually react that they see swap price is going up. They may think,

02:56 - okay, we are losing credibility here. Inflation expectations are rising. We should raise interest rates. Okay? That's kind of, that's kind of a part of the reaction function. Now, in terms of how our paper sort of fits into this topic, everyone sort of has been able to see the price of inflation swaps, from say, Bloomberg or, or other sources for a long time, okay? What we have is the micro data on the transactions. So who's actually trading in the market, okay? And that means we can ask questions like, okay, well, who's actually demanding inflation insurance and who's setting inflation

03:35 - protection? So who wants to insure themselves against higher prices? Okay? And who's at risk if, if inflation rises from these contracts? But also, you know, we know that financial, markets are imperfect and sometimes the prices that we see don't reflect purely expectations about inflation. They could reflect the market power or inefficiencies in trading. And we can ask, you know, if we can see the prices and the quantities, how much the variation is actually due that we see is due to changes in inflation and how much is due to say, you know, friction on trading activity. So data we have is, is essentially transaction level data.

04:14 - So every single transaction of an inflation swap for the UK market, so say a, a bank, a dealer bank as we call them, sells a swap contract to a hedge fund, on a particular day at a particular time, we, we see exactly that transaction, okay? And that, and that's reported as part of a regulatory dataset, that the Bank of England has access to, and we have access via, via them. And what's interesting is that we can use this data to sort of describe the features of the market, okay? And we have basically three different facts from, from these, from this transac transactional information. The first is that, essentially banks are

04:59 - net long in selling inflation protection, if that makes sense. So they're the ones who actually end up bearing inflation risk. So if you actually do function numbers, they end up having about a hundred billion dollars worth which dollars they say we pounds anymore. we dollars. They have a hundred billion dollars worth of fixation, exposure, at the beginning of 2021 when we saw the recent increase, in inflation. Okay? What's that mean? How do, how do we make sense of that? Well, we've seen about, a 50% overshooting, in the uk, price index since that, that time being 2021, okay? Compared to, say,

05:39 - the bee's target of 2% inflation, we've seen a 15% increase in, in, prices beyond that, okay? And that means that banks have sent about $15 billion just in cash terms, extra in meeting their commitments, under their inflation swap, contract. So it has to be 15 million, dollar outflow, from the banking system. and that's about 3% of bank capital. So it's not, it's not a tiny figure. obviously banks have benefited from rising rates at the same time. So yeah, they have sort of hedged themselves for the means,

06:14 - but still it's a relatively substantial, cost for them. Who's on the other side of this transactions are fact Two is that we show that facing, banks who is buying protection from the banking system are pension funds. So pension funds in the UK have, have large, real, liabilities are pensions are to an extent index linked. And pension funds want to ensure that when inflation rises, they are protected from that and don't have to end up, you know, paying us all very large pensions when they haven't got necessarily assets in the balance sheet to meet those payments.

06:49 - So they buy inflation tax from the banking system. And what's interesting is, 'cause our, our pensions are very long-term liabilities to the pension fund sector. They buy very long dated swaps, okay? So we see a lot of trading in sort of 10, 15, 20 year inflation swaps between pension funds and, and, and the banking system, okay? And a lot of volume that is some very, very long maturity swaps, but there's also a lot of trading at the short maturity of the market, okay, too. And here we see a very different participant. So our fact three is that in shorter maturities,

07:25 - we have hedge funds essentially trading against the banking system. they act as like informed traders. So when inflation is falling, they tend to, end up selling inflation protection. So they benefit when inflation falls, when inflation starts to rise, hedge funds switch their position and they end up buying protection. So they benefit from when inflation rises. So they sort of acting to get ahead of the cyclones, were benefiting from, rising and falling prices depending on, on their, on their, their net positions. And what's interesting about this is you have this very extreme segmentation,

08:00 - between these different markets. So in, in long maturity swaps, so very long-term inflation swaps, it's really pension funds trading against banks, and that's it. In the short maturity market, you have a hedge funds trading against banks. And so segmentation is very stark in the data. So you a segmented market, okay? We have this segmentation. So, so how, how I think about this thinking about, okay, we want to model the trading behavior of, of banks vis-a-vis the pension funds in the long inflation swap market and banks vis-a-vis hedge funds in the short inflation swap, market. And our goal here is to say, look, okay,

08:38 - imagine that these institutions are all, choosing what portfolio they want to invest in. They have some, some assets and liabilities, and they wanna optimally choose their portfolio knowing that they're trading against each other. So banks know they're trading against pension funds and, and, and, hedge funds military against banks and banks are trading against both counterparties actually at the same time. Okay? That's a segmentation view. But what we do is we also add frictions to this model and say, look, you know, it's not the case that we can all perfectly buy and sell insurance,

09:08 - particularly because we know pension funds, for instance, have constraints from their mandates. There's margining requirements attached to, buying a tenant. Inflation swap. Banks have capital requirements and legacy constraints on, on, on the transactions that they, that they engage in. And these, these constraints generate sort of deviations from the optimal choice, okay? And so you think about how this plays out, you can imagine a world where there's no sort of deviations, everything's perfect, okay? And we observe, you know, imagine about long, long dated inflation swaps. We observe some supply curve,

09:44 - for selling inflation protection from the banking system towards pension funds and some demand curve that arise from the pension fund sector. That's what our model predicts in a frictionless case, okay? We reached equilibrium where pension funds by protection potentially because they're more risk averse than the banking sector or because, they had different expected inflation than the banking sector. That's two explanations why I have this positive position on the part of pension funds, okay? But that's a frictionless case. We can have other trading constraints that emerge. Okay?

10:20 - So it could be the case that pension funds just can't buy things of mandates that we talked about previously. Or it could be the case that because pension funds have real liabilities on their balance sheets, they're unable to properly ensure those of their other assets. And so they have to go to the swap market to get protection. That's kind of like a, a non fundamental or non expected inflation driven demand for inflation protection. Okay? And that means that that tho those two things can shift around demand for

10:50 - inflation swaps from the pension fund sector separately from shocks to expected inflation, as it were. Okay? And a similar thing applies to the making sector too. They also have constraints if say bank capital regulation gets tightened, that can shift around the supply curve of inflation swaps from the banking sector. And of course then we have two markets, right? We have a segmented market, we have a market for long data swaps and a market for short data swaps between the banking system and hedge funds. And again, you can tell a similar story. You have a demand shifter from the hedge funds. You know, they may,

11:21 - they may face some margin requirements they can't meet, for example, and banks face supply constraints, okay? So what we end up with in the model is basically four different shocks. The first is what we care about really, which is what we call a fundamental shock when expected inflation moves. Okay? That's the one to actually get at if I the bank of even care about when expected inflation move. But we have also three other shocks, okay? One is it's a shock to the ability of the banking system to supply inflation protection, supply supply inflation derivatives, inflation swaps, okay? And then a swap,

11:54 - a demand shock from the pension fund sector and a demand shock from the hedge fund sector. So we have these three different, four different shocks that emerge from the model. And the question is how do we take the two prices that we see the price of a long-term swap and the price of a short-term swap and the quantities that we see as well. So the quantity that that pension funds buy from banks and the quantities that that hedge funds buy from banks. And take those four time series and figure out how much of the variation in the prices that we're seeing is actually driven by expected

12:26 - inflation as opposed to these other shifters that can explain how the market is moving. What we do next then is say, look, we, we have these four different shocks. How do we actually disentangle, the effects in the data we have? And what we do is propose three different strategies for doing that. The first is that, you know, on certain days we know that inflation news comes out. So for example, D O N S comes out and publishes, estimates of inflation, okay? So sorry, estimates the release of inflation for that month. Basically that's, that's the data, that's what we're thinking about.

13:01 - And so on that day, there's much more news about expected inflation than there are on other dates, okay? So we have what we call ity, identification strategy that emerges from this. We can use the fact that the relative variants of these two shocks changes to separate out the fundamental shock, which is very volatile on the inflation release dates from the other shocks that hit, hit the, hit the system of the, the data we have. Okay? So that's one strategy that we look at. The second strategy that we look at is, what we call granularity. Okay?

13:38 - So we look exploit the fact that you know each individual institutional later. So we see bank by bank pension, fund by pension fund, hedge fund by hedge fund, their trading behavior. And we say that look, because there are some very large funds or banks in the data, you know, their idiosyncratic behavior, which is not affected by effective inflation, for example, can actually generate movements in demand or movements in supply independent of, of fundamental needs about inflation. Okay? And so we use that idiosyncratic movements of large institutions as instruments for shocks of demand and supply. Okay? The third thing we do, okay,

14:16 - so we do three different strategies to try and answer this question, but they actually will lining up. But the third thing we do is something called a sign restrictions approach. And just so that look, okay, imagine that there's no spillover from a demand shock between, the long and the short-term market at a very high frequency. So we say look, within a trading day, the bank's desk that's trading long-term inflation swaps and the bank's debt trading shortterm inflation swaps don't talk to each other too much. They're busy trading and not really doing anything in that situation.

14:47 - When pension funds try to buy more swaps, it doesn't affect The price of the short dated, market. Basically that, that segmented market we talked about, okay? And vice versa, when hedge funds try to buy more swabs, okay? We also make the assumption that basically hedge funds have the most information. so when, when the inflation rises, they're the ones that react the most. Okay? And those two assumptions combined means we can actually attach signs to each of these shocks. So, so a demand shock raises prices and quantities in the loan market if it's from

15:20 - pension funds, but has no effect in the short market, for example. That's one thing we do. We can use those different signs, which you say, okay, let's identify the model that way. Okay? So we have these, these three different strategies and what they do is quite interesting. They allow us to identify because we've, we've got supply and demand shocks, in both markets. We identify the slope of supply and demand curves for long data inflation, swap and pension in funds and banks and short data inflation swaps in pension funds and banks, okay? And this is kind of like, you know, in economics you care a lot about slope supply and demand. It's one of,

15:54 - one of the most interesting things, and we can measure it in the, in these two different markets. And what's fascinating about this is that the demand curves are very similar. So slopes are the same, for both pension funds and, and hedge funds. They're very, very similar demand curves in terms of their slope. But banks have a much flatter supply curve when they're supplying swaps to pension funds compared to when they're supplying swaps to hedge funds. And that has a very, important economic consequence. It means that, you know, imagine you have a very flat supply curve, a demand shock.

16:28 - There's very little to the price because supply is able to adjust very easily, okay? And that means most of the variation in a long dated swap contract. So one more than 10 years in, in, in maturity. So most of the variation in the price of those sorts of contracts is not explained by demand shifters because you're able just to move along a very flat supply curve very easily, okay? And all the variations and explained either by shocks the bank supply, so the supply curves of up or down or expect inflation moving, okay?

17:05 - And that means that long dated swap prices, say more than 10 years are actually quite informative about face expectations. So you should, you should look at those long dated prices to get a sense of like what are long-term face expectations in contrast in the short market, because you have an upward sloping supply curve. Now it's not very flat demand stocks are up mattering a lot and generate a lot of volatility, and they move the price around a lot, okay? And so short dates, inflation swap prices say less than three years and much less informative but expected inflation, which is kind of frustrating if, for the Bank of England.

17:39 - 'cause they care about like what's the immediate expectations of, of, exp expect of expectation as long as, as well as a long-term thing they care about both. But in terms of getting a, a short-term gauge, actually these short dated swap prices aren't super informative. Okay? So that's, that's what we do. and we can also do decomposition too. We can ask, okay, if I take a long-term inflation swap price, how much of the, of how much of the, the sort of the time series that we see, how much of that is the, the variation is due to fundamental factors expected inflation and how much is

18:12 - due to these demand and supply shocks? And what we see in the data we have, we have quite a short time. So these five years is that the events where there was a negative shift in inflation expectations? So covid for instance, when I face inflation, fell quite a lot in that time period, the 10 year swap price overestimated the fall, okay? So the swap prices were looked like inflation expect were falling a lot more than they actually were within decomposition, okay? And the opposite is true most recently. So, so when we had, for example, in the autum this year around the mini budget crisis, a rise in,

18:47 - in long-term face expectations, there was also overshooting. So actually the market prices were saying that face expectations have risen more than they actually had done. Once you take out the effects of, of supply the demand shocks and just focus on fundamentals, so's overshooting aspect too, that's there in, in the, in the data. The third thing we do in the paper is look at individual trading behavior. And just to say, you know, I said that the short term prices are aren't a useful guide, to, excess inflation. The other issue is that when you go into institution level beha,

19:24 - pricing behavior, trading behavior, actually it turns out that really the short term market for inflation swaps in the uk, so less than three years, all the pricing behavior was explained by about four banks and another four or five hedge funds. So it's a very, very small number of institutions that are actually doing most of the trading and reacting to the news that we're seeing. Okay? So we're aggregating the information about accepted inflation for a high number of institutions in the short market in a long-term market. However, you have hundreds of pension funds trading and many, many more banks. So again,

19:56 - it's a much, much, you know, richer information set that's emerging from, from, from long dated swap prices. Okay? So again, you know, it's another reason to perhaps pay less attention to the short dated swap. The last point I want to make this is sort of like as a crosscheck of what we're doing here, is that the banks in our sample all produce monthly forecasts of inflation. Like what they expect inflation to be over the next, 12 months or so, let's say. And we can say, look, okay, we extract our shock to expect inflation, from our model and say, how do those forecasts change with respect to the shock? Okay?

20:35 - And then compare how that forecast change maps into bank's trading behavior change in response to the shop. And actually those two things run really, really well. So banks are trading on the forecast, that they're producing, which we found very interesting. So typically we sort of think that their economics department and their trading department are relatively separate. Doesn't seem to be the case. There's actually a mapping between, inflation forecast, but individual banks and their trading behavior as well. So some, there's something informative about, about individual institutions trading, that we're seeing. And if there are qualifications, I think we have,

21:09 - a couple. The first is, you know, there is, there is information contained in, in the inflation, stock market. I think that's kind of like what we learned from this. It's just not a perfect proxy, okay? So you should, you should take those measures of a slight pinch of salt, and not think of them as perfect measures of inflation. And it could be other things, driving the price that that po that you see. And policymakers should better that in mind. That's what the overarching message from this. Having said that the long dated swap is much more informative,

21:38 - it appears than short data swaps for the reasons we we sort of described, right? It's both. The flat supply curve basically eliminates the impact of, of demand shocks. And because you have many, many more actors trading in that market, so you're aggregating information across many, many more agents when you see the prices that you see. Okay? Those are the two things to bear in mind there. Short let, just swaps more problematic. Secondly, I mean, there's a slight, you know, sort of from a more macro prudential perspective, there's a slight risk that banks are, you know,

22:07 - selling a lot of inflation protection. and you know, if there is an inflationary shock that persists for a long time, given these are very long dated swaps, 10, 20 years, that could actually have an impact on bank profitability, even knock on effect in the economy. I'm not sure how regulations should be reacted to that, whether it's a concern or not, given that banks have other hedges against inflation or more precisely against wide interest rates, their, their interest margin have to rise, interest rate rises. So they have some protection from that. However, you know,

22:39 - that's, there is a concern about, about all this protection that are selling, from the banking system. the third thing is that, you know, this mapping to to individual trading behavior, we found that really exciting that the fact there is, there is actually a mapping between the trading behavior of, of, of individual institutions, and their inflation forecast that just come straight from the swap, the swap market and their inflation forecast's gonna be linked together. We think that's incredibly novel. We've never seen a paper showing that before. and we were very excited to see that.

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