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Treaty amendment procedures

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Treaty amendments constitute a critical but under-researched aspect of international law. Louis Bélanger discusses

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So basically, amendment procedures are, you know,

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the rules, that are put in, treaties, in order

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to guide states when they decide to amend, to change,

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to bring modifications to existing treaties.

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And we want, we were brought to this topic

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by the ME observations, that while there are, you know,

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many empirical data that are available on many aspects

00:25.525 --> 00:29.125
of industrial treaties, like dispute settlement,

00:29.605 --> 00:32.965
procedures, escape clauses, things like that,

00:33.025 --> 00:37.005
you know, there were no not much available about, about,

00:37.005 --> 00:38.005
element procedures.

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We were trying to figure out, why,

00:40.745 --> 00:43.765
and we came to the conclusion that, you know,

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it was mainly because, this was a very,

00:46.875 --> 00:50.365
very complex issues, you know, amendment, procedures

00:50.365 --> 00:54.125
and treaties, are made, of several,

00:54.405 --> 00:55.605
I would say moving parts.

00:55.745 --> 01:00.005
You know, there are rules for, you know, adoption rules

01:00.185 --> 01:04.285
for, you know, submission rules for entry into force,

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rules also for, what we call in the paper, you know,

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the, the coverage, which is, you know, what happens

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with states that, you know, I, I've not notified

01:14.865 --> 01:17.885
the proposal for, for, for amendment and things like that.

01:18.425 --> 01:20.725
And for each of these, you know, parts,

01:21.055 --> 01:23.685
there are very different solutions available to states.

01:23.785 --> 01:27.485
So what you find in one three T can be extremely different

01:27.515 --> 01:30.125
than what you find in, another three T.

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So we had this, this situation where we didn't have much,

01:34.425 --> 01:35.805
you know, information available,

01:36.025 --> 01:38.245
but we were convinced that it was a very important topic

01:38.245 --> 01:41.405
because, you know, you know, people who are, you know,

01:41.585 --> 01:43.365
who observe, you know, international law

01:43.425 --> 01:45.885
and, you know, international governments, you know, realize

01:45.915 --> 01:49.845
that, now a lot of area of, of activities of states,

01:49.845 --> 01:51.925
you know, are covered by existing,

01:52.045 --> 01:53.445
international treaties.

01:53.825 --> 01:56.725
So basically, when a new problem arises, you know,

01:56.905 --> 02:00.965
states will, of course, again, sometimes decide to sign

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and negotiate new treaties.

02:02.765 --> 02:05.045
But, you know, we can also amend existing one.

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And we have a very good example these days, you know, like,

02:07.785 --> 02:08.805
after,

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after the Covid Pandemic, you know, states have, you know,

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learned lessons and, you know, nowadays, you know, they are,

02:14.585 --> 02:16.685
negotiating the amendment

02:16.865 --> 02:18.765
or the possibilities of amending

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what we call the international, health regulations with,

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which is one of the big, you know, main, you know,

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treaties under the ages of the world,

02:27.925 --> 02:29.045
health organizations.

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So, so it's, it's a good example, you know,

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of the importance, of that.

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And, and we discuss also in the paper, many,

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I would say, observations that, you know,

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make us think that now, you know, more

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and more people, states are, you know, working through,

02:45.185 --> 02:47.045
amendment that more.

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But you know, often, and this is an important topic,

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so it's important, it's, it is complex.

02:52.625 --> 02:56.125
And because it's complex, we think it has been understood.

02:56.265 --> 02:58.485
So this is basically why we, we, we wanted

02:58.625 --> 02:59.765
to, to do this work.

02:59.825 --> 03:01.685
We wanted to, but simplify

03:01.905 --> 03:05.165
and, you know, try to define new, you know, concepts

03:05.595 --> 03:09.845
that would permit us then to, empirically, study.

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Uh, the, the phenomenon itself.

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The prior literature is quite scarce,

03:13.805 --> 03:15.805
and we, this was, this was problematic

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and this was surprising for us.

03:17.625 --> 03:20.285
As I said earlier, you know, we were wondering, you know,

03:20.345 --> 03:23.285
why is it that, you know, there has been so many

03:23.805 --> 03:26.605
interesting, data set that have been,

03:26.715 --> 03:30.685
that have been built over the past decades on many aspects

03:30.685 --> 03:31.725
of international treaties,

03:31.725 --> 03:34.725
but, you know, not much on international,

03:34.725 --> 03:36.485
treaties, ament procedures.

03:37.065 --> 03:38.685
Uh, this is not to say

03:38.685 --> 03:41.125
that there was not anything about that.

03:41.145 --> 03:44.325
You know, there was very excellent legal work,

03:44.545 --> 03:46.325
by very prominent legal scholars.

03:46.325 --> 03:48.165
Like, I'm just thinking about Ute.

03:48.835 --> 03:50.925
That, you know, made very, very interesting,

03:51.045 --> 03:52.485
I would say general,

03:52.485 --> 03:54.645
commentaries about ament procedures.

03:54.985 --> 03:58.565
Uh, and there also were, some,

03:58.705 --> 04:00.005
new data sets available.

04:00.385 --> 04:03.525
I'm thinking about, you know, the work from Za,

04:03.755 --> 04:04.925
Fitzmaurice and, and,

04:04.925 --> 04:08.605
and Panas Mer who, you know, published a few years ago,

04:08.985 --> 04:12.005
books like Carl, you know, entitled, you know,

04:12.005 --> 04:15.245
treaties in Motions, in, in which they do, you know, some

04:15.265 --> 04:17.405
of the things that we're doing in this, in this paper.

04:17.785 --> 04:21.645
But they were treating, you know, procedures, you know,

04:21.645 --> 04:24.445
looking at different parts, you know, adoptions, you know,

04:24.765 --> 04:26.445
entering into force, you know, but separately.

04:26.545 --> 04:29.125
And we thought that, you know, it was, it more interesting

04:29.125 --> 04:30.605
and to was certainly useful.

04:30.665 --> 04:33.565
It would be helpful to have a way to study them,

04:33.565 --> 04:34.685
you know, in combinations.

04:34.905 --> 04:39.285
And so we, we decided to move from, you know, a, a data set

04:39.285 --> 04:42.605
that would, you know, look at, you know, separately,

04:42.665 --> 04:44.605
all the moving parts to a data set

04:44.605 --> 04:46.845
that would look at the combination of the moving parts.

04:47.345 --> 04:50.605
So this was the, this was the, this was the main,

04:50.665 --> 04:52.365
the main, the main idea.

04:52.605 --> 04:56.045
I must say also that there was a lot of, I would say,

04:56.885 --> 05:00.205
critical evaluations about, all this, you know,

05:00.205 --> 05:02.845
because amendment procedures are complex.

05:03.505 --> 05:05.605
Uh, I think that there were, a lot

05:05.605 --> 05:08.205
of clear occupations in the literature about, you know,

05:08.345 --> 05:09.725
are this, is, is it working?

05:10.345 --> 05:14.765
You know, also is it putting treaties, the evolution

05:14.765 --> 05:17.085
of, of treaties out of the control of states?

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And this was a very important

05:19.295 --> 05:21.565
occupation from people looking at, you know,

05:21.755 --> 05:23.205
like developing states, you know,

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do they have the capability to follow this whole process

05:27.105 --> 05:30.445
of amending that is so complex and heterogeneous and,

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and, and things like that.

05:31.945 --> 05:34.005
So there were people who were very concerned about,

05:34.005 --> 05:36.165
you know, the, the, the, the level of control

05:36.165 --> 05:38.925
that states maintains, on the whole operation.

05:39.145 --> 05:41.405
And they were also concerned about, you know,

05:41.545 --> 05:45.205
do they really, those procedure bring, sufficient level

05:45.225 --> 05:46.325
of adaptability.

05:46.465 --> 05:49.205
So there were also, I would say, policy oriented, you know,

05:49.685 --> 05:51.605
questions that were very prominent

05:51.605 --> 05:52.685
in the, in the discussion.

05:52.985 --> 05:56.965
So we try also in the paper to begin to address those

05:57.285 --> 06:00.005
Questions using our typology and, and,

06:00.005 --> 06:01.325
and the data we collected.

06:01.385 --> 06:04.445
You know, once we, had this, typology built,

06:04.475 --> 06:08.165
basically what we did, we began, so we decided to focus on,

06:08.345 --> 06:10.085
environmental agreements.

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So we, we began with a data set,

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that was previously available that we, to which we added,

06:17.425 --> 06:19.525
you know, a few, a few, treaties.

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And this is the, data set,

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the data set from Ronald Mitchell

06:25.385 --> 06:27.805
and the en environmental envir,

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international Environmental, agreement database project.

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And so we, we decided

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to first work on environmental environmental agreement,

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because first, my Cooper had an agreement with,

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with Mitchell's team.

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And so it was, it was made available to us,

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but also we were interested to begin this,

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survey using environmental environment,

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because we were, you know, the, the,

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the literature targeted the environment as a domain where,

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you know, there should be, effective amending procedure

06:59.815 --> 07:04.085
where the adaptability of the treaties was very important.

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So we, we, we decide to look at this domain of lawmaking

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because we were saying to ourself, you know,

07:12.465 --> 07:14.925
if there is some adaptability, this is

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where we will find it.

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And it, it is like a, a more similar case in a sense that,

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because we said, you know,

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if we don't find adaptability in environmental,

07:25.765 --> 07:27.885
treaties, then, you know, probably that, you know, it,

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it won't exist anywhere else.

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So it was, it was a good test for us.

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So, so basically, we started with the, a data bank of,

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you know, 691 international treaties signed between

07:39.485 --> 07:43.885
18 seven, 57 to 2015.

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And so the first, our first move was to trying

07:48.625 --> 07:53.525
to extract from this first, list

07:53.545 --> 07:57.805
of 600 and and 91 treaties, you know, which one actually had

07:58.405 --> 07:59.565
amending procedures,

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because this is a very important thing that, you know,

08:01.965 --> 08:03.485
I must say at the onset is

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that not every international treaties has,

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this has specific, amending procedures.

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And this is because, you know, there is, there is,

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there is some customary law,

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and there is also the,

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Vienna convention international law that provides, you know,

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default rules for treaties where you don't have, you know,

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specific amending rules.

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So not all treaties.

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And so a treaty

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that doesn't have an amending rules doesn't mean that you,

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you, you cannot, you know, amend it.

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It's just mean that, you know, states have not taken,

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you know, on the costs

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and to, to, to specify, you know, a specific, you know,

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amending, procedures.

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So the, so the first thing was, you know, we have to,

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find and say something about, you know,

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what are the treaties with,

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and what are the treaties without amending procedure?

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So we found out of the, 609, 91,

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we found about half 335 of those treaties,

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in which we found, rules, about, about,

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about, amendments.

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So, we, we, we, we, we,

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we then could, you know, we made some observation,

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about, about, about, about this, and, and,

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and found that, you know, there was a very interesting

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trend, you know, it, it, it's quite clear

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that more and more when states they negotiate in

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international treaties in the environmental sector,

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you know, they add, you know, they add,

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amen D procedures, you know, for the whole dataset, it's 50%

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of the, of the treaties that are covered.

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But, you know, if you look at recent years,

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we are more in the 70%, you know, ratio.

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So basically now we can, we,

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we can see a very interesting historical trend.

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And, you know, the more

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and more, you know, states, they do,

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provide international treaties with, with that.

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But then we were able to, you know, operate our second move.

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So we then focused on those treaties with procedures,

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and then we, we constructed another data set, and then, and,

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but our unit,

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of analysis in this new data set was no longer, you know,

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the treaties themselves,

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but what I referred earlier, to as the,

10:30.575 --> 10:32.115
MN procedures.

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And we did that because there are some treaties

10:35.355 --> 10:37.835
with more than one amending procedures.

10:37.895 --> 10:40.515
And, you know, a very current situation is a,

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is a treaty where you have, you know, ming procedures

10:43.975 --> 10:46.395
for the main text of the treaties, but you have different

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and procedures, like

10:47.515 --> 10:50.435
for annexes in the environmental sector, you know,

10:50.505 --> 10:52.275
annexes can be very, very important

10:52.275 --> 10:54.875
because, you know, this is why this is where you have,

10:55.295 --> 10:58.275
you know, mainly, basically the scope of application

10:58.775 --> 11:01.195
of the treaty that is, that is described.

11:01.195 --> 11:02.595
It's, it's, it's quite significant.

11:03.495 --> 11:07.435
So out of the 235 treaties,

11:07.815 --> 11:12.035
we extracted 491 procedures.

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And so we constructed a second dataset with

11:16.665 --> 11:18.435
491 entries,

11:19.095 --> 11:23.115
and then we used this dataset to first

11:23.725 --> 11:25.355
build our typology,

11:26.215 --> 11:29.315
and then, you know, try to,

11:29.425 --> 11:31.835
make some empirical observations about, you know,

11:31.835 --> 11:33.315
the typology itself.

11:33.415 --> 11:34.795
One of the main problem we wanted

11:34.795 --> 11:36.355
to address was the complexity

11:36.415 --> 11:39.955
and the heterogeneity of the amending procedure.

11:40.255 --> 11:44.115
So one methodology we choose in order to address this

11:44.255 --> 11:48.155
and to construct a simplified typology, one of the,

11:48.185 --> 11:51.755
main objective that we had was to, you know,

11:51.805 --> 11:56.725
build a simplified typology, of those, procedures.

11:57.505 --> 12:00.525
So I said it earlier, the problem is that, you know,

12:00.525 --> 12:02.365
there are many, moving parts,

12:02.495 --> 12:05.405
there are many different solutions for, all

12:05.405 --> 12:06.685
of those, moving parts.

12:07.105 --> 12:11.085
So how can we, you know, build a simplified

12:11.605 --> 12:13.405
typology in order to, you know,

12:13.495 --> 12:15.685
study the whole, the whole thing.

12:16.225 --> 12:19.685
So we used one methodology, that has been

12:20.205 --> 12:23.925
proposed in order exactly to do that, to simplify, you know,

12:23.995 --> 12:27.845
very complex data set in, amenable typologies.

12:28.385 --> 12:31.525
Uh, and it is the property space reduction methodology

12:31.835 --> 12:34.445
that has been, developed, you know,

12:34.505 --> 12:36.005
by a Barton in the fifties.

12:36.225 --> 12:38.965
And, you know, that has been, also developed

12:38.965 --> 12:41.685
and modernized by authors methodologists like Colin

12:41.855 --> 12:43.325
Elman over the last years.

12:43.745 --> 12:45.965
So, ba basically, it's a, it's a indicative

12:45.965 --> 12:48.405
and indicative, kind of methodologies.

12:49.025 --> 12:51.725
And I will just, you know, quickly explain how,

12:51.865 --> 12:53.085
how we proceed.

12:53.085 --> 12:55.165
It, it gives you some steps, you know,

12:55.165 --> 12:59.005
it gives you some logical steps that you have to follow,

12:59.025 --> 13:01.685
in order to proceed with, with this reduction.

13:01.785 --> 13:05.325
So basically what you do is that first you use, you know,

13:05.705 --> 13:08.685
all, you know, the relevant, I would say, categorization

13:08.755 --> 13:12.845
that you, have for your, for your phenomenon.

13:12.905 --> 13:17.485
So in our case, what we did is that we, we decide

13:17.485 --> 13:19.765
to limit ourself to three dimensions

13:19.905 --> 13:23.005
or three of the moving parts I described earlier.

13:23.345 --> 13:27.725
So, you know, the rules for adoption of amendments,

13:28.105 --> 13:30.805
the rules for entry into force of amendments,

13:31.105 --> 13:34.485
and the rules for what we call coverage, which is, you know,

13:34.485 --> 13:37.725
the rules about, you know, what to do with states

13:38.035 --> 13:40.765
that have not, you know, ratified the amendment

13:40.765 --> 13:42.525
that have been first adopted,

13:42.985 --> 13:46.525
and for which there was, there was enough ratification

13:47.025 --> 13:48.925
for their entry to force.

13:49.345 --> 13:52.485
So you have three first, you know, dimension.

13:53.105 --> 13:55.765
And for all these dimensions, we had, you know,

13:55.915 --> 13:57.525
five different forms

13:57.825 --> 14:00.965
or five different, categories of foods.

14:01.035 --> 14:05.045
Like for example, for adoption, you have adoption, you know,

14:05.405 --> 14:07.485
requires, you know, anonymous consent.

14:07.785 --> 14:09.965
Uh, adoption requires majority.

14:11.325 --> 14:15.165
So you have different, so, so we had five different forms

14:15.425 --> 14:18.565
for the three, different categories.

14:18.905 --> 14:21.965
So basically what we, what, what, what, what,

14:21.965 --> 14:25.205
what we had was a tri-dimensional, what we call,

14:25.385 --> 14:26.485
property space.

14:27.305 --> 14:29.525
And this tri-dimensional, you know,

14:29.785 --> 14:32.965
had 124 different categories

14:33.425 --> 14:34.965
of amendment procedures.

14:35.145 --> 14:38.165
So we started with this very big categorization.

14:38.715 --> 14:41.285
Then what we, the, the first thing we did, we

14:41.805 --> 14:44.045
identified every possibilities

14:44.305 --> 14:46.165
for which we had an empirical case.

14:46.305 --> 14:48.565
So this was the first reduction, which is,

14:48.565 --> 14:50.085
you know, referred to the name of themselves.

14:50.145 --> 14:51.925
So we had the first reduction.

14:52.145 --> 14:55.445
So, we went from,

14:55.455 --> 14:58.805
those 125 possibilities to,

14:58.895 --> 15:02.805
52 different combinations for which we had actual cases

15:03.265 --> 15:05.085
for which we, we had variable cases.

15:05.625 --> 15:08.045
And then you proceed, you know, using different theories.

15:08.105 --> 15:11.325
In our case, you know, we used theories about, you know,

15:11.325 --> 15:13.365
what we call constitutional decision making,

15:13.915 --> 15:15.605
because, you know, essentially

15:15.795 --> 15:18.085
what are amendment procedures, there are rules

15:18.225 --> 15:19.565
for deciding the rules.

15:20.545 --> 15:21.805
And when you have rules,

15:21.865 --> 15:25.765
and when you decide on rules for, for rules, then our,

15:25.765 --> 15:28.045
your first, you know, protection is about control.

15:28.245 --> 15:31.565
You know, what is, you know, how states when they decide on,

15:31.665 --> 15:33.805
on amending procedures, you know, what kind

15:33.805 --> 15:36.725
of controls they try to maintain on the whole procedures,

15:37.275 --> 15:41.525
will, will the end product, will be binding to me,

15:41.555 --> 15:43.885
will the end, will I have a control on the

15:43.905 --> 15:45.045
end product for others?

15:45.185 --> 15:49.285
And things like that. So we, used those, kind of,

15:49.345 --> 15:52.885
you know, theories, and we were very inspired by, you know,

15:53.045 --> 15:56.365
a Buchanan and AK who are, you know, the main authors,

15:56.365 --> 15:59.125
you know, in the rational study of that kind of rules.

15:59.425 --> 16:02.965
And we also used concept that we borrowed from what we call,

16:03.425 --> 16:06.205
what is, what is usually found, you know,

16:06.385 --> 16:09.165
the rational design of international institution

16:09.185 --> 16:10.885
or international treaties, you know,

16:11.075 --> 16:12.925
from others like barbarina.

16:12.925 --> 16:15.565
So we use especially two very key concepts,

16:15.695 --> 16:18.845
which is the level of adaptability that, you know, each

16:18.845 --> 16:21.925
of the rules brought to the procedures

16:22.145 --> 16:24.445
or to, to the future treatment that is covered

16:24.445 --> 16:27.045
by the procedures and the developed tech flexibility.

16:27.745 --> 16:29.245
So basically, we had all those,

16:29.305 --> 16:33.435
and so basically what we did once we had our 52 Ks,

16:33.775 --> 16:37.275
we organized the 52 Ks in terms of, you know, their,

16:37.535 --> 16:42.475
you know, the numbers of treaties that one found in every

16:42.655 --> 16:44.195
of the remaining 52 cells.

16:44.415 --> 16:46.515
And then we looked at, you know, neighboring cells

16:46.975 --> 16:49.235
and we looked at the content of the treaties, you know,

16:49.255 --> 16:51.275
and we compared, you know, the content

16:51.275 --> 16:54.395
of treaties in one cell in other or in other cells.

16:54.575 --> 16:56.955
And then you combine cells on the basis,

16:57.135 --> 17:00.555
or, you know, are, are there certain, certain, you know,

17:00.675 --> 17:02.515
theoretical proximities between,

17:02.545 --> 17:05.155
between the two when you look at the whole, you know,

17:05.435 --> 17:07.075
procedures compared to the whole

17:07.275 --> 17:08.755
procedures in under treated.

17:09.255 --> 17:11.315
So this is how gradually

17:12.015 --> 17:15.555
we evolve from our 52 initial categories to four.

17:16.415 --> 17:21.115
So we end up with four types, four types

17:21.425 --> 17:24.355
that we name, you know, we think, you know,

17:24.705 --> 17:25.875
good names for those types.

17:25.975 --> 17:29.915
So we had what we call the hard, the hard majority case,

17:30.175 --> 17:34.035
the soft, majority case, the soft veto case,

17:34.295 --> 17:36.035
and the hard veto case.

17:36.095 --> 17:39.035
So tho those were our four types,

17:39.695 --> 17:41.195
and those are the times

17:41.195 --> 17:44.435
that we discuss in length in the late parts of the papers,

17:44.655 --> 17:48.195
and that we use to make some, general,

17:48.635 --> 17:51.805
I would say empirical observations about, you know,

17:51.955 --> 17:54.725
what have the treaties, where you found,

17:55.175 --> 17:57.485
where you found those types, what they have in common.

17:57.585 --> 17:59.045
We have those four types.

17:59.505 --> 18:01.685
So I will just present them quickly

18:02.025 --> 18:04.805
and what are their characteristics, and then,

18:04.905 --> 18:06.445
and then, you know, follow up

18:06.445 --> 18:09.605
with some empirical observations about, you know, exactly

18:09.675 --> 18:13.085
what, what have in common, the treaties that are covered by,

18:13.145 --> 18:14.685
by each of the, of the types.

18:15.025 --> 18:18.765
So the first type is the hard veto types, the hard veto type

18:18.985 --> 18:22.005
of, you know, regroup, you know, procedures

18:22.435 --> 18:25.365
that have in common, the fact that, you know, basically

18:26.315 --> 18:27.345
individual states,

18:27.345 --> 18:29.425
they maintain control on the whole process.

18:29.805 --> 18:32.145
So basically you have consensus

18:32.145 --> 18:35.425
or an unanimity that is, you know, required for the adoption

18:35.765 --> 18:39.065
of the amending the amendment that are proposed.

18:39.495 --> 18:42.705
Then, you know, you have to wait for some kind of an,

18:42.925 --> 18:45.545
you know, unanimity of consent

18:46.205 --> 18:49.985
before the amendment, you know, enter into force,

18:50.845 --> 18:53.225
and there is no possibility to opt out.

18:53.445 --> 18:55.865
So basically, you know, so there is no possibility

18:55.865 --> 18:57.185
to opt out, which means that, you know,

18:57.185 --> 18:58.985
everybody is on board,

18:59.045 --> 19:02.385
and there is no possibility for one state, for example, not

19:02.405 --> 19:04.505
to ratify, you know, the amendment

19:04.885 --> 19:09.105
and to just opt out, which means to, be, covered

19:09.285 --> 19:10.865
by the ancient

19:11.085 --> 19:14.345
or the, the ex andante version of the treaty.

19:14.345 --> 19:16.505
So it's not flexible. So at the end of the process,

19:17.045 --> 19:20.545
you know, the treaty, you know, has to be amended, you know,

19:20.565 --> 19:22.305
as a whole, period.

19:22.925 --> 19:26.305
And every member, member states, you know, has a veto

19:26.405 --> 19:29.145
for at all of the moment of the process.

19:29.965 --> 19:33.705
So this covered a third of our procedures,

19:33.805 --> 19:36.265
and we were very, very surprised by this number.

19:36.525 --> 19:37.985
We were surprised by this number

19:37.985 --> 19:41.745
because we thought that when states would decide to

19:42.375 --> 19:44.785
provide a treaty with an amending procedure,

19:45.525 --> 19:48.465
it would be depends that they would want

19:48.485 --> 19:51.545
to bring some adaptability to the treaty that they were,

19:51.575 --> 19:54.545
they were not satisfied with, you know,

19:55.085 --> 19:57.625
the Vienna Convention default rules

19:57.685 --> 20:00.265
and the Vienna Convention default truth, truth says,

20:00.445 --> 20:01.705
you know, in a few words

20:01.925 --> 20:05.625
and to simplify things, it says that basically, you know,

20:05.965 --> 20:08.985
the same thing as the hard veto rules,

20:09.125 --> 20:11.905
but you know, opens also, the possibilities

20:12.205 --> 20:13.945
for a majority of voting

20:14.125 --> 20:16.385
for adoption if you have an national conference.

20:16.725 --> 20:19.745
And also to have, you know, a majority threshold

20:20.125 --> 20:23.705
for entry into fourths, you know, if that was the rule that,

20:23.965 --> 20:25.625
had been used, you know,

20:26.045 --> 20:27.825
for the creation of the treaty itself.

20:27.845 --> 20:30.065
So there were, there is some, you know, flexibility

20:30.125 --> 20:31.185
or adaptability here,

20:31.365 --> 20:34.425
but you don't have of that in the hard veto case.

20:34.765 --> 20:38.145
So basically you have a third of our situation

20:38.635 --> 20:42.785
where basically states were willing to, you know,

20:43.105 --> 20:46.145
I would say, covered by an amendment procedure

20:46.295 --> 20:47.485
that was more rigid

20:47.545 --> 20:50.085
and more conservative than, you know, the default rules

20:50.225 --> 20:51.645
of the Viader convention.

20:51.665 --> 20:54.565
So basically it means that, you know, for a third

20:54.585 --> 20:58.165
of the cases, states, you know, took the costs

20:58.425 --> 21:02.165
and the time to, you know, to add an amending procedure

21:02.275 --> 21:05.725
that was very, very, very in favor of their control

21:05.805 --> 21:06.885
of the whole whole thing.

21:06.945 --> 21:09.085
So this was, this is the first, the first one,

21:09.505 --> 21:12.885
the second one, the second tip type is much more in line

21:12.885 --> 21:15.245
with what I just described, you know,

21:15.385 --> 21:18.805
in discussing via the convention default, model.

21:19.145 --> 21:21.485
And this is what it is, a type, what we,

21:21.485 --> 21:24.845
we call the soft veto type of amending procedures.

21:24.945 --> 21:27.725
And this covered about 20% our case.

21:27.945 --> 21:30.805
So basically this, I, I won't repeat.

21:30.805 --> 21:33.885
This means that, you know, you have to have some consensus

21:33.985 --> 21:36.205
or unanimity to adopt a rule,

21:36.465 --> 21:40.085
but then, you know, if for any reason, one state,

21:40.275 --> 21:44.565
even if it has not object for the adoption of the, of the,

21:44.665 --> 21:47.845
of the, of the amendment, if it is not able

21:48.065 --> 21:51.325
or not willing to ratify, okay, then, you know,

21:51.465 --> 21:53.405
it doesn't prevent the whole group to go

21:53.505 --> 21:56.245
and have, you know, the amendment into force.

21:56.265 --> 21:59.765
So you cannot block in this model, you know, the movement

21:59.765 --> 22:02.045
of the, of the whole group, you know, by yourself.

22:02.185 --> 22:06.365
So, basically this is 20% of the, of the number.

22:06.435 --> 22:09.325
Then you have 40%, which is the most important,

22:09.645 --> 22:13.405
category, which is what we call the soft, majority,

22:13.935 --> 22:18.085
where you can adapt a new amendment, an amendment

22:18.155 --> 22:20.165
with a majority,

22:20.425 --> 22:24.605
and, you can also have the amendment, you know,

22:24.615 --> 22:27.765
enter into force even if the whole group is not on board.

22:27.825 --> 22:30.245
And then you have an opting out option, which means that,

22:30.245 --> 22:34.485
you know, states that have not voted for the amendment

22:34.585 --> 22:36.565
or have not ratified the amendment, you know,

22:36.565 --> 22:37.805
they can stay in the treaty,

22:37.905 --> 22:40.045
but they will be covered between them

22:40.225 --> 22:41.245
and the other, you know,

22:41.385 --> 22:43.445
by the earlier version of the treat.

22:43.505 --> 22:46.485
So this bring what we call fragmentation of

22:46.705 --> 22:48.325
and flexibility in the treaties.

22:48.465 --> 22:51.485
It means that a treaty that has been amended,

22:51.625 --> 22:56.005
and it can be several at times using this type of,

22:56.125 --> 23:00.125
amending procedures, can be divided in two, you know, subset

23:00.425 --> 23:04.445
of obligation, the obligation for the, states

23:04.445 --> 23:07.125
that have accepted and ratified the amendment

23:07.545 --> 23:10.685
and, you know, another set of rules, the old one for,

23:10.945 --> 23:13.485
you know, states that are reluctant,

23:13.705 --> 23:17.685
and also the relations between T states and all the others.

23:18.105 --> 23:21.045
So this makes, you know, divisions in the rules covered

23:21.045 --> 23:23.005
by the treaty, but everybody stay in the tweet.

23:23.425 --> 23:25.845
And so, and there's the fourth type,

23:25.895 --> 23:29.045
which is the hard V two type, and the hard V two type.

23:29.225 --> 23:31.485
It is a very interesting, type.

23:31.555 --> 23:35.925
It's, it's only 6% of, our, dataset.

23:36.305 --> 23:39.405
But the v the hard vito types, it means that, you know,

23:39.475 --> 23:42.805
basically the heart majority type, I, I mean, it means

23:42.805 --> 23:45.525
that basically you can have a decision

23:45.865 --> 23:47.805
for the adoption with a majority.

23:48.545 --> 23:51.245
You can have them entry into force,

23:51.825 --> 23:54.965
but you don't have any, opting out option, which means

23:54.965 --> 23:57.765
that at the end of the process states that don't want

23:57.765 --> 24:01.165
to ratify or, you know, are not satisfied with the,

24:01.225 --> 24:03.365
the amendment, they have the choice.

24:03.905 --> 24:05.645
Uh, they can be forced to withdraw,

24:05.825 --> 24:07.525
or they have to withdraw by themself.

24:07.785 --> 24:10.285
But at the hand, you know, the treaty remained hard.

24:10.665 --> 24:13.805
And then, so basically states have a choice, you know,

24:13.805 --> 24:16.205
they can be covered by an obligation that they,

24:16.205 --> 24:18.445
this didn't want it, they didn't ratify,

24:18.625 --> 24:20.125
or they can, they can get up.

24:20.185 --> 24:21.725
Uh, and so this is interesting,

24:21.725 --> 24:25.725
and even if it's just 6% of our cases, we devote, you know,

24:25.785 --> 24:27.965
we give a lot of attention to this category

24:28.155 --> 24:31.885
because it opens, you know, the door to what legal scholars,

24:32.345 --> 24:34.525
called non-consensual lawmaking.

24:34.665 --> 24:37.125
You know, basically it brings possibility

24:37.175 --> 24:41.005
where a state can find itself covered by an obligation

24:41.385 --> 24:44.885
to which it has not consented by, you know, voting in favor

24:45.105 --> 24:46.325
or codifying.

24:46.585 --> 24:50.485
The, so we, we look at all the individual cases in order

24:50.545 --> 24:52.445
to understand exactly what's going on here,

24:52.445 --> 24:54.525
because this is very significant, unfortunately,

24:54.525 --> 24:56.765
or unfortunately, depends on where your heart is.

24:56.785 --> 24:58.925
You know, basically we find that, you know,

24:59.535 --> 25:02.365
where really there are situation

25:02.365 --> 25:05.165
where non-consensual lawmaking could happen.

25:05.305 --> 25:07.365
You know, it only covers where we, I would say,

25:07.455 --> 25:10.565
quite in its insignificant, area of the treaties,

25:10.945 --> 25:13.485
or there are in obscure treaties,

25:13.585 --> 25:16.725
and where, you know, there has never been any amendment.

25:16.985 --> 25:20.405
So, you know, basically it's theoretically important.

25:20.885 --> 25:23.805
Interesting, but empirically, you know, it covers important,

25:24.125 --> 25:26.965
I would say finding of the work is the typology itself.

25:27.125 --> 25:29.845
I think we hope that, you know, the typology will be useful

25:29.905 --> 25:33.805
for people who want to study and ending procedures,

25:34.305 --> 25:36.845
and were a little bit, you know, put off

25:36.905 --> 25:39.405
by the complexity of the whole thing.

25:39.505 --> 25:41.805
So we think that, you know, we make some contribution here.

25:42.025 --> 25:44.005
But apart from that, I think there are three

25:44.805 --> 25:47.325
interesting conclusions that we can highlight.

25:47.475 --> 25:51.045
Therefore, one is that, you know, despite what we,

25:51.445 --> 25:55.005
expected, you know, there is no evolution in the typologies,

25:55.185 --> 25:57.885
you know, in historical evolution in the typology.

25:57.955 --> 26:00.125
What I mean is that, you know, I said earlier that,

26:00.125 --> 26:02.805
you know, we have seen a trend that, you know, more

26:02.805 --> 26:05.765
and more states are covered or, or,

26:05.765 --> 26:09.525
or states, you know, include, procedures.

26:10.145 --> 26:13.245
But, you know, once we, looked at, you know,

26:13.435 --> 26:17.645
what types state choose in order to, you know,

26:17.715 --> 26:20.565
provide treaties with amening procedures, you know,

26:20.875 --> 26:21.885
this has not evolved.

26:21.905 --> 26:25.765
So the distribution of times has not changed historically.

26:26.025 --> 26:28.285
So that means that, you know, we thought that, you know,

26:28.295 --> 26:32.245
types that would provide more adaptability to the treaties,

26:32.345 --> 26:34.445
you know, would be more

26:34.545 --> 26:36.885
and more important in, you know,

26:36.885 --> 26:38.445
the distribution, but they're not.

26:38.665 --> 26:42.405
So basically it means that even if states are, more

26:42.405 --> 26:46.045
and more interested in, you know, putting a amendment

26:46.605 --> 26:49.405
procedures in treaties, they don't necessarily do that

26:49.405 --> 26:50.645
because they want to bring more

26:50.645 --> 26:51.885
adaptability to the treaties.

26:51.945 --> 26:55.685
And it also often is the case that we have lately decided

26:55.825 --> 26:58.365
to, provide treaties with Aman link procedures

26:58.365 --> 27:00.445
that are very, that are very rigid.

27:01.025 --> 27:02.685
The second thing is about power.

27:03.025 --> 27:06.805
You know, we found an intent, very interesting link, be

27:06.805 --> 27:10.125
between the presence of a great power or,

27:10.265 --> 27:13.405
or between power asymmetry among the member states

27:13.425 --> 27:17.725
of a treaty and what I would call, you know, rigidity,

27:17.945 --> 27:22.285
or that I would, so the decision to, opt for,

27:22.705 --> 27:27.485
you know, hard veto or sub veto kind of procedures.

27:27.505 --> 27:30.285
And so we think that this should be further studied.

27:30.585 --> 27:33.205
And the third and final, observation

27:33.745 --> 27:34.845
is about flexibility

27:35.265 --> 27:38.165
and what I thought, what I discussed earlier about,

27:38.505 --> 27:42.565
you know, fragmentation, you know, basically, we see

27:42.565 --> 27:47.245
that when states want to bring adaptability to, to,

27:47.385 --> 27:49.325
an agreement,

27:49.385 --> 27:54.005
or a treaty, what they do is that they build, you know,

27:54.305 --> 27:57.485
amending procedures that permits

27:57.595 --> 27:59.005
that kind of ad adaptability.

27:59.025 --> 28:02.165
But it can, it come at the, the cost of flexibility,

28:02.475 --> 28:05.365
this kind of, of fragmentation that is described earlier.

28:05.705 --> 28:08.365
You know, you know, it's, you know, this is interesting,

28:08.385 --> 28:10.485
but you can wonder what will, you know,

28:10.485 --> 28:14.405
happen in a few years if lawmaking international lawmaking

28:14.865 --> 28:16.685
is made more and more through amendment.

28:17.425 --> 28:20.725
And if the result is that, you know, you have,

28:21.045 --> 28:23.805
amending solutions that at the end of the process

28:24.585 --> 28:28.365
brings fragmentation in the treaties where you have treaties

28:28.365 --> 28:30.845
that will have, you know, what, that will evolve

28:31.225 --> 28:36.205
as growingly, you know, subsets of obligations instead of,

28:36.345 --> 28:39.765
you know, moving, you know, as a block from one,

28:39.855 --> 28:41.205
state to, to the other.

28:41.715 --> 28:45.045
Then, it raises a lot of, of question about,

28:45.105 --> 28:47.485
you know, where this, where this is going.

28:47.625 --> 28:50.485
So we suggest at the end of the paper that this is some,

28:50.635 --> 28:53.845
some thing that should be a source of preoccupation

28:53.845 --> 28:55.325
and a source of further research.

00:00 - So basically, amendment procedures are, you know, the rules, that are put in, treaties, in order to guide states when they decide to amend, to change, to bring modifications to existing treaties. And we want, we were brought to this topic by the ME observations, that while there are, you know,

00:22 - many empirical data that are available on many aspects of industrial treaties, like dispute settlement, procedures, escape clauses, things like that, you know, there were no not much available about, about, element procedures. We were trying to figure out, why, and we came to the conclusion that, you know, it was mainly because, this was a very, very complex issues, you know, amendment, procedures and treaties, are made, of several,

00:54 - I would say moving parts. You know, there are rules for, you know, adoption rules for, you know, submission rules for entry into force, rules also for, what we call in the paper, you know, the, the coverage, which is, you know, what happens with states that, you know, I, I've not notified the proposal for, for, for amendment and things like that. And for each of these, you know, parts, there are very different solutions available to states. So what you find in one three T can be extremely different

01:27 - than what you find in, another three T. So we had this, this situation where we didn't have much, you know, information available, but we were convinced that it was a very important topic because, you know, you know, people who are, you know, who observe, you know, international law and, you know, international governments, you know, realize that, now a lot of area of, of activities of states, you know, are covered by existing, international treaties.

01:53 - So basically, when a new problem arises, you know, states will, of course, again, sometimes decide to sign and negotiate new treaties. But, you know, we can also amend existing one. And we have a very good example these days, you know, like, after, after the Covid Pandemic, you know, states have, you know, learned lessons and, you know, nowadays, you know, they are, negotiating the amendment or the possibilities of amending

02:19 - what we call the international, health regulations with, which is one of the big, you know, main, you know, treaties under the ages of the world, health organizations. So, so it's, it's a good example, you know, of the importance, of that. And, and we discuss also in the paper, many, I would say, observations that, you know, make us think that now, you know, more and more people, states are, you know, working through,

02:45 - amendment that more. But you know, often, and this is an important topic, so it's important, it's, it is complex. And because it's complex, we think it has been understood. So this is basically why we, we, we wanted to, to do this work. We wanted to, but simplify and, you know, try to define new, you know, concepts that would permit us then to, empirically, study. the, the phenomenon itself.

03:11 - The prior literature is quite scarce, and we, this was, this was problematic and this was surprising for us. As I said earlier, you know, we were wondering, you know, why is it that, you know, there has been so many interesting, data set that have been, that have been built over the past decades on many aspects of international treaties, but, you know, not much on international, treaties, ament procedures.

03:37 - this is not to say that there was not anything about that. You know, there was very excellent legal work, by very prominent legal scholars. Like, I'm just thinking about Ute. That, you know, made very, very interesting, I would say general, commentaries about ament procedures. and there also were, some, new data sets available.

04:00 - I'm thinking about, you know, the work from Za, Fitzmaurice and, and, and Panas Mer who, you know, published a few years ago, books like Carl, you know, entitled, you know, treaties in Motions, in, in which they do, you know, some of the things that we're doing in this, in this paper. But they were treating, you know, procedures, you know, looking at different parts, you know, adoptions, you know, entering into force, you know, but separately. And we thought that, you know, it was, it more interesting

04:29 - and to was certainly useful. It would be helpful to have a way to study them, you know, in combinations. And so we, we decided to move from, you know, a, a data set that would, you know, look at, you know, separately, all the moving parts to a data set that would look at the combination of the moving parts. So this was the, this was the, this was the main, the main, the main idea. I must say also that there was a lot of, I would say,

04:56 - critical evaluations about, all this, you know, because amendment procedures are complex. I think that there were, a lot of clear occupations in the literature about, you know, are this, is, is it working? You know, also is it putting treaties, the evolution of, of treaties out of the control of states? And this was a very important occupation from people looking at, you know, like developing states, you know,

05:23 - do they have the capability to follow this whole process of amending that is so complex and heterogeneous and, and, and things like that. So there were people who were very concerned about, you know, the, the, the, the level of control that states maintains, on the whole operation. And they were also concerned about, you know, do they really, those procedure bring, sufficient level of adaptability. So there were also, I would say, policy oriented, you know,

05:49 - questions that were very prominent in the, in the discussion. So we try also in the paper to begin to address those Questions using our typology and, and, and the data we collected. You know, once we, had this, typology built, basically what we did, we began, so we decided to focus on, environmental agreements. So we, we began with a data set, that was previously available that we, to which we added,

06:17 - you know, a few, a few, treaties. And this is the, data set, the data set from Ronald Mitchell and the en environmental envir, international Environmental, agreement database project. And so we, we decided to first work on environmental environmental agreement, because first, my Cooper had an agreement with, with Mitchell's team. And so it was, it was made available to us,

06:45 - but also we were interested to begin this, survey using environmental environment, because we were, you know, the, the, the literature targeted the environment as a domain where, you know, there should be, effective amending procedure where the adaptability of the treaties was very important. So we, we, we decide to look at this domain of lawmaking because we were saying to ourself, you know, if there is some adaptability, this is where we will find it.

07:16 - And it, it is like a, a more similar case in a sense that, because we said, you know, if we don't find adaptability in environmental, treaties, then, you know, probably that, you know, it, it won't exist anywhere else. So it was, it was a good test for us. So, so basically, we started with the, a data bank of, you know, 691 international treaties signed between 18 seven, 57 to 2015. And so the first, our first move was to trying

07:48 - to extract from this first, list of 600 and and 91 treaties, you know, which one actually had amending procedures, because this is a very important thing that, you know, I must say at the onset is that not every international treaties has, this has specific, amending procedures. And this is because, you know, there is, there is, there is some customary law, and there is also the,

08:16 - Vienna convention international law that provides, you know, default rules for treaties where you don't have, you know, specific amending rules. So not all treaties. And so a treaty that doesn't have an amending rules doesn't mean that you, you, you cannot, you know, amend it. It's just mean that, you know, states have not taken, you know, on the costs and to, to, to specify, you know, a specific, you know,

08:41 - amending, procedures. So the, so the first thing was, you know, we have to, find and say something about, you know, what are the treaties with, and what are the treaties without amending procedure? So we found out of the, 609, 91, we found about half 335 of those treaties, in which we found, rules, about, about, about, amendments. So, we, we, we, we, we,

09:18 - we then could, you know, we made some observation, about, about, about, about this, and, and, and found that, you know, there was a very interesting trend, you know, it, it, it's quite clear that more and more when states they negotiate in international treaties in the environmental sector, you know, they add, you know, they add, amen D procedures, you know, for the whole dataset, it's 50% of the, of the treaties that are covered. But, you know, if you look at recent years,

09:51 - we are more in the 70%, you know, ratio. So basically now we can, we, we can see a very interesting historical trend. And, you know, the more and more, you know, states, they do, provide international treaties with, with that. But then we were able to, you know, operate our second move. So we then focused on those treaties with procedures, and then we, we constructed another data set, and then, and, but our unit,

10:21 - of analysis in this new data set was no longer, you know, the treaties themselves, but what I referred earlier, to as the, MN procedures. And we did that because there are some treaties with more than one amending procedures. And, you know, a very current situation is a, is a treaty where you have, you know, ming procedures for the main text of the treaties, but you have different and procedures, like

10:47 - for annexes in the environmental sector, you know, annexes can be very, very important because, you know, this is why this is where you have, you know, mainly, basically the scope of application of the treaty that is, that is described. It's, it's, it's quite significant. So out of the 235 treaties, we extracted 491 procedures. And so we constructed a second dataset with 491 entries,

11:19 - and then we used this dataset to first build our typology, and then, you know, try to, make some empirical observations about, you know, the typology itself. One of the main problem we wanted to address was the complexity and the heterogeneity of the amending procedure. So one methodology we choose in order to address this and to construct a simplified typology, one of the,

11:48 - main objective that we had was to, you know, build a simplified typology, of those, procedures. So I said it earlier, the problem is that, you know, there are many, moving parts, there are many different solutions for, all of those, moving parts. So how can we, you know, build a simplified typology in order to, you know, study the whole, the whole thing. So we used one methodology, that has been

12:20 - proposed in order exactly to do that, to simplify, you know, very complex data set in, amenable typologies. and it is the property space reduction methodology that has been, developed, you know, by a Barton in the fifties. And, you know, that has been, also developed and modernized by authors methodologists like Colin Elman over the last years. So, ba basically, it's a, it's a indicative and indicative, kind of methodologies.

12:49 - And I will just, you know, quickly explain how, how we proceed. It, it gives you some steps, you know, it gives you some logical steps that you have to follow, in order to proceed with, with this reduction. So basically what you do is that first you use, you know, all, you know, the relevant, I would say, categorization that you, have for your, for your phenomenon. So in our case, what we did is that we, we decide to limit ourself to three dimensions

13:19 - or three of the moving parts I described earlier. So, you know, the rules for adoption of amendments, the rules for entry into force of amendments, and the rules for what we call coverage, which is, you know, the rules about, you know, what to do with states that have not, you know, ratified the amendment that have been first adopted, and for which there was, there was enough ratification for their entry to force. So you have three first, you know, dimension.

13:53 - And for all these dimensions, we had, you know, five different forms or five different, categories of foods. Like for example, for adoption, you have adoption, you know, requires, you know, anonymous consent. adoption requires majority. So you have different, so, so we had five different forms for the three, different categories. So basically what we, what, what, what, what, what we had was a tri-dimensional, what we call,

14:25 - property space. And this tri-dimensional, you know, had 124 different categories of amendment procedures. So we started with this very big categorization. Then what we, the, the first thing we did, we identified every possibilities for which we had an empirical case. So this was the first reduction, which is, you know, referred to the name of themselves.

14:50 - So we had the first reduction. So, we went from, those 125 possibilities to, 52 different combinations for which we had actual cases for which we, we had variable cases. And then you proceed, you know, using different theories. In our case, you know, we used theories about, you know, what we call constitutional decision making, because, you know, essentially what are amendment procedures, there are rules

15:18 - for deciding the rules. And when you have rules, and when you decide on rules for, for rules, then our, your first, you know, protection is about control. You know, what is, you know, how states when they decide on, on amending procedures, you know, what kind of controls they try to maintain on the whole procedures, will, will the end product, will be binding to me, will the end, will I have a control on the end product for others?

15:45 - And things like that. So we, used those, kind of, you know, theories, and we were very inspired by, you know, a Buchanan and AK who are, you know, the main authors, you know, in the rational study of that kind of rules. And we also used concept that we borrowed from what we call, what is, what is usually found, you know, the rational design of international institution or international treaties, you know, from others like barbarina. So we use especially two very key concepts,

16:15 - which is the level of adaptability that, you know, each of the rules brought to the procedures or to, to the future treatment that is covered by the procedures and the developed tech flexibility. So basically, we had all those, and so basically what we did once we had our 52 Ks, we organized the 52 Ks in terms of, you know, their, you know, the numbers of treaties that one found in every of the remaining 52 cells. And then we looked at, you know, neighboring cells

16:46 - and we looked at the content of the treaties, you know, and we compared, you know, the content of treaties in one cell in other or in other cells. And then you combine cells on the basis, or, you know, are, are there certain, certain, you know, theoretical proximities between, between the two when you look at the whole, you know, procedures compared to the whole procedures in under treated. So this is how gradually

17:12 - we evolve from our 52 initial categories to four. So we end up with four types, four types that we name, you know, we think, you know, good names for those types. So we had what we call the hard, the hard majority case, the soft, majority case, the soft veto case, and the hard veto case. So tho those were our four types, and those are the times that we discuss in length in the late parts of the papers,

17:44 - and that we use to make some, general, I would say empirical observations about, you know, what have the treaties, where you found, where you found those types, what they have in common. We have those four types. So I will just present them quickly and what are their characteristics, and then, and then, you know, follow up with some empirical observations about, you know, exactly what, what have in common, the treaties that are covered by,

18:13 - by each of the, of the types. So the first type is the hard veto types, the hard veto type of, you know, regroup, you know, procedures that have in common, the fact that, you know, basically individual states, they maintain control on the whole process. So basically you have consensus or an unanimity that is, you know, required for the adoption of the amending the amendment that are proposed. Then, you know, you have to wait for some kind of an,

18:42 - you know, unanimity of consent before the amendment, you know, enter into force, and there is no possibility to opt out. So basically, you know, so there is no possibility to opt out, which means that, you know, everybody is on board, and there is no possibility for one state, for example, not to ratify, you know, the amendment and to just opt out, which means to, be, covered by the ancient

19:11 - or the, the ex andante version of the treaty. So it's not flexible. So at the end of the process, you know, the treaty, you know, has to be amended, you know, as a whole, period. And every member, member states, you know, has a veto for at all of the moment of the process. So this covered a third of our procedures, and we were very, very surprised by this number. We were surprised by this number because we thought that when states would decide to

19:42 - provide a treaty with an amending procedure, it would be depends that they would want to bring some adaptability to the treaty that they were, they were not satisfied with, you know, the Vienna Convention default rules and the Vienna Convention default truth, truth says, you know, in a few words and to simplify things, it says that basically, you know, the same thing as the hard veto rules, but you know, opens also, the possibilities

20:12 - for a majority of voting for adoption if you have an national conference. And also to have, you know, a majority threshold for entry into fourths, you know, if that was the rule that, had been used, you know, for the creation of the treaty itself. So there were, there is some, you know, flexibility or adaptability here, but you don't have of that in the hard veto case. So basically you have a third of our situation

20:38 - where basically states were willing to, you know, I would say, covered by an amendment procedure that was more rigid and more conservative than, you know, the default rules of the Viader convention. So basically it means that, you know, for a third of the cases, states, you know, took the costs and the time to, you know, to add an amending procedure that was very, very, very in favor of their control of the whole whole thing.

21:06 - So this was, this is the first, the first one, the second one, the second tip type is much more in line with what I just described, you know, in discussing via the convention default, model. And this is what it is, a type, what we, we call the soft veto type of amending procedures. And this covered about 20% our case. So basically this, I, I won't repeat. This means that, you know, you have to have some consensus or unanimity to adopt a rule,

21:36 - but then, you know, if for any reason, one state, even if it has not object for the adoption of the, of the, of the, of the amendment, if it is not able or not willing to ratify, okay, then, you know, it doesn't prevent the whole group to go and have, you know, the amendment into force. So you cannot block in this model, you know, the movement of the, of the whole group, you know, by yourself. So, basically this is 20% of the, of the number. Then you have 40%, which is the most important,

22:09 - category, which is what we call the soft, majority, where you can adapt a new amendment, an amendment with a majority, and, you can also have the amendment, you know, enter into force even if the whole group is not on board. And then you have an opting out option, which means that, you know, states that have not voted for the amendment or have not ratified the amendment, you know, they can stay in the treaty, but they will be covered between them

22:40 - and the other, you know, by the earlier version of the treat. So this bring what we call fragmentation of and flexibility in the treaties. It means that a treaty that has been amended, and it can be several at times using this type of, amending procedures, can be divided in two, you know, subset of obligation, the obligation for the, states that have accepted and ratified the amendment and, you know, another set of rules, the old one for,

23:10 - you know, states that are reluctant, and also the relations between T states and all the others. So this makes, you know, divisions in the rules covered by the treaty, but everybody stay in the tweet. And so, and there's the fourth type, which is the hard V two type, and the hard V two type. It is a very interesting, type. It's, it's only 6% of, our, dataset. But the v the hard vito types, it means that, you know, basically the heart majority type, I, I mean, it means

23:42 - that basically you can have a decision for the adoption with a majority. You can have them entry into force, but you don't have any, opting out option, which means that at the end of the process states that don't want to ratify or, you know, are not satisfied with the, the amendment, they have the choice. they can be forced to withdraw, or they have to withdraw by themself. But at the hand, you know, the treaty remained hard.

24:10 - And then, so basically states have a choice, you know, they can be covered by an obligation that they, this didn't want it, they didn't ratify, or they can, they can get up. and so this is interesting, and even if it's just 6% of our cases, we devote, you know, we give a lot of attention to this category because it opens, you know, the door to what legal scholars, called non-consensual lawmaking. You know, basically it brings possibility

24:37 - where a state can find itself covered by an obligation to which it has not consented by, you know, voting in favor or codifying. The, so we, we look at all the individual cases in order to understand exactly what's going on here, because this is very significant, unfortunately, or unfortunately, depends on where your heart is. You know, basically we find that, you know, where really there are situation where non-consensual lawmaking could happen.

25:05 - You know, it only covers where we, I would say, quite in its insignificant, area of the treaties, or there are in obscure treaties, and where, you know, there has never been any amendment. So, you know, basically it's theoretically important. Interesting, but empirically, you know, it covers important, I would say finding of the work is the typology itself. I think we hope that, you know, the typology will be useful for people who want to study and ending procedures, and were a little bit, you know, put off

25:36 - by the complexity of the whole thing. So we think that, you know, we make some contribution here. But apart from that, I think there are three interesting conclusions that we can highlight. Therefore, one is that, you know, despite what we, expected, you know, there is no evolution in the typologies, you know, in historical evolution in the typology. What I mean is that, you know, I said earlier that, you know, we have seen a trend that, you know, more and more states are covered or, or,

26:05 - or states, you know, include, procedures. But, you know, once we, looked at, you know, what types state choose in order to, you know, provide treaties with amening procedures, you know, this has not evolved. So the distribution of times has not changed historically. So that means that, you know, we thought that, you know, types that would provide more adaptability to the treaties, you know, would be more and more important in, you know,

26:36 - the distribution, but they're not. So basically it means that even if states are, more and more interested in, you know, putting a amendment procedures in treaties, they don't necessarily do that because they want to bring more adaptability to the treaties. And it also often is the case that we have lately decided to, provide treaties with Aman link procedures that are very, that are very rigid. The second thing is about power.

27:03 - You know, we found an intent, very interesting link, be between the presence of a great power or, or between power asymmetry among the member states of a treaty and what I would call, you know, rigidity, or that I would, so the decision to, opt for, you know, hard veto or sub veto kind of procedures. And so we think that this should be further studied. And the third and final, observation is about flexibility and what I thought, what I discussed earlier about,

27:38 - you know, fragmentation, you know, basically, we see that when states want to bring adaptability to, to, an agreement, or a treaty, what they do is that they build, you know, amending procedures that permits that kind of ad adaptability. But it can, it come at the, the cost of flexibility, this kind of, of fragmentation that is described earlier. You know, you know, it's, you know, this is interesting, but you can wonder what will, you know,

28:10 - happen in a few years if lawmaking international lawmaking is made more and more through amendment. And if the result is that, you know, you have, amending solutions that at the end of the process brings fragmentation in the treaties where you have treaties that will have, you know, what, that will evolve as growingly, you know, subsets of obligations instead of, you know, moving, you know, as a block from one, state to, to the other. Then, it raises a lot of, of question about,

28:45 - you know, where this, where this is going. So we suggest at the end of the paper that this is some, some thing that should be a source of preoccupation and a source of further research.

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