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UK aid to Africa

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Melita Lazell investigates how UK aid to Africa changed in the 2010s. Based on a thematic analysis of nearly 30 key policy documents spanning 2000–2020.

Image courtesy of interviewee. March 25, 2024

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This video video discusses the impact of rising nationalism and populist politics, particularly in Europe and the United States, on development policy and aid from OECD countries, with a focus on the UK. It breaks down and analyzes two significant contexts: the rise of nationalism and populism and the pervasiveness of neoliberalism in development models.

1. **Populism and Nationalism**: The speaker investigates how the rise of populist leaders like Trump in the US and political movements in the UK, Hungary, Poland, and Italy have affected the framing and distribution of development aid. Traditionally, development policies reflected a globalist perspective, which now conflicts with right-wing populist ideologies.

2. **Neoliberalism**: Acclaimed as the dominant economic model since the late 1980s, neoliberalism has shaped OECD donor countries' development approaches. It promotes individual freedom through free markets and private property rights, but the speaker points out that state intervention is often necessary to maintain these markets. The global financial crisis of 2007-2008, instead of disrupting neoliberalism, simply led to new forms of it, like authoritarian neoliberalism.

3. **Securitization of Development**: The analysis also delves into how development has been increasingly framed in national security terms. Aid is justified as necessary for the UK’s national interest, with poverty reduction and democracy promotion directly linked to concerns about stability and security in recipient countries.

4. **UK as a Case Study**: The UK is chosen as a focal point for examining changes in development policy from the early 2000s to 2020. Shifts included the incorporation of development aid into the foreign policy agenda, reflecting a national interest narrative. This video video period also saw a notable anti-aid sentiment rise amidst austerity measures, which complicated the UK's philanthropic stance.

5. **Research Findings**: The analysis based on key policy documents revealed that UK development policy shifted to prominently align with national interests, asserting that all aid projects must demonstrate their contributions to this agenda. The prioritization of security and economic interests overshadowed traditional development goals like poverty alleviation.

Through this discussion, the text argues that the UK's development approach in this era exemplifies a broader trend of neoliberal populism, where national interests increasingly dictate foreign aid strategies, often at the expense of vulnerable populations in developing countries. The conclusion emphasizes that this shift could lead to diminished future UK contributions to African development.

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So I think that the context for the, the study is,

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is twofold, really.

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Um, it includes, firstly, this, the, the rise

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of nationalism, the rise of, populist politics in Europe

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and in the United States.

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And I'm interested in how this interacts

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with development policy and aid, of, OECD countries.

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Secondly, we've got the, the kind of pervasiveness

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of neoliberalism, which is the, the economic model,

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which underpins many OECD donor approaches to development.

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So how do these kind of two dimensions interact

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with development policy and a distribution of donors?

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How does the, the rise in nationalist

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and populist politics affect what donors

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can say about development, how they frame development,

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and how they distribute,

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official development assistance, which is

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otherwise known as, ODA?

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So, firstly, just to say a little bit about the, the,

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those kind of populist

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and nationalist tendencies, we see that in the

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or, we saw that in the election of Trump in the us,

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the vote to leave the European Union in the UK in 2016,

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the election of Orban in Hungary, or the Law

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and Justice Party in Poland or Maloney in, in Italy.

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So how does, development policy

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and aid fit in that context?

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Because, compared to other elements of foreign policy,

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development aid has, has kind of historically spoken

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to a more liberal or a more globalist perspective,

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which is kind of an odds with right wing populist politics.

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Um, so moving on to to think about neoliberalism,

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neoliberal development models have been dominant

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for most OECD countries since like late 1980s.

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These began with,

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structural adjustment programs in the 1980s.

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Then we get the comprehensive development framework

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and poverty reduction strategy papers in the 1990s.

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And then in the two thousands, we get this move towards,

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millennial development goals, and then subsequently the,

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the sustainable development goals

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and also the, the securitization of development,

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which I'll say a little bit about, in a moment.

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Uh, but that's all still within this framework

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of neoliberal development, models.

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And then in the 2010s, we get a move to what,

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what I've called the nationalization of development age aid,

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which is still, underpinned by neoliberalism.

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But here we see the rationale for development, policy

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and aid framed in a, a very different way.

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There are quite, a, a, a number of bodies of literature,

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which I think are relevant to this topic.

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And that includes scholarly work on the securitization

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of development on the, the UK's,

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relationship with Africa,

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Um, critical scholarship on neoliberal development,

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as well as recent literature on the connections between

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national populism and neoliberalism.

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So all of these, I think, provide really relevant

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insights to this topic.

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Um, but if we kind of kick off with neoliberalism,

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I always find that David Harvey's work is really useful

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as a starting point.

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So for Harvey Neoliberalism is a, is a theory of political,

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economic practice that proposes

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that the most efficient way, to, to kind of develop,

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to advance human wellbeing is through, liberating,

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individual entrepreneurial freedoms,

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and skills within, kind

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of institutional framework that is strongly supportive

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of private property rights, of free markets,

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and of, free trade.

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And I would add to that, that,

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that the phrase free market can be a little bit misleading

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as rather than markets being free,

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they're always guaranteed and upheld

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and created by the state.

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Um, the role of the state within neoliberal,

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within the neoliberal model is, is to create

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and preserve an institutional framework that's appropriate

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to such practices.

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And that's, that's kind of

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how Harvey understands neoliberalism as, as well.

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Um, since, kind of Harvey's initial exploration

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of neoliberalism, we get the global financial crisis

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of 2007, 2008,

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and that kind of opens up the possibility that,

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neoliberal models of economic development will

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be de-legitimized.

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Um, but we haven't seen

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that actually neoliberalism is really resilient

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and it's remained resilient through the, the 2010s.

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So this kind of has led to another body of literature,

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which is talked about, what are these new

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forms of neoliberalism?

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How can we understand neoliberalism

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after the, the financial crisis?

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So then we get to people like, Filho, who's theorized.

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Um, this is a, a kind

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of move toward au authoritarian neoliberalism, which sees,

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populist leaders intensifying neoliberalism under the

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veil of nationalism,

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and also Keely, who argues that,

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since the financial crisis,

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we've witnessed this turn towards right wing neoliberal,

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populism,

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and both senior neoliberalism as a kind

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of political project, that that has to rely on the state

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to c to, to, to, to carry out

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to this project, successfully.

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So, when I talk about the conclusions

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to this research project later, our return to some

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of these ideas about how, neoliberalism has kind

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of reformed, itself.

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Um, moving on to a second body of literature,

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the securitization of development, which

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became a really well children field of analysis in in 2000,

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in the two thousands.

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Um, and at the, this is kind of, duffield

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and were at the forefront of that early debate,

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and they argued that, the global south, was kind

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of largely excluded from formal networks

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of global capitalism.

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Um, and that within the context of the securitization

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of development, that, that, that actually

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provided a way for the global north to, to kind

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of manage these excluded populations.

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So developing interventions, were there as a way

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to manage, to manage the instability that came from,

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this exclusion.

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And then there's a, there's a kind

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of smaller body of literature.

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So this includes, people like Taylor

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and her Mary, that consider the links

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between neoliberalism

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and security, a bit more explicitly.

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Um, and this body's literature is interested in

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how neoliberalism causes insecurity,

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but also how neoliberalism, is, is kind of a frame

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of reference for understanding what security is

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and is also put forward as the remedy for security concerns.

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And again, I return to this later when thinking about

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how development policy might, play this, this role.

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Finally, there's a body of work tracing,

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UK Africa relationships in the contemporary period.

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Uh, this also kind of provides valuable insights

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to this, research.

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And it's a, it is a kind of top, it,

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it's been a popular topic of investigation over

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the last few decades.

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Um, for example, there was new labor

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and kind of driven by Blair,

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new labor elevated Africa to a major policy concern.

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But there was quite a disjuncture between the,

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the new labor discourse on Africa

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and then practice in its relationship, with Africa.

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We can think, for example, about trade practices.

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Um, and then there's also authors such as Beswick

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who focused on the, the conservatives in opposition in

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that same period and up until 2016.

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Um, and she argues that the African development was used

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by the Conservative Party as a kind of rebranding exercise,

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like from this nasty party to compassionate,

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conservatism.

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Um, and then bringing it up to date.

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We have, authors such as like, Lightfoot

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and Morley, who recognize

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that the current conservative government have shifted

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to a more insistent articulation

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of the national interest in its approach to development.

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So that is where my, kind of research,

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starts from.

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So, so well, this, yeah, this brings me nicely

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to why I chose to focus on the UK as a a case study.

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Um, I mean, firstly, I live and work in the, in the uk,

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and I would like my research to have some kind

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of policy impact.

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Uh, aside from that, the UK was at the forefront

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of securitizing development in the two thousands.

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Um, there's also been a lot of debate,

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within the government and the mainstream media about the,

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the efficacy of development aid.

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Um, and actually in, in 2022, following this debate,

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the UK subsumed the former department

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for international development into the foreign

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and commonwealth office, in what looked like,

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an attempt to downgrade the importance of development

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and development assistance.

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It was presented as a way of bringing together a,

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a development of foreign policy.

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But many commentators have argued that actually this is a,

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a kind of downgrading of, of development.

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Um, the 2010s also marked a significant change in

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administration from the, from a, from a labor government

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to a conservative liberal democrat coalition.

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And then moving on from that, the conservative win in 2015,

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then led to the Brexit vote in 2016,

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which also had implications for UK development aid.

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Um, and this period, it was kind of marked

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by this anti aid agenda in sections of the, of the press

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and government that sought to kind

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of discredit development projects funded by UK aid.

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And it also linked to this, the, the, the kind

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of nationalist tone of the pro, Brexit debate.

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And finally, the uk, despite all of this kind

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of discrediting of aid,

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the UK had actually positioned itself as a, a kind

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of international, global development leader

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and a core, OECD donor.

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So when I carried out this research,

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the UK was ranked third in terms of ODA volume.

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It's now fifth due to the cuts that happened in 2023,

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but that happened after the completion of, of this project.

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So I just found that the UK,

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because of all of these changes, and

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'cause of the domestic political context,

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was a really interesting case study through which to

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evaluate approaches to African development

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and aid in the 2010s.

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The research is based on, thematic analysis

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of nearly 30,

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key UK policy documents spanning 2000 to 2020.

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And these documents include government, white papers,

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reports, evaluations,

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and speeches that were delivered

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by the international development ministers.

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And then letters between the International Development

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Select committee and those ministers.

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And these documents set out, kind

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of overarching strategies for African development.

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And they also, spend quite a lot of time kind

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of explaining the government's justification for providing

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official development assistance to Africa.

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Um, in addition to that, the, the analysis was supplemented

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by, some documents from the US and Denmark

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and the OECD, just to kind

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of assess the broader relevance of the, of the study really.

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And I then used NVivo to organize occupants

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and then code them through, through two rounds

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of coding, to understand what the trends

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and rationale for UK development policy were in this period.

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So what were the results of this analysis?

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Well, I found that in the 2010s, the UK government moved,

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explicitly

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and kind of unapologetically

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to justify aid in the national interest.

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And this meant that all aspects of development policy

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and projects had to demonstrate their contribution

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to the national interest.

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And I, I think that this,

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this move towards justifying aid in this way, it probably,

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it, it, it, it kind of came initially from

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that security development framing

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of aid in the two thousands.

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So in the two thousands,

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as security development Nexus became this kind of central,

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plank for aid policy of many OECD donors,

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including the uk, including, the us, Denmark,

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and in OECD, policy PA papers as well.

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Um, and the logic here was that

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that conflict insecurity undermine development whilst

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poverty and injustice, underpin instability.

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Um, so in this earlier period, the, the security in,

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in the narrative, the security that that is being referred

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to in the security development nexus is primarily the

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security of the poor.

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Um, and that then kind of shifts to, first of all,

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then talking about, international security.

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So how aid

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and development programs have a role in, in, in kind

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of strengthening international security.

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Um, and so then from that base in the two thousands,

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in the 2010s, a number of bilateral donors,

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including then the UK shifted to kind of forcefully insist

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that aid must only be, used to reinforce donor security.

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And we get a deepening of that in the uk.

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Um, so it's not just, donor security,

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but it's about uk economic and commercial

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and strategic interest as well.

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And that shift, it began a bit earlier in the US there

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was a, a, a paper published in 2002

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that was titled Foreign Aid in the National Interest.

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Um, but in the uk, that explicit criteria that aid,

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must only be used in the national interest wasn't part

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of that earlier, earlier narrative.

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So the perceived, risks to,

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UK national interest from Africa in the,

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in the policy discourse, they're identified as, as conflict

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and terrorism and organized crime,

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and migration, migration has become kind

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of become particularly securitized in the last,

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decade.

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Um, I mean, and that was a change.

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So until the mid, 2010s migration was more likely

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to be framed as a challenge to fragile states

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because of what was termed, brain drain.

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And it was also understood to meet the demands

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for labor in developed countries.

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But that narrative really changed, from 2016,

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and that in part reflected the spike, in 2015

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of people seeking refuge in Europe.

15:21.385 --> 15:24.485
And it also reflected the nationalistic, kind of turn

15:24.485 --> 15:26.565
of the, of the Brexit campaign as well.

15:26.945 --> 15:29.725
Um, at this point, migration was kind of recast

15:29.905 --> 15:33.885
as this development, this direct threat to the, the uk.

15:34.865 --> 15:37.205
So in, in response to that, at this time,

15:37.405 --> 15:40.365
DFID put forward three, that's a department

15:40.365 --> 15:44.005
for international development in the uk put forward three

15:44.055 --> 15:47.565
priorities, in the 20 10, 3, quite broad priorities.

15:47.565 --> 15:48.765
There were other things as well,

15:48.825 --> 15:51.485
but these kind of come up, as, as,

15:51.785 --> 15:53.845
as key in the, in the discourse.

15:54.345 --> 15:57.485
Um, there's poverty reduction, democratization,

15:57.705 --> 15:58.805
and women and girls.

15:59.425 --> 16:02.725
Um, so the, the first of those three, the poverty reduction,

16:02.995 --> 16:06.405
that does represent a continuation with the two thousands.

16:06.425 --> 16:09.965
But the rationale and the framing of the policy had shifted.

16:10.825 --> 16:13.365
So in the two thousands, the UK and,

16:13.385 --> 16:16.525
and also other OECD donors, through this lens

16:16.525 --> 16:19.285
of the security development nexus linked poverty

16:19.465 --> 16:23.365
to an increased risk of, local, conflict

16:23.585 --> 16:26.945
and instability in the 2010s.

16:26.945 --> 16:31.625
Poverty was then kind of framed to pose this direct threat,

16:32.605 --> 16:37.345
to the UK national interest, not least through

16:37.575 --> 16:41.985
because of, migration, I mean, in the late 2020s,

16:42.095 --> 16:44.825
this is slightly beyond the period of this, of this project,

16:45.005 --> 16:48.505
but in the, in the, sorry, in the early 2020s,

16:48.505 --> 16:50.745
poverty reduction seems to then kind

16:50.745 --> 16:52.505
of drop off the agenda entirely.

16:53.005 --> 16:56.865
And there's very few references to poverty reduction,

16:56.885 --> 16:59.505
in policy papers from kind of 20 21, 22,

16:59.925 --> 17:01.105
and it's only in the,

17:01.105 --> 17:03.705
the very latest white paper from this year

17:03.735 --> 17:06.985
that we see poverty being, reinstated as a,

17:07.005 --> 17:08.145
as a key objective.

17:08.565 --> 17:11.545
And then moving on to that second priority in the 2010s,

17:11.545 --> 17:14.825
the growth of democracy in Africa, which is often understood

17:15.165 --> 17:19.465
as, adherence to the rule of law, or open

17:19.605 --> 17:22.105
and accountable, governance, again,

17:22.105 --> 17:24.665
that was linked directly to UK security.

17:25.365 --> 17:28.505
Um, and D-F-A-O-D wrote something like the, the consequences

17:28.525 --> 17:31.545
of weak governance in Africa impact US all.

17:31.605 --> 17:34.745
So there was this kind of direct link drawn between,

17:34.745 --> 17:39.185
democracy and, and, UK national security,

17:40.405 --> 17:42.705
and then thirdly, women and girls now.

17:42.925 --> 17:45.465
So the rights of women and girls were, were also part

17:45.465 --> 17:46.545
of the UK's approach

17:46.565 --> 17:49.765
to development in Africa in the two thousands within the

17:49.765 --> 17:51.845
context of the millennium development goals.

17:52.265 --> 17:56.805
But in the 2010s, it, it was just interesting

17:56.805 --> 17:59.645
to see the shift in how this was then framed.

17:59.945 --> 18:02.405
So, the, the rights of women

18:02.425 --> 18:05.685
and girls then apparently became essential, vital

18:05.825 --> 18:09.285
to the UK's long-term security and prosperity.

18:09.905 --> 18:11.565
Um, and they wrote kind of,

18:11.565 --> 18:14.645
without the progress on gender equality, a safer

18:15.345 --> 18:16.885
UK was simply not possible.

18:17.185 --> 18:20.325
So this, I just think this really shows how that move

18:20.345 --> 18:23.285
to ensure that all UK development aid, including the rights

18:23.285 --> 18:26.005
of women's, women and girls, not traditionally this,

18:26.035 --> 18:30.725
foreign policy, priority,

18:31.585 --> 18:33.685
now had to support rhetorically,

18:33.785 --> 18:36.325
at least the UK's national interest.

18:36.705 --> 18:38.925
And it was no longer enough for a development goal

18:38.925 --> 18:42.085
to have value outside of that UK national interest.

18:43.615 --> 18:46.355
So the response to tackling these priorities

18:46.425 --> 18:50.195
that were identified, remained a neoliberal one.

18:51.625 --> 18:53.525
And that's kind of despite the fact

18:53.555 --> 18:57.285
that it is well documented that neoliberalism continues

18:57.285 --> 19:00.765
to cause insecurity for vulnerable populations in Africa.

19:01.195 --> 19:05.085
This might be through creating new surplus populations

19:05.275 --> 19:08.365
that then become, spheres of, accumulation

19:08.365 --> 19:09.805
for capital or through loans

19:09.905 --> 19:11.605
and credits that are offered by private

19:12.485 --> 19:15.485
companies in the absence of state-based welfare programs.

19:15.905 --> 19:18.725
But the, this kind of nationalization of,

19:18.755 --> 19:22.205
development agenda, it, it ignored this and,

19:22.305 --> 19:25.045
and actually attempted to mitigate those negative effects

19:25.225 --> 19:28.005
of neoliberal capitalism through,

19:28.005 --> 19:31.045
through reproducing neoliberal, relations.

19:32.695 --> 19:34.315
And, and,

19:34.375 --> 19:37.315
and that that neoliberal, development model was also,

19:37.655 --> 19:40.155
put forward as having the capacity

19:40.155 --> 19:43.195
to directly forward the UK national interests.

19:43.615 --> 19:45.275
So, for example, there's a push

19:45.295 --> 19:48.635
to create employment opportunities within a market context

19:49.215 --> 19:50.675
in Africa, and it was argued

19:50.675 --> 19:53.555
that this would actually reduce migration to, to Europe

19:53.855 --> 19:56.435
and even address the root causes of violent extremism.

19:56.975 --> 19:58.755
Um, or,

19:58.815 --> 20:00.315
or there was a focus on kind

20:00.315 --> 20:02.595
of reducing trade barriers in East Africa.

20:03.015 --> 20:05.435
Uh, the argument was that this would open up opportunities

20:05.575 --> 20:07.195
for UK private investment.

20:07.695 --> 20:11.875
So this, I think that this went a bit deeper than the,

20:11.895 --> 20:13.995
the abandoned practice of Tide age,

20:13.995 --> 20:16.835
because tide aid was kind of limited to specific contracts.

20:17.095 --> 20:19.755
But this approach encompasses, all aspects

20:19.755 --> 20:20.955
of development programming.

20:21.215 --> 20:24.675
And I think that the space to fund interventions,

20:24.705 --> 20:27.875
outside of this remit has, has, has shrunk.

20:29.545 --> 20:31.885
So because, the nationalization

20:31.885 --> 20:34.205
of UK development policy ignores the way in which

20:34.235 --> 20:37.445
neoliberalism creates insecurity,

20:38.105 --> 20:41.085
the perceived benefits, of mitigating risks

20:41.145 --> 20:44.685
to the UK are, are kind of unlikely to materialize in terms

20:44.705 --> 20:47.045
of reduced migration or organized crime.

20:47.225 --> 20:50.205
For example, the uk of course, might represent,

20:50.255 --> 20:53.125
might reap some kind of short term commercial

20:53.845 --> 20:57.085
benefits from this, from their policy.

20:57.345 --> 21:00.525
So, so in the face of,

21:01.495 --> 21:04.645
these contradictions that the nationalization

21:04.645 --> 21:07.445
of development is built on a number of, a number

21:07.465 --> 21:10.325
of unsubstantiated assumptions that,

21:10.425 --> 21:12.485
and that kind of enables then in the UK

21:12.625 --> 21:15.965
to offer neoliberal development solutions to the risks

21:15.995 --> 21:19.605
that they see, opposed to the,

21:19.625 --> 21:21.245
the UK national interest.

21:21.945 --> 21:25.085
The first is that conflict instability

21:25.265 --> 21:29.725
and insecurity have only internal, domestic, political

21:29.745 --> 21:32.725
and economic drivers, things like corruption

21:32.825 --> 21:33.845
or poor governance.

21:34.265 --> 21:35.525
So the UK approach

21:35.585 --> 21:38.605
to development is focused on steering domestic change within

21:39.045 --> 21:42.045
recipient countries, rather than focusing on, any kind

21:42.245 --> 21:45.845
of structural change or focusing on harmful trade practices,

21:46.025 --> 21:48.285
things that would have a, a, a, a kind

21:48.285 --> 21:49.965
of greater, impact.

21:51.005 --> 21:52.365
Secondly, instability

21:52.745 --> 21:55.605
and insecurity were understood as a, as a kind

21:55.605 --> 21:57.685
of deviation from, rather than intrinsic

21:57.825 --> 21:59.925
to neoliberal models of development.

22:00.585 --> 22:03.245
So the, the, the, the kind of logic is

22:03.245 --> 22:05.885
that development will bring societies into a kind

22:05.885 --> 22:08.645
of normal pattern of growth and security.

22:09.025 --> 22:12.125
And of course, that's been the underlying principle of,

22:13.075 --> 22:15.575
of DFID, since late 1990s.

22:15.575 --> 22:18.815
And is also the lens through which, OECD on,

22:18.815 --> 22:22.295
donors understanding security in Africa, as well.

22:23.395 --> 22:27.415
And finally, and again, despite research to the country,

22:27.755 --> 22:29.575
the national security agenda

22:29.875 --> 22:33.095
and the, so the UK's national security agenda

22:33.715 --> 22:36.815
and the International Development Agenda,

22:36.965 --> 22:39.615
were understood by the UK government as kind

22:39.615 --> 22:42.095
of fully aligned there, there were no kind of tensions

22:42.095 --> 22:43.495
or contradictions there.

22:43.955 --> 22:45.895
And again, that wasn't always the case.

22:46.115 --> 22:49.415
So, in the two thousands, DFID

22:49.475 --> 22:52.815
and the UK government were quite cautious,

22:53.145 --> 22:56.775
about putting aid at the services of national security.

22:57.595 --> 23:00.895
And it, it kind of, during those earlier periods,

23:01.055 --> 23:03.935
DFID recognized at least three tensions

23:03.935 --> 23:05.495
between the government security work

23:05.555 --> 23:06.895
and the development work.

23:07.395 --> 23:09.615
Uh, first of all, DFID acknowledged that

23:10.265 --> 23:13.455
while its primary concern was low income countries,

23:13.765 --> 23:17.335
international security threats were more often linked

23:17.355 --> 23:19.775
to networks operating in middle income countries.

23:20.355 --> 23:25.335
And secondly, security work generally focuses on kind

23:25.335 --> 23:27.335
of immediate short-term outcomes.

23:28.035 --> 23:29.815
And DFID argue that

23:29.815 --> 23:32.695
that might inadvertently undermine the foundations

23:32.755 --> 23:35.175
for, development.

23:35.755 --> 23:38.135
And finally, because development agencies put,

23:38.395 --> 23:41.815
put national partners, in the lead on the ground,

23:42.305 --> 23:45.285
there was a concern that international security forces might

23:45.285 --> 23:48.165
feel that they lacked the, the, the,

23:48.185 --> 23:50.285
the international development partners to work

23:50.285 --> 23:51.525
with, on the ground.

23:52.385 --> 23:57.365
And those, those tensions led DFID to conclude prior

23:57.385 --> 23:59.965
to the 2010s that UK development assistance

24:00.025 --> 24:04.245
to finance programs whose primary objectives primary,

24:04.305 --> 24:05.965
are tackling threats to the UK

24:06.065 --> 24:10.045
or global security, this means that,

24:10.205 --> 24:14.445
DFD concluded that it cannot use UK development assistance

24:14.625 --> 24:18.085
to finance programs whose primary objective is tackling

24:18.085 --> 24:20.445
threats to UK or global security.

24:21.265 --> 24:24.645
And that, that kind of complexity was absent then from the

24:24.645 --> 24:26.525
development policy of the 2010s.

24:26.945 --> 24:29.365
Um, and in terms of the material impact

24:29.385 --> 24:32.605
of these discursive changes, I've, I've just talked about,

24:32.905 --> 24:36.525
the UK did increase age, committed to peace conflict

24:36.525 --> 24:39.645
and security activities, both per capita

24:39.705 --> 24:42.125
and proportionally, as did the US and,

24:42.125 --> 24:43.325
and Denmark and Sweden.

24:43.945 --> 24:48.565
Um, and also since 2010, countries which hold a,

24:48.645 --> 24:52.405
a strategic interest for the UK were more likely to receive

24:52.405 --> 24:53.445
that type of aid.

24:53.705 --> 24:56.245
And then more recently we've seen the shift towards,

24:56.245 --> 24:59.005
potentially towards kind of more mature economies,

24:59.255 --> 25:01.885
which are more likely to offer investment opportunities

25:02.065 --> 25:03.285
for the UK as well.

25:04.585 --> 25:08.445
So, moving on to the the domestic context.

25:08.705 --> 25:11.725
At the time, there was a particular domestic context I think

25:11.725 --> 25:14.325
that enabled and to some extent drove

25:14.355 --> 25:17.445
that shift in development policy in the 2010s.

25:18.595 --> 25:20.895
And at the same time, development policy was all was

25:21.175 --> 25:23.455
utilized to further certain, domestic

25:23.675 --> 25:26.095
and international political agendas.

25:26.835 --> 25:31.135
So in the, in the post global financial crisis period,

25:31.595 --> 25:36.135
neoliberal austerity policies contributed to,

25:36.195 --> 25:39.455
to this, anti aid agenda in sections

25:39.455 --> 25:41.015
of the UK government and society,

25:41.015 --> 25:42.495
which I had mentioned earlier.

25:43.195 --> 25:44.935
And even though ODA it, it,

25:44.995 --> 25:48.655
it remains a pretty small portion of the government budget.

25:48.765 --> 25:50.735
This anti aid sentiment,

25:50.735 --> 25:53.895
particularly in the the right wing press, grew

25:53.915 --> 25:55.055
during this period.

25:55.585 --> 25:58.575
There was this argument that during a time of austerity

25:58.605 --> 26:01.255
that government spending should focus,

26:01.255 --> 26:03.975
should be focused on supporting vulnerable people at home

26:03.995 --> 26:05.335
rather than abroad.

26:05.795 --> 26:09.095
So this position prioritized, the national interest

26:09.095 --> 26:10.295
and domestic concerns

26:10.555 --> 26:13.895
and attempted to kind of demonstrate, solidarity

26:14.205 --> 26:15.655
with the people, and it,

26:15.655 --> 26:16.855
and it denounced kind

26:16.855 --> 26:19.175
of outta control spending by government.

26:19.315 --> 26:21.775
And so it aligned with that increase in nationalist

26:21.775 --> 26:24.495
and populist sentiment that we saw during and

26:24.495 --> 26:26.175
after the Brexit campaign.

26:26.835 --> 26:29.495
And in response to this, there was this kind of value

26:29.495 --> 26:33.295
for money or fiscal prudence narrative along the same lines

26:33.295 --> 26:35.615
of austerity, which emerged as part

26:35.615 --> 26:38.295
of the government's development policy in the 2010s

26:38.645 --> 26:42.135
development projects, had to represent,

26:42.155 --> 26:44.725
an an acceptable use of taxpayers money.

26:44.945 --> 26:48.365
And one of the key ways of doing that was to spend aid in,

26:48.585 --> 26:51.955
in the national interest,

26:52.015 --> 26:53.035
aid and development policy.

26:53.775 --> 26:54.835
As I said, underpinned

26:54.835 --> 26:58.875
by neoliberalism also played a useful political role at the

26:59.155 --> 27:03.915
domestic level, justifying policy in the national interest.

27:04.015 --> 27:07.715
And therefore, good value in terms of taxpayers money

27:08.225 --> 27:12.435
responded to that growing populism in, in the uk,

27:12.685 --> 27:14.715
which was itself, in part driven

27:14.735 --> 27:17.675
by the global financial crisis and subsequent austerity

27:17.735 --> 27:20.355
and increased economic insecurity.

27:21.295 --> 27:24.915
And that framing of, development policy around the,

27:24.915 --> 27:26.875
the national interest and around value

27:27.015 --> 27:31.395
for money in the 2010s, that does contrast quite sharply

27:31.395 --> 27:34.715
with what we saw in the two thousands when,

27:34.715 --> 27:36.995
the labor administrations of First Blair

27:36.995 --> 27:39.795
and then Brown were devising development policy

27:39.825 --> 27:42.675
that was in the context of the GA eight summit at Glen

27:42.735 --> 27:44.155
Eagles in 2005.

27:44.535 --> 27:48.075
And the, the make poverty history campaign in the same,

27:48.335 --> 27:50.035
the same year,

27:50.035 --> 27:52.355
and there was substantial public support for aid

27:52.375 --> 27:55.675
and development, which kind of marked out, that

27:55.675 --> 27:59.315
that two thousands period from the, the, the 2010s.

27:59.535 --> 28:02.915
And indeed in, in the two thousands, DFID argued that

28:02.915 --> 28:06.315
that UK citizens would hold them to account if they failed

28:06.415 --> 28:09.155
to use the aid budget to tackle global property

28:09.415 --> 28:10.915
and to help the most vulnerable.

28:11.295 --> 28:14.035
Um, but, but in the 2010s, the,

28:14.055 --> 28:15.555
the narrative really change,

28:15.895 --> 28:18.555
and it was about the, the public would hold the government

28:18.555 --> 28:21.155
to account if they failed to use ODA,

28:21.735 --> 28:26.355
in the national interest within the, the context then

28:26.355 --> 28:28.555
of the UK government's austerity agenda

28:28.855 --> 28:33.235
and calls for ODA plus, we might expect,

28:33.715 --> 28:36.155
a reduction in ODA in the 2010s,

28:36.155 --> 28:37.195
but that's not what happens.

28:37.415 --> 28:39.915
We, we get this ring fencing of ODA.

28:40.215 --> 28:44.955
And then in 2013, the UK met the, 0.7%

28:44.975 --> 28:47.955
of GNIA commitment for the first time as well.

28:47.975 --> 28:50.675
And then that was made a, a legal obs

28:51.275 --> 28:53.595
a legal obligation in 2015.

28:54.375 --> 28:57.355
So that, that seems a bit of a, a bit of a puzzle.

28:57.555 --> 28:59.435
I mean, it might have been that it was part

28:59.435 --> 29:01.355
of the conservative rebrand.

29:01.735 --> 29:02.795
Um, under Cameron,

29:03.545 --> 29:07.395
however, the domestic unpopularity of aid

29:07.395 --> 29:11.595
and its kind of protection beyond Cameron, might suggest

29:11.595 --> 29:13.595
that, a reduction of ODA

29:13.595 --> 29:17.675
during this time would've undermined the UK's post Brexit

29:17.675 --> 29:19.795
global projection of soft power.

29:20.175 --> 29:21.755
So as well as the domestic drivers

29:22.185 --> 29:24.195
that we've just discussed,

29:24.375 --> 29:26.875
the UK's international standing was also relevant

29:26.875 --> 29:28.875
for its international development strategy.

29:30.055 --> 29:32.795
It had used this, its reputation

29:33.015 --> 29:36.355
and standing, as a global development leader to,

29:36.375 --> 29:39.995
to gain, some influence in international institutions

29:39.995 --> 29:41.075
in the 2010s.

29:41.665 --> 29:43.725
Um, and, and DFID

29:43.725 --> 29:47.245
and the UK government really kind of marketed itself

29:47.345 --> 29:49.925
as a global leader in many aspects

29:49.945 --> 29:52.205
of international development in quite a, a kind

29:52.205 --> 29:53.445
of hyperbolic way.

29:53.705 --> 29:55.765
And that really ramped up as well in the context

29:55.945 --> 29:57.565
of the breakfast vote.

29:58.105 --> 30:01.725
So as the UK wrestled with how it could maintain leverage

30:01.725 --> 30:05.285
and authority in international institutions,

30:05.285 --> 30:09.085
relations following Brexit, promoting itself as a,

30:09.165 --> 30:11.805
a global leader in international development,

30:11.925 --> 30:13.685
would've been quite an appealing method through which

30:13.685 --> 30:16.885
to maintain soft power, advantage.

30:17.505 --> 30:19.965
But despite this, and again, kind of slightly

30:19.975 --> 30:21.485
after the period of this project,

30:22.275 --> 30:26.165
that assault on agent development was evident, through,

30:26.505 --> 30:29.685
in a kind of really material way through the,

30:29.945 --> 30:33.805
the reduction of age from 0.7 to 0.5%

30:33.805 --> 30:37.645
of GNI in the context of the economic decline caused

30:37.705 --> 30:42.365
by covid and of course the, the submerging of DFID into the,

30:42.625 --> 30:44.285
foreign and commonwealth office.

30:46.075 --> 30:50.215
Um, so these, the cha these changes in the UK along

30:50.215 --> 30:52.695
with the, the anti aid agenda that preceded it,

30:52.845 --> 30:54.975
they fit really well with the nationalist tone

30:54.975 --> 30:58.255
of the conservative party, as well as that fiscal prudence,

30:58.315 --> 31:00.215
value for money narrative.

31:00.795 --> 31:03.055
Um, and these moves also align really well

31:03.055 --> 31:06.535
with the core tenants of neoliberal ideology, the idea

31:06.835 --> 31:09.655
of freedom, from progressive forms

31:09.655 --> 31:13.695
of government intervention to redistribute wealth, that,

31:13.695 --> 31:16.175
that kind of goes against some normative foundations

31:16.175 --> 31:19.055
of neoliberalism, of individual freedom of commitment

31:19.055 --> 31:22.495
to a small state ideologically, if not in practice.

31:23.035 --> 31:25.655
And so at the close of the 2010s,

31:25.675 --> 31:28.255
the UK's nationalization of development approach,

31:28.655 --> 31:31.295
I think fits quite well into,

31:31.565 --> 31:35.175
what Keeley has called right wing neoliberal populism

31:35.715 --> 31:39.655
or sar philo's concept of authoritarian neoliberalism

31:39.685 --> 31:40.935
that I began with.

31:41.635 --> 31:44.455
Um, it's underpinned by neoliberal values

31:44.635 --> 31:46.215
and at the same time reflects

31:46.235 --> 31:49.335
and feeds this national populist, sentiment.

31:49.715 --> 31:52.615
And we have kind of commentators on the right

31:52.995 --> 31:56.815
and neoliberals identifying the state as problematic.

31:57.195 --> 31:58.695
So for Neoliberals,

31:58.695 --> 32:02.295
state elites have distorted the market through, kind

32:02.295 --> 32:05.215
of social engineering attempts, which includes, aid,

32:05.215 --> 32:06.335
which includes ODA

32:06.635 --> 32:10.095
and for the right wing, kind of problems are caused by

32:10.655 --> 32:13.935
socially irresponsibility of, of a liberal state.

32:14.675 --> 32:18.935
So in conclusion, the research makes I think three,

32:18.935 --> 32:21.415
related arguments to further our understanding

32:21.475 --> 32:24.895
of donor motivation and donor behavior in the 2010s.

32:25.225 --> 32:29.015
First of all, aid has explicitly has

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to explicitly demonstrate its alignment

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with the national interest.

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Secondly, and despite research to the country,

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a neoliberal development model was prescribed.

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And finally, these reflected

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and contributed to the rise of, in kind of right wing,

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sentiment, the nationalization of a can be understood

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as part of a new right wing neoliberal populism.

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And I think that these observations have relevance

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for other OEC donors, as well

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who might have experienced similar political

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and economic upheaval in the 2010s.

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And, these changes that I, as I said, have now had,

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economic and institutional consequences in the uk,

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which have, I think downgraded,

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the future UK contribution to African development, I think

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that, well, there is now less money, fewer projects,

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and this kind of narrower focus on the national interest

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while retaining the neoliberal model of, of development.

00:00 - So I think that the context for the, the study is, is twofold, really. it includes, firstly, this, the, the rise of nationalism, the rise of, populist politics in Europe and in the United States. And I'm interested in how this interacts

00:18 - with development policy and aid, of, OECD countries. Secondly, we've got the, the kind of pervasiveness of neoliberalism, which is the, the economic model, which underpins many OECD donor approaches to development. So how do these kind of two dimensions interact with development policy and a distribution of donors? How does the, the rise in nationalist and populist politics affect what donors can say about development, how they frame development, and how they distribute,

00:53 - official development assistance, which is otherwise known as, ODA? So, firstly, just to say a little bit about the, the, those kind of populist and nationalist tendencies, we see that in the or, we saw that in the election of Trump in the us, the vote to leave the European Union in the UK in 2016, the election of Orban in Hungary, or the Law and Justice Party in Poland or Maloney in, in Italy. So how does, development policy

01:22 - and aid fit in that context? Because, compared to other elements of foreign policy, development aid has, has kind of historically spoken to a more liberal or a more globalist perspective, which is kind of an odds with right wing populist politics. so moving on to to think about neoliberalism, neoliberal development models have been dominant for most OECD countries since like late 1980s. These began with, structural adjustment programs in the 1980s.

01:57 - Then we get the comprehensive development framework and poverty reduction strategy papers in the 1990s. And then in the two thousands, we get this move towards, millennial development goals, and then subsequently the, the sustainable development goals and also the, the securitization of development, which I'll say a little bit about, in a moment. but that's all still within this framework of neoliberal development, models. And then in the 2010s, we get a move to what,

02:26 - what I've called the nationalization of development age aid, which is still, underpinned by neoliberalism. But here we see the rationale for development, policy and aid framed in a, a very different way. There are quite, a, a, a number of bodies of literature, which I think are relevant to this topic. And that includes scholarly work on the securitization of development on the, the UK's, relationship with Africa, critical scholarship on neoliberal development,

03:02 - as well as recent literature on the connections between national populism and neoliberalism. So all of these, I think, provide really relevant insights to this topic. but if we kind of kick off with neoliberalism, I always find that David Harvey's work is really useful as a starting point. So for Harvey Neoliberalism is a, is a theory of political, economic practice that proposes that the most efficient way, to, to kind of develop,

03:32 - to advance human wellbeing is through, liberating, individual entrepreneurial freedoms, and skills within, kind of institutional framework that is strongly supportive of private property rights, of free markets, and of, free trade. And I would add to that, that, that the phrase free market can be a little bit misleading as rather than markets being free, they're always guaranteed and upheld

04:03 - and created by the state. the role of the state within neoliberal, within the neoliberal model is, is to create and preserve an institutional framework that's appropriate to such practices. And that's, that's kind of how Harvey understands neoliberalism as, as well. since, kind of Harvey's initial exploration of neoliberalism, we get the global financial crisis of 2007, 2008,

04:32 - and that kind of opens up the possibility that, neoliberal models of economic development will be de-legitimized. but we haven't seen that actually neoliberalism is really resilient and it's remained resilient through the, the 2010s. So this kind of has led to another body of literature, which is talked about, what are these new forms of neoliberalism? How can we understand neoliberalism

04:57 - after the, the financial crisis? So then we get to people like, Filho, who's theorized. this is a, a kind of move toward au authoritarian neoliberalism, which sees, populist leaders intensifying neoliberalism under the veil of nationalism, and also Keely, who argues that, since the financial crisis, we've witnessed this turn towards right wing neoliberal, populism,

05:28 - and both senior neoliberalism as a kind of political project, that that has to rely on the state to c to, to, to, to carry out to this project, successfully. So, when I talk about the conclusions to this research project later, our return to some of these ideas about how, neoliberalism has kind of reformed, itself. moving on to a second body of literature, the securitization of development, which

05:57 - became a really well children field of analysis in in 2000, in the two thousands. and at the, this is kind of, duffield and were at the forefront of that early debate, and they argued that, the global south, was kind of largely excluded from formal networks of global capitalism. and that within the context of the securitization of development, that, that, that actually provided a way for the global north to, to kind

06:27 - of manage these excluded populations. So developing interventions, were there as a way to manage, to manage the instability that came from, this exclusion. And then there's a, there's a kind of smaller body of literature. So this includes, people like Taylor and her Mary, that consider the links between neoliberalism and security, a bit more explicitly.

06:52 - and this body's literature is interested in how neoliberalism causes insecurity, but also how neoliberalism, is, is kind of a frame of reference for understanding what security is and is also put forward as the remedy for security concerns. And again, I return to this later when thinking about how development policy might, play this, this role. Finally, there's a body of work tracing, UK Africa relationships in the contemporary period. this also kind of provides valuable insights

07:26 - to this, research. And it's a, it is a kind of top, it, it's been a popular topic of investigation over the last few decades. for example, there was new labor and kind of driven by Blair, new labor elevated Africa to a major policy concern. But there was quite a disjuncture between the, the new labor discourse on Africa and then practice in its relationship, with Africa.

07:51 - We can think, for example, about trade practices. and then there's also authors such as Beswick who focused on the, the conservatives in opposition in that same period and up until 2016. and she argues that the African development was used by the Conservative Party as a kind of rebranding exercise, like from this nasty party to compassionate, conservatism. and then bringing it up to date. We have, authors such as like, Lightfoot

08:23 - and Morley, who recognize that the current conservative government have shifted to a more insistent articulation of the national interest in its approach to development. So that is where my, kind of research, starts from. So, so well, this, yeah, this brings me nicely to why I chose to focus on the UK as a a case study. I mean, firstly, I live and work in the, in the uk, and I would like my research to have some kind

08:51 - of policy impact. aside from that, the UK was at the forefront of securitizing development in the two thousands. there's also been a lot of debate, within the government and the mainstream media about the, the efficacy of development aid. and actually in, in 2022, following this debate, the UK subsumed the former department for international development into the foreign and commonwealth office, in what looked like,

09:22 - an attempt to downgrade the importance of development and development assistance. It was presented as a way of bringing together a, a development of foreign policy. But many commentators have argued that actually this is a, a kind of downgrading of, of development. the 2010s also marked a significant change in administration from the, from a, from a labor government to a conservative liberal democrat coalition. And then moving on from that, the conservative win in 2015,

09:50 - then led to the Brexit vote in 2016, which also had implications for UK development aid. and this period, it was kind of marked by this anti aid agenda in sections of the, of the press and government that sought to kind of discredit development projects funded by UK aid. And it also linked to this, the, the, the kind of nationalist tone of the pro, Brexit debate. And finally, the uk, despite all of this kind of discrediting of aid,

10:21 - the UK had actually positioned itself as a, a kind of international, global development leader and a core, OECD donor. So when I carried out this research, the UK was ranked third in terms of ODA volume. It's now fifth due to the cuts that happened in 2023, but that happened after the completion of, of this project. So I just found that the UK, because of all of these changes, and 'cause of the domestic political context,

10:51 - was a really interesting case study through which to evaluate approaches to African development and aid in the 2010s. The research is based on, thematic analysis of nearly 30, key UK policy documents spanning 2000 to 2020. And these documents include government, white papers, reports, evaluations, and speeches that were delivered by the international development ministers.

11:21 - And then letters between the International Development Select committee and those ministers. And these documents set out, kind of overarching strategies for African development. And they also, spend quite a lot of time kind of explaining the government's justification for providing official development assistance to Africa. in addition to that, the, the analysis was supplemented by, some documents from the US and Denmark and the OECD, just to kind

11:54 - of assess the broader relevance of the, of the study really. And I then used NVivo to organize occupants and then code them through, through two rounds of coding, to understand what the trends and rationale for UK development policy were in this period. So what were the results of this analysis? Well, I found that in the 2010s, the UK government moved, explicitly and kind of unapologetically to justify aid in the national interest.

12:26 - And this meant that all aspects of development policy and projects had to demonstrate their contribution to the national interest. And I, I think that this, this move towards justifying aid in this way, it probably, it, it, it, it kind of came initially from that security development framing of aid in the two thousands. So in the two thousands, as security development Nexus became this kind of central,

12:54 - plank for aid policy of many OECD donors, including the uk, including, the us, Denmark, and in OECD, policy PA papers as well. and the logic here was that that conflict insecurity undermine development whilst poverty and injustice, underpin instability. so in this earlier period, the, the security in, in the narrative, the security that that is being referred to in the security development nexus is primarily the security of the poor.

13:27 - and that then kind of shifts to, first of all, then talking about, international security. So how aid and development programs have a role in, in, in kind of strengthening international security. and so then from that base in the two thousands, in the 2010s, a number of bilateral donors, including then the UK shifted to kind of forcefully insist that aid must only be, used to reinforce donor security. And we get a deepening of that in the uk.

13:59 - so it's not just, donor security, but it's about uk economic and commercial and strategic interest as well. And that shift, it began a bit earlier in the US there was a, a, a paper published in 2002 that was titled Foreign Aid in the National Interest. but in the uk, that explicit criteria that aid, must only be used in the national interest wasn't part of that earlier, earlier narrative. So the perceived, risks to,

14:34 - UK national interest from Africa in the, in the policy discourse, they're identified as, as conflict and terrorism and organized crime, and migration, migration has become kind of become particularly securitized in the last, decade. I mean, and that was a change. So until the mid, 2010s migration was more likely to be framed as a challenge to fragile states because of what was termed, brain drain.

15:05 - And it was also understood to meet the demands for labor in developed countries. But that narrative really changed, from 2016, and that in part reflected the spike, in 2015 of people seeking refuge in Europe. And it also reflected the nationalistic, kind of turn of the, of the Brexit campaign as well. at this point, migration was kind of recast as this development, this direct threat to the, the uk. So in, in response to that, at this time,

15:37 - DFID put forward three, that's a department for international development in the uk put forward three priorities, in the 20 10, 3, quite broad priorities. There were other things as well, but these kind of come up, as, as, as key in the, in the discourse. there's poverty reduction, democratization, and women and girls. so the, the first of those three, the poverty reduction, that does represent a continuation with the two thousands.

16:06 - But the rationale and the framing of the policy had shifted. So in the two thousands, the UK and, and also other OECD donors, through this lens of the security development nexus linked poverty to an increased risk of, local, conflict and instability in the 2010s. Poverty was then kind of framed to pose this direct threat, to the UK national interest, not least through because of, migration, I mean, in the late 2020s, this is slightly beyond the period of this, of this project,

16:45 - but in the, in the, sorry, in the early 2020s, poverty reduction seems to then kind of drop off the agenda entirely. And there's very few references to poverty reduction, in policy papers from kind of 20 21, 22, and it's only in the, the very latest white paper from this year that we see poverty being, reinstated as a, as a key objective. And then moving on to that second priority in the 2010s,

17:11 - the growth of democracy in Africa, which is often understood as, adherence to the rule of law, or open and accountable, governance, again, that was linked directly to UK security. and D-F-A-O-D wrote something like the, the consequences of weak governance in Africa impact US all. So there was this kind of direct link drawn between, democracy and, and, UK national security, and then thirdly, women and girls now. So the rights of women and girls were, were also part

17:45 - of the UK's approach to development in Africa in the two thousands within the context of the millennium development goals. But in the 2010s, it, it was just interesting to see the shift in how this was then framed. So, the, the rights of women and girls then apparently became essential, vital to the UK's long-term security and prosperity. and they wrote kind of, without the progress on gender equality, a safer

18:15 - UK was simply not possible. So this, I just think this really shows how that move to ensure that all UK development aid, including the rights of women's, women and girls, not traditionally this, foreign policy, priority, now had to support rhetorically, at least the UK's national interest. And it was no longer enough for a development goal to have value outside of that UK national interest. So the response to tackling these priorities

18:46 - that were identified, remained a neoliberal one. And that's kind of despite the fact that it is well documented that neoliberalism continues to cause insecurity for vulnerable populations in Africa. This might be through creating new surplus populations that then become, spheres of, accumulation for capital or through loans and credits that are offered by private companies in the absence of state-based welfare programs. But the, this kind of nationalization of,

19:18 - development agenda, it, it ignored this and, and actually attempted to mitigate those negative effects of neoliberal capitalism through, through reproducing neoliberal, relations. And, and, and that that neoliberal, development model was also, put forward as having the capacity to directly forward the UK national interests. So, for example, there's a push to create employment opportunities within a market context

19:49 - in Africa, and it was argued that this would actually reduce migration to, to Europe and even address the root causes of violent extremism. or, or there was a focus on kind of reducing trade barriers in East Africa. the argument was that this would open up opportunities for UK private investment. So this, I think that this went a bit deeper than the, the abandoned practice of Tide age,

20:13 - because tide aid was kind of limited to specific contracts. But this approach encompasses, all aspects of development programming. And I think that the space to fund interventions, outside of this remit has, has, has shrunk. So because, the nationalization of UK development policy ignores the way in which neoliberalism creates insecurity, the perceived benefits, of mitigating risks to the UK are, are kind of unlikely to materialize in terms

20:44 - of reduced migration or organized crime. For example, the uk of course, might represent, might reap some kind of short term commercial benefits from this, from their policy. So, so in the face of, these contradictions that the nationalization of development is built on a number of, a number of unsubstantiated assumptions that, and that kind of enables then in the UK to offer neoliberal development solutions to the risks

21:15 - that they see, opposed to the, the UK national interest. The first is that conflict instability and insecurity have only internal, domestic, political and economic drivers, things like corruption or poor governance. So the UK approach to development is focused on steering domestic change within recipient countries, rather than focusing on, any kind of structural change or focusing on harmful trade practices,

21:46 - things that would have a, a, a, a kind of greater, impact. Secondly, instability and insecurity were understood as a, as a kind of deviation from, rather than intrinsic to neoliberal models of development. So the, the, the, the kind of logic is that development will bring societies into a kind of normal pattern of growth and security. And of course, that's been the underlying principle of,

22:13 - of DFID, since late 1990s. And is also the lens through which, OECD on, donors understanding security in Africa, as well. And finally, and again, despite research to the country, the national security agenda and the, so the UK's national security agenda and the International Development Agenda, were understood by the UK government as kind of fully aligned there, there were no kind of tensions or contradictions there.

22:43 - And again, that wasn't always the case. So, in the two thousands, DFID and the UK government were quite cautious, about putting aid at the services of national security. And it, it kind of, during those earlier periods, DFID recognized at least three tensions between the government security work and the development work. first of all, DFID acknowledged that while its primary concern was low income countries,

23:13 - international security threats were more often linked to networks operating in middle income countries. And secondly, security work generally focuses on kind of immediate short-term outcomes. And DFID argue that that might inadvertently undermine the foundations for, development. And finally, because development agencies put, put national partners, in the lead on the ground, there was a concern that international security forces might

23:45 - feel that they lacked the, the, the, the international development partners to work with, on the ground. And those, those tensions led DFID to conclude prior to the 2010s that UK development assistance to finance programs whose primary objectives primary, are tackling threats to the UK or global security, this means that, DFD concluded that it cannot use UK development assistance to finance programs whose primary objective is tackling

24:18 - threats to UK or global security. And that, that kind of complexity was absent then from the development policy of the 2010s. and in terms of the material impact of these discursive changes, I've, I've just talked about, the UK did increase age, committed to peace conflict and security activities, both per capita and proportionally, as did the US and, and Denmark and Sweden. and also since 2010, countries which hold a,

24:48 - a strategic interest for the UK were more likely to receive that type of aid. And then more recently we've seen the shift towards, potentially towards kind of more mature economies, which are more likely to offer investment opportunities for the UK as well. So, moving on to the the domestic context. At the time, there was a particular domestic context I think that enabled and to some extent drove that shift in development policy in the 2010s.

25:18 - And at the same time, development policy was all was utilized to further certain, domestic and international political agendas. So in the, in the post global financial crisis period, neoliberal austerity policies contributed to, to this, anti aid agenda in sections of the UK government and society, which I had mentioned earlier. And even though ODA it, it, it remains a pretty small portion of the government budget.

25:48 - This anti aid sentiment, particularly in the the right wing press, grew during this period. There was this argument that during a time of austerity that government spending should focus, should be focused on supporting vulnerable people at home rather than abroad. So this position prioritized, the national interest and domestic concerns and attempted to kind of demonstrate, solidarity

26:14 - with the people, and it, and it denounced kind of outta control spending by government. And so it aligned with that increase in nationalist and populist sentiment that we saw during and after the Brexit campaign. And in response to this, there was this kind of value for money or fiscal prudence narrative along the same lines of austerity, which emerged as part of the government's development policy in the 2010s

26:38 - development projects, had to represent, an an acceptable use of taxpayers money. And one of the key ways of doing that was to spend aid in, in the national interest, aid and development policy. As I said, underpinned by neoliberalism also played a useful political role at the domestic level, justifying policy in the national interest. And therefore, good value in terms of taxpayers money responded to that growing populism in, in the uk,

27:12 - which was itself, in part driven by the global financial crisis and subsequent austerity and increased economic insecurity. And that framing of, development policy around the, the national interest and around value for money in the 2010s, that does contrast quite sharply with what we saw in the two thousands when, the labor administrations of First Blair and then Brown were devising development policy that was in the context of the GA eight summit at Glen

27:42 - Eagles in 2005. And the, the make poverty history campaign in the same, the same year, and there was substantial public support for aid and development, which kind of marked out, that that two thousands period from the, the, the 2010s. And indeed in, in the two thousands, DFID argued that that UK citizens would hold them to account if they failed to use the aid budget to tackle global property and to help the most vulnerable.

28:11 - but, but in the 2010s, the, the narrative really change, and it was about the, the public would hold the government to account if they failed to use ODA, in the national interest within the, the context then of the UK government's austerity agenda and calls for ODA plus, we might expect, a reduction in ODA in the 2010s, but that's not what happens. We, we get this ring fencing of ODA.

28:40 - And then in 2013, the UK met the, 0.7% of GNIA commitment for the first time as well. And then that was made a, a legal obs a legal obligation in 2015. So that, that seems a bit of a, a bit of a puzzle. I mean, it might have been that it was part of the conservative rebrand. under Cameron, however, the domestic unpopularity of aid and its kind of protection beyond Cameron, might suggest

29:11 - that, a reduction of ODA during this time would've undermined the UK's post Brexit global projection of soft power. So as well as the domestic drivers that we've just discussed, the UK's international standing was also relevant for its international development strategy. It had used this, its reputation and standing, as a global development leader to, to gain, some influence in international institutions

29:39 - in the 2010s. and, and DFID and the UK government really kind of marketed itself as a global leader in many aspects of international development in quite a, a kind of hyperbolic way. And that really ramped up as well in the context of the breakfast vote. So as the UK wrestled with how it could maintain leverage and authority in international institutions,

30:05 - relations following Brexit, promoting itself as a, a global leader in international development, would've been quite an appealing method through which to maintain soft power, advantage. But despite this, and again, kind of slightly after the period of this project, that assault on agent development was evident, through, in a kind of really material way through the, the reduction of age from 0.7 to 0.5% of GNI in the context of the economic decline caused

30:37 - by covid and of course the, the submerging of DFID into the, foreign and commonwealth office. so these, the cha these changes in the UK along with the, the anti aid agenda that preceded it, they fit really well with the nationalist tone of the conservative party, as well as that fiscal prudence, value for money narrative. and these moves also align really well with the core tenants of neoliberal ideology, the idea of freedom, from progressive forms

31:09 - of government intervention to redistribute wealth, that, that kind of goes against some normative foundations of neoliberalism, of individual freedom of commitment to a small state ideologically, if not in practice. And so at the close of the 2010s, the UK's nationalization of development approach, I think fits quite well into, what Keeley has called right wing neoliberal populism or sar philo's concept of authoritarian neoliberalism that I began with.

31:41 - it's underpinned by neoliberal values and at the same time reflects and feeds this national populist, sentiment. And we have kind of commentators on the right and neoliberals identifying the state as problematic. So for Neoliberals, state elites have distorted the market through, kind of social engineering attempts, which includes, aid, which includes ODA and for the right wing, kind of problems are caused by

32:10 - socially irresponsibility of, of a liberal state. So in conclusion, the research makes I think three, related arguments to further our understanding of donor motivation and donor behavior in the 2010s. First of all, aid has explicitly has to explicitly demonstrate its alignment with the national interest. Secondly, and despite research to the country, a neoliberal development model was prescribed. And finally, these reflected

32:42 - and contributed to the rise of, in kind of right wing, sentiment, the nationalization of a can be understood as part of a new right wing neoliberal populism. And I think that these observations have relevance for other OEC donors, as well who might have experienced similar political and economic upheaval in the 2010s. And, these changes that I, as I said, have now had, economic and institutional consequences in the uk, which have, I think downgraded,

33:17 - the future UK contribution to African development, I think that, well, there is now less money, fewer projects, and this kind of narrower focus on the national interest while retaining the neoliberal model of, of development.

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